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AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT 
IN  CHINA 


WRITINGS  OF  PAUL  S.  REINSCH 


The  Common  Law  in  the  Early  Ameri- 
can Colonies,  1899 
World  Politics  at  the  End  of  the  Nine- 
teenth Century  as  Influenced  by  the 
Oriental  Situation,  1900 
Colonial  Government,  1902 
Colonial  Administration,  1905 
American  Legislatures  and  Legislative 

Methods,  1907 
Intellectual  Currents  in  the  Far  EAsf, 

1911 
International  Unions,  191  i 
Essentials  of  Government,  1920 

(Published  in  Chinese) 

Secret  Diplomacy,  1921 


AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT 
IN  CHINA 


BY 
PAUL    Sf'^REINSCH 

AMERICAN  NUNISTER  TO  CHINA, 
I9I3-I9I9 


GARDEN    CITY,  N.  Y.,    AND    TORONTO 

DOUBLEDAY,   PAGE  &   COMPANY 
1922 


COPYRIGHT,  1922,  BY 

DOUBLEDAY,  PAGE  &  COMPANY 

ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED,  INCLUDING  THAT  OF  TRANSLATION 

INTO  FOREIGN  LANGUAGES,  INCLUDING  THE  SCANDINAVIAN 

COPYRIGHT.  192I,  1922,  BY  ASIA  PUBLISHING  COMPANY  IN  THE 
UNITED  STATES  AND  ENGLAND.     ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 

PRINTED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 

AT 

THI  COUNTRY  LIPE  PRESS,  GARDEN  CITY,  N.  Y. 

first  Edition 


CONTENTS 

PART  I 

OLD  CHINA  AND  THE  NEW  REPUBLIC 

CHAPTER 

I.     The  Dictator-President  of  China 


II. 

III. 

IV. 

V. 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 

IX. 

X. 


XI. 

XII. 
XIII. 
XIV. 

XV. 

XVI. 

XVII. 


China  of  Many  Persons  .... 
Old  Confucianism  in  the  New  China 
A  Glimpse  Behind  the  Political  Scenes 
With  Men  Who  Watch  Politics 
China  of  Merchant-Adventurers 
Prompt  Proposals  for  American  Action 
A  Little  Vision  for  China 

"Slow  Americans" 

Folk  Ways  and  Officials  .... 


FAGB 
I 

8 

23 
42 
48 

59 
70 
80 

95 
108 


PART  II 

THE  PASSING  OF  YUAN  SHIH-KAI 

The  War:  Japan  in  Shantung 123 

The  Famous  Twenty-One  Demands     .      .  129 

Getting  Together 1 50 

War  Days  in  Peking 161 

Emperor  Yuan  Shih-Kai 171 

Downfall  and  Death  of  Yuan  Shih-Kai     .      .  183 

Republicans  in  the  Saddle 198 


vi  CONTENTS 

PART  III 
THE  WAR  AND  CHINA 

CHAPTER  PAGB 

XVIII.     American  Entrepreneurs  in  Peking.      .      .  207 

XIX.     Guarding  the  "Open  Door"       ....  217 

XX.     Diary  of  Quiet  Days.     Autumn  of  1916    .  230 

XXI.     China  Breaks  with  Germany      ....  241 

XXII.     China's  Bosses  Come  to  Peking       .      .  260 

XXIII.  An  Emperor  for  a  Day 272 

XXIV.  War  with  Germany:  Readjustments     .      .  286 
XXV.     The  Chinese  Go  A-Borrowing    ....  296 

PART  IV 

LAST  YEAR  OF  WAR  AND  AFTERMATH 

XXVI.     The  Lansing-Ishii  Notes 307 

XXVII.     Amidst  Troubles  Peking  Rejoices    .      .      .317 

XXVIII.     A  New  World  War  Coming?      ....  328 

XXIX.     Japan  Shows  Her  Teeth        339 

XXX.     Bandits,  Intriguers,  and  a  House  Divided  .  347 

XXXI.     Young  Men  in  Peking,  Old  Men  in  Paris  .  358 

XXXII.     A  Nation  Strikes  and  Unites      ....  368 

XXXIII.    Taking  Leave  of  Peking        .....  375 

Index 391 


INTRODUCTION 

Through  recent  developments  China  has  been  put  in  the 
forefront  of  international  interest.  The  world  is  beginning 
to  have  an  idea  of  its  importance.  Those  who  have  long 
known  it,  who  have  given  attention  to  its  traditions  and  the 
sources  of  its  social  and  industrial  strength,  have  the  con- 
viction that  China  will  become  a  factor  of  the  first  magnitude 
in  the  composition  of  the  world  of  the  twentieth  century. 
They  have  penetrated  beyond  the  idea  that  China  is  a  land  of 
topsy-turvy,  the  main  function  of  which  is  to  amuse  the  out- 
sider with  unexpected  social  customs,  and  which,  from  a 
political  point  of  view,  is  in  a  state  bordering  upon  chaos. 
When  we  ask  ourselves  what  are  the  elements  which  may 
constitute  China's  contribution  to  the  future  civilization  of 
the  world,  what  are  the  characteristics  which  render  her 
civilization  significant  to  all  of  us,  we  enter  upon  a  subject 
that  would  in  itself  require  a  volume  merely  to  present  in 
outline.  From  the  point  of  view  of  social  action,  there  is  the 
widely  diffused  sense  of  popular  equity  which  has  enabled 
Chinese  society  for  these  many  centuries  to  govern  itself,  to 
maintain  property  rights,  personal  honour  and  dignity  with- 
out recourse  to  written  law  or  set  tribunals,  chiefly  through 
an  informal  enforcement  by  society  itself  acting  through 
many  agencies,  of  that  underlying  sense  of  proportion  and 
tightness  which  lives  in  the  hearts  of  the  people.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  economic  life,  China  presents  the  picture  of  a 
society  in  which  work  has  not  been  robbed  of  its  joy,  in  which 
the  satisfaction  of  seeing  the  product  of  industry  grow  in 
the  hands  of  the  craftsman  still  forms  the  chief  reward  of  a 
labour  performed  with  patient  toil  but  without  heartbreaking 


viii  INTRODUCTION 

drudgery.  From  the  point  of  view  of  social  organization, 
China  forms  an  extremely  intricate  organism  in  which  the 
specific  relationship  between  definite  individuals  counts  far 
more  than  any  general  principles  or  ideas.  Loyalty,  piety,  a 
sense  of  fitness  give  meaning  to  the  ceremonial  of  Chinese 
social  life,  which  is  more  than  etiquette  as  a  mere  ornament 
of  social  intercourse  in  that  it  bodies  forth  in  visible  form  as 
every-day  observances,  the  relations  and  duties  upon  which 
society  rests.  From  the  point  of  view  of  art,  China  stands 
for  a  refinement  of  quality  which  attests  the  loving  devotion 
of  generations  to  the  idea  of  a  perfect  product;  in  the  repre- 
sentative arts,  calmness  of  perception  has  enabled  the 
Chinese  to  set  a  model  for  the  artistic  reproduction  of  the 
environments  of  human  life.  In  their  conception  of  policy 
and  world  position,  the  Chinese  people  have  ever  shown  a 
readiness  to  base  any  claim  to  ascendancy  upon  inherent  ex- 
cellence and  virtue.  They  have  not  imposed  upon  their 
neighbours  any  artificial  authority,  though  they  have  proudly 
received  the  homage  and  admiration  due  their  noble  culture. 
At  this  time,  when  the  Far  Eastern  question  is  the  chief 
subject-matter  of  international  conferences  and  negotiations, 
China  stands  before  the  world  in  the  eyes  of  those  who  really 
know  her,  not  as  a  bankrupt  pleader  for  indulgence  and 
assistance,  but  as  a  great  unit  of  human  tradition  and  force 
which,  heretofore  somewhat  over-disdainful  of  the  things 
through  which  other  nations  had  won  power  and  preference 
and  mechanical  mastery,  has  lived  a  trifle  carelessly  in  the 
assurance  that  real  strength  must  rest  on  inner  virtue;  Qhina 
has  made  no  use  of  the  arts  of  self-advertisement,  but  has  felt 
within  her  the  consciousness  of  a  great  human  force  that  must 
ultimately  prevail  over  petty  intrigue  and  forceful  aggression. 
The  secular  persistence  of  Chinese  civilization  has  given  to 
the  Chinese  an  inner  strength  and  confidence  which  make 
them  bear  up  even  when  the  aggressiveness  of  nations  more 
effectively  organized  for  attack  seems  to  render  their  posi- 


INTRODUCTION  ix 

tion  well-nigh  desperate.  Can  the  world  fail  to  realize  that 
if  this  vast  society  can  continue  to  live  according  to  its 
traditions  of  peace  and  useful  industry  instead  of  being  made 
the  battleground  of  contending  Imperial  interests,  the  peace  of 
the  world  will  be  more  truly  advanced  than  it  may  be  by  any 
covenants  of  formal  contrivance?  Declarations,  treaties, 
and  leagues  are  all  useful  instruments,  but  unless  the  nations 
agree  without  afterthought  to  respect  the  life  and  civilization 
of  China,  all  professions  of  world  betterment  would  be  belied 
in  fact.  If  China  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  material  for  the 
imperialist  policies  of  others,  peace  conferences  will  discuss 
and  resolve  in  vain. 

During  the  six  years  of  my  work  in  China  I  was  constantly 
surrounded  by  the  evidences  of  the  transition  of  Chinese  life 
to  new  methods  and  aims.  In  all  its  complex  phases  this 
enormous  transformation  passed  in  review  before  my  eyes, 
in  all  its  deep  significance,  not  only  for  China  and  the  Far 
East,  but  for  the  whole  world.  It  was  this  that  made  life 
and  work  in  China  at  this  time  so  intensely  fascinating.  A 
new  form  of  government  had  been  adopted.  As  I  repre- 
sented the  Republic  upon  which  it  had  been  largely  mod- 
eled, whose  spirit  the  Chinese  were  anxious  to  follow,  it 
fell  to  me  to  counsel  with  Chinese  leaders  as  if  I  had 
been  one  of  their  number.  The  experience  of  a  great 
American  commonwealth  which  had  itself  successfully  en- 
deavoured to  raise  its  organization  to  a  higher  plane  was  of 
unending  assistance  to  me  in  enabling  me  to  see  the  Chinese 
problems  as  part  of  what  right-thinking  men  were  struggHng 
for  throughout  the  world.  The  most  discouraging  feature 
was,  however,  that  the  needs  of  China  so  often  took  the  form 
of  emergencies  in  which  it  seemed  futile  to  plan  at  long  range, 
in  which  immediate  help  was  necessary.  Where  one  was 
cooperating  with  a  group  of  men  beset  by  overpowering 
difficulties  of  the  moment,  it  often  seemed  academic  even 
to  think  of  the  general  improvement  of  political  and  economic 


X  INTRODUCTION 

organization,  over  a  longer  range  of  time.  The  old  elements 
of  the  Imperial  regime,  the  traditional  methods  of  basing 
authority  on  something  from  above,  the  purely  personal 
conception  of  politics  with  the  corruption  incident  upon  the 
idea  that  members  of  clans  must  take  care  of  each  other — 
which  formerly  was  a  virtue — all  were  the  sources  of  the 
outstanding  difficulties  that  jutted  everywhere  into  the  plans 
for  a  more  highly  and  efficiently  organized  commonwealth. 
But  it  was  a  pleasure  to  see  the  growing  manifestation  of  a 
commonwealth  spirit,  the  organization  of  public  opinion,  and 
the  clearer  vision  of  the  demands  of  public  service.  Even 
among  the  officials  the  idea  that  the  Government  was  merely 
a  taxing  and  office-holding  organization  was  giving  way, 
especially  among  the  younger  men,  to  a  desire  that  the 
functions  of  government  should  be  used  for  developmental 
purposes,  in  helping  the  people  towards  better  methods  in 
agriculture  and  industry,  in  encouraging  improved  communi- 
cations and  public  works  of  many  kinds. 

International  action  as  seen  from  Peking  during  this 
period  did  not  have  many  reassuring  qualities.  In  most 
cases  it  was  based  upon  a  desire  to  lose  no  technical  ad- 
vantage of  position;  to  yield  not  a  whit,  no  matter  what 
general  benefit  might  result  through  mutual  concessions. 
Each  one  was  jealously  guarding  his  position  in  which  he 
had  advanced  step  by  step.  Some  were  willing  to  make 
common  cause  with  others  in  things  that  would  not  always 
commend  themselves  to  a  sense  of  equity,  in  order  that  they 
might  take  still  another  step  forward.  During  the  major 
part  of  this  period  one  power  employed  every  device  of 
intrigue,  intimidation,  corruption,  and  force  in  order  to  gain 
a  position  for  itself  in  flagrant  disregard  of  the  rights  of  the 
Chinese  people  itself,  and  in  oblivion  of  the  rights  of  others. 

As  to  American  policy,  the  difficulties  which  I  encountered 
arose  from  the  fact  that  a  great  deal  was  expected  of  a 
country  so  powerful,  which  had  declared  and  always  pursued 


INTRODUCTION  xi 

a  policy  so  just  to  China.  Chinese  goodwill  and  confidence, 
and  the  real  friendship  of  the  Chinese  people  toward 
America  certainly  tended  to  make  easier  any  task  America 
might  be  ready  to  undertake.  But  America  had  no  political 
aims  and  desired  to  abstain  particularly  from  anything 
verging  on  political  interference,  even  in  behalf  of  those 
principles  we  so  thoroughly  believe  in.  American  relation- 
ships to  China  depended  not  on  governmental  action,  but  on 
a  spontaneous  cooperation  between  the  two  peoples  in  mat- 
ters of  education,  commerce,  and  industry. 

Infinitely  complex  as  were  the  questions  of  Chinese  inter- 
nal aflPairs  and  of  the  privileges  and  desires  of  the  various 
powers,  yet  to  my  mind  it  was  not  a  difficult  problem  to  see 
what  should  be  done  in  order  to  put  matters  on  a  sound 
foundation.  I  had  learned  to  have  great  confidence  in  the 
ability  of  the  Chinese  to  manage  their  own  affairs  when  let 
alone,  particularly  in  commerce  and  industry. 

That  was  the  first  desideratum,  to  secure  for  them  im- 
munity from  the  constant  interference,  open  and  secret,  on 
the  part  of  foreign  interests  desirous  of  confusing  Chinese 
affairs  and  drawing  advantage  from  such  confusion.  So  far 
as  American  diplomatic  action  was  concerned,  its  essential 
task  was  to  prevent  such  interference,  and  to  see  to  it  that 
China  could  not  be  closed  even  by  those  indirect  meth- 
ods which  often  accompany  the  most  vociferous,  ardent 
declarations  in  favour  of  Chinese  independence  and  sov- 
ereignty. We  therefore  had  to  keep  a  close  watch  and  to 
resist  in  specific  detail  any  and  all  of  those  innumerable 
efforts  on  the  part  of  others  to  secure  and  fortify  a  position 
of  privilege.  That  was  the  negative  side  of  our  action.  The 
positive  side,  however,  was  entirely  non-political.  Ameri- 
cans sought  no  position  of  tutordom  or  control.  Only  upon 
the  free  and  spontaneous  invitation  of  the  Chinese  would 
they  come  to  counsel  and  assist. 

The  important  thing  was  that  Americans  should  continue 


xii  INTRODUCTION 

to  take  a  hand  in  the  education  of  China  and  the  upbuilding 
of  Chinese  business  and  enterprise.  They  had  done  this  in 
the  past,  and  would  do  it  in  the  future  in  the  spirit  of  free 
cooperation,  without  desire  to  exercise  a  tutelage  over  others, 
always  rejoicing  in  any  progress  the  Chinese  themselves 
made.  Such  activities  must  continue  and  increase.  Sound 
action  in  business  and  constructive  work  in  industry  should 
be  America's  contribution  to  the  solution  of  the  specific  diffi- 
culties of  China.  The  Chinese  people  were  discouraged,  con- 
fused, disillusioned;  but  every  centre,  no  matter  how  small, 
from  which  radiate  sound  influences  in  education  and  busi- 
ness, is  a  source  of  strength  and  progress.  If  Americans 
could  be  stopped  from  doing  these  things,  or  impeded  and 
obstructed  in  them,  then  there  would  nothing  further  remain 
worth  while  for  Americans  to  do.  But  if  they  could  organize 
enterprises,  great  and  small,  they  would  in  the  most  direct 
and  effective  manner  give  the  encouragement  and  organizing 
impulse  which  China  needed  so  urgently.  So  the  simple 
principle  of  American  action  in  China  is  this:  By  doing 
things  in  themselves  worth  while,  Americans  will  contrib- 
ute most  to  the  true  liberation  of  the  Chinese  people. 

Never  has  one  nation  had  a  greater  opportunity  to  act  as 
counsellor  and  friend  to  another  and  to  help  a  vast  and  lov- 
able people  to  realize  its  striving  for  a  better  life.  Coopera- 
tion freely  sought,  unconstrained,  spontaneous  desire  to 
model  on  institutions  and  methods  which  are  admired — that 
is  the  only  way  in  which  nations  may  mutually  influence 
each  other  without  the  coercion  of  political  power  and  the 
cunning  of  intrigue.  That  is  a  feeling  which  has  existed  in 
the  hearts  of  the  Chinese  toward  America.  The  American 
people  does  not  yet  realize  what  a  treasure  it  possesses  in  this 
confidence. 


PART  I 

OLD  CHINA  AND  THE 
NEW  REPUBLIC 


AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT 
IN  CHINA 

CHAPTER  I 
THE  DICTATOR-PRESIDENT  OF  CHINA 

"My  opponents  are  disloyal.  They  would  pull  down  my 
government."  He  who  spoke  was  cordial  in  his  manner  as 
he  thus  off  handedly  epitomized  his  theory  of  government. 

Yuan  Shih-kai,  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  was 
short  of  stature  and  thick-set;  but  his  expressive  face,  his 
quick  gestures,  his  powerful  neck  and  bullet  head,  gave  him 
the  appearance  of  great  energy.  His  eyes,  which  were  fine 
and  clear,  alive  with  interest  and  mobile,  were  always 
brightly  alert.  They  fixed  themselves  on  the  visitor  with 
keen  penetration,  yet  never  seemed  hostile;  they  were  full 
always  of  keen  interest.  These  eyes  of  his  revealed  how 
readily  he  followed — or  usually  anticipated — the  trend  of 
the  conversation,  though  he  listened  with  close  attention, 
seemingly  bringing  his  judgment  to  bear  on  each  new  detail. 
Frenchmen  saw  in  him  a  resemblance  to  Clemenceau;  and 
this  is  born  out  by  his  portrait  which  appears  on  the  Chinese 
dollar.  In  stature,  facial  expression,  shape  of  head,  contour 
of  features  as  well  as  in  the  manner  of  wearing  his  moustache, 
he  did  greatly  resemble  the  Tiger. 

I  had  noted  these  things  when  I  was  first  presented  to  the 
President,  and  I  had  felt  also  the  almost  ruthless  power  of 
the  man.  Republican  in  title  he  was,  but  an  autocrat  at 
heart.    All  the  old  glittering  trappings  of  the  empire  he  had 


2         AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

preserved.  Even  the  Chief  of  the  MiUtary  Department  of 
the  President's  household,  General  Yin  Chang,  whom  Yuan 
had  sent  to  fetch  me  in  Imperial  splendour,  is  a  Manchu  and 
former  Imperial  commander.  His  one  foreign  language 
significantly  enough  was  German  which  he  acquired  when  he 
was  minister  in  Berlin.  I  had  passed  between  files  of  the 
huge  guardsmen  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  who  had  Frederick  the 
Great's  fondness  for  tall  men ;  and  I  found  him  in  the  showy 
palace  of  the  great  Empress  Dowager,  standing  in  the  main 
throne  hall  to  receive  me.  He  was  flanked  by  thirty  generals 
of  his  household,  extended  in  wings  at  both  sides  of  him, 
and  their  uniforms  made  it  a  most  impressive  scene. 

But  that  was  an  occasion  of  state.  Later,  at  a  more 
informal  interview,  accompanied  only  by  Mr.  WiUiams, 
secretary  of  the  legation  and  Mr.  Peck,  the  Chinese  secretary, 
observed  Yuan's  character  more  fully.  He  had  just  expelled 
from  parliament  the  democratic  party  (Kuo  Min  Tang); 
then  he  had  summarily  dismissed  the  Parliament  itself. 
Feeling,  perhaps,  a  possible  loss  of  American  goodwill  he 
had  sent  for  me  to  explain  his  action. 

"  It  was  not  a  good  parliament,  for  it  was  made  up  largely 
of  inexperienced  theorists  and  young  politicians,"  he  began. 
"They  wished  to  meddle  with  the  Government  as  well  as  to 
legislate  on  all  matters.  Their  real  function  was  to  adopt 
a  permanent  constitution  for  the  Republic,  but  they  made  no 
headway  with  that."  And  with  much  truth  he  added: 
"Our  traditions  are  very  different  from  your  Western  ones 
and  our  affairs  are  very  complex.  We  cannot  safely  apply 
your  abstract  ideas  of  policy." 

Of  his  own  work  of  stirring  up,  through  emissaries,  internal 
and  partisan  controversies  which  prevented  the  new  parlia- 
ment from  effectively  organizing.  Yuan  of  course  omitted 
to  speak.  Moreover,  he  said  Httle  of  the  possibility  of 
more  closely  coordinating  the  executive  and  the  legislative 
branches;  so  while  he  avowed  his  desire  to  have  a  constitu- 


THE  DICTATOR-PRESIDENT  OF  CHINA        3 

tion  forthwith,  and  to  reconstitute  Parliament  by  more 
careful  selections  under  a  new  electoral  law,  I  found  myself 
thinking  of  his  own  career.  His  personal  rule,  his  un- 
scrupulous advancement  to  power,  with  the  incidental 
corruption  and  cold-blooded  executions  that  marked  it, 
and  his  bitter  personal  feeling  against  all  political  opponents 
— these  were  not  quahties  that  make  for  stable  parliamentary 
government,  which  depends  on  allowing  other  people  frankly 
to  advocate  their  opinions  in  the  effort  to  gain  adherents 
enough  to  succeed  in  turn  to  political  power.  The  failure  to 
understand  this  basic  principle  of  democracy  is  the  vice  of 
Chinese  politics. 

"As  you  see,"  Yuan  beamed  eagerly,  "the  Chinese  Re- 
public is  a  very  young  baby.  It  must  be  nursed  and  kept 
from  taking  strong  meat  or  potent  medicines  like  those 
prescribed  by  foreign  doctors."  This  metaphor  he  repeated 
with  relish,  his  eyes  sparkling  as  they  sought  mine  and  those 
of  the  other  listeners  to  get  their  expressions  of  assent  or 
reserve. 

A  young  baby  indeed  and  childishly  cared  for!  Here,  for 
example,  is  a  decree  published  by  Yuan  Shih-kai  on  March 
8,  191 5.  It  indicates  how  faith  in  his  repubhcanism 
was  penetrating  to  remote  regions,  and  how  such  faith  was 
rewarded  by  him: 

"Ihsihaishun,  Prince  of  the  Koersin  Banner,  reported 
through  the  Board  for  MongoHa  and  Tibet  that  Kuanchuk- 
chuaimupal,  Hutukhtu  of  the  Banner,  has  led  his  followers 
to  support  the  cause  of  the  Republic  and  requested  that  the 
said  Hutukhtu  be  rewarded  for  his  good  sentiments.  The 
said  Hutukhtu  led  his  followers  and  vowed  allegiance  to  the 
Republic,  which  action  shows  that  he  clearly  understands  the 
good  cause.  He  is  hereby  allowed  to  ride  in  a  yellow 
canopied  carriage  to  show  our  appreciation." 

This  rather  naive  emphasis  on  externals  and  on  display  is 
born  of  the  old  imperialism,  a  more  significant  feature  of 


4         AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Chinese  political  life  than  it  may  seem.  It  colours  most  of 
the  public  ceremonies  in  China.  The  state  carriage  which 
the  President  had  sent  to  convey  me  to  his  ojfficial  residence 
in  the  Imperial  City  for  the  presentation  of  my  credentials, 
on  November  17th,  was  highly  ornate,  enamelled  in  blue  with 
gold  decorations.  It  was  drawn  by  eight  horses,  with  a 
cavalry  escort  sent  by  the  President  and  my  own  guard  of 
mounted  marines;  the  legation  staff  of  secretaries  and 
attaches  accompanied  me  in  other  carriages. 

Thus  in  an  old  Imperial  barouche  and  with  an  ex-Imperial 
military  officer,  General  Yin,  at  my  side,  I  rolled  on  toward 
the  abode  of  the  republican  chief  magistrate.  We  ahghted 
at  the  monumental  gate  of  an  enclosure  that  surrounds  the 
lovely  South  Lake  in  the  western  part  of  the  Imperial  City. 
On  an  island  within  this  lake  arose,  tier  above  tier,  and  roofed 
with  bright  tiles  of  blue  and  yellow,  the  palace  assigned  by 
the  Empress  Dowager  to  Emperor  Kwang  Hsu;  for  long 
years,  until  death  took  him,  it  was  his  abode  in  semi-cap- 
tivity.   This  palace  was  now  the  home  of  President  Yuan. 

The  remote  origin  of  its  buildings,  their  exquisite  forms  and 
trilliant  colouring,  as  contrasted  with  the  sombreness  of  the 
lake  at  that  season,  and  the  stirring  events  of  which  they  have 
been  the  scene,  cannot  fail  to  impress  the  visitor  as  he  slowly 
glides  across  the  Imperial  lake  in  the  old-fashioned  boat,  with 
its  formal  little  cabin,  curtained  and  upholstered,  and  with 
its  lateral  planks,  up  and  down  which  pass  the  men  who 
propel  the  boat  with  long  poles. 

Arrived  at  the  palace,  everything  recalled  the  colourful 
court  life  so  recently  departed.  I  was  greeted  by  the  master 
of  ceremonies,  Mr.  Lu  Cheng-hsiang,  and  his  associate, 
Mr.  Alfred  Sze,  later  Chinese  minister  at  London  and 
Washington.  The  former  soon  after  became  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  while  Mr.  Sze  was  originally  sent  as  minister 
to  England.  These  gentlemen  escorted  me  through  a  series 
of  courts  and  halls,  all  spacious  and  impressive,  until  we 


THE  DICTATOR-PRESIDENT  OF  CHINA       5 

reached  the  old  Imperial  library,  a  very  jewel  of  architecture 
in  this  remarkable  Eastern  world  of  beauty.  The  Hbrary 
faces  on  a  clear  and  deep  pool  round  which  are  grouped  the 
court  theatre  and  various  throne  rooms  and  festival  halls; 
all  quiet  and  secluded — a  charming  place  for  distinguished 
entertainments.  The  rustle  of  heavy  silks,  the  play  of 
iridescent  colour,  the  echoes  of  song  and  lute  from  the 
theatre — all  that  exquisite  oriental  refinement  still  seems 
to  linger. 

The  Hbrary  itself  is  the  choicest  of  all  these  apartments. 
The  perfect  sense  of  proportion  expressed  in  the  architecture, 
the  quiet  reserve  in  all  its  decorations,  the  living  literary 
reminiscence  in  the  verses  written  on  the  paper  panels  by  the 
Imperial  hand,  all  testify  to  a  most  fastidious  taste. 

Here  we  rested  for  a  few  minutes  while  word  was  carried 
to  the  President,  who  was  to  receive  my  credentials.  Then 
followed  our  walk  between  the  files  of  the  huge  guardsmen, 
our  entrance  to  the  large  audience  chamber  in  the  pretentious 
modern  structure  erected  by  the  Empress  Dowager,  and  the 
presentation  to  Yuan  Shih-kai,  as  he  stood  in  the  centre, 
flanked  by  his  generals. 

I  was  formally  presented  to  the  President  by  Mr.  Sun 
Pao-chi,  Minister  of  Foreign  AflTairs;  and  Dr.  Wellington  Koo 
translated  my  brief  address  and  the  President's  reply. 

A  military  dictatorship  had  succeeded  the  old  imperialism, 
that  was  all.  Yuan  had  made  his  reputation  and  gained  his 
power  as  a  military  commander.  Yet  there  was  about  him 
nothing  of  the  adventurer,  nor  any  suggestion  of  the  field  of 
battle.  He  seemed  now  to  be  an  administrator  rather  than  a 
military  captain.  Certainly  he  had  won  power  through 
infinite  patience,  great  knowledge  of  men,  political  insight, 
and,  above  all,  through  playing  always  a  safe  if  unscrupulous 
game. 

What  is  meant  by  governing  in  a  republic  he  could  not 
know.     Without  high  literary  culture,  although  with  a  mind 


6         AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

trained  and  well  informed,  he  had  not  seen  foreign  countries, 
nor  had  he  any  knowledge  of  foreign  languages.  Therefore, 
he  could  have  only  a  remote  and  vague  notion  of  the  foreign 
institutions  which  China  at  this  time  was  beginning  to 
imitate.  He  had  no  real  knowledge  or  conception  of  the 
commonwealth  principle  of  government,  nor  of  the  true  use 
and  function  of  a  parHament,  and  particularly  of  a  parlia- 
mentary opposition.  He  merely  accepted  these  as  necessary 
evils  to  be  held  within  as  narrow  limits  as  possible. 

During  the  two  and  a  half  years  from  my  coming  to  Peking 
until  the  time  of  his  death.  Yuan  Shih-kai  left  the  enclosure 
of  his  palace  only  twice.  This  reminds  me  of  the  American, 
with  an  introduction  from  the  State  Department,  who  wired 
me  from  Shanghai  asking  me  to  arrange  for  him  to  take  a 
moving  picture  of  Yuan  "proceeding  from  his  White  House 
to  his  Capitol."  This  enterprising  Yankee  would  have 
had  plenty  of  time  to  meditate  on  the  difference  between 
oriental  political  customs  and  our  own  if  he  had  waited  for 
Yuan  Shih-kai  to  "proceed"  from  his  political  hermitage. 
The  President's  seclusion  was  usually  attributed  to  fear  of 
assassination,  but  if  such  fear  was  present  in  his  mind,  as  well 
it  might  have  been,  there  was  undoubtedly  also  the  idea, 
taken  over  from  the  Empire,  that  the  holder  of  the  highest 
political  power  should  not  appear  in  public  except  on  very 
unusual  occasions. 

When  he  received  me  informally,  he  doffed  the  uniform  of 
state  and  always  wore  a  long  Chinese  coat.  He  had  retained 
the  distinction  and  refinement  of  Chinese  manners,  with  a  few 
additions  from  the  West,  such  as  shaking  hands.  His  cue  he 
had  abandoned  in  191 2,  when  he  decided  to  become  President 
of  the  Repubhc.  In  the  building  which  is  now  the  Foreign 
Office  and  where  he  was  then  residing.  Yuan  asked  Admiral 
Tsai  Ting-kan  whether  his  entry  into  the  new  era  should  not 
be  outwardly  expressed  by  shedding  the  traditional  adorn- 
ment of  the  head  which  though  once  a  sign  of  bondage  had 


THE  DICTATOR-PRESIDENT  OF  CHINA       7 

become  an  emblem  of  nationality.  When  Admiral  Tsai 
advised  strongly  in  favour  of  it,  Yuan  sent  for  a  big  pair  of 
scissors,  and  said  to  him:  **It  is  your  advice.  You  carry  it 
out."  The  Admiral,  with  a  vigorous  clip,  transformed  Yuan 
into  a  modern  man. 

But   inwardly   Yuan   Shih-kai   was   not    much   changed 
thereby. 


CHAPTER  II 
CHINA  OF  MANY  PERSONS 

Yuan  Shih-kai,  a  ruler  whose  power  was  personal,  whose 
theories  of  government  were  those  of  an  absolute  monarch, 
who  believed  that  in  himself  lay  the  hope  of  his  people;  China 
itself  a  nation  of  individualists,  among  whom  there  was  as  yet 
no  unifying  national  sense,  no  inbred  love  of  country,  no 
traditions  of  personal  responsibility  toward  their  government, 
no  sense  that  they  themselves  shared  in  the  making  of  the 
laws  which  ordered  their  lives — these,  I  think,  were  the  first 
clear  impressions  I  had  of  the  land  to  which  I  came  as  envoy 
in  the  early  days  of  the  RepubHc. 

Even  the  rivers  and  cities  through  which  we  passed  on  our 
way  to  Peking  seemed  to  deepen  this  feeling  for  me.  The 
houseboats  jammed  together  in  the  harbour  at  Shanghai 
visualized  it.  Each  of  these  boats  sheltered  a  family, 
who  lived  and  moved  and  had  their  being,  for  the  most  part, 
on  its  narrow  decks.  Each  family  was  quite  independent  of 
the  people  on  the  next  boat.  Each  was  immersed  in  the 
stern  business  of  earning  bread.  These  houseboat  people 
(so  it  seemed)  had  little  in  common  with  each  other,  little  in 
common  with  the  Hfe  of  the  cities  and  villages  which  they 
regularly  visited.  As  a  class  they  Hved  apart;  and  each 
family  was,  for  most  of  the  time,  isolated  from  the  others. 
Their  life,  I  thought,  was  the  civilization  of  China  in  minia- 
ture. Of  course  such  a  figure  applies  only  roughly.  I  mean 
merely  to  suggest  that  the  population  of  this  vast  country  is 
not  a  homogeneous  one  in  a  political  sense.  The  unit  of 
society  is — as  it  has  been  for  many  centuries — the  family, 

s 


CHINA  OF  MANY  PERSONS  9 

not  the  state.  This  is  changing  now,  and  changing  rapidly. 
The  seeds  of  democracy  found  fertile  soil  in  China;  but  a 
civilization  which  has  been  shaping  itself  through  eighty 
centuries  cannot  be  too  abruptly  attacked.  China  is,  after 
all,  an  ancient  monarchy  upon  which  the  republican  form  of 
government  was  rather  suddenly  imposed.  It  is  still  in  the 
period  of  adjustment.  Such  at  least  were  my  reactions  as 
we  ascended  the  Hwang-pu  River,  on  that  October  day  in 
191 3,  and  drew  into  the  harbour  basin  which  lies  at  the  centre 
of  Shanghai. 

In  one  of  the  hotels  of  the  city  we  found  the  "Saturday 
Lunch  Club  "  in  session.  I  was  not  a  little  surprised  that  this 
mid-day  gastronomic  forum,  which  had  but  lately  come  into 
vogue  in  America,  had  become  so  thoroughly  acclimated  in 
this  distant  port.  But  despite  the  many  nationalities  rep- 
resented at  this  international  gathering, the  language  was 
English.  As  to  dress,  many  of  the  Chinese  at  the  luncheon 
.  referred  their  dignified,  long-flowing  robes  to  Western  coats 
and  trousers. 

Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang  was  present  in  Chinese  costume  and  a 
little  purple  skull  cap,  and  we  sat  down  to  talk  together. 
He  related  the  moves  made  by  President  Yuan  against  the 
democratic  party  (Kuo  Min  Tang)  in  parliament  and  said: 
"Yuan  Shih-kai's  sole  aim  is  to  get  rid  of  parliament.  He 
has  no  conception  of  free  government,  is  entirely  a  man  of 
personal  authority.  The  air  of  absolutism  surrounds  him. 
Beware,"  Dr.  Wu  admonished,  "when  you  get  behind  those 
high  walls  of  Peking.  The  atmosphere  is  stagnant.  It 
seems  to  overcome  men  and  make  them  reactionary.  No- 
body seems  to  resist  that  power!" 

Later  I  was  accosted  on  a  momentous  matter  by  an  Ameri- 
can missionary.  He  was  not  affiliated  with  any  missionary 
society,  but  had  organized  a  so-called  International  In- 
stitute for  a  Mission  among  the  Higher  Classes.  His  mien 
betrayed  overburdening  care,  ominous  presentiment,  and  he 


lo       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

said  he  had  already  submitted  a  grave  matter  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  State.  It  concerned  the  Saturday  Lunch  Club. 
Somewhat  too  precipitately  I  spoke  with  gratification  of  its 
apparent  success.  "But,  sir,"  he  interposed,  "it  was  estab- 
lished and  set  in  motion  by  the  consul-general ! ' ' 

As  still  I  could  not  see  wherein  the  difficulty  lay,  my 
visitor  became  emphatic. 

"Do  you  not  realize,  sir,  that  my  institute  was  established 
to  bring  the  diflPerent  nationalities  together,  and  that 
the  formation  of  such  a  club  should  have  been  left  to 
me!^ 

When  I  expressed  my  feeling  that  there  was  no  end  of  work 
to  be  done  in  the  world  in  establishing  relationships  of  good- 
will; that  every  accomplishment  of  this  kind  was  to  be  re- 
ceived with  gratitude,  he  gave  me  up.  I  had  thought,  at  first, 
that  he  was  about  to  charge  the  consul-general,  at  the  very 
least,  with  embezzlement. 

That  afternoon  I  inspected  the  student  battalion  of  St. 
John's  University.  This  institution  is  modern,  affiliated 
with  the  Episcopalian  Church,  and  many  of  its  alumni  are 
distinguished  in  public  Hfe  as  well  as  in  industrial  enterprise 
and  commerce.  Of  these  I  need  only  mention  Dr.  W.  W. 
Yen,  Dr.  WelHngton  Koo,  Dr.  Alfred  Sze,  and  Dr.  Wang 
Chung-hui,  later  Chief  Justice  of  China.  Dr.  Hawks  Pott, 
the  president,  introduced  me  to  the  assembled  students  as 
an  old  friend  of  China.  There  I  met  Dr.  Pott's  wife,  a 
Chinese  lady,  and  several  of  their  daughters  and  sons,  two 
of  whom  later  fought  in  the  Great  War. 

A  newspaper  reporter  brought  me  back  abruptly  to  local 
matters.  He  was  the  first  to  interview  me  in  China.  "Will 
you  remove  the  American  marines,"  he  queried,  "from  the 
Chienmen  Tower?" 

A  disturbing  question!  I  was  cautious,  as  I  had  not  even 
known  there  were  marines  posted  on  that  ancient  tower. 
Whether  they  ought  to  be  kept  there  was  a  matter  to 


CHINA  OF  MANY  PERSONS  ii 

look  into,  along  with  other  things  affecting  the  destiny  of 
nations. 

I  could  not  stop  to  see  Shanghai  then,  but  did  so  later. 
If  one  looks  deeply  enough  its  excellences  stand  out.  The 
private  gardens,  behind  high  walls,  show  its  charm;  acres 
covered  with  glorious  plants,  shrubs,  and  bushes;  rows  and 
groves  of  springtime  trees  radiant  with  blossoms;  the  parks 
and  the  verandas  of  clubs  where  pecple  resort  of  late  after- 
noons to  take  their  tea;  the  glitter  of  Nanking  Road  at 
night,  its  surge  of  humanity,  the  swarming  life  on  river  and 
creeks.  This  is  the  real  Shanghai,  market  and  meeting 
place  of  the  nations. 

Nanking  came  next,  visited  the  4th  of  November.  For- 
lorn and  woeful  the  old  capital  lay  in  gray  morning  light  as 
we  entered.  The  semi-barbarous  troops  of  Chang  Hsun 
lined  its  streets.  They  had  sacked  the  town,  ostensibly 
suppressing  the  last  vestiges  of  the  "  Revolution. "  General 
Chang  Hsun,  an  old  imperialist,  still  clinging  to  ancient 
customs,  had  espoused  the  cause  of  President  Yuan.  A 
rough  soldier  quite  innocent  of  modernity,  he  had  taken 
Nanking,  not  really  for  the  republican  government,  but  for 
immediate  advantage  to  himself,  and  for  his  soldiers  to  loot 
and  burn.  There  they  stood,  huge,  black-uniformed,  pig- 
tailed  men,  *' guarding"  the  streets  along  which  the  native 
dwellers  were  slinking  sullenly  and  in  fear.  Everywhere 
charred  walls  without  roofs;  the  contents  of  houses  broken 
and  cast  on  the  street;  fragments  of  shrapnel  in  the  walls — 
withal  a  depressing  picture  of  misery. 

Nanking,  immense  and  primitive,  had  reverted  partly 
to  agriculture,  and  for  miles  the  houses  of  farmers  line  ex- 
tensive fields.  Three  Japanese  men-of-war  rode  at  anchor 
in  mid-river;  they  had  come  to  support  the  representations 
of  the  Japanese  consul  over  an  injury  suffered  by  a  Japanese 
barber  during  the  disturbances.  General  Chang  Hsun, 
forced  to  offer  reparation,  had  among  other  things  to  call 


12       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

ceremoniously  on  the  Japanese  consul  to  express  his  formal 
regrets.  This  he  did,  saving  his  face  by  arranging  to  call  on 
all  the  foreign  consuls  the  same  day. 

Another  bit  of  local  colour:  We  were  driven  to  the  Ameri- 
can consulate,  modestly  placed  on  the  edge  of  the  agricultural 
region  of  Nanking,  with  barns  in  the  offing.  The  consul  being 
absent  on  leave,  the  official  in  charge  greeted  us.  His  wife 
related  that  a  few  days  before  thirty  of  Chang's  braves, 
armed  to  the  teeth,  had  come  to  the  house  to  see  what  they 
might  carry  off.  In  her  husband's  absence  Mrs.  Gilbert  met 
them  at  the  door  and  very  quietly  talked  the  matter  over 
with  them  as  to  what  unending  bother  it  would  occasion 
everybody,  particularly  General  Chang,  if  his  men  should 
invade  the  American  consulate,  and  how  it  would  be  far 
better  to  think  it  over  while  she  prepared  some  tea  for  them. 

The  men,  at  first  fierce  and  unrelenting,  looked  at  one 
another  puzzled,  then  found  seats  along  the  edge  of  the 
veranda.  When  the  tea  came  in,  their  spokesman  said  they 
recognized  that  theirs  had  been  a  foolish  enterprise.  With 
expressions  of  civility  and  gratitude  they  consumed  their  tea 
and  went  away — which  shows  what  one  American  woman  can 
do  in  stilling  the  savage  breast  of  a  Chinese  vandal  by  a 
quiet  word  of  reason. 

After  the  exhibition  his  men  had  made  of  themselves  in 
Nanking,  I  had  no  wish  to  call  on  His  Excellency  Chang 
Hsun.  We  arranged  to  take  the  first  train  for  Tientsin. 
Crossing  the  broad  river  by  ferry,  from  its  deck  friends 
pointed  out  Tiger  Head  and  other  famous  landscapes,  the 
scenes  of  recent  fighting  and  of  clashes  during  the  Revo- 
lution of  191 1.  In  the  sitting  room  of  our  special  car  on  the 
Pukow  railway,  the  little  company  comprised  Dr.  Stanley 
K.  Hornbeck,  who  went  on  with  me  to  Peking;  Mr.  Roy  S. 
Anderson,  an  American  uniquely  informed  about  the 
Chinese,  and  a  Chinese  governmental  representative  who 
accompanied  me.     In  a  single  afternoon  Mr.  Anderson  gave 


CHINA  OF  MANY  PERSONS  13 

me  a  complete  view  of  the  existing  situation  in  Chinese 
politics,  relating  many  personal  incidents  and  characteris- 
tics. 

In  Chinese  politics  the  personal  element  is  supreme.  The 
key  to  the  ramifications  of  political  influence  lies  in  knowl- 
edge of  persons;  their  past  history,  affiliations  and  interests, 
friendships,  enmities,  financial  standing,  their  groupings  and 
the  interactions  of  the  various  groups.  Intensely  human, 
there  is  little  of  the  abstract  in  Chinese  social  ethics.  Their 
ideals  of  conduct  are  personal,  while  the  remoter  loyalties 
to  principle  or  patriotic  duty  are  not  strongly  expressed 
in  action.  In  this  immediate  social  cement  is  the  strength 
by  which  Chinese  society  has  been  able  to  exist  for  ages. 

The  defect  of  this  great  quality  is  in  the  absence  of  any 
motive  whereby  men  may  be  carried  beyond  their  narrower 
interests  in  definitely  conceived,  broad  public  aims.  When 
I  came  to  China  these  older  methods  prevailed  more  than  at 
present;  hence  Mr.  Anderson's  knowledge  of  the  Chinese, 
wide  as  the  nation  and  specific  as  to  the  qualities  of  all  its 
important  men,  enabled  me  to  approach  Chinese  affairs 
concretely,  personally,  and  to  lay  aside  for  the  time  any 
general  and  preconceived  notions.  It  enabled  me  to  see, 
also,  how  matters  of  such  vast  consequence,  as,  for  example, 
the  Hwai  River  famines,  had  been  neglected  for  the  short- 
sighted individual  concerns  of  Chinese  politics. 

That  afternoon  we  passed  through  the  Hwai  River  region. 
An  apparently  endless  alluvial  plain,  it  is  inexhaustibly  rich 
in  depth  and  quality  of  soil — loessy  which  has  been  carried 
down  from  the  mountains  and  deposited  here  for  eons. 
Fitted  by  Nature  to  be  one  of  the  most  fertile  garden  spots 
on  earth,  Nature  herself  has  spoiled  it.  The  rivers,  swollen 
by  torrential  rains  in  the  highlands,  flood  this  great  area 
periodically,  destroying  all  crops;  for  many  years  only  two 
harvests  have  been  gathered  out  of  a  possible  six,  in  some 
years  there  have  been  none  at  all. 


14       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Here  the  visitations  of  famine  and  plague  are  immemorial. 
The  liberal  and  effective  assistance  which  the  American  Red 
Cross  gave  during  the  last  famine,  in  191 1,  is  gratefully 
remembered  by  the  Chinese.  Beholding  this  region,  so 
richly  provided  and  lacking  only  a  moderate,  systematic 
expenditure  for  engineering  works  to  make  it  the  source  of 
assured  livelihood  for  at  least  twenty  millions  more  than  its 
present  population,  I  resolved  that  one  of  my  first  efforts 
would  be  to  help  reclaim  the  vast  estate. 

We  arrived  after  dark  in  the  province  of  Shantung — Shan- 
tung, which  was  destined  to  play  so  large  a  part  in  my  official 
life  in  China!  The  crowds  at  stations  were  growing  enor- 
mous, their  greetings  more  vociferous.  An  old  friend 
appeared,  Tsai  Chu-tung,  emissary  of  the  Provincial  Gover- 
nor and  of  the  Commissioner  of  Foreign  Affairs;  he  had  been 
a  student  under  me,  and,  for  a  time,  my  Chinese  secretary. 
Past  the  stations  with  their  military  bands  and  metallic 
welcomes  and  deputations  appearing  with  cards,  at  all  hours 
of  the  night,  we  arrived  at  length  at  Tsinan,  Shantung's 
capital.  Here,  in  behalf  of  the  Governor,  the  young  Com- 
missioner Tsai,  together  with  an  official  deputation,  formally 
greeted  me;  thence  he  accompanied  me  to  Peking,  affording 
me  another  chance  to  hear  from  a  very  keen  and  highly 
trained  man  an  account  of  China's  situation. 

Reaching  Tientsin  that  afternoon,  we  were  met  by  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Civil  Governor  and  by  his  band.  There  the 
American  community,  it  seems,  had  been  stirred  prematurely 
by  news  of  my  coming,  and  had  visited  the  station  for  two 
days  in  succession.  The  manager  of  the  railway,  a  Britisher, 
had  confused  the  Consul-General  by  his  error  in  date  of  my 
arrival,  starting  too  soon  the  entire  machinery  of  reception, 
including  a  parade  by  the  Fifteenth  United  States  Infantry. 

We  'had  dinner  that  evening  with  Civil  Governor  Liu  at 
his  palace.  Miles  of  driving  in  rain  through  dark,  narrow 
streets,  ending  with  a  vision  of  huge  walls  and  lantern- 


CHINA  OF  MANY  PERSONS  15 

illuminated  gates,  found  us  in  the  inner  courts,  and,  finally, 
in  the  main  hall  of  the  antique,  many-coloured  structure 
where  the  fat  and  friendly  Governor  received  us.  The  heads 
of  the  various  provincial  departments  attended,  together 
with  the  President  of  the  Assembly  and  the  military  aides. 
Young  Mr.  Li,  the  Governor's  secretary  and  interpreter  for 
the  after-dinner  speechmakers,  performed  the  rare  feat  of 
rendering  into  either  language  an  entire  speech  at  a  time — 
and  the  speeches  were  not  short.  My  Chinese  secretary 
commented  on  his  brilliant  translations,  the  perfect  render- 
ings of  the  English  into  Chinese,  and  I  could  myself  admire 
his  mastery  of  the  English  idiom.  Such  talent  of  trans- 
lation is  seldom  displayed;  the  discourse  of  speakers  is  usually 
limited  to  brief  paragraphs,  continually  checked  by  the 
renderings  of  the  interpreters.  Of  course,  this  interrupts  the 
flow  of  thought  and  contact  with  one's  hearers.  But  the 
interpreter  at  this  dinner  even  managed  to  translate  jokes 
and  witticisms  without  losing  the  point.  A  play  on  words  is 
most  diflRcult  to  carry  into  a  foreign  tongue,  but  the  Chinese 
is  so  full  of  opportunities  for  puns  that  a  nimble  interpreter 
will  always  find  a  substitute.  To  the  telling  of  a  really  funny 
situation  the  Chinese  can  be  relied  on  to  respond.  Their 
humour  is  not  unlike  the  American,  which  delights  par- 
ticularly in  exposing  undue  pretensions.  Interpreters,  in 
translating  speeches  to  the  general  public,  have  sometimes 
resorted  to  something  of  their  own  invention,  in  order  to 
produce  the  expected  laugh.  When  they  despair  of  making 
the  foreign  joke  hit  the  bull's-eye,  they  occasionally  help 
things  along  by  making  personal  remarks  about  the  speaker, 
whose  gratifications  at  the  hilarity  produced  is  usually  un- 
clouded by  a  knowledge  of  the  method  employed. 

Our  departure  from  Tientsin  was  signalized  by  an  unusual 
mark  of  Chinese  governmental  courtesy.  For  the  trip  to 
Peking  we  found  assigned  the  palace  car  of  the  former 
Empress  Dowager,  and  I  was  told  that  it  had  not  been  used 


i6       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

since  her  reign  came  to  an  end.  Adapting  a  new  invention 
to  old  custom,  the  car's  interior  had  been  arranged  as  a  little 
palace  chamber.  The  entrance  doors  were  in  a  double  set. 
Those  in  the  centre  were  to  be  opened  only  when  the  sover- 
eign entered  or  departed,  the  side  doors  being  for  ordinary 
use.  Opposite  the  central  doors  at  the  end  of  the  salon  stood 
a  little  throne,  high  and  wide,  upholstered  in  Imperial  yellow. 
The  draperies  and  upholsteries  of  the  car  were  all  of  that 
colour,  and  it  made,  in  its  way,  quite  a  showing  of  splendour 
and  departed  greatness. 

As  one  approaches  the  capital  city,  the  beautiful  mountain 
forms  of  the  so-called  Western  Hills,  which  rise  suddenly 
out  of  the  plain  about  ten  miles  beyond  Peking  and  attain 
an  altitude  of  from  six  to  seven  thousand  feet,  present  a 
striking  contrast  to  the  flat  and  far-stretching  Chihli  plain. 
The  towers  and  city  walls  of  Peking,  an  impressive  and 
astounding  apparition  of  strength  and  permanence,  befit  this 
scene.  Solemn  and  mysterious,  memorable  for  their  size, 
extent,  and  general  inevitableness  of  structure,  they  can  be 
compared  only  with  the  Pyramids,  or  with  great  mountains 
fashioned  by  the  hand  of  Nature  herself.  Looking  down 
upon  these  plains,  where  so  many  races  have  met,  fought, 
worked,  lived,  and  died,  where  there  is  one  of  the  chief 
meeting  points  of  racial  currents,  these  walls  are  in  them- 
selves the  symbols  of  a  memorable  and  long-sustained 
civilization. 

As  we  approach  more  ciosely,  the  walls  tower  immediately 
above  us  as  the  train  skirts  them  for  several  miles,  crosses  a 
number  of  busy  roads  leading  to  the  southern  gates  of  the 
city,  and  then  suddenly  slips  through  an  opening  in  the  walls 
to  the  inside.  We  first  pass  through  the  so-called  Chinese 
city;  this  particular  corner  is  no  longer  densely  populated, 
but  is  now  left  to  gardens,  fields,  and  burial  places  with  their 
monuments  and  pagodas.  We  only  skirt  the  populous  part 
of  the  Chinese  city.     Soon  we  are  brought  immediately  under 


CHINA  OF  MANY  PERSONS  17 

the  lofty  walls  which  separate  the  Chinese  from  the  Manchu 
city,  adjacent  to  it  on  the  north,  but  separated  from  it  by  an 
enormous  wall  one  hundred  feet  high,  with  a  diameter  of 
eighty  feet.  Where  the  two  encircling  walls  meet,  towering 
bastions  soar  upward,  and  above  the  roadways  rise  high  gate- 
houses of  many  stories.  The  impassivity  of  these  monu- 
mental structures  contrasts  sharply  with  the  swarming 
human  life  that  surges  in  the  streets  below. 

From  Mr.  Willys  R.  Peck,  Chinese  Secretary  of  the 
Legation,  who  had  met  us  at  Tientsin  and  accompanied  us  to 
Peking,  I  learned  more  about  the  recent  events  in  the  capital 
and  the  fight  which  Yuan  Shih-Kai  was  waging  against  the 
Parliament.  At  the  station  we  were  greeted  by  a  large  con- 
course of  civilian  and  military  officials,  and  Mr.  E.  T. 
WiUiams,  Charge  d'Affaires  since  Mr.  Calhoun's  departure, 
acted  as  introducer.  The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Sun 
Pao-chi,  a  tall,  benevolent-looking  man,  wearing  European 
dress  and  long  chin  whiskers,  and  speaking  a  little  English 
with  more  French  and  German,  offered  his  welcome  and 
felicitations.  Other  high  officials  were  there,  many  members 
of  the  American  community,  and  several  representatives  of 
the  parliament.  It  was  a  delight  to  see  the  fine-looking 
companies  of  American  marines,  who  among  all  troops  in 
Peking  are  noted  for  their  well-groomed,  smart,  and  soldierly 
appearance.  Included  for  the  official  welcome  was  a  com- 
pany of  stalwart  Chinese  infantry,  and  one  of  the  Peking 
gendarmerie,  which  also  is  military  in  its  organization. 
The  several  bands  vied  with  each  other  in  playing  national 
airs  and  salutes,  while  thousands  of  spectators  congregated. 

The  central  Tartar  city  gate  (the  Chienmen),  was  still 
in  its  original  form,  and  in  passing  through  or  under  it  one 
received  an  indelible  impression  of  the  stupendous  majesty 
and  dignity  which  characterize  this  unique  capital.  The 
curtain  walls  connecting  the  inner  and  outer  gates  have  since 
been  removed.    We  drove  through  a  side  gate  in  the  curtain 


i8       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

wall,  finding  ourselves  in  an  impressive  plaza  overtowered 
by  the  two  lofty  and  beautiful  gate-houses.  Two  small 
picturesque  antique  temples  flank  the  main  entrance;  one, 
dedicated  to  the  God  of  War,  was  a  favourite  place  with 
the  Empress  Dowager,  who  stopped  her  cortege  there  when- 
ever she  passed.  From  the  flag-poles  of  these  temples  huge, 
brilHantly  coloured  banners  floated  in  the  air.  Atop  the  wall 
from  which  the  Chienmen  Tower  arises  were  American 
marines  on  guard  and  looking  down  upon  us.  These,  then, 
were  the  men  whose  presence  up  there  seemed  to  be  interest- 
ing people  so  much. 

From  the  main  gateway  one  looks  straight  up  the  avenue 
which  forms  the  central  axis  of  Peking;  it  leads  through  many 
ornamental  gates  and  between  stately  buildings  to  the 
central  throne  halls  of  the  Imperial  Palace.  The  city  plan  of 
Peking  is  a  symmetrical  one.  This  central  axis,  running  due 
north  and  south,  passes  through  a  succession  of  important 
gateways,  monuments,  and  seats  of  power.  From  it  the  city 
expands  regularly  east  and  west;  on  the  south  the  Chinese 
city,  the  symmetry  of  its  streets  and  alleyways  more  broken; 
and  the  Manchu  city  on  the  north,  with  broad  avenues  lead- 
ing to  the  principal  gates,  while  the  large  blocks  between 
them  are  cut  up  more  regularly  by  narrower  streets  and 
alleyways. 

From  the  main  south  gate  of  the  Chinese  city  the  central 
line  passes  along  the  principal  business  street  to  the  central 
south  gate  of  the  Tartar  city — ^the  imposing  Chienmen — 
while  eighty  rods  beyond  this  stands  the  first  outer  gate  of 
the  Imperial  City.  .Thence  the  central  line  cuts  the  large 
square  which  lies  immediately  outside  of  the  Forbidden 
City,  forming  the  main  approach  to  the  Imperial  City. 
The  line  then  passes  between  pillars  and  huge  stone  lions 
through  the  Forbidden  City's  first  gate,  cutting  its  inner 
parade  ground  and  inner  gate,  above  which  stands  the 
throne    from   which    the    Emperor    reviewed    his    troops. 


CHINA  OF  MANY  PERSONS         ^       19 

Through  the  central  enclosures,  with  the  throne  rooms  and 
coronation  halls,  three  magnificent  structures  in  succession, 
the  line  passes,  at  the  point  where  the  thrones  stand,  into  the 
residential  portion  of  the  Forbidden  City  where  the  present 
Emperor  lives,  and  strikes  the  summit  of  Coal  Hill,  the 
highest  point  in  Peking.  It  bisects  the  temple  where  the 
dead  bodies  of  Emperors  reposed  before  burial,  and  proceeds 
from  the  rear  of  the  Imperial  City  by  its  north  gate  through 
the  ancient  Bell  Tower  and  Drum  Tower.  A  more  awe- 
inspiring  and  majestic  approach  to  a  seat  of  power  is  not  to 
be  seen  in  this  world.  We  can  well  imagine,  when  tribute 
bearers  came  to  Peking  and  passed  along  this  highway  beset 
with  imposing  structures  and  great  monuments,  that  they 
were  prepared  to  pay  homage  when  finally  in  the  presence 
of  the  being  to  whose  might  all  this  was  but  an  introduction. 

But  we  did  not  follow  along  this  path  of  sovereign  power. 
After  passing  through  the  Chienmen  we  turned  directly  to 
the  right  to  enter  the  Legation  Quarter  and  to  reach  the 
American  Legation,  which  nestles  immediately  inside  the 
Tartar  wall  in  the  shadow  of  the  tall  and  imposing  Chienmen 
Tower.  It  is  the  first  of  the  great  establishments  along 
Legation  Street,  which  is  approached  through  a  beautiful 
many-coloured  pailu,  or  street  arch. 

No  other  American  representative  abroad  has  quite  so 
easy  a  time  upon  arrival  at  his  post.  We  were  going  to  a 
home  prepared  for  our  reception,  adequately  furnished,  and 
with  a  complete  staff  of  servants  and  attendants  who  were 
ready  to  serve  luncheon  immediately,  if  required.  In  most 
cases,  unfortunately,  an  American  diplomatic  representative 
will  for  weeks  or  months  have  no  place  to  lay  his  head  except 
in  a  hotel.  Many  American  ministers  and  ambassadors  have 
spent  fully  one  half  the  time  during  their  first  year  of  office 
in  making  those  necessary  living  arrangements  which  I  found 
entirely  complete  at  Peking.  That  is  the  crucial  period,  too, 
when  their  minds  should  be  free  for  observing  the  situation 


20       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

in  which  they  are  to  do  their  work.  May  the  time  soon  come 
when  the  nation  reahzes  more  fully  the  need  of  dignified 
representation  of  its  interests  abroad. 

The  residence  of  the  minister  I  found  simple  but  handsome, 
in  stately  colonial  renaissance  style,  its  interior  admirably 
combining  the  spaciousness  needed  for  official  entertaining 
with  the  repose  of  a  real  home.  It  is  made  of  imported 
American  materials,  and  a  government  architect  was  ex- 
pressly sent  to  put  up  the  legation  buildings.  He  had  been 
designing  government  structures  in  America,  and  the  some- 
what stereotyped  chancery  and  houses  of  the  secretaries  were 
popularly  called  "the  young  post  offices."  But  the  minis- 
ter's house,  largely  due  to  the  efforts  of  Mr.  Rockhill,  who 
was  minister  at  the  time,  is  a  masterpiece  of  appropriateness 
— all  but  the  chimneys.  It  is  related  that  the  architect, 
being  unfamiliar  with  the  ways  of  Chinese  labourers  and 
frequently  impatient  with  them,  incurred  their  ill-will. 
When  Mr.  Rockhill  first  occupied  the  residence,  it  was  found 
the  chimneys  would  not  draw;  the  disgruntled  masons  had 
quietly  walled  them  up,  in  order  that  the  architect  might 
"lose  face,"  and  the  chimney  from  the  fireplace  of  the  large 
dining  room  was  so  thoroughly  blockaded  that  it  remained 
permanently  out  of  commission. 

At  a  distance  from  the  "compound,"  or  enclosure,  which 
surrounds  the  minister's  residence,  fronting  on  a  central 
plaza,  there  is  a  veritable  hamlet  of  additional  houses  oc- 
cupied by  secretaries,  attaches,  consular  students,  and  the 
clerical  staff.  It  is  a  picturesque  Chinese  village,  with  an 
antique  temple  and  many  separate  houses,  each  with  its 
garden  enclosed  within  high  walls — a  rescued  bit  of  ancient 
China  in  the  midst  of  the  European  monotony  of  the  Le- 
gation Quarter.  It  adjoins  the  Jade  Canal,  opposite  the 
hotel  called  "Sleeping  Cars"  by  some  unimaginative  director, 
but  more  fitly  known  as  the  Hotel  of  the  Four  Nations.  At 
the  Water  Gate,  where  the  Jade  Canal  passes  under  the 


CHINA  OF  MANY  PERSONS  21 

Tartar  wall,  is  the  very  point  where  the  American  marines 
first  penetrated  into  the  Tartar  city  in  1900. 

The  Chinese  are  remarkably  free  from  self-consciousness, 
and  therefore  are  good  actors;  as  one  sees  the  thousands  pass- 
ing back  and  forth  on  the  streets,  one  feels  that  they,  too,  are 
all  acting.  Here  are  not  the  headlong  rush  and  elbowing 
scramble  of  the  crowded  streets  of  a  Western  metropolis. 
All  walk  and  ride  with  dignity,  as  if  conscious  of  a  certain 
importance,  representing  in  themselves  not  the  eager  purpose 
presently  to  get  to  a  certain  place,  but  rather  a  leisurely  flow 
of  existence,  carrying  traditions  and  memories  of  centuries 
in  which  the  present  enterprise  is  but  a  minor  incidedt. 
Foreign  women  have  sometimes  been  terrified  by  these  vast, 
surging  crowds;  but  no  matter  how  timid  they  be,  a  few 
rickshaw  rides  along  the  streets,  a  short  observation  of  the 
manners  of  these  people,  will  make  the  faintest  hearted  feel 
at  home.  Before  long  these  Tartaric  hordes  cease  to  be 
terrifying,  and  even  the  feeling  that  they  are  ethnological 
specimens  passes  away;  it  is  remarkable  how  soon  one  feels 
the  humanity  of  it  all  among  these  multitudes  that  seem  to 
engulf  but  that  never  press  or  crowd. 

Looking  down  upon  a  Chinese  street,  with  multitudes  of 
walkers  and  runners  passing  back  and  forth,  mingled  among 
donkey  carts,  riders  on  horse-  or  donkey-back,  mule  litters, 
rickshaws,  camel  caravans,  flocks  of  animals  led  to  sale  and 
slaughter,  together  with  rapidly  flying  automobiles — all  gives 
the  impression  of  perfect  control  of  motion  and  avoidance, 
of  crowding  and  scuffling,  and  recalls  the  movements  of 
practised  dancers  on  a  crowded  ballroom  floor.  A  view  of 
the  crowds  which  patiently  wait  at  the  great  gateways  for 
their  turn  to  pass  through  aflfords  a  constant  source  of 
amusement  and  delight.  The  Une  slowly  pushes  through  the 
gate  Hke  an  endless  string  being  threaded  through  a  needle. 
If  there  is  mishap  or  colHsion,  though  voices  of  protest  may 
arise,  they  will  never  be  those  of  the  stoic,  dignified  persons 


22       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

sitting  in  the  rickshaws;  it  is  against  etiquette  for  the  passen- 
ger to  excite  himself  about  anything,  and  he  leaves  that  to 
the  rickshaw  man.  All  humanity  and  animaldom  live  and 
work  together  in  China,  in  almost  undisturbed  harmony  and 
mutual  understanding. 

Only  occasionally  a  hubbub  of  altercation  rises  to  the 
skies.  In  these  days  the  pigtails  had  only  just  been  aboHshed. 
Under  the  old  conditions,  the  technique  of  personal  combat 
was  for  each  party  to  grab  the  other  by  the  cue  and  hold  him 
there,  while  describing  to  him  his  true  character.  During 
the  first  years  of  the  reform  era  one  might  still  see  men  who 
were  having  a  difference  frantically  grabbing  at  the  back  of 
each  other's  heads  where  there  was,  however,  no  longer  any- 
thing to  afford  a  secure  hold. 

A  great  part  of  Chinese  life  is  public.  It  is  on  the  streets 
with  their  innumerable  restaurants;  their  wide-open  bazaars 
of  the  trades;  their  ambulent  letter-writers  and  story-tellers 
with  the  curious  ones  clustered  about  them;  their  itinerant 
markets;  their  gliding  rickshaws;  their  haphazard  little  shops 
filled  with  a  profusion  of  ageless,  precious  relics.  There  is 
the  charm  of  all  this  and  of  the  humanity  there  swarming, 
with  its  good-natured  consideration  for  the  other  fellow,  its 
constant  movement,  its  excited  chatter,  its  animation  and  its 
pensiveness,  and  its  occasional  moments  of  heated  but  blood- 
less combat. 


CHAPTER  III 
OLD  CONFUCIANISM  IN  THE  NEW  CHINA 

"The  whole  Chinese  people  hold  the  doctrines  of  Con- 
fucius most  sacred,"  declared  President  Yuan  Shih-kai  in  his 
decree  of  November  26,  191 3,  which  re-introduced  much  of 
the  old  state  religion.  He  stopped  a  little  short  of  giving 
Confucianism  the  character  of  an  established  religion,  but 
ordered  that  the  sacrificial  rites  and  the  biennial  commemo- 
ration exercises  be  restored.  "I  am  strongly  convinced," 
he  said,  "of  the  importance  of  preserving  the  traditional 
beliefs  of  China."  In  this  he  was  upheld  by  the  Confucian 
Society  at  Peking,  in  the  organization  of  which  an  American 
university  graduate.  Dr.  Chen  Huan-chang,  was  a  leading 
spirit.  Mr.  Chen's  doctoral  dissertation  had  dealt  with  the 
economic  principles  of  Confucius  and  his  school;  upon  his 
return  to  China  his  aim  had  been  to  make  Confucianism  the 
state  religion  under  the  Republic. 

The  Christian  missionaries  were  agitated.  They  felt  it 
to  be  a  step  backward  for  the  new  republic  to  recognize  any 
form  of  belief.  Yuan,  however,  said:  "It  is  rather  the  ethic 
and  moral  principles  of  Confucius,  as  a  part  of  education, 
that  the  GJovernment  wishes  to  emphasize."  As  there  is 
nothing  mystical  or  theological  about  Confucianism,  such  a 
view  is,  indeed,  quite  tenable. 

Yuan  Shih-kai  again  declared  toward  the  end  of  December: 
"  I  have  decided  to  perform  the  worship  of  heaven  on  the  day 
of  the  winter  solstice." 

This  fell  on  the  23  rd  of  December,  and  again  excited  dis- 
cussion. "  It  means  that  Yuan  is  edging  toward  the  assump- 
tion of  the  Imperii  dignity,"  many  said- 

»3 


24       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

I  had  a  talk  about  this  matter  with  the  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  Mr.  Chu  Chi-chien,  who  was  thoroughly  informed 
concerning  the  details  of  Confucian  worship  and  the  worship 
of  Heaven;  he  had,  in  fact,  an  inexhaustible  fund  of  knowledge 
of  Chinese  traditions.  Nevertheless,  he  was  a  man  of  action, 
planning  cities,  building  roads,  and  developing  industries. 
Comparatively  young  and  entirely  Chinese  by  education 
and  character,  he  had  supremely  that  knowledge  of  the 
personalities  of  Chinese  politics  which  was  necessary  in 
his  ministry.  As  a  builder  he  became  the  Baron  Haussmann 
of  Peking,  widening  and  paving  the  avenues,  establishing 
parks,  rearranging  public  places,  in  all  of  which  he  did 
marvels  within  his  short  term  of  two  years.  He  established 
the  National  Museum  of  Peking,  and  converted  a  part  of  the 
Imperial  City  into  a  public  park  which  has  become  a  centre  of 
civic  life  theretofore  unknown  in  China.  Mr.  Chu*s  famili- 
arity with  religion,  art,  and  architecture — he  was  a  living 
encyclopaedia  of  archaeology  and  art — and  his  pleasure  in 
reciting  the  history  of  some  Chinese  temple  or  palace  did  not 
free  him  from  a  modern  temptation.  He  would  try  to  import 
too  many  foreign  elements  in  the  improvements  which  he 
planned,  so  that  foreign  friends  of  Chinese  art  had  to  keep 
close  to  him  to  prevent  the  bringing  in  of  incongruous  Wes- 
tern forms  which  would  have  spoiled  the  marvellous  harmony 
of  this  great  city. 

"It  would  be  dangerous,"  Mr.  Chu  informed  me,  "for  the 
republican  government  to  neglect  the  worship  of  Heaven. 
The  entire  farm  population  observes  the  ceremonial  relative 
to  sowing,  harvesting,  and  other  rural  occupations  according 
to"  the  old  calendar.  Should  the  worship  of  Heaven  be 
omitted  on  the  winter  solstice  day,  now  that  the  Government 
has  become  established;  and  should  there  follow  a  leanness  or 
entire  failure  of  crops,  the  Government  would  surely  be  held 
responsible  by  the  farmers  throughout  the  land." 

"Of  course,"  he  added,  smilingly,  "the  worship  will  not 


OLD  CONFUCIANISM  IN  THE  NEW  CHINA    25 

guarantee  good  crops,  but  at  any  rate  it  will  relieve  the 
Government  of  responsibility." 

I  could  not  but  reflect  that,  even  in  our  own  democracy, 
administrations  have  been  given  credit  and  blame  by  reason 
of  general  prosperity  or  of  the  lack  of  it,  and  that  good 
crops  certainly  do  help  the  party  in  power. 

*'In  the  ritual,  we  shall  introduce  some  changes  appro- 
priate to  republicanism,"  Mr.  Chu  assured  me.  "I  am 
myself  designing  a  special  ceremonial  dress  to  be  worn  by 
those  participating,  and  the  music  and  liturgy  will  be  some- 
what changed."  But  it  was  difficult  to  see  wherein  con- 
sisted the  specific  republican  bias  of  the  changes.  Yuan 
Shih-kai  did  proceed  to  the  Temple  of  Heaven  before  day- 
break on  December  23  rd;  in  the  dark  of  the  morning  the 
President  drove  to  that  wonderfully  dignified  open-air 
sanctuary  in  its  large  sacred  grove  along  the  southern  wall  of 
the  Chinese  city.  He  drove  surrounded  by  personal  body- 
guards over  streets  covered  with  yellow  sand  and  lined  three- 
fold with  soldiers  stationed  there  the  evening  before.  With 
him  were  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  Master 
of  Ceremonies,  the  Censor  General,  the  Minister  of  War, 
and  a  staff  of  other  high  officials  and  generals.  Arrived  at 
the  temple,  he  changed  his  uniform  for  the  sacrificial  robes 
and  hat,  and,  after  ablutions,  proceeded  together  with  all 
the  other  dignitaries  to  the  great  circular  altar,  which  he 
ascended.  He  was  there  joined  by  the  sacrificial  meat- 
bearers,  the  silk  and  jade  bearers,  the  cupbearers,  and  those 
who  chanted  invocations.  In  succession  the  different  cere- 
monial offerings  were  brought  forward  and  presented  to 
Heaven  with  many  series  of  bows.  A  prayer  was  then 
offered,  as  follows: 

Heaven,  Thou  dost  look  down  on  us  and  givest  us  the  nation.  All- 
seeing  and  all-hearing,  everywhere,  yet  how  near  and  how  close:  We 
come  before  Thee  on  this  winter  solstice  day  when  the  air  assumes  a  new 
life;  in  spirit  devout,  and  with  ceremony  old,  we  offer  to  Thee  jade,  silk, 


26       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

and  meat.  May  our  prayer  and  offerings  rise  unto  Thee  together  with 
sweet  incense.  We  sanctify  ourselves  and  pray  that  Thou  accept  our 
offerings. 


The  first  Confucian  ceremony,  which  the  President 
attended  in  person  at  four  o'clock  in  the  morning,  took  place 
about  two  months  later.  A  complete  rehearsal  of  the 
ceremony,  with  all  details,  had  been  held  on  the  preceding 
afternoon.  Many  foreigners  were  present.  Passing  from 
the  entrance  of  the  Temple,  between  rows  of  immemorial 
ilex  trees,  and  through  lofty  porticoes,  in  one  of  which  are 
preserved  the  famous  stone  drums  which  date  from  the  time 
of  the  Sage,  the  visitors  entered  the  innermost  enclosure. 
It,  too,  is  set  with  ancient  trees,  which,  however,  leave  the 
central  portion  open.  The  musical  instruments  were  placed 
on  the  platform  in  front  of  the  main  temple  hall.  Here  the 
ceremony  itself  was  enacted,  while  the  surface  of  the  court 
was  filled  with  members  of  the  Confucian  Society,  ranks  of 
dignified  long-gowned  men,  members  of  the  best  classes  of 
Peking. 

I  was  told  that  the  music  played  on  this  occasion  was  a 
modification  of  the  classic  strains  which  had  from  time 
immemorial  been  heard  here.  Perfect  knowledge  of  this 
music  seems  no  longer  to  exist.  The  music  accompanying 
the  ceremony  was  nevertheless  attractive,  produced  with 
jade  plaques,  flutes,  long-stringed  instruments  resembling 
small  harps,  but  with  strings  of  more  uniform  length,  drums, 
and  cymbals.  A  dominant  note  was  struck  on  one  of  the 
jade  plaques,  whereupon  all  the  instruments  fell  in  with  a 
humming  sound,  held  for  fully  a  minute,  which  resembled 
the  murmur  of  forest  trees  or  the  surging  of  waves.  There 
was  no  melody;  only  a  succession  of  dominants,  with  the 
accompaniment  of  this  flow  of  sound  surging  up,  then  ebbing 
and  receding.  One  of  the  instruments  is  most  curious,  in  the 
shape  of  a  leopard-like  animal,  in  whose  back  there  are 


OLD  CONFUCIANISM  IN  THE  NEW  CHINA    27 

closely  set  about  twenty  small  boards.  At  certain  stages 
of  the  music  a  stick  is  rapidly  passed  over  these  boards,  giv- 
ing a  very  peculiar  punctuation  to  the  strains  that  are  being 
played. 

The  chief  dignitaries  officiating  were  Mr.  Chu  Chi-chien, 
the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  and  Mr.  Sun  Pao-chi,  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  gorgeous  in  their  newly  devised 
ceremonial  costumes.  The  splendid  and  dignified  surround- 
ings of  the  temple  courts  enhanced  the  ceremony,  but  it 
depended  for  its  effect  on  the  manner  of  chanting,  the  music, 
and  the  very  dignified  demeanour  of  all  who  participated. 
Quite  apart  from  the  question  of  the  advisability  of  a  state 
religion  or  the  possible  reactionary  influences  which  such 
ceremonies  might  have,  I  could  not  but  feel  that  the  refusal 
to  cast  off  entirely  such  traditions  was  inspired  by  sound 
instinct. 

Moreover,  this  revival  came  during  the  adoption  of  new 
ways.  Chinese  ladies  came  out  in  general  society  for  the 
first  time  on  the  night  of  the  5th  of  February,  at  the  Foreign 
Office  ball.  Many  representatives  of  the  outlying  de- 
pendencies of  China  were  there  in  picturesque  costumes, 
invariably  exhibiting  a  natural  self-confidence  which  made 
them  seem  entirely  in  place  in  these  modern  surroundings. 
The  Foreign  Office  building,  planned  by  an  American  archi- 
tect, contains  on  the  main  floor  an  impressive  suite  of 
apartments  so  arranged  as  to  give  ample  space  for  large 
entertainments,  while  it  affords  every  opportunity  for  the 
more  intimate  gathering  of  smaller  groups.  Guests  were 
promenading  through  the  long  rows  of  apartments  from  the 
ballroom,  where  the  excellent  Navy  Band  was  playing  for 
the  dancers. 

The  Chinese  women  gave  no  hint  of  being  unaccustomed 
to  such  general  gatherings  of  society,  but  bore  themselves 
with  natural  ease  and  dignity.  Nor  did  they  conceal  their 
somewhat  amused  interest  in  the  forms  of  the  modern  dance; 


28       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

for  only  a  few  of  the  younger  Chinese  ladies  had  at  that  time 
acquired  this  Western  art.  The  number  of  votaries,  how- 
ever, increased  rapidly  during  the  next  few  years. 

From  among  the  Tartars  of  the  outlying  regions  this 
occasion  was  graced  by  a  Living  Buddha  from  Mongolia,  to 
whom  the  Chinese  officials  were  most  attentive.  Sur- 
rounded by  a  large  retinue,  he  overtopped  them  all,  and  his 
bodily  girth  seemed  enormous.  He  found  his  way  early  in 
the  evening  to  a  room  where  refreshments  were  being  offered, 
took  possession  of  a  table,  and  proceeded  to  divest  himself  of 
seven  or  eight  layers  of  outer  garments.  Thus  reduced,  he 
became  a  man  of  more  normal  dimensions.  Several  of  his 
servitors  then  went  foraging  among  the  various  tables,  bring- 
ing choice  dishes  to  which  the  Living  Buddha  did  all  justice. 
Long  after  midnight  reports  still  came  to  the  ballroom: 
"The  Living  Buddha  is  still  eating." 

It  seems  remarkable  that  Chinese  women  should  so  readily 
adapt  themselves  to  wholly  new  situations.  They  have 
shown  themselves  capable  of  leadership  in  social,  political, 
and  scientific  matters;  a  great  many  develop  wide  intellectual 
interests  and  manifest  keen  mental  powers.  When  I  gave 
the  Commencement  address  at  the  Women's  Medical  College 
of  Peking,  the  13th  of  February,  I  was  curious  to  see  what 
types  of  Chinese  women  would  devote  themselves  to  a  med- 
ical education.  In  this  field  Dr.  King  Yamei  and  Dr.  Mary 
Stone  are  the  pioneers.  With  the  advance  of  modern  medi- 
cine in  China  many  Chinese  women  have  adopted  the 
career  of  nurses  and  of  physicians.  On  this  occasion  the 
women  students  of  the  middle  school  sang  various  selections, 
and  I  was  impressed  with  the  cello-like  quality  of  their  alto 
voices.  As  customary  on  such  occasions  my  address  was 
made  through  an  interpreter.  The  delivery  of  these  chopped- 
ofF  paragraphs  can  scarcely  be  inspiring,  yet  Chinese  audi- 
ences are  so  courteous  and  attentive  that  they  never  give 
the  speaker  any  suggestion  of  impatience. 


OLD  CONFUCIANISM  IN  THE  NEW  CHINA    29 

A  luncheon  at  the  Botanical  Gardens  was  given  the  next 
day  by  the  Minister  of  Agriculture,  Mr.  Chang  Chien.  This 
institution,  to  which  a  small  and  rather  hungry-looking 
collection  of  animals  is  appended,  occupies  an  extensive 
area  outside  of  the  northwest  gate,  and  was  formerly  a  park 
or  pleasure  garden  of  the  Empress  Dowager.  A  modern- 
style  building,  erected  for  her  use  and  composed  of  large 
main  apartments  on  each  floor,  with  smaller  side-chambers 
opening  out  from  them,  was  used  for  our  luncheon  party. 
Its  walls  were  still  hung  with  pictures  painted  by  the  hand 
of  the  august  lady,  who  loved  to  vary  her  busy  life  by  paint- 
ing flowers.  The  conversation  here  was  mostly  on  Chinese 
art,  there  being  among  the  guests  an  antiquarian  expert. 
Chow,  who  exhibited  some  fine  scrolls  of  paintings.  I  noted 
that  the  Chinese  evinced  the  same  interest  in  the  writing  ap- 
pended to  the  paintings  (colophon)  as  in  the  picture  itself. 
They  seemed  to  admire  especially  the  ability,  in  some  famous 
writers,  of  executing  complicated  strokes  without  hesitation 
and  with  perfect  control.  When  we  were  looking  at  a  page 
written  by  a  famous  Sung  poet,  Mr.  Chow  said:  "He  always 
finished  a  stroke  lightly,  like  his  poems,  still  leaving  some- 
thing unsaid." 

Chinese  handwriting  has  infinite  power  to  express  diflfer- 
ences  of  character  and  cultivation.  It  is  closely  associated 
with  personality.  Some  writing  has  the  precision  of  a  steel 
engraving;  other  examples,  again,  show  the  sweep  and 
assurance  of  a  brush  wielded  by  a  Franz  Hals.  It  is  the 
latter  that  the  Chinese  particularly  admire;  and  even  without 
any  knowledge  of  Chinese  script  one  cannot  but  be  impressed 
with  its  artistic  quality  and  its  power  to  reveal  personal 
characteristics.  It  is  still  the  great  ambition  of  educated 
Chinese  to  write  well — ^that  is,  with  force  and  individual 
expression.  My  host  on  this  occasion  was  one  of  the  most 
noted  calligraphers  in  China.  Many  emulated  him;  among 
them  a  northern  military  governor  who  had  risen  from  the 


30       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

ranks,  but  spent  laborious  hours  every  day  decorating  huge 
scrolls  with  a  few  characters  he  had  learned,  with  which  to 
gladden  the  hearts  of  his  friends. 

The  new  things  cropping  out  in  Chinese  life  had  their 
detractors.  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Rockhill  had  come  to  Peking  for 
a  visit.  Relieved  of  official  duties  through  a  change  in  the 
administration,  it  was  quite  natural  that  Mr.  Rockhill 
should  return  where  his  principal  intellectual  interests  lay. 
Throughout  our  first  conversation  at  dinner  Mrs.  Rockhill 
affected  a  very  reactionary  view  of  things  in  China,  praising 
the  Empire  and  making  fun  of  all  attempts  at  modernization. 
One  would  have  thought  her  not  only  a  monarchist,  but  a 
believer  in  absolutism  of  the  old  Czarist  type.  A  woman  so 
clever  can  make  any  point  of  view  seem  reasonable.  Mr. 
Rockhill  did  not  express  himself  so  strongly,  but  he  was 
evidently  also  filled  with  regret  for  the  old  days  in  China 
which  had  passed.  While  we  were  together  receiving  guests 
at  a  dinner  I  was  giving  Mr.  Rockhill,  some  of  the  young 
Foreign  Office  counsellors  appeared  in  the  distance,  wearing 
conventional  evening  clothes.  "How  horrible,"  Mr.  Rock- 
hill murmured,  quite  distressed.  Not  perceiving  anything 
unusual  to  which  his  expression  of  horror  could  refer,  I 
asked,  "What?"  "They  ought  to  wear  their  native  cos- 
tume," he  answered;  "European  dress  is  intolerable  on  them, 
and  it  is  so  with  all  these  attempted  imitations." 

The  talk  at  another  dinner,  a  small  gathering  including 
Mr.  Rockhill,  Doctor  Goodnow,  and  Dr.  Henry  C.  Adams, 
revolved  around  conditions  in  China  and  took  a  rather 
pessimistic  tone.  Doctor  Adams  had  been  elaborating  a 
system  of  unified  accounting  for  the  railways.  "At  every 
turn,"  he  said,  "we  seem  to  get  into  a  blind  alley  leading  up 
to  a  place  where  some  spider  of  corruption  sits,  the  whole 
tribe  manipulated  by  a  powerful  head  spider." 

This  inheritance  of  corruption  from  the  easy-going  past, 
when  the  larger  portion  of  official  incomes  was  made  up 


OLD  CONFUCIANISM  IN  THE  NEW  CHINA    31 

of  commissions  and  fees,  was  recognized  to  be  a  great  evil 
by  all  the  more  enlightened  Chinese  ofiicials.  They  at- 
tempted to  combat  it  in  behalf  of  efficient  administration 
but  they  could  not  quite  perform  the  heroic  task  of  lifting  the 
entire  system  bodily  onto  a  new  basis.  Because  the  new 
methods  would  require  greatly  increased  salaries,  the  ideal 
of  strict  accountability,  honesty,  and  efficiency,  could  only 
be  gradually  approached.  Doctor  Goodnow  for  his  part 
contributed  to  the  conversation  a  sense  of  all  the  diffi- 
culties encountered  by  saying:  "Here  is  a  hitherto  non- 
political  society  which  had  vegetated  along  through  centuries 
held  together  by  self-enforced  social  and  moral  bonds,  with- 
out set  tribunals  or  formal  sanction.  Now  it  suddenly  de- 
termines to  take  over  elections,  legislatures,  and  other 
elements  of  our  more  abstract  and  artificial  Western  system. 
I  incline  to  beheve  that  it  would  be  infinitely  better  if  the 
institutional  changes  had  been  more  gradual,  if  the  system  of 
representation  had  been  based  rather  on  existing  social 
groupings  and  interests  than  on  the  abstract  idea  of  universal 
suflFrage.  These  political  abstractions  as  yet  mean  nothing 
to  the  Chinese  by  way  of  actual  experience." 

He  also  did  not  approve  of  the  persistent  desire  of  the 
democratic  party  to  establish  something  analogous  to  the 
English  system  of  cabinet  government.  He  felt  that  far 
more  political  experience  was  needed  for  working  so  delicate 
a  system.  "I  am  inclined  to  look  to  concentration  of  power 
and  responsibility  in  the  hands  of  the  President  for  more 
satisfactory  results,"  he  said. 

Mr.  Rockhill's  fundamental  belief  was  that  it  would  be 
far  better  for  the  world  not  to  have  meddled  with  China  at 
all.  "She  should  be  allowed  to  continue  under  her  social 
system,"  he  urged,  "a  system  which  has  stood  the  test  of 
thousands  of  years;  and  to  trust  that  the  gradual  influence  of 
example  would  bring  about  necessary  modifications."  He 
had  thorough  confidence  in  the  ability  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  if 


32       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

allowed  a  free  hand,  to  govern  China  in  accordance  with  her 
traditional  ideas  but  with  a  sufficient  application  of  modern 
methods.  He  even  considered  the  strict  press  censorship 
applied  by  Yuan  Shih-kai's  government  as  proper  under  the 
circumstances. 

Throughout  this  conversation,  which  dwelt  mostly  on 
difficulties,  shortcomings  and  corruption,  there  was,  never- 
theless, a  notable  undercurrent  of  confidence  in  the  Chinese 
people.  These  experienced  men  whose  work  brought  them 
into  contact  with  specific  evils,  looked  at  the  Chinese,  not 
from  the  ordinary  viewpoint  so  usual  with  foreigners  who 
assume  the  utter  hopelessness  of  the  whole  China  business, 
but  much  as  they  would  consider  the  shortcomings  of  their 
own  nation,  with  an  underlying  faith  in  the  inherent  strength 
and  virtue  of  the  national  character.  The  idea  of  China 
being  bankrupt  was  laughed  to  scorn  by  Mr.  Rockhill. 
"There  are  its  vast  natural  and  human  resources,"  he 
exclaimed.  "The  human  resources  are  not  just  a  quantity 
of  crude  physical  man  power,  but  there  is  a  very  highly 
trained  industrial  capacity  in  the  handicrafts."  But  it  is 
exactly  when  we  realize  the  stupendous  possibilities  of  the 
country,  her  resources  of  material  wealth,  her  man  power, 
her  industrial  skill,  and  her  actual  capital  that  the  difficulties 
which  obstruct  her  development  seem  so  deplorable. 

Mr.  Liang  Chi-chao  gave  a  dinner  at  about  this  time,  at 
which  Doctor  Adams,  Doctor  Goodnow,  President  Judson  of 
Chicago,  and  the  ladies  were  present.  Mr.  Liang  had  a  cook 
who  was  a  master  in  his  art,  able  to  produce  all  that  infinite 
variety  of  savory  distinction  with  which  meat,  vegetables,  and 
pastry  can  be  prepared  by  the  Chinese.  One  usually  speaks 
of  Chinese  dinners  as  having  from  one  hundred  fifty  to  two 
hundred  courses.  It  would  be  more  accurate,  however,  to 
speak  of  so  many  dishes,  as  at  all  times  there  are  a  great 
many  different  dishes  on  the  table  from  which  the  guests 
make  selection.    The  profusion  of  food  supplied  at  such  a 


OLD  CONFUCIANISM  IN  THE  NEW  CHINA    33 

dinner  is  certainly  astonishing.  The  guests  will  take  a  taste 
here  and  there;  but  the  greater  part  of  it  is  sent  back  to  the 
household  and  retainers.  It  is  a  popular  mistake  to  be- 
lieve that  Chinese  food  is  composed  of  unusual  dishes. 
There  are  indeed  birdsnest  soup,  shark  fins,  and  ducks' 
kidneys,  but  the  real  excellence  of  Chinese  cooking  lies  in  the 
ability  to  prepare  one  thing,  such  as  chicken,  or  fish,  in  in- 
numerable ways,  with  endless  varieties  of  crispness,  consist- 
ency, and  flavour.  It  is  notable  to  what  extent  meat 
predominates.  Although  there  is  always  a  variety  of  vegeta- 
bles and  of  fruit,  the  amount  of  meat  consumed  by  the 
Chinese  is  certainly  astonishing  to  one  who  has  classified  them, 
as  is  usually  done,  as  a  vegetarian  people. 

The  show  of  abundance  at  a  Chinese  banquet  seems  the 
fare  of  poverty  compared  with  the  cargoes  of  delicacies 
served  at  the  Imperial  table.  It  was  a  rule  of  the  Imperial 
household  that  any  dish  which  the  Emperor  had  at  any  time 
called  for,  must  be  served  him  at  the  principal  meal  every 
day;  as  his  reign  lengthened  the  numbers  of  dishes  at  his 
table,  naturally,  constantly  increased.  It  is  related  that  the 
dinner  of  the  Emperor  Chen  Lung  required  one  hundred  and 
twenty  tables;  and  the  Empress  Dowager,  at  the  time  of  her 
death,  had  worked  up  to  about  ninety-six  tables.  It  is  not 
to  be  wondered  at  that  the  Emperor's  kitchen  had  an  army 
of  three  hundred  cooks!  At  one  time  when  the  Duke  Tsai 
was  discussing  with  me  the  financial  situation  of  the  Imperial 
family,  he  remarked,  with  a  deep  sigh:  "The  Emperor  has 
had  to  reduce  the  number  of  his  servants.  For  instance,  at 
present  he  has  only  thirty  cooks."  Not  knowing  of  the 
custom  described  above,  I  was  inclined  to  consider  that 
number  quite  adequate.  I  believe  the  little  Emperor  has 
at  the  time  I  write  reached  the  quota  of  about  fifteen  tables. 

At  the  hospitable  board  of  Mr.  Liang  Chi-chao,  while  the 
dishes  were  served  in  Chinese  style  and  the  food  eaten  with 
chopsticks,  some  modifications  of  the  usual  dinner  procedure 


34       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

had  been  made.  The  etiquette  of  a  Chinese  meal  requires 
that  when  a  new  set  of  dishes  with  food  has  been  placed  in 
the  centre  of  the  table,  the  host,  hostess,  and  other  members 
of  the  family  survey  what  is  there  and  pick  out  the  choicest 
morsels  to  lay  on  the  plates  of  their  guests.  The  guests 
then  reciprocate  the  courtesy,  and  the  interchange  of  favours 
continues  throughout  the  dinner,  giving  the  whole  affair  a 
most  sociable  aspect.  At  Mr.  Liang  Chi-chao's  table  these 
courtesies  were  observed,  but  there  were  special  chopsticks 
provided  for  taking  the  food  from  the  central  dishes  and 
transferring  it  to  a  neighbour's  or  to  one's  own. 

The  conversation  after  dinner  wandered  toward  Chinese 
ethics.  Mr.  Liang  Chi-chao  is  one  of  the  most  competent 
authorities  on  this  subject  and  on  its  relations  to  Western 
thought  and  life.  I  ventured  this  opinion:  "While  the  high 
respect  in  which  the  elders  are  held  by  the  younger  gene- 
ration in  China  is  a  remarkably  strong  social  cement,  it  is 
discouraging  to  progress  in  that  it  gives  the  younger  and  more 
active  little  chance  to  carry  out  their  own  ideas." 

"But  the  system  does  not,"  Mr.  Liang  rejoined,  "neces- 
sarily work  to  retard  change;  because  it  is,  after  all,  society 
rather  than  individuals  which  controls.  With  all  proper 
respect  for  elders,  the  younger  element  has  ample  oppor- 
tunity to  bring  forward  and  carry  out  ideas  of  social  change." 

He  regarded  the  principle  of  respect  for  elders  and  of 
ancestor  worship  of  fundamental  importance;  in  addition  to 
its  direct  social  effects,  it  gave  to  Chinese  society  all  that  the 
Western  peoples  derive  from  the  belief  in  immortality.  The 
living  individual  feels  a  keen  sense  of  permanence  through 
the  continuity  of  a  long  line  of  ancestors,  whose  influence 
perceptibly  surrounds  those  actually  Hving;  moreover,  their 
own  actions  are  raised  to  a  higher  plane,  as  seen  not  from  the 
narrow  interests  of  the  present,  but  in  relation  to  the  life 
of  the  generations  that  are  to  succeed,  in  whom  the  character 
and  action  of  the  individual  now  Hving  will  persist. 


OLD  CX)NFUCIANISM  IN  THE  NEW  CHINA  35 

This  evening's  entertainment,  with  its  intimate  Chinese 
setting  and  its  conversation  dealing  with  the  deeper  relation- 
ships between  different  civilizations,  has  remained  a  memo- 
rable experience  for  those  who  attended  it.  Only  recently  it 
was  thus  recalled  by  one  of  the  guests :  "Think  of  going  to  a 
dinner  with  the  'Secretary  of  Justice'  in  Washington,  and 
conversing  about  the  immortality  of  the  soul!" 

Interested  to  see  how,  despite  the  new  ways  in  China,  the 
old  Confucianism  persisted,  I  determined  upon  a  pilgrimage 
to  the  Confucian  shrines.  Dr.  Henry  C.  Adams  invited 
me  in  November,  1914,  to  join  him  on  a  trip  to  the  sacred 
mountain,  Taishan,  in  Shantung  Province,  and  to  Chiifu,  the 
home  of  Confucius. 

A  small  party  was  made  up.  I  slipped  away  quietly  in 
order  to  avoid  official  attentions  and  to  spare  the  local 
authorities  all  the  bother  of  formally  entertaining  a  foreign 
representative.  We  arrived  at  Taianfu  early  in  the  morn- 
ing, where  with  the  help  of  missionaries  chair-bearers  had 
been  secured  to  carry  us  up  the  mountain. 

The  trip  to  these  sacred  heights  is  of  an  unusual  character. 
The  ascent  from  the  base  is  almost  continuously  over  stair- 
ways. Up  these  steep  and .  difficult  grades  two  sturdy 
chairmen,  with  a  third  as  alternate,  will  carry  the  traveller 
rapidly  and  with  easy  gait.  The  route  is  fascinating  not  only 
because  of  the  singular  natural  beauty  of  the  ravines  through 
which  it  passes,  and  of  the  constantly  broadening  prospects 
over  the  fruitful  plains  of  Shantung  from  every  eminence, 
but  because  of  the  historic  interest  of  the  place;  this  is 
testified  to  by  innumerable  temples,  monuments,  tablets,  and 
inscriptions  sculptured  in  the  living  rock  which  line  the  path 
up  the  mountain.  It  must  be  remembered  that  in  the  time  of 
Confucius  this  was  already  a  place  of  pilgrimage  of  im- 
memorial tradition;  a  place  of  special  grandeur,  wherein  the 
mind  might  be  freed  of  its  narrow  needs  and  find  its  place  in 
the  infinite.     Many  of  its  monuments  refer  to  Confucius  and 


36       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

record  his  sayings  as  he  stopped  by  the  way  to  rest  or  to  be- 
hold the  prospect.  At  one  point,  whence  one  looks  off  a  steep 
precipice  down  to  the  plain  thousands  of  feet  below,  his  say- 
ing, as  reported,  was:  "Seen  from  this  height,  man  is  indeed 
but  a  speck  or  insect."  But  not  all  of  his  remarks  were  of 
this  obvious  nature,  which  justifies  itself  in  its  appeal  to 
the  common  mind,  to  be  initiated  into  the  truths  of  the 
spirit. 

In  these  thousands  of  years  many  other  sages,  emperors, 
and  statesmen  have  ascended  the  sacred  hill,  also  leaving 
memorials  in  the  shape  of  sculptured  stones  bearing  their 
sentiments.  It  would  be  an  agreeable  task  for  a  vacation  to 
read  these  inscriptions  and  to  let  the  imagination  shadow 
forth  again  these  unending  pilgrimages  extending  back  to  the 
dawn  of  history. 

The  stairway  leading  up  the  mountain,  which  is  about 
6,000  feet  high,  is  often  so  steep  that  we  had  to  guard  against 
being  overcome  by  dizziness  in  looking  down.  Occasionally 
a  stop  is  made  at  a  wayside  temple,  where  tea  is  served  in  the 
shady  courts.  In  the  summer  heat  these  refuges  must  be 
especially  grateful.  We  reached  the  temples  that  crown  the 
summit  after  a  journey  of  about  six  hours.  In  a  temple 
court  at  the  very  top  the  servants  who  had  preceded  us  had 
set  up  their  kitchen,  and  an  ample  luncheon  was  awaiting 
us  there. 

At  this  altitude  a  cold  and  cutting  wind  was  blowing.  Yet 
we  preferred  to  stay  outside  of  the  temple  buildings  in  order 
to  enjoy  the  view  which  is  here  unrolled,  embracing  a  great 
portion  of  the  whole  province  of  Shantung.  I  noted  that  the 
coolies  did  not  seem  impressed  with  the  sanctity  of  this 
majestic  height,  but  used  the  temple  courts  as  a  caravan- 
serai. 

The  descent  is  made  rapidly,  as  the  practised  chair-bearers 
run  down  the  stairs  with  quick,  sure  steps — ^which  gives  the 
passenger  the  sensation  of  skirting  the  mountainside  in  an 


OLD  CONFUCIANISM  IN  THE  NEW  CHINA   37 

aeroplane.  When  I  inquired  whether  accidents  did  not 
occasionally  happen,  they  told  me:  "Yes,  but  the  last  time 
when  any  one  has  fallen  was  about  four  hundred  years  ago." 
As  in  the  early  days  chair-bearers  who  had  fallen  were  killed, 
the  tendency  to  fall  was  in  the  course  of  time  eradicated. 
They  descend  with  a  gliding  motion  that  reminds  one  of  the 
flight  of  birds.  The  chair-bearers  are  united  in  a  guild,  and 
happen  to  be  Mohammedans  by  religion. 

The  town  of  Taianfu,  which  lies  at  the  foot  of  the  moun- 
tain, is  notable  for  a  very  ancient  and  stately  temple  dedi- 
cated to  the  god  who  represents  the  original  nature  worship 
which  centres  around  Mount  Taishan,  and  which  forms  the 
historic  basis  for  all  religion  in  China.  The  spacious  temple 
courts,  with  their  immemorial  trees  and  their  forests  of  tall 
stone  tablets  bearing  inscriptions  dedicated  by  emperors  for 
thousands  of  years  past,  testify  to  the  strength  of  the  native 
faith.  The  streets  of  the  town,  set  at  frequent  intervals 
with  arches  bearing  sculptured  animal  forms,  were  lined  with 
shops  through  whose  trellised  windows,  now  that  night  had 
come,  lights  were  shining,  revealing  the  activities  within. 
These,  with  an  occasional  tall  tower  or  temple  shadowing 
the  gathering  darkness,  made  this  old  town  appear  full  of 
romance  and  strange  beauty. 

Sleeping  on  our  car,  we  were  by  night  carried  to  the  railway 
station  of  Chiifu ;  some  seven  miles  farther  on  lies  the  town  of 
the  same  name,  the  home  of  Confucius.  We  hired  donkey 
carts  at  the  station;  also,  as  the  ladies  were  anxious  to  have 
the  experience  of  using  the  local  passenger  vehicle,  the  wheel- 
barrow, we  engaged  a  few  of  these;  whereupon  our  modest 
cavalcade  proceeded  first  to  the  Confucian  burial  ground,  to 
the  north  of  the  city.  On  the  way  thither  we  were  met  by 
chair-bearers  who  carried  a  portable  throne  and  brought 
complimentary  messages  from  the  Holy  Duke.  As  the  chair 
had  been  sent  for  my  use,  there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  get 
in.     Soon  appeared,  also,  a  string  of  mule  carts  drawn  by 


38       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

sleek  and  well-fed  animals,  contrasting  with  the  bony  and 
dishevelled  beasts  we  had  hired. 

It  was  plain  that  the  incognito  was  ended,  and  that  the 
Duke  had  been  apprised  of  our  coming.  Then  came  the 
emissaries  of  the  district  magistrate,  offering  further  courte- 
sies, such  as  a  guard  of  honour;  and  another  delegation  from 
the  Duke  brought  a  huge  red  envelope  containing  an  invi- 
tation for  luncheon.  We  tried  to  decline  all  these  civilities 
and  to  stroll  about  quietly,  in  order  to  come  entirely  under 
the  spell  of  this  place.  But  there  was  no  more  rambling  and 
strolling  for  us.  We  had  to  sit  in  our  chairs  and  carts, 
and,  after  two  polite  declinations  of  the  luncheon  invita- 
tion, alleging  the  shortness  of  our  time  and  our  desire  to  see 
everything  thoroughly,  and  asking  leave  to  call  on  the  Duke 
later  in  the  afternoon — ^we  accepted  the  customary  third  issue 
of  the  ducal  invitation. 

Our  procession  was  quite  imposing  as  we  passed  on  to  the 
inner  gate  of  the  cemetery.  Covering  about  one  and  a  half 
square  miles,  the  enclosure  has  been  the  burial  ground  of 
the  Confucian  family  for  at  least  three  thousand  years, 
antedating  Confucius  himself.  No  other  family  in  the 
world  has  such  memorials  of  its  continuity.  The  simple 
dignity  of  a  huge  marble  slab  set  erect  before  the  mound- 
covered  grave  marks  the  burial  place  of  the  sage.  The  ad- 
joining site  of  the  house  where  his  disciples  guarded  his  tomb 
for  generations,  but  which  ultimately  disappeared  some  two 
thousand  years  ago,  also  bears  monuments  and  inscriptions. 

Leaving  the  cemetery,  a  large  cavalry  escort  sent  by  the 
district  magistrate  joined  our  cavalcade  of  chairs,  mule 
carts,  and  wheelbarrows,  together  with  crowds  of  the  curious 
who  trudged  along.  The  village  streets  were  lined  with 
people  anxious  to  see  the  strangers;  but  their  curiosity  had 
nothing  intrusive.  They  were  friendly  lookers-on,  nodding 
a  pleasant  welcome  should  your  eye  catch  theirs. 

We  passed  through  many  gates  of  the  ancient  palace  before 


OLD  CONFUCIANISM  IN  THE  NEW  CHINA  39 

we  were  finally  received  by  the  Duke  himself  at  the  main 
inner  doorway.  He  was  accompanied  by  the  magistrate,  and 
with  these  two  we  sat  down  to  chat;  nearly  an  hour  elapsed 
before  we  were  summoned  to  the  table.  The  meal,  which 
was  made  up  of  innumerable  courses,  lasted  at  least  two 
hours,  during  which  we  kept  up  an  animated  conversation 
concerning  the  more  recent  history  of  the  town  and  of  the 
temple. 

The  Duke  was  agitated  because  missionaries  from  Taianfu 
were  trying  to  acquire  land  in  the  town  of  Chiifu.  He 
looked  upon  this  intrusion  as  unwarranted,  saying  that  as  his 
town  was  devoted  to  the  memory  of  the  Chinese  sage,  it  did 
not  seem  suitable  that  any  foreign  religion  should  try  to 
introduce  its  worship,  and  it  would  certainly  result  in  local 
ill-feeling. 

I  tried  to  quiet  his  apprehensions  by  speaking  of  the  edu- 
cational work  of  missionaries,  of  the  fact  that  they,  also, 
respected  the  great  sage;  but  it  was  hard  to  allay  his  op- 
position. 

The  magistrate  was  jovial,  laughing  uproariously  at  the 
mildest  joke.  When  we  arose  from  the  table,  the  Duke  took 
us  to  the  apartments  of  the  Duchess,  who  was  staying  with 
the  infant  daughter  recently  born,  their  first  child.  The 
Duchess  was  his  second  wife,  and  he  was  considerably  her 
senior.  The  little  lady  seemed  to  be  particularly  fond  of  cats, 
of  which  at  least  forty  were  playing  about  her;  one  of  these 
she  presented  to  Mrs.  Adams. 

The  great  Temple  of  Confucius  immediately  adjoins  the 
palace.  Although  the  afternoon  was  wearing  on,  we  still 
had  time  to  visit  it  and  to  wander  about  in  its  noble  courts. 
The  pillars  in  the  main  halls  are  adorned  by  marvellous 
sculpture,  and  the  temple  is  remarkable  for  the  refined 
beauty  of  the  structures  composing  it  and  for  the  serene 
dignity  of  its  aspect.  Adjoining  the  main  temple  is  an 
ancient  well  near  which  stood  the  original  house  of  Confucius. 


40       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Stone  reliefs  present  in  a  long  series  the  history  of  Confucius 
in  pictures,  and  there  is  a  great  collection  of  instruments 
used  in  performing  the  classical  music.  But  the  chief  charm 
of  the  temple  Hes  in  the  vistas  afforded  by  its  courts,  set  with 
magnificent  trees  and  with  the  monuments  of  the  past  seventy 
generations. 

It  was  dark  when  we  had  finished  our  visit  to  the  temple. 
We  bade  the  Duke  farewell,  and  our  cavalcade,  starting  back 
to  the  station,  was  now  made  picturesque  by  the  flaring 
torches  and  the  huge  paper  lanterns  which  were  carried 
alongside  each  chair  and  cart.  Slowly  the  procession  wound 
its  way  back  over  the  dark  plains  toward  the  lights  of  the 
station  platform  and  the  emblems  of  a  mechanical  civiliza- 
tion that  contrasted  at  every  point  with  the  life  we  had  seen. 
The  Duke  had  regretted  having  objected  so  strongly  to  the 
proposal  to  bring  the  railway  closer  to  the  town,  for  it  was  of 
inconvenience  to  visitors;  but  he  felt,  after  all,  that  the  great 
sage  himself  would  always  prefer  the  peacefulness  and  quiet 
of  the  older  civilization. 

I  revisited  Chiifu  three  years  later,  this  time  with  Mr. 
Charles  R.  Crane  and  Mrs.  Reinsch,  who  had  been  unable  to 
accompany  me  on  the  first  visit.  The  officials  were  expect- 
ing us,  and  everywhere  we  were  followed  with  attentions. 
Not  satisfied  with  giving  us  two  private  cars,  the  railway 
oflnicials  insisted  that  we  have  a  special  engine,  too.  In  the 
region  of  Chiifu  we  gathered  an  army  of  military  escorts. 
Arriving  at  the  palace,  the  Duke  greeted  us  with  a  child 
on  either  arm.  The  little  daughter  was  now  over  three,  the 
son  slightly  over  one  year  old.  I  have  never  seen  any  one 
who  appeared  more  devoted  to  his  children  than  the  Duke. 
He  always  had  them  with  him,  carried  them  about,  playing 
with  them  and  fondling  them.  When  he  and  the  Duchess 
visited  us  in  Peking  he  brought  the  two  little  ones,  and  they 
and  my  small  children  played  long  together  joyfully  and  to 
the  amusement  of  their  elders.    The  Duke  was  tall,  broad- 


OLD  CONFUCIANISM  IN  THE  NEW  CHINA  41 

shouldered,  aristocratic  looking.  While  not  credited  with 
great  ability,  he  was  undoubtedly  a  man  of  intelligence, 
although  his  education  had  been  narrowly  classical  and  had 
not  given  him  contact  with  the  world's  affairs.  He  was 
seventy-third  in  line  from  the  great  sage.  At  that  time  he 
was  engaged  especially  with  plans  to  create  in  Chiifu  a 
university  wherein  the  Confucian  tradition  should  be  pre- 
served in  its  purity,  but  which  should  also  teach  modem 
science. 

Once  during  the  revolution  against  the  Manchus  the  Duke 
was  considered  a  possible  successor  to  the  throne.  If  the 
country  had  had  a  Chinese  family  of  great  prominence  in 
affairs,  the  transfer  of  the  monarchy  to  a  Chinese  house 
might  have  been  accompHshed,  but  the  Duke  was  by  no 
means  a  man  of  action  or  a  politician.  Neither  had  the 
descendants  of  the  Ming,  Sung,  and  Chow  emperors,  or  of 
other  Imperial  houses,  sufficient  prominence  or  genius  for 
leadership  to  command  national  attention. 

The  title  of  the  Holy  Duke  is  the  only  one  in  China  which 
remains  permanently  the  same.  Under  the  empire,  titles 
were  granted,  but  in  each  succeeding  generation  the  rank  was 
lowered  by  one  grade  until  the  status  of  a  commoner  had 
again  been  reached.  By  this  arrangement,  under  which 
noble  rank  gradually  "petered  out,"  China  escaped  the 
creation  of  a  class  or  caste  of  nobility. 


CHAPTER  IV 
A  GLIMPSE  BEHIND  THE  POLITICAL  SCENES 

Modelling  largely  on  American  example,  China  is  striving 
to  create  truly  representative  political  institutions.  Per- 
sonal rule,  imperial  traditions,  hamper  the  Chinese  in  their 
efforts,  unguided  as  they  are  by  experience;  moreover,  they 
meet  with  foreign  skepticism  and  opposition.  It  is  Amer- 
ica's role  not  officiously  to  interfere  in  their  endeavours,  but 
in  every  proper  way  to  help  them. 

The  institutions  a  nation  develops  are  largely  its  own  busi- 
ness. Other  nations  should  not  interfere.  But  in  China 
all  Hberal-minded,  forward-looking  men  see  in  the  United 
States  a  free  government  which  they  not  only  wish  to  emu- 
late, but  to  which  they  look  for  interest,  sympathy,  and 
moral  assistance.  The  results  of  their  efforts  are  by  no 
means  indifferent  to  us.  Should  they  fail,  should  militarist 
and  absolutist  elements  gain  the  upper  hand;  particularly, 
should  China  become  an  appendage  to  a  foreign  militarist 
autocracy,  grave  dangers  would  arise.  The  ideals  of  the 
progressive  Chinese  are  in  keeping  with  the  peaceful, 
industrious  traditions  of  China.  With  these  traditions 
Americans  in  China  are  closely  allied.  They  do  not  seek, 
nor  have  they  need  to  seek,  to  control  by  political  means  the 
choice  of  the  Chinese  people.  On  the  other  hand,  it  would  be 
difficult  for  them  to  tolerate  any  attempt  to  prevent  the 
Chinese  from  freely  following  the  model  of  their  choice,  and 
from  securing  those  mutually  helpful  relations  with  Ameri- 
cans which  they  themselves  desire.  In  this  sense  only,  then, 
have  Americans  a  vital  interest  in  Chinese  politics.  That 
personal  rule  and  imperial  traditions,  as  well  as  military  des- 

42 


A  GLIMPSE  BEHIND  THE  POLITICAL  SCENES  43 

potism,  are  still  powerful  enough  to  hamper  the  will  of  the 
new  Chinese  democracy  may  be  manifest  from  a  few  in- 
stances that  early  came  to  my  attention. 

The  first  case  was  that  of  Mr.  C.  T.  Wang.  When  he  re- 
lated to  me  the  history  of  the  dissolution  of  his  party — he  was 
and  still  is  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  democratic  party  (Kuo 
Min  Tang) — he  told  me  that  he  was  in  great  personal  danger. 
Mr.  Wang  had  been  marked  for  execution  as  a  leader  of  the 
disbanded  party  and  he  was  living  in  concealment  as  a 
refugee. 

His  call  upon  me,  shortly  after  my  arrival  in  Peking,  was 
my  first  direct  contact  with  Chinese  internal  or  party  poli- 
tics. He  had  greeted  me  at  the  railway  station  upon  my 
arrival,  and  now  he  told  me  the  story  of  Yuan  Shih-kai's  suc- 
cessful attempt  to  break  down  the  opposition  of  the  parlia- 
ment and  to  render  that  body  entirely  innocuous.  Mr. 
Wang  was  the  Vice-President  of  the  Senate,  and  through  his 
party  was  associated  with  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen  and  General 
Huang  Hsin,  the  men  who  had  attempted  the  revolution  dur- 
ing the  summer  just  passed.  But  Mr.  Wang  represented  the 
younger,  more  modern-minded  elements  in  the  party,  who 
desired  to  adopt  the  best  institutions  and  practices  of  the 
West,  but  who  did  not  favour  violent  measures. 

Yuan  Shih-kai  had  divided  the  majority  party,  in  order 
in  the  end  to  destroy  its  two  sections.  The  most  recent 
action  in  this  fight  was  the  dissolution  of  the  Kuo  Min 
Tang,  which  was  decreed  by  the  President  on  November  5th, 
on  the  ground  that  this  body  was  implicated  in,  and  respon- 
sible for,  the  revolutionary  movement  against  the  President. 
The  President  had  approached  the  Tutuhs — or  military 
governors,  after  the  downfall  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  called 
Tuchuns — in  the  various  provinces  and  had  secured  in  ad- 
vance an  endorsement  of  his  action.  Of  course,  this  appeal 
ignored  the  constitutional  character  which  the  state  was 
supposed  to  have,  and  encouraged  the  military  governors  in 


44       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

thinking  that  they  were  semi-independent  rulers.  After  the 
death  of  Yuan  their  sense  of  their  own  importance  and  inde- 
pendence grew  apace.  They  imitated  him  in  looking  upon 
their  armies  as  their  personal  property.  Moreover,  they 
seized  control  of  the  provincial  taxes.  From  all  this  arose 
that  pseudo-feudalism  of  military  despots,  which  is  the  bane- 
ful heritage  left  by  Yuan  Shih-kai  in  China. 

I  had  already  received,  through  the  Department  of  State, 
an  inquiry  from  American  friends  concerning  Mr.  Wang's 
safety.  He  was  graduated  from  Yale  University,  was 
first  among  the  American-returned  students,  and  favour- 
ably known  among  Americans  in  general.  He  had  been  the 
president  of  the  Chinese  Y.  M.  C.  A.  and  bore  the  reputation 
of  being  an  able,  clean-handed,  and  conscientious  man.  I 
could  not,  of  course,  know  in  how  serious  danger  Mr.  Wang 
found  himself,  nor  could  I  make  any  formal  representations 
in  a  case  where  the  facts  were  unknown.  However,  through 
making  inquiry  as  to  whether  any  unfavourable  action,  such 
as  arrest,  was  contemplated,  I  hinted  to  the  Government  that 
any  harsh  action  against  Mr.  Wang  would  be  noted.  The 
very  fact  that  a  well-disposed  foreign  nation  is  taking  notice 
will  tend  to  prevent  rash  or  high-handed  action,  which  is  fre- 
quently forced  by  some  individual  hothead  commander  or 
official.  When  public  attention  has  been  directed  to  the 
unjust  treatment  of  a  man,  rash  vindictiveness  may  be  re- 
strained by  wiser  heads. 

A  further  example  of  the  working  of  Chinese  internal 
politics  which  came  under  my  observation  at  this  time  is 
shown  in  the  method  by  which  Yuan  Shih-kai  politely  im- 
prisoned the  Vice-President. 

From  time  to  time  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  made  efforts  to 
induce  the  Vice-President,  General  Li  Yuan-hung,  to  come 
to  Peking  from  Wuchang,  where  he  was  stationed  in  com- 
mand of  troops.  He  had  sent  him  messengers  and  letters, 
protesting  the  need  he  felt  of  having  General  Li  closely  by 


A  GLIMPSE  BEHIND  THE  POLITICAL  SCENES    45 

his  side  in  order  to  profit  by  his  support  and  advice  on  im- 
portant affairs.  These  poHte  invitations  had  been  an- 
swered by  General  Li  in  a  most  self-deprecatory  tone;  he 
could  not  aspire  to  the  merit  and  wisdom  attributed  to  him 
by  the  President;  he  could  be  of  but  little  assistance  in  im- 
portant affairs  of  state;  it  was  far  better  for  him  to  stay  in 
his  position  as  commander  at  Wuchang,  whence  he  could 
effectively  support  the  authority  of  the  President  and  all  his 
beneficent  works. 

This  interchange  of  correspondence  went  on  for  some 
time.  It  was  evident  that  General  Li  did  not  wish  to  come  to 
Peking.  It  was  surmised  that  the  President  did  not  like 
the  prominence  which  the  democratic  party  had  given  to 
the  name  of  General  Li  Yuang-hung,  whom  they  had  her- 
alded as  a  true  republican  and  a  man  of  popular  sympathies. 
Probably  Yuan  feared  that  General  Li  might  be  placed  at 
the  head  of  a  new  political  movement  against  the  President's 
authority. 

The  President  not  only  sent  messengers  and  letters  of 
cordial  invitation,  but  he  also  rearranged  the  disposal  of 
troops,  with  the  result  that  bodies  of  troops  upon  which 
Yuan  Shih-kai  could  rely  were  drawn  around  Wuchang 
with  a  constantly  shortening  radius.  Finally  in  December 
General  Li  realized  that  he  had  no  alternative.  He  there- 
fore informed  the  latest  messenger  of  Tuan  that  he  could 
no  longer  resist  the  repeated  cordial  invitations,  and  that 
while  he  was  sharply  conscious  of  his  shortcomings,  he  would 
endeavour  to  assist  the  chief  magistrate  to  the  limit  of  his 
powers. 

He  came  to  Peking  in  December,  without  troops  of  his 
own.  The  President  received  him  with  the  greatest  cor- 
diality, embracing  him  and  vowing  that  now  the  burden  of 
responsibility  was  lightened  for  him;  that  he  must  have  his 
great  associate  and  friend  always  close  at  hand,  where  he 
could  consult  with  him  daily,  in  fact,  any  hour  of  the  day 


46       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

and  night;  he  therefore  invited  General  Li  to  make  his  home 
close  to  the  palace  of  Yuan,  namely,  on  the  little  island  in  the 
South  Lake  in  whose  many-coloured,  gracefully  formed  halls. 
Emperor  Kwang  Hsu  was  for  many  years  kept  a  prisoner 
by  the  Empress  Dowager. 

There  General  Li  took  his  residence,  knowing  that  his  great 
friend  the  first  magistrate  could  not  spare  his  presence  at 
any  hour  of  day  or  night. 

The  question  arose  whether  the  foreign  representatives 
should  call  on  the  newly  arrived  Vice-President.  The  Gov- 
ernment tentatively  suggested  that  as  hosts  it  might  be 
proper  for  them  to  make  the  first  call.  Whether  or  not 
this  was  done  in  the  expectation  that  the  suggestion  would 
not  be  accepted,  it  certainly  was  not  the  desire  of  Yuan 
Shih-kai  to  encourage  close  relations  between  the  Vice- 
President  and  any  outsiders. 

Although  Yuan  Shih-kai  still  allowed  the  rump  parliament 
to  exist,  he  had  undoubtedly  decided  at  this  time  to  dispose 
of  it  entirely.  A  ready  pretext  was  at  hand,  because,  with 
the  expulsion  of  the  Kuo  Min  Tang,  the  parliament  no 
longer  could  muster  a  quorum.  On  November  13th,  it  was 
announced  that  a  central  administrative  conference  would 
be  created  to  act  in  an  advisory  capacity  in  matters  of  gov- 
ernment. It  was  plain  that  this  body  was  intended  to  dis- 
place parliament.  The  Hst  of  nominees  was  made  up  mostly 
of  men  of  the  old  regime,  literati  and  ex-officials — the  kind 
known  among  the  Chinese  as  "skeletons";  a  group  of  high 
standing  and  very  good  reputation,  but  from  which  little 
constructive  action  could  be  expected.  Among  them  was  a 
very  effective  orator.  Ma  Liang,  a  member  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church.  He  was  a  dignified,  elderly  man,  who 
came  to  see  me  to  talk  about  reforestation  and  colonization 
of  outlying  regions.  His  contact  with  Western  civilization 
had  been  through  the  Jesuit  College  at  Zikawei.  Another 
member  was  Dr.  Yen  Fu,  who  had  won  reputation  by  trans- 


A  GLIMPSE  BEHIND  THE  POLITICAL  SCENES   47 

lating  a  large  number  of  scientific  works  into  Chinese  and 
creating  a  modern  scientific  terminology  in  Chinese.  Among 
other  councillors  with  whom  I  became  well  acquainted  was 
Hsu  Shih-chang,  later  President  of  China,  and  Li  Ching-hsi, 
a  nephew  of  Li  Hung-chang,  who  had  been  Viceroy  of  Yun- 
nan under  the  Empire. 

Dr.  Frank  J.  Goodnow,  the  American  Constitutional  Ad- 
visor, often  discussed  Chinese  political  affairs  with  me.  It 
was  his  impressionthat  parHament  had  attemptedtotake  over 
too  much  of  Western  political  practice  without  sufficiently 
considering  its  adaptability  to  Chinese  uses.  He  believed 
that  the  administrative  power  should  not  be  subject  to  con- 
stant interference  by  parliament,  and  that  China  was  not 
yet  ready  for  the  cabinet  system.  He  therefore  held  a 
rather  conservative  view  favouring  gradual  development  in 
the  direction  of  Western  institutions,  but  not  a  wholesale 
adoption  of  the  same.  The  Yuan  Shih-kai  government 
took  advantage  of  this  attitude  of  the  American  expert  to 
give  out,  whenever  it  proposed  a  new  arrangement  for 
strengthening  its  hold,  that  the  matter  had  the  approval 
of  Doctor  Goodnow  and  other  foreign  advisers.  However, 
these  authorities  were  not  really  consulted;  that  is,  they  were 
not  brought  into  the  important  conferences,  nor  given  the 
chance  to  cooperate  in  the  formulation  of  vital  projects. 
As  a  matter  of  form  they  were,  of  course,  "consulted" — 
but  usually  after  the  decisions  had  been  made.  They  were 
informed  of  what  had  been  agreed  upon;  and  then  it  was 
announced  that  the  approval  of  the  advisers  had  been 
secured.  Another  example  of  the  bland  self-sufficiency  of 
Yuan  Shih-kai  and  his  government.  They  believed  in  them- 
selves; they  considered  that  they  were  accountable  only  to 
themselves;  they  had  fundamentally  the  monarchic  point 
of  view  in  all  departments  of  public  service. 


CHAPTER  V 
WITH  MEN  WHO  WATCH  POLITICS 

I  FOUND  in  Peking  several  good  observers  of  political  life, 
especially  Dr.  George  Morrison,  Mr.  B.  Lenox  Simpson,  and 
Mr.  W.  H.  Donald.  All  three  had  the  training  in  obser- 
vation and  judgment  which  comes  from  writing  for  respon- 
sible papers.  Doctor  Morrison  was  gifted  with  a  memory 
for  details.  Thus,  he  would  say:  "When  I  first  visited  New 
York  I  lived  in  a  little  hall  room  on  the  third  floor  of  157 
East  Twenty-ninth  Street,  with  a  landlady  whose  name 
was  Simkins,  who  had  green  eyes  and  a  red  nose  and  who 
charged  me  two  dollars  a  week  for  my  room."  ^He  delighted 
in  detaiHng  minutely  his  daily  doings.  His  sense  of  infinite 
detail  combined  with  his  remarkable  memory  made  Doctor 
Morrison  an  encyclopaedia  of  information  about  Chinese 
public  men.  He  knew  their  careers,  their  foibles  and  am- 
bitions, and  their  personal  relationships.  Like  most  British 
in  China  he  was  animated  with  a  sincere  wish  to  see  the 
Chinese  get  ahead,  and  was  distressed  by  the  obstacles 
which  a  change  for  the  better  encountered  at  every  step. 
His  own  mind  was  of  the  analytical  and  critical  type  rather 
than  the  constructive,  and  his  greatest  services  were  ren- 
dered as  interpreter  of  events  and  in  giving  to  public  men 
and  the  people  a  clear  idea  of  the  significance  of  complex 
Chinese  situations.  **I  am  annoyed,"  he  would  say,  "be- 
cause kindly  old  ladies  persistently  identify  me  with  the 
missionary  Morrison  who  died  in  1857." 

Mr.  Donald's  acquaintance  with  Chinese  affairs  had  come 
through  close  contact  with  the  leaders  of  new  China,  with 
whom  he  cooperated  intimately  in  their  military  and  politi- 

48 


WITH  MEN  WHO  WATCH  POLITICS         49 

cal  campaigns.  He  had  a  heart  for  the  Chinese,  as  if  they 
had  been  his  own  people.  He  worried  about  their  troubles 
and  fought  their  fights.  Mr.  Simpson,  the  noted  writer  who 
uses  the  pen  name  "Putnam  Weale,"  began  active  life  as 
a  member  of  the  Maritime  Customs  service,  but  he  soon 
resigned,  to  devote  himself  wholly  to  literary  work.  His 
masterly  works  of  political  analysis  were  written  in  the 
period  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  although  his  best-known 
book  came  a  little  earlier — a  book  which  long  earned  him  the 
ill-will  and  suspicion  of  many  of  the  legations  in  Peking. 
He  himself  disavows  giving  in  "Indiscreet  Letters  from 
Peking"  a  recital  of  actual  facts.  He  told  me:  "I  wished 
to  give  the  psychology  of  a  siege,  selecting  from  the  abund- 
ant material  significant  facts  and  expressions,  but  I  was  not 
in  any  sense  attempting  to  chronicle  events  and  personal 
actions.'* 

Mr.  Simpson  has  also  written  a  series  of  novels  dealing 
with  Chinese  life.  The  short  stories  are  the  best;  the 
longer  ones,  while  interesting  in  description  and  clever  in 
dialogue,  lack  that  intuitive  power  of  characterization  which 
is  found  in  the  greatest  novels,  though  "Wang  the  Ninth" 
which  has  recently  come  from  the  press  is  an  admirable 
study  of  Chinese  psychology  and  an  excellent  story  as  well. 
Though  his  playful  and  cynical  mind  often  led  people  to 
judge  that  he  was  working  solely  for  literary  effect,  it  seemed 
to  me  he  had  a  deep  appreciation  of  what  China  should  mean 
to  the  world ;  he  also  had  real  sympathy  for  the  Chinese,  and 
desired  in  every  way  to  help  them  to  realize  the  great  prom- 
ise of  their  country  and  people.  As  a  conversationalist  Mr. 
Simpson  resembled  Macaulay,  in  that  his  interludes  of  si- 
lence were  infrequent.  Notwithstanding  the  brilliance  of 
this  conversation,  luncheon  parties  of  men  occasionally 
seemed  to  become  restive  under  a  monologue  which  gave 
few  others  a  chance  to  wedge  in  a  word. 

Aside  from  these  three  British  writers,  many  other  men 


so       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

were  following  with  intelligent  interest  the  course  of  events. 
Bishop  Bashford,  gifted  with  a  broad  and  statesmanlike 
mind,  could  always  be  trusted  to  give  passing  events  sig- 
nificant interpretations.  Dr.  W.  A.  P.  Martin  had  then 
reached  an  age  at  which  the  individual  details  of  current 
affairs  no  longer  interested  him.  His  intimate  friend,  Dr. 
Arthur  H.  Smith — a  rarely  brilHant  extemporaneous  speaker 
— ^was  full  of  witty  and  incisive  observations,  often  deeply 
pessimistic,  though  tempered  with  a  deep  friendship  for  the 
Chinese  people. 

Among  the  members  of  the  diplomatic  corps  it  was  chiefly 
the  Chinese  secretaries  who  busied  themselves,  out  of  pro- 
fessional interest  with  the  details  of  Chinese  affairs,  al- 
though they  did  not  in  all  cases  exhibit  a  broad  grasp  of  the 
situation. 

Mr.  Willys  R.  Peck,  Chinese  secretary  of  the  American 
Legation,  born  in  China,  had  a  complete  mastery  of  the 
difficult  language  of  the  country.  He  could  use  it  with  a  col- 
loquial ease  that  contrasted  most  pleasantly  with  the  stilted 
and  stiflp  enunciation  of  the  ordinary  foreigner  speaking 
Chinese.  His  tact  in  intercourse  with  the  Chinese  and  his 
judgment  on  character  and  political  affairs  could  be  relied  on. 
Mr.  Peck  took  the  place  of  Mr.  E.  T.  Williams,  who  was 
called  to  Washington  as  chief  of  the  Far  Eastern  Division 
in  the  State  Department.  I  considered  it  great  good  for- 
tune that  there  should  be  at  the  Department  a  man  so 
experienced  and  so  famiUar  with  Chinese  affairs. 

It  was  my  good  fortune  to  have  as  first  secretary  of  the  le- 
gation a  man  exceptionally  qualified  to  cope  with  the  diffi- 
culties and  intricacies  of  Chinese  affairs.  Not  only  are 
these  affairs  infinitely  complex  in  themselves,  but  they  have 
been  overlaid  through  many  decades  with  a  web  of  foreign 
treaty  provisions,  which  makes  them  still  more  baffling  to  the 
stranger  who  tackles  them.  But  Mr.  J.  V.  A.  MacMurray, 
the  secretary,  was  possessed  of  a  keenly  analytical,  legally 


WITH  MEN  WHO  WATCH  POLITICS  51 

trained  mind  which  was  able  to  cut  through  the  most  hope- 
lessly tangled  snarl  of  local  custom,  national  law,  inter- 
national agreement,  and  general  equity.  Also  his  interest 
in  things  Chinese  was  so  deep  and  genuine  that  his  re- 
searches were  never  perfunctory.  The  son  of  a  soldier,  he 
had  an  almost  religious  devotion  to  the  idea  of  public  service. 

Among  the  ministers  themselves.  Sir  John  Jordan,  actual 
Dean  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps,  was  through  long  experience 
and  careful  attention  to  affairs  most  fitted  to  speak  with 
authority  on  things  Chinese.  I  was  immediately  greatly 
attracted  to  him  and  formed  with  him  a  close  acquaintance- 
ship. This  led  to  constant  cooperation  throughout  the 
difficult  years  that  lay  ahead.  Sir  John  was  a  man  of  un- 
usually long  and  varied  experience  in  China.  He  came  first 
to  the  consular  service,  then  became  minister  resident  in 
Korea,  and  his  forty  years  of  official  work  had  given  him 
complete  intimacy  with  Chinese  affairs.  Although  he  speaks 
Chinese  with  fluency,  in  official  interviews  and  conversa- 
tions he  was  always  accompanied  by  his  Chinese  secretary 
and  expressed  himself  formally  in  English.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  few  diplomats  ever  use  the  Chinese  language  in  official 
conversation.  Because  of  its  infinite  shades  of  meaning  it 
is  a  complex  and  rather  unprecise  medium,  therefore  misun- 
derstandings are  more  readily  avoided  through  the  con- 
current use  of  another  language.  WTiile  Sir  John  understood 
Chinese  character  and  affairs  and  was  sympathetic  with  the 
country  in  which  his  life  work  had  been  spent,  yet  there  dwelt 
in  him  no  spirit  of  easy  compliance.  When  he  considered  it 
necessary,  he  could  insist  so  strongly  and  so  emphatically 
upon  the  action  he  desired  taken  that  the  Chinese  often 
thought  of  him  as  harsh  and  unrelenting:  yet  they  always 
respected  his  essentially  English  spirit  of  fairness  and  straight- 
forwardness. 

Other  colleagues  with  whom  close  relationships  grew  up 
were  Don  Luis  Pastor,  the  Spanish  minister,  a  gentleman 


52       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

thoroughly  American  in  his  ways  and  familiar  through 
long  residence  in  Washington  with  our  affairs;  and  Count 
Sforza,  the  Italian  minister.  To  the  latter  China  seemed 
more  or  less  a  place  of  exile;  he  appeared  bored  and  only  mod- 
erately interested  in  the  affairs  about  him.  But  his  legation — 
with  Countess  Sforza,  Madame  Vare,  whose  Lombard  beauty 
did  not  suggest  her  Scotch  origin;  the  Marquise  Denti, 
with  her  quizzical,  Mona  Lisa-like  haunting  smile,  concealing 
great  ennui;  and  the  entirely  girHsh  and  playful  Countess 
Zavagli,  a  figure  which  might  have  stepped  out  of  a  Watteau 
— ^was  a  most  charming  social  centre.  M.  Beelaerts  van 
Blokland,  the  Netherlands  minister,  a  man  of  clear-thinking, 
keen  mind,  and  great  reasonableness,  and  the  Austrian  min- 
ister, M.  von  Rosthom,  a  profound  Chinese  scholar,  who  was 
then  working  on  a  Chinese  history,  were  men  of  whom  I  saw 
much  during  these  years. 

There  were  few  sinologists  in  Peking  at  this  time.  The 
successive  Chinese  secretaries  of  the  American  Legation  rank- 
ed high  in  this  respect.  Of  resident  sinologists  the  most  noted, 
Mr.  (later  Sir)  Edward  Backhouse  was  a  recluse,  who  never 
allowed  himself  to  be  seen  in  the  company  of  other  people  of  a 
Western  race.  At  the  only  period  when  I  had  long  conver- 
sations with  him  I  found  him  much  disturbed  by  wild 
rumours  current  in  the  Chinese  quarter  to  which  I  could  not 
attach  any  weight.  Others  whose  knowledge  of  Chinese 
was  exceptional  were  Mr.  Sidney  Mayers,  representative  of 
the  British  China  Corporation,  who  had  formerly  been  in 
the  consular  service;  Doctor  Gattrell,  who  had  acted  as 
secretary  of  the  American  Group;  Mr.  W,  B.  Pettus,  the 
director  of  the  Peking  Language  School;  Mr.  Simpson,  al- 
ready mentioned ;  and  several  missionaries  and  professors  at 
Peking  University. 

Of  the  Chinese  there  were,  of  course,  many  with  whom  I 
could  profitably  discuss  the  events  of  the  day  and  gather 
suggestions  and  interpretations  of  value.     With  all  these 


WITH  MEN  WHO  WATCH  POLITICS  53 

men  I  conversed  upon  events,  relying  for  my  information  not 
on  rumours  or  reports,  but  on  the  facts  which  I  could  learn 
through  the  men  directly  concerned;  or  through  others  well 
informed.  The  opinion  which  I  formed  from  such  various 
sources  about  the  political  condition  of  China  at  this  time, 
the  spring  of  1914,  may  be  stated  as  follows: 

The  political  authority  of  the  Central  Government  in 
China  rested  upon  military  organization.  Other  sources  of 
authority,  such  as  customary  submission  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  support  based  upon  the  intelligent  cooperation  of  all 
classes  of  citizens  in  the  achievement  of  the  purposes  of 
government  in  accordance  with  public  opinion  on  the  other, 
were  only  of  secondary  influence.  It  was  therefore  import- 
ant to  inquire  whether  the  military  power  was  so  organized 
as  to  afford  a  stabilizing  support  to  publip  authority.  This 
did  not  seem  to  be  the  case. 

In  the  first  place,  the  existence  of  a  large  army  of  doubt- 
ful efficiency  was  in  itself  an  evil,  considering  the  then  limited 
resources  of  the  Chinese  State,  and  the  fact  that  any  attempt 
to  reduce  the  military  forces  to  more  reasonable  dimensions 
met  with  stubborn  opposition.  Whenever  troops  were  dis- 
banded they  showed  no  tendency  to  return  to  useful  occupa- 
tions :  the  ex-soldiers  desired  only  to  continue  to  live  upon  the 
country,  and,  no  longer  serving  the  established  authority, 
they  joined  bandit  gangs,  rendering  the  interior  of  the  ma- 
jority of  the  provinces  insecure. 

The  weakness  of  the  army  was  strikingly  demonstrated 
whenever  an  attempt  was  made  to  use  it  to  defend  the 
country  against  either  external  or  internal  enemies.  In  the 
campaign  against  the  Mongols,  the  Chinese  troops  had 
failed  entirely;  even  within  the  country  itself,  this  huge 
army  was  not  able  to  insure  the  fulfilment  of  that  first  duty 
of  a  government — ^the  protection  of  the  lives  and  property  of 
its  citizens. 

In  the  provinces  of  Honan  and  Hupei  brigands,  led  by  a 


54       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

person  known  as  "White  Wolf,"  had  for  months  been  terri- 
fying the  population;  ravaging  the  countryside;  sacking 
walled  cities;  murdering  and  outraging  the  population;  and 
in  a  number  of  instances  had  killed  foreigners.  Thus  far 
the  army  had  been  powerless  to  suppress  these  brigands;  in 
fact,  evidence  was  at  hand  that  the  troops  had  repeatedly 
been  so  lax  and  remiss  that  the  only  explanation  of  their 
conduct  would  seem  to  lie  in  a  secret  connivance  at  the 
brigandage,  and  lack  of  cooperation  among  the  commanders 
of  the  troops. 

As  the  authority  of  the  Central  Government  was  com- 
mensurate with  its  control  over  the  tutuhs  (tuchuns),  or 
military  governors,  the  attitude  of  the  latter  toward  the 
President  had  to  be  carefully  watched;  and  it  was  causing  no 
small  uneasiness  that  there  did  not  seem  to  be  perfect 
agreement  among  these  pillars  of  authority  in  the  various 
provinces;  thus,  friction  had  recently  been  reported  between 
General  Tuan  Chi-jui,  the  Minister  of  War,  who  was  the  act- 
ing tutuh  of  Hupei,  and  General  Feng  Kuo-chang,  the 
tutuh  of  Kiangsu,  two  of  the  most  powerful  supporters  of 
the  President. 

None  of  the  provinces  of  China,  during  the  preceding 
three  months,  had  been  free  from  brigandage,  attempted 
rebellion,  troubles  resulting  from  the  disbanding  of  troops, 
and  local  riots.  Conditions  were  worst  in  the  provinces  of 
Honan  and  Hupei,  in  which  the  bands  of  "White  Wolf" 
are  operating. 

These  bands  had  assumed  a  distinctly  anti-foreign  atti- 
tude. In  Kansu  there  were  constant  Mohammedan  up- 
risings, related  to  the  open  rebellion  in  Tibet  and  Mongolia. 
Bandit  movements  had  also  occurred  in  the  provinces  of 
Shansi,  Shensi,  Szechuan  (super-added  to  revolts  of  the 
troops),  Anhui,  Kiangsi,  Hunan,  Fukien,  Kweichow,  Yun- 
nan, and  Kwangtung.  Chekiang,  Kwangsi,  Shantung,  and 
Chihh  had  been  the  least  molested. 


WITH  MEN  WHO  WATCH  POLITICS  55 

While  the  Government  had  been  unable  to  fulfil  its  duty  of 
protecting  the  lives  and  property  of  its  citizens,  it  was  also 
unable  to  exercise  the  elementary  power  of  providing, 
through  taxation,  the  means  for  its  own  support.  The 
maintenance  of  the  army  had  eaten  up  the  available  means 
and  it  had  not  been  possible  to  secure  sufficient  money  from 
the  provinces  to  meet  the  ordinary  running  expenses  of 
the  Central  Government.  The  remarkable  resisting  power 
of  China  is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that,  notwithstanding  the 
conditions  of  rebellion  and  political  unrest  which  charac- 
terized the- year  191 3,  general  commerce  remained  so  active 
that  the  collections  of  the  Customs  and  of  the  Salt  Gabelle 
exceeded  those  of  any  previous  year.  These  two  sources  of 
revenue  were  sufficient  to  provide  for  the  interest  payments 
and  amortization  of  the  long-term  foreign  loans  then  con- 
tracted; their  administration,  under  foreign  control,  had 
secured  to  the  Central  Government  the  funds  to  meet 
these  obligations  and  to  avoid  open  bankruptcy. 

All  other  forms  of  taxation  were  disorganized.  The  col- 
lection of  the  land  tax  was  in  many  places  discontinued; 
records  had  been  destroyed,  or  the  population  took  an  atti- 
tude hostile  to  its  collection.  The  proceeds  of  the  likin,  as 
far  as  collected,  were  retained  for  provincial  use.  Alto- 
gether, the  Central  Government  received  from  the  provinces 
not  more  than  10  per  cent,  of  the  estimated  income  from 
these  sources  under  the  last  Imperial  Budget  for  1912. 

Meanwhile,  the  Central  Government  had  been  living  from 
hand  to  mouth,  using  the  proceeds  of  foreign  loans  for  ad- 
ministrative purposes,  and  was  kept  going  by  taking  cash  ad- 
vances upon  foreign  loan  contracts  made  for  furnishing 
materials  and  for  various  concessions.  In  this  way  the  future 
had  been  discounted  to  a  dangerous  extent. 

The  weakness  of  the  financial  administration  of  the  Gov- 
ernment was  found  in  all  other  branches  of  its  activities. 
There  was  little  evidence  of  constructive  capacity. 


56       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

In  the  ministries  and  departments  of  the  Central  Govern- 
ment the  greatest  disorganization  was  apparent.  In  deal- 
ing with  technical  questions  the  officials  were  often  entirely 
at  sea,  not  being  trained  themselves  in  these  matters,  nor 
willing  to  make  real  use  of  the  many  advisers  who  were  en- 
gaged by  the  Government;  there  was  no  adequate  system  of 
accounting;  the  departmental  records  were  not  well  kept; 
frequently  the  existence  of  a  transaction  was  not  known  to 
the  officials  most  nearly  concerned;  past  transactions,  fully 
consummated,  had  been  forgotten;  there  was  no  centraliza- 
tion of  governmental  knowledge;  so  a  great  deal  of  the  public 
business  was  transacted  in  a  haphazard  way,  leading  to  a 
helpless  opportunism  of  doing  the  things  most  strongly 
urged  and  of  grasping  at  small  immediate  advantages  at  the 
cost  of  engagements  long  to  be  regretted. 

Ambitious  schemes  of  general  policy  had  been  brought 
up,  and  elaborate  regulations  promulgated,  to  all  of  which 
little  attention  was  subsequently  paid.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  had  scarcely  been  one  single  concrete  result  ob- 
tained in  constructive  work. 

The  metropolitan  Province  of  Chihli  had  been  quiet  and 
peaceful  since  the  outbreak  of  191 2.  The  Government  here 
certainly  had  sufficient  authority  to  introduce  constructive 
reforms,  and  the  general  conditions  for  such  action  in  this 
province  had  been  relatively  most  favourable.  But  not 
even  in  the  case  of  Chihli  Province  had  the  taxation  system 
been  rendered  efficient;  no  efficient  auditing  methods  had 
been  introduced  in  practice,  although  systems  of  auditing 
control  had  been  promulgated;  educational  institutions  had 
been  allowed  to  run  down :  in  short,  under  the  most  favour- 
able conditions,  no  constructive  work  had  been  accomplished. 

Nearly  all  attempts  to  do  something  of  a  constructive 
nature  had  been  immediately  associated  with  foreign  loans, 
often  involving  a  cash  advance  to  the  Government.  It 
might,  of  course,  be  said  that  the  great  difficulty  of  the 


WITH  MEN  WHO  WATCH  POLITICS  57 

Chinese  Government  was  exactly  that  it  lacked  the  funds  for 
carrying  out  constructive  work;  and  that,  therefore,  only 
such  lines  of  improvement  could  be  followed  for  which  it 
had  been  possible  to  secure  foreign  loans. 

This,  however,  was  only  partly  true.  A  great  many  re- 
forms could  have  been  accomplished  without  the  increase  of 
expenditure;  indeed,  they  would  have  resulted  in  a  reduction 
of  outlay.  The  fact  seemed  to  be  that  the  Central  Govern- 
ment, realizing  how  important  foreign  financial  support 
had  been  to  it  during  the  Revolution  of  191 3,  was  anxious 
to  secure  more  and  more  funds  from  abroad  without  count- 
ing the  ultimate  cost. 

An  opportunity  for  obtaining  from  abroad  large  sums  of 
money,  far  beyond  any  amount  ever  before  dealt  with  by 
Chinese  officials  and  merchants,  in  itself  had  an  unsettling 
effect  upon  methods  of  public  business.  The  old  caution 
and  economy,  which  kept  the  public  debt  within  narrow 
limits,  had  given  way  to  a  readiness  to  obtain  funds  from 
abroad  in  enormous  amounts,  without  apparently  the 
realization  of  the  burden  imposed  upon  China  by  way  of  the 
necessity  of  return  in  the  future  through  the  results  of  labour 
and  sacrifice  of  miUions  of  people. 

Nor  had  the  old  system,  under  which  the  inadequate 
salaries  of  officials  had  ordinarily  to  be  supplemented  by 
extraneous  illicit  gains,  given  way  to  a  more  efficient  and 
business-like  organization  of  the  public  service  under  which 
officials  would  be  able  to  devote  their  undivided  attention  to 
the  accomplishment  of  their  regular  allotted  tasks  without 
spending  their  energy  in  contriving  additional  means  of 
obtaining  income. 

In  the  case  of  certain  classes  of  officials,  the  Government 
had  endeavoured  to  place  their  salaries  at  a  figure  sufficient 
to  render  them  independent  of  these  practices;  but  the 
resources  of  the  Government  were  not  adequate  to  enable  it 
at  once  to  place  the  entire  public  service  upon  a  basis  of 


58        AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

individual  independence.  It  was  also  true  that  certain 
among  the  closest  advisers  of  the  President  were  commonly 
believed  to  have  used  their  positions  for  the  purpose  of 
accumulating  vast  private  fortunes — a  belief  which,  whether 
justified  or  not,  must  be  counted  with  in  determining  the 
standing  of  the  Government  as  enjoyed  throughout  the 
country. 

Thus  the  old  hostility  and  lack  of  confidence,  which 
formerly  characterized  the  relations  between  merchants  and 
officials,  continued  under  the  new  system. 

Through  the  dissolution  of  the  Parliament,  the  Govern- 
ment had  destroyed  an  organ  which  might,  in  the  course  of 
time,  have  estabHshed  relations  of  confidence  between  the 
great  middle  class  of  China  and  the  Government. 

As  a  statesman,  the  President  emphasized  in  the  first  place 
the  requirements  of  order  and  of  authority.  To  him  it 
seemed  that  Parliament,  with  its  free  discussion,  with  its 
opportunity  for  forming  political  factions,  opposing  the  men 
in  authority,  stood  in  the  way  of  the  establishment  of  a  last- 
ing system  of  legal  order.  He,  therefore,  dissolved  first  the 
national  parliament,  then  the  assemblies  of  the  provinces, 
and  finally  the  local  self-governing  bodies. 

In  each  case  inefficiency  was  justly  complained  of.  The 
men  in  the  parliamentary  bodies  had  often  been  self-seeking, 
factional,  and  unpractical.  But  the  President  seemed  to 
have  no  perception  of  the  true  value  of  parliamentary  action 
as  a  basis  of  public  authority;  he  considered  opposition  to  the 
Government  synonymous  with  opposition  to  lawful  au- 
thority. And  in  his  ideas  upon  the  reconstitution  of  Parlia- 
ment, as  far  as  they  had  been  announced,  two  main  principles 
dominated:  first,  that  only  men  of  mature  experience  and  of 
conservative  ideas  should  be  selected;  and  secondly,  that  the 
activities  of  ParHament  should  be  confined  to  discussing  and 
giving  advice  upon  policies  already  determined  upon  by  the 
Administration. 


CHAPTER  VI 
CHINA  OF  MERCHANT-ADVENTURERS 

The  past  may  become  in  the  human  present  more  alive 
than  ever.  John  Richard  Green  finds  in  the  old  records  of 
the  guilds  of  Berwick  an  enactment  "that  where  many 
bodies  are  found  side  by  side  in  one  place  they  may  become 
one,  and  have  one  will,  and  in  the  dealings  of  one  with 
another  have  a  strong  and  hearty  love.**  In  the  history  of 
the  Saxons,  Edwin  of  Northumbria  "caused  stakes  to  be 
fixed  in  the  highways  where  he  had  seen  a  clear  spring," 
and  "brazen  dishes  were  chained  to  them,  to  refresh  the 
weary  sojourner,  whose  fatigues  Edwin  had  himself  ex- 
perienced." These  things  shine  with  the  sun,  and  enlighten 
our  work  to-day.  The  Maine  woodsman  sits  on  a  stump 
whose  rings  number  centuries  of  growth.  When  Chinese 
children  came  to  play  with  our  children  at  the  Legation,  I 
was  always  impressed  by  their  dignity  of  demeanour  and 
their  observance  of  the  courtesies  while  their  elders  were 
present.  On  the  faces  of  these  little  heirs  of  the  Holy  Duke 
the  composure  of  eighty  generations  of  culture  and  traditions 
sat  freshly;  and  it  by  no  means  alloyed  their  delight,  which 
was  unstinted,  in  American  toys  and  dolls. 

This  transmutation  of  the  old  into  new  life  is  seen  every- 
where in  China.  The  day  comes  every  morning  fresh  as  a 
flower.  But  we  know  it  is  old;  it  is  an  ancient  day,  white- 
clad  and  beautiful  as  the  stars.  The  Chinese  peasant  thrusts 
his  stick  of  a  plough  many  eons  deep  into  his  ancestral  soil. 
In  north  China  it  is  loess  soil,  the  most  fertile  on  the  globe, 
brought  down  from  the  mountains  for  millenniums  and 
deposited  to  depths  of  from  twenty  to  thirty  feet.     When 

59 


6o       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

there  are  no  floods  the  rain  sinks  deeply  into  this  porous  soil, 
meets  the  moisture  retained  below,  and  draws  up  therefrom 
the  inorganic  salts  that  are  held  dissolved.  So  its  fertility 
is  inexhaustible. 

But  floods  do  come,  as  they  have  come  unchecked  for  ages. 
In  the  Hwai  River  region,  with  all  this  natural  richness 
underfoot,  the  people  are  poor,  weak,  famine-stricken,  living 
in  aggregations  of  shabby  hovels  that  are  periodically  swept 
away.  Its  crops,  which  should  normally  be  six  in  three 
years,  average  but  two  and  three.  This  region  is  only  one 
example  of  several  prodigious  and  extensive  valleys  choked 
with  fertility,  yet  with  famine  and  pestilence  raging  through 
them,  cursed  as  they  are  by  inundations  that  might  be  com- 
pletely checked  at  little  engineering  cost.  With  these  regions 
reclaimed  and  the  border  provinces  colonized,  China's  crops 
alone  would  support  double  her  present  population.  The 
people  of  the  Hwai  region,  secure  and  aflfluent,  might  be 
easily  increased  by  twenty  million  living  heirs  of  a  fifty- 
centuries-old  civilization.  Indeed,  a  little  vision  and  scien- 
tific application  would  transform  China. 

With  what  the  ages  have  produced  for  the  West — ^the  old 
guild  spirit  reviving,  if  you  please,  in  the  modern  trust — ^the 
West  can  meet  the  East.  The  true  ministers  and  am- 
bassadors to  China  are  the  merchant-adventurers  of  the 
Western  nations,  bearing  their  goods,  their  steel  and  tools, 
their  unique  engineering  skill  and  works.  It  was  not  for 
what  the  entrepreneurs  ** could  get  out  of"  China,  nor  yet 
for  what  China  could  get  out  of  us,  that  my  poHcy  as  Ameri- 
can minister  was  directed  to  this  complementary  meeting  of 
two  civilizations.  It  was  because  I  saw  millions  perishing 
wretchedly  whose  birthright  in  the  higher  arts  and  amenities 
of  living  is  at  least  as  rich  as  our  own — perishing  for  lack  of 
an  organizing  skill  which  it  is  the  province  of  the  Western 
peoples  to  supply.  It  was  because  I  knew,  with  their 
admirable  family  life  and  local  democratic  institutions,  it 


CHINA  OF  MERCHANT-ADVENTURERS      6i 

needed  only  trunk-line  railways  to  link  together  these  close- 
set  communities,  comprising  one  quarter  of  the  earth's  popu- 
lation, into  as  admirable  a  central  democracy. 

But  how  the  West  was  then  meeting  the  East  came  home 
to  me  on  the  second  morning  of  my  stay  in  Peking.  I 
entered  the  breakfast  room,  where  I  found  Doctor  Hombeck 
in  a  state  of  annoyance.  He  handed  me  the  morning  copy 
of  the  Journal  de  Peking^  a  sheet  published  in  French  and 
known  to  be  subservient  to  Russian  and  French  political 
interests  from  which  it  got  subventions.  The  article  in 
question  was  a  scurrilous  attack  on  me  personally,  and  on 
American  action  in  China  generally. 

A  Chinese  journal  in  Shanghai  had  published  a  laudatory 
article  in  which  had  been  cited  extracts  from  my  published 
books.  One  of  these,  taken  from  "World  Politics,"  had  hap- 
pened to  speak  of  French  subserviency  to  Russian  policy 
in  the  Far  East.  The  French  journal  repeated  these  ex- 
pressions as  if  they  had  been  given  out  by  me  in  an  inter- 
view upon  arriving  in  China.  As  they  were  in  fact  taken 
from  books  published  more  than  ten  years  before,  which  had 
run  the  gauntlet  of  French  critical  journals  without  ever 
having  been  taken  as  hostile  to  France,  I  did  not  have 
any  reason  to  worry,  and  the  fume  and  fury  of  the  local 
journal  rather  amused  me  than  otherwise.  I  could,  however, 
not  help  noting  the  temper  of  these  attacks,  their  bitterness 
and  the  utter  rashness  and  lack  of  inquiry  with  which  the 
charges  were  made.  It  gave  me  early  warning,  considering 
its  gross  lack  of  courtesy  to  a  newcomer,  who  had  entered  the 
field  in  a  spirit  friendly  to  all,  as  to  what  might  be  expected 
from  some  of  our  friendly  rivals.  When  several  years  later 
one  of  the  ministers  whose  legation  stood  sponsor  for  this 
sheet  approached  me  with  a  request  to  use  my  influence  to 
suppress  a  Chinese  paper  which  had  attacked  him,  I  re- 
gretted that  it  was  not  in  my  power  to  be  of  assistance. 

The  significance  of  the  article  lay  of  course  in  its  attack 


62       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

upon  American  policy,  which  was  characterized  as  one  of 
"bluff",  and  which  charged  the  United  States  with  assuming  a 
tone  of  superior  virtue  in  criticising  others,  and,  while  loudly 
professing  friendship  for  the  Chinese,  failing  to  shoulder  any 
part  of  the  responsibility  in  actual  affairs.  The  Y.  M.  C.  A, 
and  the  Standard  Oil  Company  were  coupled  together  as 
twin  instruments  of  a  nefarious  and  hypocritical  policy. 

The  China  Press,  the  American  newspaper  of  Shanghai, 
pointed  out  that  the  attack  of  the  French  paper  indicated 
what  the  American  minister  would  have  to  face,  and  ob- 
served that  the  success  or  failure  of  his  diplomatic  mission 
must  depend  upon  the  readiness  of  the  American  Govern- 
ment to  take  an  active  part  in  the  rehabilitation  of  China. 
Should  America  play  the  role  of  an  altruistic  but  impotent 
friend,  and  of  a  captious  critic  of  the  other  powers,  it  could 
gain  neither  sympathy  nor  respect. 

The  American  Government  was  at  this  time  severely 
criticised  for  its  failure  to  endorse  the  Six-Power  Consortium; 
it  was  urged  that  the  Administration  had  sacrificed  the  best 
opportunity  for  bringing  American  goodwill  to  bear  on 
Chinese  public  affairs,  by  exercising  a  moderating  and 
friendly  influence  in  the  council  of  the  great  powers.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  ought  to  be  considered  that  a  new  adminis- 
tration, when  confronted  with  the  sudden  proposal  that  it 
give  exclusive  support  to  one  special  group  of  banks,  might 
well  hesitate,  particularly  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  group 
in  this  case  consisted  of  only  four  New  York  houses.  An 
earlier  administration  had  answered  such  an  inquiry  in  a 
similar  way.  Considering  the  merits  of  the  question  from 
the  point  of  view  of  China,  the  action  might  present  itself 
in  the  light  of  a  refusal  to  join  with  others  in  placing  upon 
the  young  republic  the  fetters  of  foreign  financial  control. 
Moreover,  the  proceeds  of  the  Reorganization  Loan  were 
actually  not  used  for  the  benefit  of  the  Chinese  people,  but 
on  the  contrary  this  financial  support  fastened  the  personal 


CHINA  OF  MERCHANT-ADVENTURERS       63 

authority  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  on  the  country  and  enabled  him 
to  carry  on  a  successful  fight  against  parliament.  That 
body  never  gave  its  approval  to  the  loan. 

From  my  conversations  with  President  Wilson  before 
departing  for  my  post  I  had  formed  the  conclusion  that  the 
President  realized  that  as  America  had  withdrawn  from  a 
cooperative  effort  to  assist  in  the  development  of  China,  it 
was  incumbent  upon  her  to  do  her  share  independently  and 
to  give  specific  moral  and  financial  assistance;  in  fact,  I 
received  the  President's  assurance  of  active  support  for  con- 
structive work  in  China.  In  his  conversation  he  dwelt, 
however,  more  on  the  educational  side  and  on  political  ex- 
ample and  moral  encouragement,  than  on  the  matter  of 
finance  and  commerce. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  in  China  the  withdrawal  of  the 
United  States  from  the  Consortium  was  interpreted  as  an  act 
of  friendship  by  all  groups  with  the  exception  of  that  which 
was  in  control  of  the  Government  at  the  time,  which  would 
have  preferred  to  have  the  United  States  at  the  council  table 
of  the  Consortium  Powers.  Those  opposed  to  the  Govern- 
ment were  particularly  strong  in  their  commendation  of  our 
refusal  to  join  in  an  agreement  which  to  them  seemed  far 
from  beneficial  to  China.  But  all  parties  without  exception 
drew  the  conclusion  that  the  friendly  action  of  the  United 
States,  which  had  now  rejected  the  method  of  international 
cooperation,  would  continue  independently  of  the  others.  In 
view  of  the  power  and  resources  of  the  United  States,  it  was 
hoped  that  there  would  be  a  greater  participation  by  the 
United  States  in  Chinese  industrial  and  commercial  affairs, 
as  well  as  in  administrative  loans,  than  had  hitherto  existed. 

It  is  apparent  from  all  this  that  the  American  position  in 
China  was  not  free  from  difficulties.  The  covert  antagonism 
of  the  five  Consortium  Powers  was  continuous.  We  were 
isolated,  and  would  be  judged  by  what  we  could  do  by  our- 
selves.    Should  it  turn  out  that  we  had  nothing  to  offer  but 


64       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

sage  advice,  the  strictures  of  our  rivals  might  in  time  come  to 
carry  a  certain  amount  of  conviction. 

So  far  as  the  Americans  themselves  were  concerned,  they 
were  thoroughly  discouraged,  and  everywhere  talked  as  if 
it  were  all  up  with  American  enterprise  in  China.  When  I 
said:  "No,  it  is  only  just  beginning,"  polite  incredulity  was 
the  best  I  could  expect.  It  is  very  probable  that  the  Ameri- 
cans who  were  so  downcast  saw  in  the  appointment  of  a 
literary  and  university  man  as  minister  to  China  an  ad- 
ditional indication  that  there  was  to  be  no  special  encourage- 
ment given  to  American  economic  enterprise.  Having  long 
been  famiUar  with  the  underlying  facts  of  the  Far  Eastern 
situation,  I  had  entirely  made  up  my  mind  on  the  primary 
importance  of  American  participation  in  the  industrial  and 
economic  development  of  China.  No  one  could  have  ap- 
preciated more  highly  than  I  did  the  important  work  done 
by  American  missionaries,  teachers,  and  medical  men,  in 
bringing  to  China  a  conception  of  Western  learning  and  life. 
But  if  China  should  have  to  rely  entirely  on  other  nations  for 
active  support  in  the  modern  development  of  her  industries 
and  resources,  then  our  position  in  the  eyes  of  the  Chinese 
nation  could  never  come  up  to  the  opportunities  which  Nature 
had  given  us  through  our  geographic  position  and  our 
industrial  strength. 

I  had  long  discarded  any  narrow  interpretation  of  diplo- 
macy, but  even  if  I  had  adhered  to  the  principle  that  the 
diplomat  must  busy  himself  only  with  political  matters,  I 
should  have  had  to  admit  that  in  China  political  matters 
included  commerce,  finance,  and  industry.  I  did  not,  of 
course,  intend  that  the  Legation  should  enter  into  a  scramble 
for  concessions,  but  it  was  my  purpose  that  it  should  main- 
tain sympathetic  contact  with  Americans  active  in  the 
economic  life  of  China,  and  should  see  to  it  that  the  desire  of 
the  Chinese  to  give  them  fair  treatment  should  not  be  de- 
feated from  any  other  source. 


CHINA  OF  MERCHANT-ADVENTURERS       65 

When  I  thought  of  American  enterprise  in  China  I  had 
less  in  mind  the  making  of  government  contracts,  than  the 
gaining  of  the  confidence  of  the  Chinese  people  in  the  various 
provincial  centres  of  enterprise  by  extensive  business  under- 
takings, resting  on  a  sound  and  broad  foundation.  In  China 
the  people  are  vastly  more  important  than  the  Government, 
so  that  it  is  necessary  to  make  up  one's  mind  from  the  start 
not  to  regard  Peking  as  the  end-all  and  be-all  of  one's 
activity,  but  to  interest  one's  self  deeply  in  what  is  going  on 
in  all  of  those  important  interior  centres  where  the  real 
power  of  government  over  the  people  is  exercised,  and 
where  the  active  organizations  of  the  people  are  located. 

The  universal  knowledge  that  America  has  no  political 
aims  in  China,  of  itself  gives  Americans  the  confidence  of  the 
Chinese  and  predisposes  the  latter  to  favour  intimate  co- 
operation. Our  policy  is  known  to  be  constructive  and  not 
to  imply  insidious  dangers  to  their  national  life.  It  would 
be  discouraging  to  the  Chinese,  should  Americans  fail  to  take 
a  prominent  part  in  the  development  of  Chinese  resources. 
To  Americans  the  idea  of  securing  preeminence  or  pre- 
dominance is  foreign,  but  from  the  very  nature  of  their 
purely  economic  interest  they  have  to  resist  any  attempt  on 
the  part  of  others  to  get  exclusive  rights  or  a  position  of 
predominance,  which  could  be  utilized  to  restrict,  or  entirely 
to  extinguish,  American  opportunities. 

I  was  therefore  resolved  to  give  every  legitimate  en- 
couragement to  constructive  enterprise,  whether  it  were  in 
education,  finance,  commerce,  or  industry.*  Fully  a  year 
before  going  to  China  I  had  expressed  my  view  of  the  nature 

iThe  leading  British  paper  of  China  had  this  to  say  concerning  the  modern  functions  of  diplomacy: 
"It  is  characteristic  of  Doctor  Reinsch  and  his  outlook  upon  China  that  he  should  mark  a  point  of  prog- 
ress in  the  fact  that  the  legations  are  ceasing  to  be  merely  political  centres,  and  that,  instead  of  poli- 
tics being  the  one  and  only  object  of  their  existence,  they  are  now  establishing  relations  of  all  kinds  of 
mutual  helpfulness  in  vital  phases  of  national  reorganization.  In  this  connection,we  may  see  an  increase 
in  the  number  of  experts  who  will  come,  unofficially  for  the  most  part,  to  study  conditions  and  gather 
data  which  may  be  available  as  a  sure  foundation  for  progress."  I  may  say  in  passing  that  the  British 
papers  in  China,  throughout  the  period  of  my  work  there,  were  almost  uniformly  fair  and  friendly,  and 
gave  credit  for  honest  efforts  to  improve  condition*. 


66       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

of  American  policy  there,  saying  that  a  united  China,  master 
of  its  own  land,  developing  its  resources,  open  to  all  nations 
of  the  world  equally  for  commercial  and  industrial  activity, 
should  be  the  chief  desideratum. 

Among  the  specific  American  interests  already  existing  in 
China,  that  of  missionary  and  educational  work  had  at  this 
time  to  be  given  the  first  rank.  There  are  two  factors  which 
have  made  it  possible  for  this  work  to  achieve  a  really  notable 
influence.  The  one  is  that  it  is  plainly  the  result  of  in- 
dividual impulse  on  the  part  of  a  great  many  people  animated 
by  friendly  motives,  and  i:ot  the  result  of  a  concerted  plan  of 
propaganda.  The  second  factor  is  the  spirit  of  helpfulness 
and  cooperation  which  permeates  this  work.  There  is  no 
trace  of  a  desire  to  establish  a  permanent  tutelage.  An 
institution  like  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  acts  with  the  sole  thought  of 
helping  the  Chinese  to  a  better  organization  of  their  own 
social  and  educational  life.  The  sooner  they  are  able  to 
manage  for  themselves,  the  better  it  seems  to  please  the 
American  teachers,  who  may  remain  for  a  while  as  friendly 
counsellors,  but  who  make  no  effort  to  set  up  a  permanent 
hierarchy  of  supervision.  The  Chinese  have  an  intense 
respect  for  their  educators,  and  it  has  been  the  good  fortune 
of  many  Americans — men  Hke  Dr.  W.  A.  P.  Martin  and  Dr. 
Chas.  D.  Tenney — ^to  win  the  devoted  loyalty  of  innumerable 
Chinese  through  their  activity  as  teachers. 

Among  commercial  enterprises  the  Standard  Oil  Company 
was  carrying  petroleum  to  all  parts  of  China.  It  had  intro- 
duced the  use  of  the  petroleum  lamp,  had  extended  the 
length  of  the  day  to  the  hundreds  of  millions  of  Chinese,  and 
even  its  emptied  tin  cans  had  become  ubiquitous  in  town 
and  country,  because  of  the  manifold  uses  to  which  these 
receptacles  could  be  put.  For  efficiency  and  close  contact 
with  the  people,  the  Chinese  organization  of  this  great 
company  was  indeed  admirable. 

A  similar  result  had  been  obtained  by  the  British-Ameri- 


CHINA  OF  MERCHANT-ADVENTURERS      67 

can  Tobacco  Company,  which,  although  organized  in  England 
under  British  law,  is  American  by  majority  ownership,  busi- 
ness methods,  and  personnel.  The  cigarette  had  been  made 
of  universal  use,  and  had  been  adapted  to  the  taste  and 
purchasing  ability  of  the  masses.  Though  there  were 
several  American  commission  firms  of  good  standing,  none 
had  the  extensive  trade  and  financial  importance  of  the  great 
British  houses.  Several  American  firm  names  established 
in  China  early  in  the  nineteenth  century,  like  that  of  Frazar 
&  Company,  had  become  British  in  ownership.  The  only 
American  bank  was  the  International  Banking  Corporation, 
which  at  this  time  confined  itself  to  exchange  business  and  did 
not  differ  in  its  poHcy  or  operations  from  the  common  run  of 
treaty  port  banks. 

If  national  standing  in  China  were  to  be  determined  by  the 
holding  of  government  concessions,  America  was  at  this 
time,  indeed,  poorly  equipped.  The  Bethlehem  Steel 
Corporation  had  in  1910  concluded  a  contract  with  the 
Imperial  Government  for  the  construction  of  vessels  to  the 
value  of  J^20,ooo,ooo.  When  I  came  to  China,  a  vice- 
president  of  the  corporation,  Mr.  Archibald  Johnston,  was 
in  Peking,  ready  to  arrange  with  the  republican  govern- 
ment for  a  continuance  of  the  contract.  The  American 
banking  group  was  a  partner  in  the  Hukuang  Railways,  in 
which  it  shared  with  the  British,  French,  and  German  groups. 
An  American  engineer  was  employed  at  the  time  in  making  a 
survey  of  a  portion  of  the  proposed  Hne  along  the  Yangtse 
River.  The  American  group  also  held  the  concession  for  the 
Chinchow-Aigun  Railway  in  Manchuria,  the  execution  of 
which  had  been  blocked  by  Russia  and  Japan.  The  group 
further  participated  with  the  three  other  groups  above 
mentioned  in  the  option  for  a  currency  loan.  The  only 
activity  going  on  at  this  time  in  connection  with  these 
various  contracts,  on  the  part  of  America,  was  the  survey  of 
the  Hukuang  railway  line  west  of  Ichang. 


68       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

For  some  time  the  practice  had  grown  up,  on  the  part  of 
European  powers,  to  urge  the  Chinese  to  employ,  as  advisers, 
men  reputed  to  have  expert  knowledge  in  certain  fields. 
The  most  noted  adviser  at  this  time  was  Dr.  George  Morri- 
son, who  had  gained  a  reputation  in  interpreting  Far  East- 
ern affairs  as  Peking  correspondent  for  the  London  Times 
during  and  after  the  critical  period  of  1900.  A  fresh  group 
of  advisers  had  just  been  added  under  the  terms  of  the 
Reorganization  Loan.  Each  power  therein  represented  had 
insisted  that  the  Chinese  appoint  at  least  one  of  its  nationals 
as  an  adviser.  The  American  Government  had  never  urged 
China  to  make  such  an  appointment.  But  when  President 
Eliot  visited  China  in  191 3,  Chinese  officials  expressed  to 
him  the  wish  that  a  prominent  American  should  be  retained 
as  adviser  to  the  Chinese  Government.  President  Eliot 
suggested  that  the  Carnegie  Endowment  might  propose 
certain  experts  from  whom  the  Chinese  Government  could 
then  make  a  selection.  This  method  was  actually  followed, 
and  as  a  result  Prof.  F.  J.  Goodnow  of  Columbia  University, 
a  recognized  authority  on  constitutional  law,  had  been  re- 
tained by  the  Chinese  Government  and  was  at  this  time 
already  in  residence  at  Peking.  The  Ministry  of  Communi- 
cations on  its  part  had  sought  a  man  familiar  with  railway 
accounting,  and  had  called  upon  the  late  Prof.  Henry  C. 
Adams,  the  noted  economist  and  railway  expert  of  Michigan 
University. 

The  important  administrative  positions  of  Inspector 
General  of  Customs  and  of  Foreign  Inspector  of  the  Salt 
Revenue  were  held  by  two  British  officials.  The  salt 
administration  had  come  within  the  purview  of  inter- 
national supervision  through  the  Reorganization  Loan 
agreement;  and,  as  America  was  not  a  party  to  that  loan, 
the  appointment  of  Americans  to  any  positions  in  this  service 
was  frowned  upon  by  several  of  the  partners.  The  In- 
spector, Sir  Richard  Dane,  an  official  of  long  experience  in 


CHINA  OF  MERCHANT-ADVENTURERS      69 

India,  however,  adopted  the  policy  of  not  confining  the 
appointments  to  subjects  of  the  Consortium  Powers.  He 
had  retained  several  Americans,  in  whom  he  seemed  to 
place  great  confidence.  In  the  Customs  Service,  Americans 
did  not  hold  the  number  of  positions  to  which  they  were 
relatively  entitled.  This  was  undoubtedly  due  to  the  fact 
that  very  few  people  in  the  United  States  knew  that  such 
positions  in  China  are  open  to  Americans;  moreover,  many 
of  those  Americans  who  were  actually  appointed  had  be- 
come impatient  with  the  relatively  slow  advancement  in  this 
service  and  had  been  attracted  by  other  opportunities.  There 
were,  however,  a  number  of  highly  reputed  and  efficient 
American  officials  in  the  Customs  Service. 


CHAPTER  VII 
PROMPT    PROPOSALS    FOR   AMERICAN    ACTION 

The  Chinese  were  not  slow  in  showing  what  conclusions 
they  deduced  from  the  withdrawal  of  the  American  Govern- 
ment from  the  Six-Power  Consortium.  On  November  27th, 
two  cabinet  ministers  called  on  me  for  a  private  conver- 
sation. Following  this  interview  Mr.  Chang  Chien,  recog- 
nized master  of  antique  Chinese  learning,  but  also  Minister 
of  Industries  and  Commerce,  came  to  me.  I  will  relate  the 
substance  of  what  passed  on  these  two  occasions,  beginning 
with  Mr.  Chang. 

Chang  Chien  carried  off  first  honours  in  the  great  metro- 
politan examinations  of  Peking  under  the  old  regime  in  1899. 
He  is  a  scholar  par  excellence  o\  the  Chinese  classics,  and  his 
chirography  is  so  famous  that  he  has  been  able  to  support  a 
college  out  of  the  proceeds  of  a  sale  of  examples  of  his  writing. 
But  he  has  not  rested  satisfied  with  the  ancient  learning.  In 
the  region  of  his  home.  Nan  Tung-chow,  on  the  banks  of  the 
Yangtse,  he  has  established  schools,  factories,  and  experiment 
stations  for  the  improvement  of  agriculture  and  industry. 
He  had  financial  reverses.  People  at  this  time  still  doubted 
whether  he  would  be  permanently  successful,  although  they 
admitted  that  he  had  given  impetus  to  many  improvements. 
Since  then  his  enterprises  have  flourished  and  multiphed. 
He  has  become  a  great  national  figure,  whose  words,  spoken 
from  an  honest  desire  for  right  public  action,  have  decisive 
weight  with  the  nation.  While  he  still  represents  the  old 
belief  that  the  superior  man  of  perfect  literary  training  should 
be  able  successfully  to  undertake  any  enterprise  and  to  solve 
any  practical  difficulty — ^which  belief  is  contrary  to  the  de- 

70 


PROPOSALS  FOR  AMERICAN  ACTION        71 

mands  of  our  complex  modern  life  for  specialization — yet 
he  has  succeeded  in  bending  his  intelligence  to  thoroughly 
modern  tasks. 

As  would  be  expected  from  his  high  culture  as  a  Chinese 
scholar,  Mr.  Chang  Chien  is  a  man  of  refinement  and  dis- 
tinction of  manners,  than  which  nothing  could  be  more 
considerate  and  more  dignified.  The  Chinese  are  exceed- 
ingly sensitive  to  the  thought  and  feeling  of  any  one  in 
whose  company  they  happen  to  be;  if  their  host  is  busy  or 
preoccupied,  no  matter  how  politely  he  may  receive  them, 
they  will  nevertheless  sense  his  difficulty  and  will  cut  their 
visit  short.  They  also  have  great  tact  in  turning  a  conversa- 
tion or  avoiding  discussions  they  are  not  ready  for,  and  they 
can  do  this  in  a  manner  which  makes  it  impossible  to  force 
a  discussion  without  impolite  insistence.  The  smoothness 
and  velvetiness  of  Chinese  manners,  together  with  the  ab- 
sence of  all  servile  assent  and  the  maintenance  of  complete 
independence  of  discussion,  are  marvellous  and  bear  evidence 
to  thousands  of  years  of  social  training. 

Mr.  Chang  Chien  was  particularly  interested  in  river 
and  harbour  development,  and  in  plans  for  the  drainage 
of  those  regions  of  China  which  are  subject  to  periodical 
floods.  It  was  contemplated  to  estabhsh  a  special  conser- 
vancy bureau  under  whose  care  surveys  for  important  proj- 
ects were  to  be  undertaken.  I  questioned  Mr.  Chang  con- 
cerning the  status  of  the  Hwai  River  conservancy  scheme 
for  the  prevention  of  floods  in  the  northern  portion  of  the 
provinces  of  Kiangsu  and  Anhui,  the  region  from  which  he 
came. 

"I  have  already  established  a  special  engineering  school," 
he  replied,  "in  order  to  train  men  for  this  work.  A  large 
part  of  the  survey  has  been  made,  and  it  can  be  entirely  com- 
pleted by  a  further  expenditure  of  35,000  taels. 

"Besides  the  enormous  benefit  of  such  a  work  to  all  the 
adjoining  agricultural  lands,"  he  continued,  "there  would  be 


72       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

reclaimed  nearly  3,000,000  acres  which  could  now  not  be  used 
at  all,  although  their  soil  is  inexhaustibly  fertile.  The  land 
thus  reclaimed  would  be  salable  immediately  for  at  least  ^40 
an  acre.  Would  not  this  alone  be  ample  security  for  a  large 
conservancy  loan?    $25,000,000  would  do  the  work.'* 

Mr.  Chang  was  also  interested  in  the  establishment  of  a 
commercial  and  industrial  bank,  in  copartnership  with 
American  capitahsts.  *'Such  a  bank,"  he  said,  "would  as- 
sist in  furnishing  the  capital  for  the  works  of  internal  im- 
provement." 

It  was  quite  plain  that  Mr.  Chang  looked  upon  a  bank 
as  an  institution  which  would  invest  its  capital  in  such  enter- 
prises— a  conception  which  was  then  quite  current  among  the 
Chinese.  They  had  not  yet  fully  realized  that  in  the  mod- 
ern organization  of  credit  a  bank  may  act  as  a  depository  and 
may  make  temporary  loans,  but  more  permanent  invest- 
ments must  ultimately  be  placed  with  individual  capitalists, 
with  banks  acting  only  as  underwriting  and  selling  agencies. 

As  we  talked  about  the  execution  of  these  large  and  useful 
projects,  Mr.  Chang  repeatedly  made  expressions  such  as 
this :  "  I  prefer  American  cooperation.  I  am  ready  to  employ 
American  experts  to  work  out  the  plans  and  to  act  as  super- 
visors. But  please  to  bear  in  mind,  these  works  may  not  be 
undertaken  without  raising  a  large  part  of  the  needed  funds 
in  the  United  States  or  in  other  countries." 

When  the  two  cabinet  ministers  called  they  brought  no 
interpreter.  "The  matters  about  which  we  wish  to  talk," 
they  said,  "are  so  important  that  we  wish  to  keep  the  dis- 
cussion confined  to  as  few  persons  as  possible.  We  bring 
the  ideas  of  President  Yuan  Shih-kai  and  his  government 
with  respect  to  what  Americans  might  do  in  China." 

They  first  gave  me  a  review  of  the  recent  development  of 
the  Russo-Japanese  entente  with  respect  to  Manchuria  and 
MongoHa.  They  expressed  their  behef  that  an  understand- 
ing existed  between  these  powers  to  treat  outer  Mongolia 


PROPOSALS  FOR  AMERICAN  ACTION        73 

as  a  region  within  which  Russian  control  should  not  be  ob- 
structed, and,  vicg  versa,  to  allow  a  free  hand  to  Japan,  not 
only  in  southern  Manchuria,  but  also  in  eastern  Mongolia. 
Continuous  activity  of  the  Japanese  in  south  China,  in 
stirring  up  opposition  to  the  Central  Government,  indicated 
a  desire  to  weaken  China,  and,  if  possible,  to  divide  it  against 
itself.  The  extraordinary  efforts  made  by  Japan  to  increase 
her  naval  establishment  were  also  particularly  mentioned. 
The  impression  their  discourse  conveyed  was  that  Japan  was 
engaged  in  a  strong  forward  poHcy  in  China,  and  that  in  this 
she  had  the  countenance  and  support  of  Russia. 

My  visitors  then  passed  on  to  the  reasons  why  the  Chinese 
entertained  the  hope  that  America  would  give  them  its 
moral  support  to  the  extent  of  opposing  the  inroads  made  by 
Japan  and  Russia,  and  of  cooperating  with  Great  Britain  and 
other  powers  favourable  to  the  Open  Door  policy  in  pre- 
venting attempts  to  break  up  the  Chinese  Repubhc.  They 
fully  realized  the  improbability  of  an  alliance  between 
China  and  the  United  States,  but  laid  stress  on  the  parallel 
interests  of  the  two  countries,  and  particularly  on  the  sym- 
pathy engendered  through  following  the  principles  of  demo- 
cratic government.  Having  become  a  republic,  the  Chinese 
Government  is  brought  into  peculiarly  close  relationship  to 
the  United  States;  it  sees  in  the  United  States  its  most  sin- 
cere and  unselfish  friend,  and  realizes  the  importance  of 
American  moral  support. 

Descending  to  particulars,  the  ministers  pointed  out  that 
while  China  appreciated  and  valued  the  friendly  interest 
and  counsel  of  the  United  States,  it  was  disappointing  that  so 
very  little  had  been  done  by  America,  while  the  European 
Powers  and  Japan  should  have  taken  such  a  very  important 
part  in  the  development  of  the  resources  of  China.  They 
said  that  the  Chinese  Government  and  people  were  desirous 
of  affording  the  Americans  unusual  opportunities,  should 
they  be  ready  to  cooperate. 


74       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Taking  up  specific  enterprises,  they  stated  that  the 
Government  was  quite  wilHng  to  ratify  and  carry  out  the 
contract  made  in  1910  by  the  Imperial  Government  with  the 
Bethlehem  Steel  Corporation.  Under  this  contract  they 
intended  to  build  vessels  adapted  for  commercial  purposes, 
but  convertible  into  warships  somewhat  like  the  vessels  of  the 
Russian  Volunteer  Fleet.  The  establishment  of  a  steam- 
ship line  to  the  United  States,  directly  or  by  way  of  the 
Panama  Canal,  was  greatly  desired  by  the  Government. 

It  was  recalled  that  at  the  time  the  naval  mission  of  Prince 
Tsao  visited  the  United  States,  the  matter  of  lending  Ameri- 
can experts  as  instructors  for  the  Chinese  navy  came  up  for 
discussion,  and  such  assistance  was  promised  by  the  Ameri- 
can Administration  under  President  Taft.  The  assistance 
contemplated  was  to  be  instructional  and  technical,  not 
involving  matters  of  policy  or  suggesting  a  political  alliance, 
and  of  a  nature  such  as  had  been  in  the  past  given  by  other 
nations,  particularly  Great  Britain.  The  ministers  stated 
that  the  Chinese  Government  still  intended  to  avail  itself  of 
this  assistance  should  the  need  for  it  arise,  and  that  American 
cooperation  in  a  matter  like  this  was  preferred  because  of  the 
political  disinterestedness  of  the  American  Government. 

The  ministers  then  took  up  more  purely  industrial  enter- 
prises, and  dwelt  particularly  on  plans  for  river  and  harbour 
improvement,  mentioning  the  Hwai  River  region  and  other 
districts  where  agricultural  pursuits  are  interrupted  by 
destructive  floods.  As  the  Central  Government  contemplated 
the  establishment  of  a  national  bureau  to  provide  for  these 
matters,  the  ministers  suggested  that  the  American  Govern- 
ment would  be  invited  to  give  its  assistance  by  lending 
experts  to  plan  and  conduct  the  proposed  works.  They 
expressed  their  beHef  that  the  experience  of  Americans  in 
such  enterprises  had  qualified  them  above  any  other  nation 
for  coping  with  these  problems  of  China. 

Other  matters  were  taken  up,  such  as  the  possible  creation 


PROPOSALS  FOR  AMERICAN  ACTION        75 

of  a  tobacco  monopoly,  from  which  the  ministers  expected 
both  increased  revenue  and  a  more  effective  organization  of 
tobacco  production  throughout  China.  It  was  not  their 
desire  to  oust  the  British-American  Tobacco  Company,  but 
they  suggested  that  an  arrangement  would  be  made  whereby 
this  company  might  act  as  the  selling  agent  of  the  Chinese 
Government. 

Another  subject  was  the  exploration  of  China  for  petro- 
leum. They  stated  that  the  Government  wished  that  the 
development  of  oil  fields  should  be  undertaken.  On  account 
of  the  manner  in  which  some  other  nations  were  wont  to 
extend  the  scope  of  any  concessions  of  this  kind  so  as  to 
estabHsh  general  claims  of  preference,  particularly  as  to 
railway  rights,  the  Government  much  preferred  to  take  up 
this  matter  with  Americans. 

It  was  apparent  that  these  men  entertained  high  hopes  of 
American  activity  in  China,  and  that  they  were  ready  to 
do  their  part  in  making  the  conditions  favourable.  Their 
minds  were  alive  with  plans  of  development.  Both  because 
of  American  experience  with  similar  problems  and  of  the 
American  spirit  of  fairness,  they  believed  that  great  benefit 
would  result  if  Americans  were  to  become  prominently  active 
in  the  vast  industrial  transformation  which  they  anticipated 
in  the  immediate  future. 

As  this  conversation  passed  from  topic  to  topic,  touching 
on  proposals  of  moment,  I  could  not  but  feel  that  a  new 
spirit  had  surely  arisen  in  China.  It  would  have  been 
inconceivable  under  the  old  regime  for  high  officials,  trained 
in  the  traditional  formalism  and  reticent  with  inherited  dis- 
trust of  the  foreigner,  to  approach  a  foreign  representative 
thus  frankly,  laying  before  him  concrete  proposals  for  joint 
action.  In  the  past,  as  we  know,  it  was  the  foreigners  who 
had  desired  changes  and  new  enterprises  and  who  had  in  and 
out  of  season  pressed  them  upon  the  reluctant  and  inert 
Chinese  officials.     But  here  were  men  who  realized  that  it  is 


76       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

the  function  of  the  Government  to  plan  and  to  initiate;  and 
they  were  ready  to  go  to  any  length  in  making  advances  to  a 
country  in  whose  motives  they  had  full  confidence. 

It  was  impossible  not  to  be  fascinated  by  the  prospects 
that  were  here  unfolded.  A  country  of  vast  resources  in 
natural  wealth,  labour,  power,  and  even  in  capital,  was  turn- 
ing toward  a  new  form  of  organization  in  which  all  these 
forces  were  to  be  made  to  work  in  larger  units,  over  greater 
areas  and  with  more  intensive  methods  than  ever  before. 
The  merely  local  point  of  view  was  giving  way  to  the  national 
outlook.  National  resources  and  industries  were  looked  at 
not  from  the  point  of  view  alone  of  any  local  group  interested 
but  of  the  unity  of  national  life  and  effort.  To  know  that 
in  this  great  task  of  reorganization,  Americans  would  be  most 
welcome  as  associates  and  directors;  that  they  were  spon- 
taneously and  sincerely  desired  in  order  that  all  these 
materials  and  resources  might  the  more  readily  be  built  into 
a  great  and  effective  unity  of  national  life — ^that,  indeed, 
could  not  fail  to  be  a  cause  for  pride  and  gratification  to  an 
American.  The  only  disturbing  thought  was  the  question 
whether  Americans  were  ready  to  appreciate  the  importance 
of  the  opportunity  here  offered.  Yet  there  could  be  no 
doubt  that  every  energy  must  be  applied  in  order  to  make 
them  realize  the  unprecedented  nature  of  the  opportunities 
and  the  importance  to  America  herself  of  the  manner  in  which 
these  materials  were  to  be  organized  so  as  to  promote  general 
human  welfare  rather  than  selfish  exploitation  and  political 
ambition. 

The  Russian  efforts  to  strengthen  their  position  in 
Mongolia,  to  which  these  two  visitors  had  alluded,  had  at 
this  time  brought  fruit  in  the  form  of  an  agreement  with 
China  to  have  the  "autonomy"  of  Mongolia  recognized.  A 
result  and  byplay  of  these  negotiations  came  to  the  notice 
of  the  foreign  representatives  in  Peking  at  a  meeting  of  the 
diplomatic  corps  on  December  nth.     The  meeting  was  at 


PROPOSALS  FOR  AMERICAN  ACTION        77 

the  British  Legation,  to  which  Sir  John  Jordan  had  by  this 
time  returned. 

The  head  of  the  large  establishment  of  the  Russian  Le- 
gation was  a  young  man,  Mr.  Krupenski.  Trained  under 
some  of  the  ablest  diplomats  of  Russia  and  having  spent  many 
years  in  Peking  as  secretary,  he  had  manifestly  not  been 
selected  by  chance.  With  his  English  secretary  he  occupied 
his  vast  house  alone,  being  unmarried.  He  entertained 
brilHantly,  ably  seconded  therein  by  the  Russo-Asiatic  Bank 
across  the  way.  Besides  his  thorough  understanding  of  the 
Chinese,  Mr.  Krupenski  had  a  valuable  quality  in  his  ability 
to  shed  all  the  odium  that  might  attach  to  the  policy  of  his 
government,  as  a  duck  sheds  water.  He  appeared  at  times 
greatly  to  enjoy  mystifying  his  colleagues,  to  judge  by  his 
amused  and  unconcerned  expression  when  he  knew  they  were 
guessing  as  to  what  his  last  move  might  mean.  Mr.  Krupen- 
ski is  tall,  florid,  unmistakably  Russian.  During  my  first 
visit  with  him  he  plunged  in  medias  res  concerning  China. 
Though  he  probably  wondered  what  move  I  might  contem- 
plate after  the  Manchurian  proposals  of  Mr.  Knox  and 
America's  withdrawal  from  the  Six-Power  Group,  he  gave  no 
hint  of  his  feelings,  which  undoubtedly  did  not  contemplate 
me  as  likely  to  become  an  intimate  associate  in  policies. 
When  I  left  him  I  knew  that  here  was  a  man,  surrounded  by 
competent  experts  in  finance,  language,  and  law,  who  could 
play  with  the  intricacies  of  Chinese  affairs  and  take  ad- 
vantage of  opportunities  and  situations  of  which  others 
would  not  even  have  an  inkling. 

At  the  meeting  of  December  nth  the  Russian  minister 
stated  that  he  desired  to  make  an  announcement,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  tell  his  colleagues  quite  blandly  that  his  govern- 
ment had  decided  to  withdraw  the  legation  guards  and 
other  Russian  troops  from  north  China,  and  that  they  sug- 
gested to  the  other  governments  to  take  similar  action. 

This  announcement  caused  surprise  all  around  the  table. 


78       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Questions  came  from  all  directions:  "Is  this  action  to  be 
immediate?"  "What  is  the  purpose  of  your  government?" 
"What  substitute  for  this  protection  do  you  suggest?" 
These  and  many  more.  The  Russian  minister  seemed 
amused  by  the  excitement  he  had  caused.  He  allowed  none 
of  the  questioners  to  worry  him  in  the  least,  or  to  draw  him 
out.  With  a  quizzical  and  non-committal  smile  he  let  the 
anxious  surmises  of  his  colleagues  run  off  his  back.  He 
shrugged  his  shoulders  and  said:  "These  are  the  instructions 
of  my  government.  Their  purpose — I  do  not  know." 
When  the  meeting  adjourned,  small  groups  walked  off  in 
different  directions,  all  still  intently  discussing  the  meaning 
of  this  move.  So,  the  legation  guards  were  really  very 
important!  The  first  question  put  to  me  in  Shanghai  had 
related  to  them,  and  here  I  found  the  diplomatic  corps 
thrown  into  excitement  by  the  announcement  that  Russia 
was  withdrawing  her  guard. 

When  I  arrived  at  the  Legation,  where  Mrs.  Reinsch  was 
receiving  and  where  visitors  in  large  numbers  were  taking  tea 
and  dancing  to  the  music  of  the  marine  band,  the  news  had 
evidently  already  preceded  me,  for  several  people  asked  me 
what  had  happened;  and  Putnam  Weale  and  W.  C.  Donald, 
the  British  press  representatives,  were  full  of  surmises.  The 
interpretation  generally  accepted  was  that  the  Russians,  and 
possibly  the  Japanese,  were  trying  to  put  the  other  powers 
in  a  hole;  if  they  did  not  withdraw  their  legation  guards  they 
might  displease  the  Chinese  Government,  after  what  Russia 
had  done;  if  they  did  withdraw  them,  they  would  give  an 
advantage  to  Russia  and  Japan,  powers  who,  on  account  of 
their  proximity  to  China,  could  send  large  bodies  of  troops 
upon  short  notice. 

From  the  attitude  of  the  diplomats  it  had  been  apparent 
that  the  proposal  of  the  Russians  would  not  prove  acceptable. 
For  weeks  the  press  was  filled  with  attempts  to  gauge  the 
true  bearing  of  the  Russian  proposal.     Looked  at  from  this 


PROPOSALS  FOR  AMERICAN  ACTION        79 

distance  after  the  Great  War,  it  is  hard  to  imagine  how  so 
relatively  unimportant  a  matter  could  cause  excitement.  Of 
course,  the  removal  of  the  legation  guard  was  not  considered 
so  important  in  itself,  but  it  was  of  moment  as  an  indication 
of  what  Russia  might  plan  with  respect  to  the  further 
advance  of  her  influence  in  China. 

Probably  Russia's  action  did  not  really  contemplate  any 
far-reaching  consequences.  The  Russians  were  urging  the 
Chinese  Government  to  make  an  arrangement  for  Mon- 
golian "autonomy,"  which  could  not  but  be  intensely  dis- 
tasteful to  the  Chinese.  The  Russians  had  to  offer  some- 
thing in  return;  with  thorough  knowledge  of  the  old  type  of 
the  Chinese  official  mind,  they  selected  something  which 
would  not  cost  them  anything,  but  which  would  be  most 
gratifying  to  the  Chinese  Government.  The  Government 
looked  upon  the  presence  of  foreign  troops  in  Peking  and  in 
Chihli  Province  as  incompatible  with  its  dignity.  Therefore, 
the  Russian  Government  knew  that  through  withdrawing  its 
troops  and  calhng  upon  the  other  governments  to  do  likewise, 
an  opportunity  would  be  given  the  Chinese  Government  to 
claim  an  important  victory,  and  the  bitterness  of  renun- 
ciation with  respect  to  Mongolia  would  thus  be  somewhat 
tempered.  Yuan  Shih-kai  and  the  Government  as  such 
would  probably  take  that  view;  but  the  Chinese  as  in- 
dividuals were  not  likely  thus  to  consider  the  presence  of 
foreign  troops  an  unmixed  evil.  These  guards  tended  to 
stabiHze  the  situation,  also  to  prevent  unconscionable  acts 
or  high-handed  inroads  by  any  individual  powers.  So 
far  as  the  people  of  China  were  concerned,  Russia  might  not 
gather  much  credit  through  this  move. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
A  LITTLE  VISION  FOR  CHINA 

I  HAVE  said  that  a  little  vision  and  the  application  of 
American  scientific  methods  would  transform  China.  Chang 
Chien  had  instanced  the  Hwai  River  valley,  and  the  ease 
with  which  it  might  be  made  to  bloom  as  the  most  fertile 
tract  on  the  globe.  China  boasts  the  most  skilled  horti- 
culturists and  truck-farmers  of  any  nation,  and  they  breed 
its  thousands  of  species  of  vegetables  and  flowering  plants 
and  shrubs.  It  is  said  of  the  Chinese  gardener,  that  if  there 
is  a  sick  or  weakened  plant,  he  "listens  and  hears  its  cry," 
and  nurses  it  into  health  like  a  mother.  But  now  the  multi- 
tudes in  the  flood-ridden  districts  must  periodically  expect 
the  scarification  of  their  gorgeous  acres,  the  bearing  away 
of  their  dwellings  and  loved  ones  on  the  remorseless  floods. 

Americans  had  for  some  time  been  aware  of  the  possi- 
bilities of  delivering  from  their  curse  these  garden  spots 
of  earth.  The  American  Red  Cross,  after  giving  $400,cxx) 
for  relief  of  the  severe  famine  in  191 1,  was  advised  by  its 
representatives  how  such  calamities  might  be  prevented,  and 
it  set  an  American  engineer  at  making  surveys  in  the  Hwai 
regions  and  suggesting  suitable  engineering  works.  Chang 
Chien,  with  his  native  school  of  engineers,  was  also  investi- 
gating the  flood  conditions,  just  about  the  time  the  American 
group  of  financiers  left  the  Six-Power  Consortium.  It  might 
be  expected  that  this  American  group  would  be  reluctant 
immediately  to  start  further  enterprises  in  China;  indeed, 
that  it  might  even  discourage  others  from  starting.  Hence 
I  thought  it  essential  to  propose  only  such  undertakings  as 
would  come  naturally  from  past  relationships  or  would  help 

80 


A  LITTLE  VISION  FOR  CHINA  8i 

develop  some  American  interest  already  established  in 
China.  I  was  attracted  by  this  plan,  sound,  useful,  and 
meritorious,  to  redeem  the  Hwai  River  region. 

I  found  that  the  Chinese  did  not  wish  to  take  up  this 
matter  with  any  other  nation  than  the  United  States,  for 
they  feared  the  territorial  ambitions  of  the  other  powers  and 
their  desire  to  establish  "spheres  of  influence"  in  China. 
To  send  in  engineers,  to  drain  and  irrigate,  meant  close 
contacts;  it  might  mean  control  over  internal  resources 
within  the  regions  affected,  for  by  way  of  security  the  foreign 
creditor  would  demand  a  mortgage  upon  the  lands  to  be 
improved.  Then  there  was  the  Grand  Canal,  a  navigable 
watercourse,  which  would  come  within  the  scope  of  such 
works,  and  would  give  the  foreign  engineers  and  capitalists  a 
direct  means  of  penetrating  the  interior.  Jealous  of  foreign 
political  control  in  their  domestic  affairs,  the  Chinese  were 
guarding  their  rights.  But  the  American  policy  was  tra- 
ditionally non-aggressive,  and  I  found  that  to  fair-minded 
Americans  the  Chinese  would  grant  concessions  which  no 
other  nation  might  hope  to  secure. 

I  therefore  asked  through  the  Department  of  State  what 
the  American  Red  Cross  might  continue  to  do.  Would  it 
take  steps  toward  the  choosing  of  a  reputable  and  efficient 
American  engineering  firm  and  have  this  firm  supported  by 
American  capitalists,  who  might  lend  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment the  funds  needed  to  reclaim  the  rich  Hwai  River  region .? 
The  Red  Cross  responded  favourably.  I  thereupon  sought 
out  Mr.  Chang  Chien,  the  scholar  and  minister,  and  got 
from  him  a  definite  agreement  to  entrust  to  the  American 
Red  Cross  the  selection  of  engineers  and  capitaHsts  to  carry 
out  this  great  reform  upon  conditions  laid  down. 

The  minister  and  I  had  frequent  conferences.  We  dis- 
cussed carefully  the  engineering  contracts,  the  conditions  of 
the  loan,  the  security.  Every  sentence  in  the  proposed 
agreement  had  been  weighed,  every  word  carefully  chosen; 


82       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

finally,  on  January  27,  1914,  it  was  signed  by  Chang  Chien 
as  minister,  and  by  myself  in  behalf  of  the  American  Red 
Cross.  The  J.  G.  White  Corporation  was  chosen  to  finance 
the  preliminary  survey.  Thus  there  were  sent  to  China 
during  the  next  summer  three  experts:  Colonel  (later  Major 
General)  Sibert,  of  the  Panama  Canal  Commission;  Mr. 
Arthur  P.  Davis,  director  of  the  United  States  Recla- 
mation Service;  and  Prof.  D.  W.  Mead,  of  the  University 
of  Wisconsin,  an  expert  in  hydraulic  engineering. 

Here  was  a  beginning  of  great  promise,  and  in  a  new 
direction. 

But  American  enterprise  had  already  affected  the  daily 
life  of  the  Chinese  in  the  field  opened  up  by  the  Standard  Oil 
Company.  In  fact,  the  lamp  of  Standard  Oil  had  Hghted 
China. 

Now  enter  Mr.  Yamaza,  the  Japanese  minister.  Japan, 
who  had  no  oil  in  her  lamp,  wished  to  explore  for  it  in  China; 
so  did  other  nations.  But  the  American  oil  company,  in  a 
way  which  I  shall  detail,  had  gotten  the  concession.  More- 
over, the  Bethlehem  Steel  Corporation  had  agreed  for 
$20,cxx),ooo  to  build  a  merchant  fleet  for  China,  convertible 
into  cruisers — this  to  take  the  place  of  an  old  imperial  con- 
tract for  warships.  At  China's  express  request,  and  not  at 
all  because  they  were  in  that  business,  the  Bethlehem  people 
also  consented  to  apply  three  millions  of  the  whole  sum  to 
improve  a  Chinese  port.  Together  with  the  Hwai  River 
enterprise  these  American  activities  had  put  Japan  on  the 
alert.  The  Japanese  press  had  distorted  their  significance, 
and  now  in  the  small  Bethlehem  contract  Mr.  Yamaza  began 
to  see  things — a  future  Chinese  mistress  of  the  Asian  seas, 
perhaps,  and  the  Chinese  littoral  all  besprinkled  with 
naval  ports.  One  evening  Mr.  Yamaza  spoke  to  me  about 
it,  and  at  length;  it  was  plain  that  his  government  meant  some 
move. 

Now  Mr.  Yamaza  and  his  first  secretary,  Mr.  Midzuno, 


A  LITTLE  VISION  FOR  CHINA  83 

were  both  unusually  clever  men.  They  drank  a  great  deal. 
The  minister  explained  that  he  did  this  for  reasons  of  health, 
because,  unless  there  were  something  he  could  give  up  if  he 
should  be  taken  sick,  it  might  be  very  bad  for  him.  I  recall 
how  Mr.  Midzuno  entertained  a  party  at  dinner  by  detailing 
his  notable  collection  of  expressions  in  various  languages,  of 
equivalents  to  the  German  term  "Katzenjammer."  Both 
of  these  men  had  previous  Chinese  experience  and  were 
intimately  familiar  with  Chinese  affairs.  Yamaza  was  a 
man  of  great  shrewdness;  being  under  the  influence  of  liquor 
seemed  rather  to  sharpen  his  understanding.  Taciturn  and 
speaking  in  hesitating  sentences,  he  would  never  commit 
himself  to  anything,  but  would  deploy  the  conversation  with 
great  skill,  in  order  to  give  his  interlocutor  every  chance  to 
do  that  very  thing. 

On  the  evening  of  this  conversation  we  were  guests  of  the 
manager  of  the  Russo-Asiatic  Bank.  An  amateur  theatrical 
performance  was  in  progress — three  French  "one-acters," 
the  chief  being  "The  Man  Who  Married  a  Dumb  Wife,"  by 
Anatole  France.  Peking  foreign  society  was  there  in  force;  the 
majority  were  gathered  in  the  large  salon  where  the  stage  was 
set,  others  promenading  or  conversing  in  small  groups.  In 
the  intermission  between  two  plays  I  encountered  the 
Japanese  minister,  and,  finding  that  he  desired  to  talk, 
wandered  with  him  to  the  smoking  room,  where  we  pre- 
empted a  corner,  whence  during  a  long  conversation  we 
would  catch  now  and  then  the  echoes  from  the  salon  as  the 
action  on  the  stage  rose  to  a  more  excited  pitch. 

Mr.  Yamaza  was  more  talkative  than  I  had  ever  seen  him. 
As  was  his  custom,  he  had  consumed  ardent  waters  quite 
freely,  but,  as  always,  his  mind  was  clear  and  alert.  "In 
Shensi  and  Chihli  provinces,"  he  opened  up,  "the  exertions  of 
Japanese  nationals  in  the  matter  of  the  concession  to  the 
Standard  Oil  Company  have  given  them  a  right  to  be  con- 
sidered.    I    have   been   contending   to   the   Chinese   that 


84       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Japan  has  a  prior  interest  in  the  oil  field  of  Shensi  Province. 
Do  you  not  know  that  Japanese  engineers  were  formerly 
employed  there  ? " 

On  my  part,  I  expressed  surprise  that  the  Japanese  papers 
should  make  so  much  noise  about  the  American  oil  con- 
cession, whereas  it  was  quite  natural  that  Americans,  who 
had  done  business  in  China  for  over  a  century,  should  oc- 
casionally go  into  new  lines  of  enterprise. 

But  it  soon  became  manifest  that  Mr.  Yamaza  was  think- 
ing of  the  Bethlehem  Steel  contract.  "I  must  tell  you," 
he  said,  "of  the  strategical  importance  of  Fukien  Province 
to  my  country."  Then  followed  a  long  exposition.  "China," 
he  concluded,  "has  promised  not  to  alienate  this  province  to 
any  other  power,  and  Japan  has  repeatedly  asserted  an  in- 
terest in  that  region." 

He  then  repeated  various  surmises  and  reports  concerning 
the  nature  of  the  Bethlehem  contract.  I  told  him  quite 
specifically  the  nature  of  the  agreement  and  about  its  long 
previous  existence.  Mr.  Johnston,  vice-president  of  the 
Bethlehem  company,  at  the  request  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment had  viewed  various  naval  ports  with  the  purpose  of 
making  an  estimate  of  improvements  which  were  most 
needed.  I  could  not  admit  any  sinister  significance  in  this 
visit  nor  concede  that  Americans  were  not  free  to  engage 
in  port  construction  in  any  part  of  China. 

While  I  had  not  been  unguarded  in  my  statements,  I  had 
assuredly  not  looked  upon  a  conversation  in  such  circum- 
stances as  a  formal  one.  Yet  I  soon  found  out  that  a  memo- 
randum upon  it  was  presented  to  the  Department  of  State 
by  the  Japanese  Ambassador  in  Washington,  during  an 
interview  with  Secretary  Bryan  on  the  question  of  harbour 
works  in  Fukien.     I  shall  revert  to  this  matter  later. 

A  peculiarity  of  Chinese  psychology  was  evinced  after  the 
Standard  Oil  contract  had  been  signed.  One  year  was 
given  to  select  specific  areas  within  which  oil  production  was 


A  LITTLE  VISION  FOR  CHINA  85 

to  be  carried  on  as  a  joint  enterprise  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment and  the  American  company,  the  ratio  of  property 
interest  of  the  two  partners  being  45  to  55.  The  contract 
undoubtedly  offered  an  opportunity  for  securing  the  major 
share  in  the  development  of  any  petroleum  resources  which 
might  be  discovered  in  China;  for,  once  such  a  partnership 
has  been  established  and  the  work  under  it  carried  out  in  an 
acceptable  manner,  an  extension  of  the  privileges  obtained 
may  confidently  be  looked  for.  But  in  itself  the  contract 
signed  in  February,  191 4,  was  only  a  beginning.  It  denoted 
the  securing  of  a  bare  legal  right;  and  in  China  a  government 
decree  or  concession  is  not  in  itself  all-powerful.  If  its 
motives  are  suspected,  if  it  has  been  obtained  by  pressure  or 
in  secrecy,  if  its  terms  are  not  understood  or  are  believed  to 
imply  unjust  burdens  to  certain  provinces  or  to  the  people  at 
large,  then  popular  opposition  will  arise.  This  may  not 
affect  the  legal  character  of  the  grant  or  the  responsibility  of 
the  Government,  but  it  will  seriously  obstruct  the  ready  and 
profitable  carrying  out  of  the  business.  The  obverse  of  this 
situation — ^the  getting  of  a  contract  "on  the  square"  and 
the  demonstration  that  it  is  fair  and  just — finds  every  in- 
fluence willing  to  cooperate. 

But  when  the  Standard  Oil  Company's  contract  had  been 
signed,  not  much  was  publicly  known  about  it  save  in  general 
terms.  Rival  interests  began  to  portray  it  as  involving  in- 
roads upon  the  rights  of  the  Chinese  people,  especially  of  the 
provinces  of  Shensi  and  Chihli.  Stories  of  bribery  were 
circulated  in  the  papers.  In  the  negotiations  concluded  at 
Peking  no  particular  attention  had  been  paid  to  local  opinion, 
the  suspicions  of  provincials  were  stirred,  and  an  outcry 
speedily  arose. 

The  representatives  of  the  Standard  Oil  Company  had  left 
Peking.  I  informed  the  company  that  its  interests  were 
endangered.  Its  response  was  to  send  to  Peking  Mr.  Roy 
S.  Anderson,  the  American  whose  intimate  knowledge  of 


86       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Chinese  affairs  has  been  referred  to.  Mr.  Anderson  held 
sessions  with  those  who  had  objected,  especially  with  the 
provincials  of  Shensi  who  were  resident  in  Peking.  He 
discussed  with  them  the  terms  of  the  contract,  pointing  out 
the  benefit  to  the  provinces  through  the  development  of  a 
large  industry  there.  The  Chinese  always  respond  to 
reasonable  discussion,  and  not  many  days  later  the  very 
associations  which  had  protested  most  vigorously  against  the 
agreement  waited  upon  the  Minister  of  Agriculture  and 
Commerce  with  their  congratulations.  They  promised  the 
aid  of  the  province  in  carrying  out  the  contract.  Had  the 
contract  not  been  straightforward  and  fair  in  its  terms  and 
free  of  undue  influence  in  its  making,  such  active  support 
could  not  have  been  had. 

It  was  then  that  the  Chinese  Government  created  an  Oil 
Development  Bureau,  together  with  a  River  Conservancy 
Bureau  for  drainage  works,  including  those  projected  in  the 
Hwai  River  region.  Of  the  new  Oil  Development  Bureau 
the  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Hsiung  Hsi-ling,  on  his  resignation 
from  the  cabinet  in  March,  accepted  the  position  as  chief. 
He  had  been  both  Premier  and  concurrently  Minister  of 
Finance.  Tall,  good-looking,  with  full  face  and  shining 
black  hair,  Mr.  Hsiung  speaks  with  great  fluency  in  a  high- 
pitched  voice.  Though  he  was  a  member  of  the  Chin  Pu 
Tang,  or  progressive  party,  he  had  been  selected  Premier 
by  Yuan  Shih-kai,  who  was  fighting  the  democratic  party 
(Kuo  Min  Tang),  probably  because  he  believed  that  parlia- 
ment would  reject  him  and  he  could  then  blame  that  body 
for  obstructive  tactics.  It  accepted  him,  and  Yuan  took 
another  path  to  overthrow  parliament.  In  his  career  Mr. 
Hsiung  had  been  aided  by  the  counsel  and  cooperation  of  his 
wife,  who  is  exceptionally  capable.  Well-intentioned,  broad- 
minded,  given  to  Western  methods,  the  Premier  was  handi- 
capped during  his  term  through  relative  inexperience  in 
administrative  and  financial  matters.     He  was  pitted  against 


A  LITTLE  VISION  FOR  CHINA  87 

men  of  shrewdness  as  politicians  and  of  deep  immersion  in 
financial  manipulations. 

As  chief  of  the  Oil  Development  Bureau,  Mr.  Hsiung's 
first  task  was  that  of  pointing  out  to  the  Japanese  minister, 
Mr.  Yamaza,  whom  the  Japanese  interests  immediately 
pressed  forward,  that  no  monopoly  of  exploitation  had  been 
granted  to  the  Standard  Oil  Company,  for  within  a  year  the 
company  would  have  to  select  specific  and  limited  areas 
within  the  two  provinces  where  production  was  to  be  carried 
on. 

"The  grant  to  Americans,"  the  Japanese  minister  there- 
upon remarked,  "seems  to  indicate  that  China  does  not  care 
much  about  the  international  friendship  of  Japan." 

Mr.  Hsiung's  reply  was  that  this  was  a  business  arrange- 
ment, and  the  nationals  of  other  countries  as  well — Great 
Britain,  France,  and  Germany — had  sought  such  concessions 
in  the  recent  past.  To  the  inquiry  whether  a  similar  agree- 
ment would  be  concluded  with  Japan  for  other  provinces, 
the  director  replied  that  it  would  not  at  this  time  be  con- 
venient. 

"Then  I  hereby  notify  you,"  Mr.  Yamaza  rejoined,  "that 
in  all  hkelihood  I  shall  take  up  this  matter  with  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs." 

Mr.  Yamaza  referred  to  the  Japanese  engineers  who  at 
one  time  worked  in  the  oil  fields  of  Shensi  Province;  where- 
upon Mr.  Hsiung  recalled  that  American  and  German  en- 
gineers had  formerly  been  employed  in  the  Hanyehping  iron 
enterprise;  yet  when  that  company  made  a  loan  agreement 
with  Japanese  interests,  no  objections  had  been  made  either 
by  America  or  Germany. 

This  conversation  illustrates  the  manner  in  which  attempts 
are  often  made  to  establish  prior  claims  with  regard  to 
enterprises  in  China  by  alleging  a  prior  desire  or  the  prior 
employment  of  individuals — considerations  which  would 
nowhere  else  be  considered  as  establishing  a  preference  or 


88       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

inchoate  option.  It  is  as  much  as  to  say  that  by  merely 
expressing  a  wish  for  a  thing  one  has  already  established  a 
prior  right  to  it  should  it  be  given  out. 

The  making  of  two  important  contracts  with  the  Chinese 
Government  naturally  attracted  attention.  Of  the  British 
press  the  North  China  Daily  News  repeated  the  judgment  of 
its  Peking  correspondent:  "The  Americans  deserve  their 
success,  for  they  have  worked  for  it  steadily  and  consist- 
ently." 

The  Daily  News  attributed  this  success  primarily  to  the 
fact  that  since  the  days  of  Secretary  Hay,  American  enter- 
prise in  China  had  been  consistently  pacific  and  benevolent. 
"In  no  country  in  the  world,"  it  declared,  "can  more  be  done 
through  friendship  and  for  friendship's  sake  than  in  China." 

The  German  press,  while  inclined  to  be  critical,  still 
admitted  the  fairness  of  the  contracts  and  the  probable 
benefit  to  be  derived  therefrom  by  China,  and  spoke  in  dis- 
approval of  the  Japanese  attitude  assumed  toward  the  new 
oil  enterprise.  Later  a  long  article  appeared  in  the  chief 
German  paper  in  China  {Ostasiatische  Lloyd),  in  which 
the  existence  of  a  very  far-reaching  policy  of  economic 
penetration  by  America  was  surmised.  The  writer  imagined 
that  all  the  factors — educational,  financial,  and  industrial — 
were  being  guided  according  to  a  complicated  but  harmonious 
plan  to  achieve  the  actual  predominance  of  American  inter- 
ests in  China. 

The  German  minister,  Von  Haxthausen,  spoke  to  me 
about  this  article.  "I  hope,"  he  said,  "that  you  will  not 
conclude  that  its  views  are  those  of  myself  and  my  legation." 

I  assured  him  that  I  felt  highly  flattered  that  anybody 
should  have  conceived  that  American  action  proceeded  with 
such  careful  planning  and  such  cunning  grasp  of  all  details. 

The  Franco-Russian  semi-official  sheet,  the  Journal  de 
Pekin,  continued  its  carping  attitude  against  all  American 
enterprise.    It  lumped  together  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.,  mission- 


A  LITTLE  VISION  FOR  CHINA  89 

aries,  Standard  Oil,  and  the  British-American  Tobacco 
Company  as  engaged  in  a  nefarious  effort  to  gain  ascendency 
for  American  influence  in  China.  It  failed,  however,  to 
surmise  the  subtle  plan  suggested  in  the  German  paper,  but 
presupposed  an  instinctive  cooperation  of  all  these  American 
agencies.  This  paper  was  occasionally  stirred  to  great  waves 
of  indignation,  as  when  it  discovered  that  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  was 
undermining  Chinese  religious  morale  and  destroying  the 
sanctity  of  holy  places  by  establishing  a  bathing  pool  in  one 
of  the  temples.  This  deplorable  desecration,  which  wrung 
from  the  breast  of  the  Belgian  editor  of  the  Franco-Russian 
sheet  moans  of  outraged  virtue,  had  for  its  substance  the 
fact  that  in  the  large  monastery  of  Wo  Fu  Ssu — in  the  foot- 
hills fifteen  miles  from  Peking,  where  the  Y.  M.  C,  A.  had 
summer  quarters — a  large  pool  in  the  residential  part  of  the 
enclosures  was  actually  used  for  a  dip  on  hot  mornings.  But 
no  Chinese  had  ever  hinted  that  his  feelings  were  lacerated. 

The  American  papers  and  Americans  generally  were  some- 
what encouraged  by  this  constructive  action.  In  the  Chinese 
Press  the  veteran  American  lawyer,  T.  R.  Jernigan,  said: 
"It  is  clear  that  the  Wilson  Administration  will  use  its 
influence  to  further  the  extension  of  the  business  of  American 
merchants  whether  they  act  in  a  corporate  capacity  or 
otherwise." 

On  the  side  of  finance  as  well  as  industry  the  Chinese 
courted  American  interest.  The  Minister  of  Finance  and 
Mr.  Liang  Shih-yi  were  frequently  my  guests;  and  we 
conversed  particularly  on  the  financial  situation.  Both  took 
a  view  quite  different  from  the  traditional  Chinese  official 
attitude.  They  desired  to  have  the  Government  make 
itself  useful  and  take  the  lead  in  organizing  both  national 
credit  and  industry.  They  considered  it  possible  to  develop 
Chinese  domestic  credit  to  an  extent  that  would  materially 
supply  the  financial  needs  of  the  Government.  Unfortu- 
nately, the  great  system  of  banking  which  had  been  built  up 


90       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

by  the  Shansi  Bankers'  Guild  was  very  inadequate  to  modern 
needs.  Banking  had  rested  wholly  on  personal  knowledge 
of  the  character  and  credit  of  borrowers;  no  collateral  was 
used,  there  was  no  dealing  in  corporate  securities. 

When  China  came  into  contact  with  the  business  methods 
of  Western  nations,  this  system  could  not  help  in  developing 
new  enterprises.  That  task  fell  largely  to  the  foreign  banks 
established  in  the  treaty  ports,  who  had  no  vision  of  the 
possibilities  of  internal  development  in  China.  The  Shansi 
bankers,  on  their  part,  unable  to  adapt  themselves  to  new 
conditions,  saw  their  field  of  action  gradually  limited,  their 
business  falhng  off.  These  banks  lost  their  grip  on  affairs. 
They  felt  themselves  in  need  of  financial  assistance  from  the 
Government.  The  Minister  of  Finance  was  considering 
whether  these  old  institutions  might  not  be  transformed  into 
modern  and  adequate  agencies  of  Chinese  domestic  credit. 
He  and  other  native  financiers  became  interested  in  the 
national  banking  system  through  which,  in  the  United  States, 
quantities  of  public  debentures  had  been  absorbed  to  furnish 
a  sound  basis  for  a  currency. 

It  seemed  impossible  to  utilize  the  Shansi  banks  as  the 
main  prop  of  a  modern  system.  A  new  organization,  such  as 
the  Bank  of  China,  planned  on  modern  lines,  might  be 
strengthened  by  American  financial  support  and  technical 
assistance.  Mr.  Liang  Shih-yi  was  willing  to  give  to  Ameri- 
can interests  an  important  share  in  the  management  of  the 
Bank  of  China  in  return  for  a  strengthening  loan.  A  New 
York  contractor,  Mr.  G.  M.  Gest,  was  at  this  time  in  Peking 
on  a  pleasure  tour  with  his  family.  Impressed  with  the  need 
for  the  launching  of  new  financial  and  industrial  enterprises 
in  China,  his  first  thought  had  been  to  secure  a  concession  to 
build  a  system  of  tramways  in  Peking.  Chinese  officials  had 
previously  told  me  of  an  existing  Chinese  contract  which 
might  be  turned  over  to  Americans.  I  was  not  very  en- 
thusiastic about  this  particular  enterprise,  because  I  feared 


A  LITTLE  VISION  FOR  CHINA  91 

it  might  destroy  the  unique  character  of  Peking  street  life, 
without  great  business  success  or  much  benefit  to  anybody. 

On  inquiring  further  we  found  that  French  interests  had 
just  signed  a  loan  contract  which  covered,  among  other 
things,  the  Peking  tramways. 

The  financing  was  curious;  the  proceeds  were  presumably 
to  be  used  to  complete  the  port  works  at  Pukow,  on  the 
Yangtse  River,  and  to  estabhsh  the  tramways  of  Peking. 
However,  it  was  plain  that  the  loan  had  been  made  really  for 
administrative  or  political  purp^oses,  its  industrial  character 
being  secondary,  as  the  work  was  indefinitely  postponed. 
This  subterfuge  of  so-called  "industrial  loans,"  of  which  the 
proceeds  were  to  be  used  for  politics,  was  later  very  exten- 
sively resorted  to,  particularly  in  the  Japanese  loans  of  191 8. 

Learning  of  this  state  of  affairs,  Mr.  Gest  turned  his  at- 
tention to  the  problem  of  Chinese  domestic  financing,  and  at 
the  close  of  his  short  residence  in  Peking  he  had  obtained 
an  option  for  the  Bank  of  China  loan  contract,  which  he 
followed  up  with  energy  upon  his  return  to  the  United  States. 

American  attention  had  been  drawn  to  the  contracts  for 
the  Hwai  River  conservancy  and  for  petroleum  exploration, 
and  American  commercial  journals  and  bankers  were  again 
giving  thought  to  the  financing  of  projects  in  China.  To 
show  the  attitude  of  New  York  bankers  at  this  time,  of  their 
difficulties,  doubts,  and  inclinations,  I  shall  cite  portions  of  a 
letter  written  me  by  Mr.  Willard  Straight,  dated  April  29, 
1914.  While  I  did  not  agree  with  Mr.  Straight  on  several 
matters  of  detail,  especially  the  withdrawal  from  the  Con- 
sortium, we  were  both  agreed  as  to  the  importance  of  con- 
tinued American  participation  in  Chinese  finance  and  in- 
dustry.    The  letter  follows: 

As  regards  the  Hwai  River  conservancy,  you  have  doubdess  already  been 
advised  that  the  Red  Cross  has  made  an  arrangement  with  J.  G.  White 
&  Company,  whereby  an  engineering  board  will  be  despatched  to  China  to 
make  a  detailed  survey.     The  matter  of  financing  was  brought  to  the 


92       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Group,  who  felt  it  impossible  satisfactorily  to  discuss  this  question  without 
more  definite  information  regarding  actual  conditions  and  the  probable 
cost  of  the  work  contemplated. 

When,  upon  receipt  of  the  report  of  the  engineering  board,  we  take  up 
the  discussion  of  the  financial  problem,  the  suggestions  contained  in  your 
letter  of  the  24th  of  March  will  be  very  valuable.  It  might,  as  you  say, 
be  comparatively  easy  to  issue  a  loan  of  ten  million  dollars  at  almost  any 
time.  That  would  depend,  however,  not  on  the  size  but  on  the  nature  of 
the  loan.  There  is  no  market  for  Chinese  securities  in  this  country  at  this 
time,  and  it  would  be  difficult  if  not  impossible  for  the  bankers  to  create 
one  within  any  reasonable  time  without  the  active  and  intelligent  support 
or  at  least  the  declared  approval  of  the  Government.     .     .     . 

When  the  American  Group  first  entered  upon  negotiations  for  the 
Hukuang  loan,  conditions  in  this  country  were  good.  Business  men  were 
looking  abroad  for  new  trade  openings,  the  Taft  Administration  was  anx- 
ious to  encourage  the  extension  of  foreign  trade  and  the  Chinese  Govern- 
mental Bubble  had  not  been  pricked.  During  our  four  years  of  experience 
a  not  inconsiderable  public  interest  in  China  and  her  development  was 
aroused,  and  had  we  issued  the  Reorganization  Loan,  as  we  had  hoped  to 
do,  in  February,  1913,  we  probably  could  have  sold  our  twenty-million- 
dollar  share  to  investors  throughout  the  country.  This  we  would  have 
been  able  to  do  despite  the  revolution  and  uncertain  governmental  condi- 
tions in  China,  because  of  public  confidence  due  to  the  support  of  our  own 
and  the  other  interested  governments. 

Neither  Mr.  Taft  nor  Mr.  Knox  ever  promised  to  send  American  battle- 
ships to  threaten  China,  or  to  land  marines  to  occupy  Chinese  territory, 
in  case  of  default  in  interest  payments.  The  public  was  misled  by  no  false 
statements,  but  there  was,  nevertheless,  a  general  belief  that  our  Govern- 
ment was  actively  interested  in  the  preservation  of  China's  credit  and  in 
the  development  of  that  country. 

This,  as  I  told  you  in  our  conversation  at  the  Century  Club,  was  changed 
by  the  President's  declaration  of  March  19,  1913.  The  fact  that  the 
President  and  the  State  Department  felt  that  China,  as  a  young  republic, 
was  entitled  to  extraordinary  consideration  and  sympathy;  the  fact  that 
our  Government'  recognized  Yuan  Shih-kai's  political  machine,  and  the 
fact  that  the  Administration  subsequently  gave  out  some  general  expres- 
sions regarding  the  Government's  interest  in  the  development  of  American 
trade,  did  not  in  any  way  restore  in  the  mind  of  the  investor  the  confidence 
which  had  been  destroyed  by  the  specific  condemnation  of  the  activities 
of  the  only  American  banking  group  which  had  had  the  enterprise,  the 
courage,  and  the  patience  to  enter  and  remain  in  the  Chinese  field  and 


A  LITTLE  VISION  FOR  CHINA  93 

which,  despite  its  unpopularity  among  certain  yellow  journals  and  a  num- 
ber of  Western  Congressmen,  stood  for  integrity,  fair  dealing,  and  sound 
business  in  the  minds  of  the  bond-purchasing  public,  upon  whose  readiness 
to  buy  the  success  of  any  bond  issue  must  depend. 

This  confidence  which  would  have  enabled  us  to  sell  Chinese  bonds  had 
been  created  by  four  years  of  hard  work  on  the  part  of  the  bankers  and  the 
Government.  Once  destroyed,  it  can  be  restored  only  by  general  govern- 
mental declarations,  which  will  probably  have  to  be  stronger  than  any  of 
those  made  by  the  Taft  Administration,  or,  in  the  absence  thereof,  by  effec- 
tive, consistent,  and  repeated  specific  proof  of  the  Government's  willingness 
to  assist  and  encourage  our  merchants,  contractors,  and  bankers.  As  you 
know,  it  is  more  difficult  to  correct  a  bad  impression  than  it  is  originally 
to  create  a  good  one. 

I  quite  appreciate  that  it  will  be  difficult  for  the  President  to  take  any 
action  which  would  seem  to  be  a  reversal  of  his  former  position,  but  I  hope 
that  the  last  paragraph  of  his  declaration  of  last  March,  in  which  he  stated 
that  he  would  urge  "all  the  legislative  measures  necessary  to  assure  to 
contractors,  engineers,  etc.,  the  banking  and  other  financial  facilities  which 
they  now  lack"  may  be  interpreted  and  developed  along  lines  which  will 
permit  him  actively  to  support  the  Red  Cross  plan. 

If  the  Administration  will  publicly  evidence  its  interest  in  and  its  sup- 
port of  this  project  during  the  next  few  months,  so  that  when  the  matter 
is  finally  brought  up  to  the  bankers  for  decision  they  may  be  able  to  feel 
that  the  public  has  become  interested  and  assured  that  our  Govenunent 
is  behind  the  plan,  it  may  prove  to  be  the  means  by  which  we  can  again 
enter  China.  This  I  have  pointed  out  to  Miss  Boardman  who,  I  feel  sure, 
fully  understands  the  situation. 

I  sincerely  trust  that  your  great  interest  and  your  energy  in  endeavour- 
ing to  extend  our  interests  in  China  may  have  an  effect  upon  our  own 
Administration.  I  believe  the  bankers  will  always  be  willing  to  help  if 
they  are  able  to  do  so,  but  we  are  not,  like  our  Continental  friends,  anxiously 
looking  for  chances  to  invest  abroad,  especially  at  the  present  time  when 
we  have  so  many  troubles  of  our  own,  and  instead  of  being  merely  shown 
the  opportunity,  we  must  be  persuaded  in  the  first  place  that  it  is  sound 
business  and  in  the  second  place  that  it  is  our  patriotic  duty  to  undertake 
it.  And  we  must  feel,  in  addition,  that  if  we  should  undertake  it  our 
enterprise  and  energy  will  not  serve  merely  to  rouse  a  storm  of  jealousy  on 
the  part  of  those  who  will  not  assume  any  risks  themselves,  but  who  cry 
"monopoly"  as  soon  as  an  interest  capable  of  handling  foreign  business  is 
f  iven  the  active  support  of  our  Government. 

I  am  sorry  that  it  is  impossible  to  give  a  more  optimistic  picture,  but 


94       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

I  assure  you  that  I  shall  do  all  in  my  power  to  support  you  and  your 
efforts,  which  I  sincerely  trust  may  be  attended  witn  the  success  they 
deserve. 

The  intelligent  support  promised  in  this  letter  continued 
until  the  untimely  death  of  Mr.  Straight  in  Paris,  while  he 
was  with  the  American  Peace  Commission. 


CHAPTER  IX 
"SLOW  AMERICANS" 

"The  Americans  are  altogether  too  slow!" 

This  exclamation  from  a  Chinese  seemed  amusing.  It 
came  on  the  evening  of  the  red  dust-storm  that  enveloped 
Peking,  during  one  of  the  long  after-dinner  conversations 
v^^ith  Liang  Shih-yi  and  Chow  Tsu-chi;  and  it  was  the  latter 
who  thus  gave  vent  to  his  impatience. 

Liang  Shih-yi,  the  "Pierpont  Morgan  of  China,"  Chief 
Secretary  to  the  President,  was  credited  as  being,  next  to 
Yuan  Shih-kai,  the  ablest  and  most  influential  man  in  Peking. 
Mr.  Liang  is  highly  educated  according  to  Chinese  literary 
standards,  and  while  he  has  not  studied  Western  science,  he 
has  a  keen,  incisive  mind  which  enables  him  readily  to  under- 
stand Western  conditions  and  methods.  His  outstanding 
quality  is  a  faculty  for  organization.  He  built  up  the 
Chinese  Communications  Service  on  the  administrative  and 
financial  side.  He  declined  taking  office  as  a  minister,  but 
usually  controlled  the  action  of  the  cabinet  through  his 
influence  over  important  subordinates,  and  managed  all 
financial  aff'airs  for  Yuan  Shih-kai.  Cantonese,  short  of 
stature  and  thickset,  with  a  massive  Napoleonic  head,  he 
speaks  little,  but  his  side  remarks  indicate  that  he  is  always 
ahead  of  the  discussion,  which  is  also  shown  by  his  searching 
questions.  When  directly  questioned  himself,  he  will  always 
give  a  lucid  and  consecutive  account  of  any  matter.  He  did 
not  rise  above  the  level  of  Chinese  official  practice  in  the 
matter  of  using  money  to  obtain  political  ends.  To  some  he 
was  the  father  of  deceit  and  corruption,  to  others  the  god  of 
wealth,  while  still  others  revered  in  him  his  great  genius  for 

9S 


96       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

organization.  While  by  no  means  a  romantic  figure,  he 
thoroughly  stimulated  a  romantic  interest  among  others,  who 
attributed  to  him  almost  superhuman  cunning  and  ability. 

When  the  noted  Sheng  Hsuan-huai  became  Minister  of 
Communications  in  191 1,  he  used  his  influence  and  cunning 
to  thwart  Liang  and  throw  him  out  of  the  mastery  of  the 
Board  of  Communications,  known  as  the  fattest  organ  of 
the  Government.  Mr.  Liang  stood  his  ground,  and  his 
influence  greatly  increased  because  of  his  ability  to  withstand 
so  strong  an  attack.  During  the  revolution  Liang  Shih-yi 
was  also  very  influential  in  the  Grand  Council,  attaching 
himself  more  and  more  strongly  to  Yuan  Shih-kai.  Always 
satisfied  with  the  substance  of  power  without  its  outward 
show,  he  steadfastly  declined  to  become  a  responsible  minis- 
ter, and  worked  from  the  vantage  ground  of  the  Secretariat 
of  the  President.  His  life  has  frequently  been  endangered. 
He  gained  the  hatred  of  the  democratic  party,  with  which 
he  was  once  associated,  because  he  aided  Yuan  in  playing  his 
complicated  game  of  first  confusing,  then  destroying,  parlia- 
ment. Nor  were  the  Progressives  (Chin  Pu  Tang)  enamoured 
of  him.  Of  great  personal  courage,  he  was  indiff'erent  to 
the  blame  and  ridicule  which  for  a  while  almost  all  news- 
papers heaped  upon  him.  As  he  was  still  in  a  comparatively 
inferior  position  when  these  attacks  began,  they  rather 
helped  him  by  calling  attention  to  his  abilities  and  his 
personal  importance.  Thus  his  opponents  advertised  him. 
In  possession  of  all  the  intricacies  of  the  situation,  when 
the  parliamentarians  first  came  to  Peking,  he  sat  back  in- 
conspicuously, and,  supplied  with  influence  and  money, 
moulded  the  political  situation  as  if  it  had  been  wax. 

Of  all  the  cabinet,  Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi,  Minister  of  Com- 
munications, was  personally  most  familiar  with  American 
afl^airs,  having  lived  for  several  years  in  Washington  and 
New  York  in  an  oflScial  capacity.  He  speaks  English 
fluently   and   prefers   American    methods.     He   hates   un- 


"SLOW  AMERICANS"  97 

necessary  ceremony.  Whenever  he  called  upon  me  I  had 
almost  to  engage  in  personal  combat  with  him  to  be  per- 
mitted to  accompany  him  to  the  outer  door,  as  is  due  to  a 
high  dignitary  in  China.  He  believes  in  learning  improved 
methods  from  reliable  foreigners,  and  will  go  as  far  as  any 
Chinese  in  giving  foreigners  whom  he  trusts  a  free  hand, 
though  he  would  not  yield  to  any  one  a  power  of  supreme 
control.  On  this  occasion  he  talked  about  the  reorgani- 
zation of  the  Bank  of  China,  and  the  possibility  of  floating 
domestic  bonds  among  Chinese  capitahsts.  Mr.  Chow  was 
chanting  a  jeremiad  about  how  the  Chinese  had  been  led  to 
give  valuable  concessions  to  Americans,  which  had  not  been 
developed,  and  how  this  had  brought  only  embarrassment 
and  trouble  to  China. 

We  spoke,  also,  of  the  original  Hankow-Canton  railway 
concession  which  the  Americans  tried  to  sell  to  King  Leopold ; 
of  the  Knox  neutralization  plan,  and  of  the  Chinchow-Aigun 
railway  concession,  the  only  effect  of  which  had  been  to 
strengthen  the  grip  of  Russia  and  Japan  on  Manchuria. 
W^hen  the  Americans,  as  a  mark  of  special  confidence  and 
trust,  had  received  the  option  on  a  currency  loan  with  the 
chance  to  reorganize  Chinese  currency,  they  had  straight- 
way invited  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  France  into  the 
game.  "Thus  they  saddled  China  with  the  International 
Consortium,"  Chow  Tsu-chi  moaned.  And  so  on  went  the 
recital,  through  many  lesser  and  larger  enterprises  that  had 
proved  abortive. 

One  had  to  confess  that  in  China  we  certainly  had  not 
taken  Fortune  by  the  forelock,  nor  even  had  we  clung  to  her 
skirts.  Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi  was  especially  grieved  at  the 
circuitous  and  dilatory  methods  of  the  Four-Power  Group 
which  held  the  contract  to  build  the  Hukuang  railways. 
"The  thirty  millions  of  dollars  originally  provided  has  been 
almost  entirely  spent,"  he  complained,  "without  producing 
more  than  two  hundred  miles  of  actual  construction;  and 


98       AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

there  is  constant  wrangling  among  the  partners  concerning 
engineering  standards.  Moreover,  everything  has  to  be  re- 
ferred from  Peking  to  London,  thence  to  New  York,  Paris, 
Berhn,  and  back  and  forth  among  them  all,  until  it  is  neces- 
sary to  look  up  reams  of  files  to  know  what  it  is  all  about. 
And  it  may  all  have  been  about  the  purchase  of  a  flat 
car." 

I  knew  well  enough  that  Americans,  too,  were  much  dis- 
couraged at  the  cumbersome  progress  of  the  Hukuang  railway 
enterprise.  The  engineering  rights  on  the  section  west  from 
Ichang  up  into  Szechuan  Province  had  been  assigned  to 
America,  and  Mr.  W.  Randolph  was  at  this  time  making  a 
survey.  He  had  great  energy  and  unhmited  behef  in  the 
future  importance  and  profitableness  of  this  line.  But  be- 
yond the  initial  survey  the  available  funds  would  not  go, 
and  no  new  financing  could  be  obtained — this  for  a  railway 
to  gain  access  to  an  inland  empire  of  forty  milHons  of  people! 

In  the  American  enterprises  which  had  been  launched 
recently,  however,  there  was  no  little  activity.  The  Standard 
Oil  Company  with  commendable  expedition,  if  perhaps  with 
undue  lavishness  of  men  and  supplies,  sent  to  China  geo- 
logical experts  of  the  first  order,  together  with  large  staffs  of 
engineers,  drilling  experts,  and  all  needed  machinery.  The 
geologists  were  soon  off  toward  the  prospective  oil  regions  in 
Chihli  and  Shensi  provinces.  In  Mr.  Hsiung  Hsi-ling's 
bureau  and  in  the  Standard  Oil  offices  the  outfitting  of 
expeditions,  the  purchase  of  supplies,  and  the  selection  of  a 
large  Chinese  personnel  proceeded  apace.  Everyone  was 
hopeful. 

With  the  Hwai  River  conservancy  matter,  also,  negoti- 
ations had  gone  rapidly  in  the  United  States.  The  American 
National  Red  Cross  and  the  engineering  firm  of  J.  G.  White 
&  Company  had  agreed  to  finance  the  preliminary  survey. 
The  American  Congress  in  May  passed  an  act  lending  the 
services   of  an  army  engineer  for  the  preHminary  survey. 


"SLOW  AMERICANS"  99 

Colonel  Sibert  of  the  Panama  Canal  Commission  was  desig- 
nated as  chairman  of  the  engineering  board.  The  outlook 
was  favourable,  action  had  been  taken  promptly. 

The  excitement  stirred  up  among  the  Japanese  by  the 
sojourn  in  China  of  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Company's  vice- 
president,  Mr.  Archibald  Johnston,  now  had  a  further  sequel. 
The  text  of  an  alleged  contract  between  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment and  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Company  was  circulated 
early  in  May — by  interested  persons — which  included  among 
other  provisions  arrangements  for  construction  of  a  naval 
base  in  Fukien  Province.  The  bogus  quality  of  the  report 
was  at  once  manifest.  Through  some  influence,  however,  it 
was  assiduously  pushed  forward,  in  the  press;  it  became  the 
basis  of  a  legend,  which  even  got  into  the  books  of  otherwise 
well-informed  writers  as  authentic.  It  was  on  the  subject 
of  this  spurious  paper  that  the  Japanese  ambassador  at 
Washington  called  on  Secretary  Bryan  for  information. 
Thus  the  matter  of  the  possible  building  of  a  naval  base  in 
Fukien  for  the  Chinese  Government  by  American  con- 
tractors became  a  matter  of  State  Department  note.  I  was 
informed  that  the  Japanese  ambassador  at  Washington  had 
left  a  summary  of  the  conversation,  of  March  12th,  between 
the  Japanese  minister  at  Peking  and  myself.  Apparently 
the  Japanese  were  attempting  to  get  around  my  refusal  to 
acknowledge  that  American  enterprise  in  China  could  in  any 
way  be  limited  by  the  declarations  or  agreements  of  other 
powers  than  the  United  States. 

The  State  Department  inquired  whether  the  newly  re- 
ported contract  for  a  loan  of  $30,000,000  was  identical  with 
the  older  contract  of  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Company.  I  was 
informed  that  the  Japanese  Government  did  not  object  to 
the  loan,  but  to  the  construction  of  any  new  naval  base  in 
Fukien,  and  that  the  Department  had  been  told  that  the 
Chinese  Government  itself  did  not  wish  to  construct  there 
because  of  the  Japanese  objection.     It  was  intimated  to 


loo     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

me  that  I  might  encourage  the  Chinese  in  the  idea  that  such 
building,  while  legitimate,  would  be  unwise. 

I  reported  to  the  Department  that  the  original  Bethlehem 
contract  had  no  connection  with  the  spurious  document 
recently  circulated;  that  only  a  very  small  sum  was  to  be 
devoted  to  harbour  work  in  China,  the  location  of  which 
had  not  been  fixed;  and  that  the  execution  of  the  entire 
contract  had  been  postponed  because  of  financial  conditions. 
While  the  Chinese  Government  was  not  contemplating  any 
construction  at  this  time,  I  stated  that  the  attempt  of  any 
other  government  to  estabHsh  a  claim  of  special  rights  of 
supervision  must  be  considered  derogatory  to  Chinese 
sovereignty  and  to  American  rights  of  equal  opportunity; 
I  urged,  therefore,  that  we  avoid  any  action  or  statement 
which  would  admit  such  a  claim,  or  which  would  in  any 
way  encourage  the  making  of  it.  The  Chinese  Government 
has  never  admitted  that  its  right  to  plan  the  defence  of 
its  coastline  is  subject  to  veto  by  any  other  government. 
Such  admission  on  our  part  that  Japan  has  the  right  to 
claim  special  interests  in  Fukien  would  shake  the  confidence 
of  the  Chinese  in  our  seriousness  and  consistency,  and  in 
our  determination  to  protect  our  legitimate  interests  in  an 
undivided  China,  freely  open  to  the  commerce  of  all  nations, 
where  Americans  can  do  business  without  asking  permission 
of  any  other  outsiders. 

Dr.  Chen  Chin-tao  was  then  acting  as  Financial  Com- 
missioner of  the  Chinese  Government  in  Europe  and  Amer- 
ica. The  danger  of  a  further  growth  of  the  idea  of  spheres 
of  influence  in  China  had  been  accentuated.  Railway  con- 
cessions had  been  allocated  to  different  nations  according 
to  territorial  areas  where  the  respective  countries  claimed 
certain  priorities;  if  concessions  were  made  otherwise,  the 
combined  influence  of  the  powers  seeking  special  spheres 
was  used  to  defeat  them.  To  meet  this  danger  a  plan  was 
developed  for  granting  a  large  construction  contract  to 


"SLOW  AMERICANS"  loi 

an  International  syndicate  made  up  of  British,  American, 
French,  and  German  companies,  who  would  divide  the  con- 
struction on  some  basis  other  than  localized  national  spheres 
of  influence.  Doctor  Chen,  with  an  American  assistant, 
was  charged  to  take  up  this  proposal  with  various  companies. 
On  the  part  of  France  and  Germany,  contractors  and  govern- 
ments seemed  favourable  to  the  idea.  In  Great  Britain 
the  firm  approached  was  Paulding  &  Company,  who  had 
already  in  the  preceding  year  received  a  railway  concession 
in  China  extending  through  the  Province  of  Hunan  and  to 
the  south  thereof.  This  firm  would  readily  cooperate, 
but  the  British  Government  objected.  It  would  accept 
the  principle  of  the  international  company  only  on  condition 
that  all  lines  traversing  the  Yangtse  Valley  should  be  con- 
structed by  the  British  participant  in  the  syndicate. 

This  suggests  the  extent  to  which  the  sphere-of-influence 
doctrine  dominated  at  this  time  the  thought  and  action  of 
the  British  Foreign  Office. 

The  American  Government,  on  its  part,  took  exception 
to  the  size  and  duration  of  the  concession,  which  it  feared, 
might  gain  a  monopolistic  character.  Probably  the  diffi- 
culty would  have  been  cleared  up,  since,  after  all,  a  specific 
and  limited,  though  considerable  grant,  was  intended.  But 
the  preliminary  discussion  had  not  resulted  in  agreement 
before  the  Great  War  supervened. 

When  Mr.  Gest  returned  to  the  United  States,  he  took 
up  the  matter  of  a  loan  to  China  with  American  financial 
interests,  but  they  hesitated  to  act  until  the  American 
Government  expressed  its  approval  and  willingness  to  give 
support.  Mr.  Gest  thereupon  laid  siege  to  the  Department 
of  State.  He  succeeded  on  the  3rd  of  June  in  securing 
from  the  Secretary  a  letter  to  the  effect  that  the  Department 
would  be  gratified  to  have  China  receive  any  substantial 
assistance  from  Americans  in  the  nature  of  a  loan  upon 
terms  similar  to  the   present  agreement.     "This  Govern- 


I02      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

ment,"  the  letter  stated,  "will,  in  accordance  with  its  usual 
policy,  give  all  proper  diplomatic  support  to  any  legitimate 
enterprise  of  that  character." 

There  had  been  much  talk  about  the  supposed  determina- 
tion of  the  Department  of  State  to  let  American  interests 
abroad  shift  for  themselves,  quite  without  encouragement 
or  special  protection.  The  letter,  though  moderate  in 
language,  nevertheless  attracted  great  attention  and  was 
taken  to  indicate  a  change  of  heart  in  the  Administration. 
I  may  say  at  this  point  that  the  Department  of  State  never 
at  anytime  failed  to  back  me  in  efforts  to  develop  and  protect 
American  interests  in  China.  But  it  was  not  always  able, 
especially  later  on,  when  overburdened  with  the  work  of  the 
war,  to  follow  up  matters  which  it  had  approved,  when  the 
opposition  or  indifference  of  other  departments  put  other 
claims  in  the  forefront. 

I  had  for  a  season  observed  and  worked  with  American 
commercial  interests  in  China.  I  had  definite  conclusions 
as  to  what  was  needed  in  the  way  of  organization  to  encour- 
age American  trade.  The  great  defect  lay  in  the  absence 
of  financial  institutions  for  handling  foreign  loans,  and  for 
assisting  in  foreign  industrial  development,  helpful  to  Amer- 
ican commerce.  The  only  American  bank  in  China,  the 
International  Banking  Corporation,  then  confined  itself 
strictly  to  exchange  business  and  to  dealing  in  commercial 
paper;  it  had  developed  no  policy  of  responding  to  local 
industrial  needs  and  helping  in  the  inner  development  of 
China.  All  the  foreign  banks  had  wholly  the  treaty-port 
point  of  view.  They  thought  not  at  all  of  developing  the 
interior  regions  upon  which  the  commerce  of  the  treaty 
ports  after  all  depends.  They  were  satisfied  with  scooping 
off  the  cream  of  international  commercial  transactions  and 
exchange  operations. 

I  strongly  favoured  creating  banking  institutions  which 
would   broadly   represent   American  capital   from  various 


"SLOW  AMERICANS"  103 

regions  of  our  country,  and  would  respond  to  the  urgent 
need  of  China  for  a  modern  organization  of  local  credit. 

There  were  but  few  American  commission  houses.  In 
most  cases  American-manufactured  goods  were  handled  by 
houses  of  other  nationality,  who  often  gave  scant  attention 
to  promoting  American  trade  and  used  American  products 
only  when  those  of  their  own  nation  could  not  be  ob- 
tained. It  seemed  worth  while  to  establish  additional  trad- 
ing companies,  especially  cooperative  organizations  among 
exporters,  after  the  fashion  of  the  "Representation  for 
British  Manufacturers,  Ltd."  Further,  I  strongly  urged 
the  American  Government  to  station  a  commercial  attache 
in  China.  I  was  gratified  by  the  appointment  during  the 
year  of  a  commercial  attache  in  the  person  of  Consul- 
General  Julean  Arnold,  an  official  of  great  intelligence,  wide 
knowledge,  and  untiring  energy. 

The  Chinese  cabinet,  which  had  been  under  a  provi- 
sional premier  for  several  months,  was  finally  reorganized 
in  June,  1914.  The  chief  change  in  the  cabinet  was  the 
appointment  of  Mr.  Liang  Tun-yen  as  Minister  of 
Communications,  and  the  shifting  of  Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi 
from  that  position  to  the  Ministry  of  Finance.  With 
these  new  ministers  American  contractors  and  financiers 
had  much  to  do.  Premier  Hsiung  Hsi-ling  had  withdrawn 
in  February,  and  with  him  the  two  other  members  of  the 
Chin  Pu  Tang  or  progressive  party.  These  political  leaders 
had  served  Yuan's  purpose  by  aiding  him  to  dissolve  par- 
liament; they  could  now  be  spared.  But  a  new  premier  was 
not  immediately  found.  Yuan  at  length  prevailed  on  Mr. 
Hsu  Shi-chang  to  take  the  premiership  in  June.  The  title 
of  premier  was  changed  to  secretary  of  state. 

I  met  Mr.  Liang  Tun-yen  for  the  first  time  on  June  2nd, 
at  a  luncheon  given  by  Mr.  B.  Lenox  Simpson,  whose  land- 
lord he  was.  Mr.  Liang  is  tall,  aristocratic-looking,  with 
a    fine,    intellectual    face.     He    speaks    English    perfectly, 


I04      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

as  he  received  his  earlier  education  in  the  United  States. 
Then,  as  on  frequent  occasions  in  subsequent  years,  he 
expressed  himself  in  a  deeply  pessimistic  strain.  He  com- 
plained of  recent  inroads  attempted  by  the  French  in  Yun- 
nan, and  of  the  methods  they  employed  to  strengthen  their 
hold.  But  this  was  only  one  cause  for  pessimism.  In  the 
future  of  his  country  he  saw  *'no  prospect  of  strong  national 
action,"  or  of  "any  sort  of  effective  help  from  the  outside." 
He  considered  the  upper  classes  "incapable  of  sacrifices 
and  vigorous  action."  He  had  recommended  in  1901, 
he  told  me,  that,  instead  of  paying  an  indemnity,  the 
Chinese  should  be  allowed  to  spend  an  equal  amount  of 
public  funds  in  sending  abroad  young  men  to  be  educated. 
All  young  Chinese,  he  said,  should  be  sent  abroad  quite 
early,  "before  they  have  become  corrupted." 

When  Mr.  Liang  Tun-yen  assumed  office,  it  was  announced 
that  he  would  subject  the  Ministry  of  Communications 
to  a  thorough  cleansing.  This  implied  that  the  ministry 
had  been  corrupt  and  systematically  so,  under  the  control 
of  Mr.  Liang  Shih-yi.  Outsiders  watched  for  indications 
of  how  that  astute  manager  would  handle  the  new  opposition. 

Mr.  Yeh  Kung-cho,  able  and  expert,  had  been  chief  of 
the  Railway  Bureau;  he  became  a  vice  minister,  but  as  he 
was  a  lieutenant  of  Liang  Shih-yi's,  it  was  understood  that 
this  position  would  probably  be  an  empty  dignity.  A 
friend  of  Mr.  Liang  Tun-yen's,  a  highly  respected  engineer 
of  American  education,  was  appointed  as  the  other  vice 
minister.  With  no  formal  or  open  breach  between  the  differ- 
ent factions,  manoeuvring  and  counter-manoeuvring  there 
undoubtedly  was.  The  influence  of  Mr.  Liang  Shih-yi, 
however,  seemed  not  seriously  shaken.  He  had  organized 
the  Chinese  railway  experts  and  engineers  in  a  railway 
association,  keeping  in  touch  with  them  through  Mr. 
Yeh  Kung-cho.  Thus  he  held  in  his  hands  the  main  lines 
of  influence.    Also,  he  continued  to  head  the  Bank  of  Com- 


"SLOW  AMERICANS"  105 

munications,  which  is  the  fiscal  agency  for  the  Railway 
Board.  So  again  it  seemed  that  the  opposition  could  not 
get  at  the  source  of  this  unusual  man's  power, 

Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi,  as  Minister  of  Finance,  warmly 
urged  the  idea  that  the  Americans,  to  whom  the  Government 
had  shown  itself  so  friendly,  reciprocate  by  making  a  loan 
to  the  Chinese  Government.  He  planned  a  loan  of 
$40,000,000  for  the  purpose  of  refunding  the  entire  floating 
indebtedness  of  his  government.  Hopes  had  been  en- 
tertained that  the  Standard  Oil  Company  would  use  its 
influence  in  bringing  about  such  a  loan,  but  that  company 
was  not  willing  to  go  outside  of  the  special  business  of  its 
contract  with  China.  The  option  which  had  been  given 
to  Mr.  Gest  had  not  yet  resulted  in  any  completed  trans- 
action in  the  United  States.  So  accustomed  were  the 
Chinese  to  the  readiness  of  any  nationality  which  held 
important  concessions,  in  turn  to  support  the  Chinese 
Government  financially,  that  they  could  not  understand 
how  America,  with  professions  of  great  friendship  and  just 
now  substantially  favoured  by  the  Chinese,  should  not  be 
ready  to  reciprocate.  The  soundness  of  the  desire  of  the 
Americans  to  have  every  transaction  stand  on  its  own  bot- 
tom and  not  to  use  financial  support  as  a  bait  to  obtain 
concessions,  could,  of  course,  be  appreciated  by  the  Chinese. 
But  at  times  their  urgent  needs  made  them  impatient. 

The  news  of  the  assassination  at  Sarajevo  reached  us 
on  July  1st.  As  this  happened  to  be,  though  we  did  not  then 
suspect  it,  the  eve  of  a  terrible  convulsion  in  which  all  ac- 
cepted conditions  of  life,  national  and  international,  were 
shattered  and  unsettled,  I  shall  here  insert  parts  of  the  memo- 
randum which  I  drew  up  for  my  guidance  at  this  time: 

It  is  evident  that  China  finds  herself  in  a  critical  situation,  in  the  sense 
that  the  fundamental  character  of  her  political  life  and  the  direction  of  her 
political  development  are  now  being  decided.  While  a  vast  community 
living  under  a  complicated  social  system,  which  embodies  the  experience 


io6      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

of  thousands  of  years,  cannot  change  its  methods  of  a  sudden  and  will 
undoubtedly  for  a  long  time  continue  to  differ  radically  from  Western 
political  societies,  yet  it  admits  of  no  doubt  that  a  new  era  of  development 
has  begun  and  that  certain  essential  alternatives  are  being  faced.  Such 
alternatives  are  the  continued  unity  of  the  nation  or  its  division;  its  con- 
tinued independence  or  the  direct  dominance  of  one  or  more  foreign  suze- 
rains; its  commercial  unity  or  its  division  into  spheres  of  influence;  the 
tendency  of  its  institutions  of  government,  whether  in  the  direction  of  the 
absolutism  of  Russia  and  Japan,  or  the  republicanism  of  the  United  States; 
and  the  character  of  its  educational  and  legal  system,  either  dominated  by 
the  ideas  of  America  and  England  or  of  continental  Europe  or  Japan. 
From  these,  there  also  follow  important  alternatives  in  industrial  and  com- 
mercial policy. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  of  great  moment  whether  the  Chinese 
Government  will  remain  free,  with  the  assistance  of  influences  friendly  to 
the  development  of  China's  nationality,  to  preserve  the  unity  of  the  Chi- 
nese State  and  to  develop  its  institutions;  or  whether  its  financial  distress, 
combined  with  the  plottings  of  a  revolutionary  opposition,  will  deliver 
it  into  the  hands  of  those  who  are  not  favourable  to  the  growth  of  China's 
national  life. 

The  United  States  of  America  enjoys  a  position  of  great  advantage  for 
assisting  the  Chinese  Government  and  influencing  its  development  in  the 
direction  of  free  national  life.  The  lack  of  a  desire  for  political  interfer- 
ence, the  real  sympathy  felt  in  America  with  the  strivings  of  the  Chinese 
people,  and  cultural,  educational,  and  charitable  work  unselfishly  per- 
formed, have  given  the  United  States  the  undivided  confidence  of  China. 
It  is  certainly  true  that  the  Chinese  people  are  anxious  to  follow  in  the 
footsteps  of  the  United  States  if  they  may  only  be  permitted  to  do  so. 

Any  development  of  enterprise  which  increases  American  commercial 
interest  in  China  is  incidentally  favourable  to  Chinese  independence;  be- 
cause, through  the  enlistment  of  neutral  interests,  the  desire  of  outsiders 
for  political  control  can  be  counterbalanced.  The  organizing  of  an  Amer- 
ican investment  bank  and  similar  agencies  for  the  development  of  Amer- 
ican commerce  in  China,  participation  of  American  capital  in  railway 
building,  and  the  development  of  mines  and  oil  fields  through  American 
companies  and  under  American  business  methods  would  all  be  welcomed 
by  China  as  the  strengthening  of  a  favourable  influence.  Different  Chi- 
nese ministers  have  repeatedly  said  to  me  that  at  this  time  China  is  in  need 
of  the  active  assistance  of  those  who  are  amicably  disposed  and  that  China 
is  willing  to  do  her  part  in  cooperating,  and  in  extending  advantages,  if 
only  such  active  support  is  forthcoming.     If  American  capital,  industry, 


"SLOW  AMERICANS"  107 

and  commerce  are  not  ready  at  this  time  to  give  that  comparatively  slight 
assistance  to  China  which  the  situation  calls  for,  it  is  likely  that  American 
action  in  China  in  the  future  will  be  on  a  far  more  modest  basis  than 
present  possibilities  promise. 

The  war,  of  course,  brought  many  changes  in  China. 
Much  of  the  good  work  which  had  been  started  was  either 
destroyed  or  long  delayed.  It  marked  the  end  of  one  phase 
of  China's  development. 


CHAPTER  X 
FOLK  WAYS  AND  OFFICIALS 

Several  voices  whispered:  "It's  Prince  Pu  Lun." 

It  was  at  President  Yuan  Shih-kai's  reception,  New 
Year's  Day,  191 4;  the  diplomatic  corps  and  high  ofl&cials 
were  there.  The  Empress  Dowager's  residence,  now  oc- 
cupied by  the  President,  was  the  scene.  From  the  side 
rooms,  whither  we  had  withdrawn  for  refreshments  after 
exchanging  greetings  with  the  President,  we  looked  out  into 
the  main  hall  and  saw  that  its  floor  had  been  entirely  cleared, 
and  a  solitarj'^  figure  in  a  general's  uniform  was  proceeding 
across  the  floor  toward  the  President.  Walking  alone  and 
unattended,  the  representative  of  the  Chinese  Imperial 
Family  had  come  to  bring  its  felicitations  to  the  President 
of  the  Republic.  For  the  first  time  since  the  abdication, 
the  Imperial  Family  was  publicly  taking  notice  of  him  who 
had  displaced  it  in  power. 

When  the  guests  began  to  depart  I  gathered  up  my  party 
and  left  the  hall,  together  with  Admiral  Tsai  Ting-kan. 
Outside  was  Prince  Pu  Lun,  still  solitary,  walking  with  sad 
and  pensive  regard.  We  overtook  him.  I  talked  pleasantly 
with  him  on  such  non-committal  matters  as  the  Imperial 
collection  of  art,  which  was  at  this  time  being  brought  from 
Mukden.  He  seemed  quite  appreciative  of  this  attention. 
I  took  him  with  me  to  the  outer  palace  gate  where  his  own 
carriage  met  him. 

Except  the  automobiles  used  inside  of  the  palace  enclosure, 
few  were  then  to  be  found  in  Peking;  soon,  with  improved 
roads,  many  hundreds  came.  The  Empress  Dowager  be- 
fore her  death  had   acquired   a  large  collection  of  these 

108 


FOLK  WAYS  AND  OFFICIALS  109 

foreign  vehicles,  which  interested  her  greatly;  but  up  to  the 
time  of  her  death  the  Board  of  Ceremonies  had  not  suc- 
ceeded in  solving  the  problem  how  she  might  ride  in  an  auto- 
mobile in  which  there  would  also  be,  in  sitting  posture, 
one  of  her  servants,  the  chauffeur.  If  they  had  had  more 
time,  I  imagine  that  they  might  have  found  some  way  by 
which  the  chauffeur  could  kneel  in  driving  the  Imperial 
car,  but,  as  it  was,  the  poor  Empress  Dowager  never  had  the 
pleasure  of  the  swift  rides  she  so  much  coveted. 

Many  popular  superstitions  still  prevailed  in  parts 
of  the  provinces.  The  military  attache  of  the  American 
Legation,  Major  Bowley,  who  later  did  distinguished  ser- 
vice in  the  Great  War  as  general  of  artillery,  was  active 
in  visiting  the  military  commanders  in  different  parts  of 
China  and  in  observing  their  actions  and  getting  their  views. 
He  had  just  returned  from  such  a  trip  to  Kiangsi  Province, 
and  related  how  one  of  the  generals  there  strove  to  im- 
prove his  morale  by  drinking  the  blood  of  enemies  who 
had  been  killed.  He  spared  Major  Bowley  a  cupful  of  this 
precious  liquid,  which  was  to  be  taken  before  breakfast. 
It  is  startling  to  discover  among  the  people  so  highly  civil- 
ized as  are  the  Chinese  occasional  remnants  of  barbarous 
doctrines  and  practices.  There  is  an  inverted  homoeo- 
pathy in  Chinese  popular  belief — ^to  the  effect  that  "equals 
strengthen  equals";  thus,  to  eat  muscle  develops  strength, 
to  eat  tripe  aids  the  digestion,  to  eat  heart  or  drink  blood 
develops  courage,  and  so  on. 

One  evening,  at  a  dinner  at  Mr.  Liang  Shih-yi's  house  a 
spirited  discussion  developed  between  the  host  and  Mr. 
Anderson.  The  latter  had  related  a  local  custom  of  the 
Soochow  region  according  to  which  it  was  permissible  for  a 
community  or  a  crowd  of  people  to  bite  to  death  any  person 
who  was  thoroughly  disapproved  of  by  all.    Apparently 


no      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

the  method  of  execution  was  in  itself  a  guaranty  of  universal 
condemnation,  as  a  great  many  people  would  have  to  co- 
operate to  effect  the  desired  result  by  this  method.  Mr. 
Liang  protested  that  the  expression  "bite  to  death"  was 
in  this  case  used  only  metaphorically,  and  there  followed 
a  long  debate  on  Chinese  folk  customs. 

A  dinner  with  General  Kiang,  Commander  of  the  Peking 
Gendarmerie,  afforded  another  sidehght  on  Chinese  character. 
We  had  already  been  seated,  when  an  unusually  tall  Chinese 
entered,  wearing  Chinese  civihan  dress.  He  was  intro- 
duced as  Tutuh  Yin  (General  Yin  Chang-heng),  and  I 
learned  that  he  had  just  returned  from  Szechuan,  where  he 
had  become  governor  during  the  revolution,  after  putting 
to  death  the  Imperial  Governor-General,  Chao  Er-feng. 
General  Yin  was  of  striking  appearance,  with  strong  fea- 
tures, and  vigorous  in  gesture.  Now,  it  is  the  custom  at 
Chinese  dinners,  particularly  when  military  are  present, 
to  engage  in  extensive  drinkings  of  health.  The  Chinese, 
who  are  usually  very  abstemious,  drink  wine  that  resembles 
sherry,  and  also  a  liqueur-like  rice  wine,  which  latter  is 
potent.  The  proposer  of  the  toast  raises  his  little  cup  and 
drains  it  in  one  draught;  the  guest  to  whom  he  addresses 
himself  is  expected  to  do  likewise;  both  say  "Gambey" 
(a  challenge  to  empty  the  cup).  General  Yin,  who  seemed 
in  high  spirits,  was  on  his  legs  half  the  time  "gambey- 
ing"  to  the  other  guests,  especially  to  myself  and  the  other 
Americans,  the  military  attache,  the  Chinese  secretary,  the 
commandant  of  the  guard,  and  other  officers.  General 
Yin  must  have  performed  this  courtesy  at  least  forty  times 
in  the  course  of  the  evening,  which  with  the  attentions 
paid  us  by  the  other  members  of  the  table  round,  amounted 
to  a  considerable  challenge  of  one's  capacity.  It  must, 
however,  be  confessed  that  I  largely  shirked  this  test,  in 
company  with  the  amiable  General  Yin  Chang,  my  Manchu 


FOLK  WAYS  AND  OFFICIALS  in 

neighbour,  by  irrigating  a  large  plant  in  front  of  us  with  the 
liquid  dedicated  to  friendship. 

I  saw  General  Yin  Chang  next  morning.  He  asked 
whether  I  knew  what  had  been  the  matter  with  Tutuh  Yin 
the  night  before.  I  said  that  he  seemed  very  animated 
and  carried  his  liquor  very  well.  General  Yin  then  told 
me  that  after  I  had  left,  the  Tutuh  Yin  had  sat  down  with 
him  and  talked  seriously  and  intently,  revealing  his  deep 
worry  lest  Yuan  Shih-kai  should  have  him  executed.  He 
stated  that  Chao  Er-hsun,  the  brother  of  the  murdered 
Viceroy,  was  in  Peking,  and  with  other  men  using  every 
influence  to  destroy  him.  *'So,"  the  Manchu  general  said, 
"his  bravado  was  just  a  cover  for  his  worries." 

Next  day  Yin  Tutuh  called  on  me  at  my  residence. 
He  expressed  deep  regret  for  having  taken  so  much  wine 
on  the  evening  of  the  dinner.  He  said :  "  It  is  not  my  custom, 
but  I  was  excited  and  worried  because  of  the  uncertainty 
of  my  affairs."  He  then  launched  forth  into  a  literary 
discussion  of  Confucianism  in  its  bearing  upon  modern 
thought.  Not  knowing  that  he  was  a  student  of  the  classics, 
I  was  surprised  when  he  revealed  this  side  of  his  nature. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  he  greatly  resembled  the  men  of  the 
Renaissance  who  combined  harsh  and  cruel  qualities  with 
a  deep  love  of  literature.  The  last  time  I  saw  the  Tutuh 
Yin,  more  than  five  years  later,  he  presented  me  with 
his  written  works.  There  were  gathered  about  twenty 
members  of  the  Confucian  Society,  and  the  conversation 
again  turned  around  the  permanent  qualities  of  Confu- 
cianism. When  the  concept  of  the  "unknowable"  was  re- 
ferred to.  General  Yin  cited  at  length  Herbert  Spencer's 
views  thereon.  He  said:  "The  greatness  of  Confucius  lies 
in  the  fact  that  he  centred  his  attention  on  those  things 
which  we  know  and  can  control,  and  that  he  aimed  at  the 
highest  development  of  human  action  on  this  common-sense 
basis.  He  leaves  the  dreams  about  the  unknowable  to  others.'* 


112      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Among  our  guests  at  a  dinner  was  Dr.  King  Ya-mei,  a  Chi- 
nese lady  noted  for  her  wide  information  and  cleverness.  We 
spoke  about  the  recent  advance  of  Russia  in  Mongolia. 
*'Who  can  resist  Russia!"  she  exclaimed.  Like  all  thinking 
Chinese,  she  was  deeply  worried  about  the  difficulties  con- 
fronting her  nation  on  all  sides.  Dr.  C.  C.  Wang,  who  was 
also  present,  spoke  of  the  lack  of  continuity  in  developing 
expert  knowledge,  because  of  the  frequent  shifts  which  are 
made  in  the  pubhc  service. 

Dr.  King  Ya-mei  then  told  an  amusing  incident,  which 
shows  how  natural  community  action  and  passive  resistance 
are  to  the  Chinese.  In  an  orphan  asylum  at  Tientsin  a 
new  set  of  regulations  had  been  issued,  but  the  orphans  had 
paid  no  attention  to  them.  After  a  good  many  children  had 
been  called  to  order  without  result,  a  meeting  was  convoked 
by  the  principal.  When  the  orphans  were  asked  why  they 
did  not  obey  the  regulations,  their  spokesman  said:  **We 
are  perfectly  satisfied  with  the  old  regulations,  and  have 
no  desire  to  change  them." — "But  the  new  regulations 
have  been  made  by  your  teachers,"  rejoined  the  superin- 
tendent, "and  they  must  be  obeyed." — "We  do  not  think," 
the  spokesman  replied,  "that  they  are  an  improvement, 
and  we  propose  to  obey  the  old  rules." — "But,  then  you 
shall  be  punished  severely." — "If  you  try  to  punish  us, 
we  shall  all  go  away;  and  then  what  will  become  of  the 
orphan  asylum?" 

They  had  reasoned  it  out  that  they  were  an  important  part 
of  the  institution.  That  orphans  should  conceive  the  idea 
to  go  on  strike  shows  how  normal  and  self-evident  that 
mode  of  social  action  seems  in  China. 

I  was  visited  by  the  newly  appointed  Chinese  minister  to 
Japan,  Mr.  Lu  Tsung-yu,  who  later  became  quite  notorious 
in  China  in  connection  with  the  loans  of  191 8.  He  was  ac- 
companied by  Doctor  Tsur,  the  president  of  Tsing  Hua 


FOLK  WAYS  AND  OFFICIALS  113 

College  and  a  leading  American-returned  student.  Mr.  Lu  is  a 
slight  man  of  suave  manners,  keen  intelligence,  and  a  love  of 
manipulation.  On  this  occasion  he  developed  the  idea  that 
cooperation  between  the  United  States,  China,  and  Japan 
was  possible  and  desirable,  as  these  three  countries  had  many 
parallel  interests.  It  was  his  opinion  that  Japan  could  not 
create  an  extensive  settlement  in  Manchuria.  He  had  been 
stationed  in  that  region  several  years  when  Hsu  Hsi-chang 
was  viceroy;  and  he  told  me  that  he  had  observed  that  the 
Japanese  came  as  officials,  soldiers,  or  railway  employees,  or 
in  connection  with  mining  enterprises :  but  they  did  not  seem 
to  have  any  impulse  to  settle  in  the  country  as  farmers,  and 
as  small  merchants  they  could  scarcely  compete  with  the 
Chinese.  Mr.  Lu  had  been  educated  in  Japan,  being  one  of 
the  first  batch  of  Chinese  students  at  Waseda  University; 
together  with  Tsao  Ju-lin,  at  this  time  Vice  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  who  also  later  played  an  important  part  in 
Chino-Japanese  affairs;  and  Chang  Chung-hsiang,  the 
Chief  Justice  of  China  at  that  time,  a  man  who  exercised 
considerable  influence  in  introducing  into  China  the  Japanese 
idea  of  judicial  procedure  and  organization  and  who  became 
Chinese  minister  in  Tokyo  in  1916.  This  trio  of  associates 
was  popularly  known  as  "the  Three  Diamonds." 

An  important  meeting  of  the  diplomatic  corps  dealt  with 
the  procedure  in  the  matter  of  claims  against  the  Chinese 
Government  on  account  of  damage  suffered  during  the  revo- 
lution. The  Japanese,  French,  and  German  representatives 
were  inclined  to  insist  that  the  Chinese  Government  be  held 
responsible  for  all  losses  which  could  in  any  way  be  said  to 
have  been  caused,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  the  revolution. 
In  hne  with  the  traditional  policy  of  fairness  and  moderation 
followed  by  the  United  States  I  strongly  urged  that  only 
losses  directly  and  physically  traceable  to  violent  action 
should  be  paid,  eliminating  such  uncertain  and  contingent 


114      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

matters  as  anticipated  profits.  The  British  minister  gave 
support  to  this  view;  his  legation, too, had  not  encouraged  the 
fihng  of  indirect  claims.  After  much  discussion,  the  sugges- 
tion was  accepted  in  the  form  proposed.  By  this  action  were 
ruled  out  indirect  claims  to  the  amount  of  nearly  four  million 
dollars,  which  had  already  been  listed  and  included  by  some 
of  the  legations  in  their  totals. 

The  British  Legation,  in  which  diplomatic  meetings  are 
held,  is  an  old  palace,  formerly  the  residence  of  a  Manchu 
prince,  which  was  purchased  by  the  British  Government  at 
the  time  when  legations  were  first  established  at  Peking. 
Fortunately,  the  fine  architectural  forms  of  the  old  structure 
had  been  retained  sufficiently  to  leave  this  group  of  buildings 
justly  proportioned,  beautifully  decorated,  and  free  from 
jarring  foreign  notes.  One  passes  to  the  minister's  residence 
through  two  lofty,  open  halls,  with  tiled  roofs  and  richly 
coloured  eaves.  The  residential  buildings  are  Chinese  with- 
out and  semi-European  within,  Chinese  decorative  elements 
having  been  allowed  to  remain  in  the  inner  spaces.  The 
diplomatic  meetings  always  took  place  in  the  dining  room, 
where  a  huge  portrait  of  Queen  Victoria,  from  the  middle 
period  of  her  reign,  impassively — not  without  symbohc 
significance — looked  down  upon  the  company. 

There  were  at  this  time  about  sixteen  legations  in  Pekmg, 
so  that  the  meetings  were  not  too  large  for  intimate  conver- 
sation. The  proceedings  were  usually  carried  on  in  the 
English  language,  partly  out  of  deference  to  the  Dean,  and 
partly  because  English  has  come  quite  naturally  to  be  the 
international  language  of  the  Far  East. 

The  diplomatic  corps  in  Peking  meets  frequently,  and  it 
has  more  comprehensive  and  complicated  business  than  falls 
to  such  a  body  in  any  other  capital.  Matters  of  diplomatic 
routine  occupy  only  a  subsidiary  place.  Because  of  the 
system  of  extra-territoriality  under  which  foreign  residents 


FOLK  WAYS  AND  OFFICIALS  115 

remain  exempt  from  Chinese  law  and  subject  only  to  that  of 
their  own  respective  nation,  the  foreign  representatives  in 
China  are  constantly  concerned  with  the  internal  affairs  of 
that  country.'  The  eflPects  of  any  legislation  by  the  Chinese 
Government  upon  foreign  residents  have  to  be  considered  by 
the  diplomatic  corps:  if  the  most  punctilious  minister  dis- 
covers that  the  measure  in  question  in  any  way  transgresses 
that  absolute  immunity  from  local  law  which  is  claimed,  then 
objection  will  be  made,  and  the  unanimous  consent,  which  is 
necessary  to  approve  of  such  matters,  is  difficult  or  impossible 
to  obtain. 

Questions  of  taxation  are  constantly  before  the  diplomatic 
corps,  as  the  Chinese  local  officials  quite  naturally  attempt 
to  find  some  way  to  make  the  foreigners  bear  at  least  part  of 
the  taxation  of  a  government  whose  general  protection  they 
demand.  The  methods  of  proving  claims  and  collecting 
indemnities  give  rise  to  much  discussion,  whenever  there 
has  been  some  outbreak  of  revolutionary  activity.  As  cer- 
tain revenues  have  been  pledged  for  international  loans,  the 
diplomatic  corps  will  object  to  the  Chinese  Government  using 
these  revenues  at  all  before  they  have  been  released  as  not 
needed  for  defraying  the  debt  charges.  One  of  the  most 
fruitful  causes  of  irritation  comes  from  attempts  frequently 
made  by  one  or  the  other  minister  to  "hold  up"  the  funds 
belonging  to  the  Chinese  until  they  have  fulfilled  some  par- 
ticular demand  which  he  had  made.  The  fact  that  it  may 
be  an  entirely  extraneous  and  irrelevant  matter,  such  as  the 
appointment  of  a  national  of  the  minister  to  a  Chinese 
government  job,  does  not  seem  to  disturb  the  man  who 
thinks  he  has  found  a  clever  way  to  achieve  his  purpose. 
The  international  settlement  at  Shanghai  and  the  regime 
of  foreign  troops  in  Peking  and  along  the  Mukden  Railway 
also  give  rise  to  a  great  many  problems  which  are  referred 
to  the  diplomatic  corps.  From  questions  involving  the 
recognition  of  the  Government  itself  to  such   matters  as 


ii6      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

the  advisability  of  bambooing  prisoners  at  Shanghai,  no 
question  seems  to  be  too  big  or  little  to  come  before  this 
body. 

The  discussions  tend  rather  to  avoid  general  issues  and  to 
confine  themselves  to  a  statement  and  explanation  of  the 
position  taken  by  each  government.  Occasionally  the  stub- 
bom  and  unreasonable  adherence  of  one  or  two  representa- 
tives to  what  is  considered  by  others  as  an  unduly  severe  and 
exacting  position,  leads  to  joint  efforts  in  an  attempt  to 
make  a  more  fair  and  liberal  policy  prevail.  The  discussions 
are  not  infrequently  longer  than  is  necessary;  the  main  points 
are  lost  sight  of,  and  discussion  becomes  entangled,  because 
one  side  may  be  talking  of  one  thing,  whereas  the  other  has 
quite  a  different  matter  in  view.  Until  it  is  discovered  that 
there  is  no  real  difference  or  only  a  difference  in  form,  much 
valuable  time  may  be  consumed.  At  times,  these  conferences 
remind  one  of  a  university  faculty  meeting. 

Weeks  were  filled  with  innumerable  conferences  on  matters 
of  business.  In  China  it  rarely  happens  that  the  decision 
Hes  with  only  one  official.  In  order  to  have  a  proposal 
accepted,  a  great  many  men  have  to  be  consulted  and  won 
over.  Impatient  representatives,  backed  by  strong  national 
force,  have  frequently  tried  to  cut  short  this  procedure,  and, 
planting  themselves  before  the  official  whose  assent  they 
needed,  have  "pounded  the  table"  until  a  promise  was  ob- 
tained. They  sometimes  succeeded  by  so  powerfully  getting 
on  the  nerves  of  the  Chinese  official  that  he  saw  no  way  to 
save  his  peace  of  mind  but  by  giving  in.  At  one  time  I  ex- 
pressed great  surprise  to  the  Minister  of  Finance,  because,  in- 
stead of  insisting  that  reasonable  arrangements  for  the  re- 
newal of  a  certain  short-term  loan  should  be  made,  he  had 
given  the  representative  in  question — ^the  agent  of  a  munition 
company — a  large  order  for  additional  materials  which  were 
not  needed,  only  to  secure  an  extension  of  time.     He  said,  in 


FOLK  WAYS  AND  OFFICIALS  117 

self-defence:     "The  manners  of  the  man  were  so  abominable 
that  I  could  not  stand  it  any  longer."  ' 

However,  the  method  of  the  strong  arm  and  mailed  fist, 
while  it  has  produced  results  in  China,  has  also  carried  in 
itself  the  elements  of  its  own  defeat.  The  Chinese  may  make 
a  concession  under  such  circumstances,  but  they  will  there- 
after have  no  interest  whatsoever  in  facilitating  the  business 
in  question;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  likely  to  be  delayed  and 
obstructed  at  every  point,  so  that  it  can  be  carried  out  only 
through  constant  pressure  and  show  of  force.  The  people  of 
China  have  a  strong  and  widespread  sense  of  equity.  He 
who  proposes  a  reasonable  arrangement  and  gives  himself 
the  trouble  to  talk  it  over  with  officials  and  other  men  con- 
cerned, in  the  spirit  of  arriving  at  a  solution  fair  to  all,  will 
build  on  a  sound  foundation.  Whenever  foreign  interests 
have  acted  on  this  principle,  the  results  have  been  far  more 
fruitful  of  good  than  where  things  have  been  carried  through 
with  a  high  hand  by  demand  and  threat,  without  reasoning 
or  give  and  take.  But  to  sit  in  conference  with  various  people 
on  all  the  phases  of  any  proposal  is  a  great  consumer  of 
time.  One  is  kept  busy  day  and  night  in  following  the  roads 
and  trails  that  lead  to  the  final  meeting  of  minds  from  which 
action  is  to  result. 

I  had  a  visit  from  the  Tuchun  Tien,  of  Kalgan,  after  my 
return  from  America  in  the  fall  of  1918.  I  found  that  the 
Tuchun  was  in  very  bad  grace  at  the  American  Legation. 
He  had  interfered  with  an  automobile  service  which  an  Amer- 
ican had  tried  to  establish  between  Kalgan  and  Urga,  in 
Mongolia,  and  had  in  other  ways  shown  an  apparent  hos- 
tility to  legitimate  American  enterprise.  As  the  writing  of 
notes  had  not  secured  any  satisfactory  results,  I  began  to 
probe  into  the  situation  to  find  what  lay  back  of  the  attitude 
of  the  general. 

I  found  that  he  was  "blood-brother"  of  Mr.  Pan  Fu,  whom 


ii8      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

in  turn  I  numbered  among  my  friends.  I  therefore  consulted 
Mr.  Pan  Fu  about  the  situation.  He  said  that  there  must  be 
some  misunderstanding,  as  the  General  was  certainly  not 
animated  by  any  feeling  of  hostility  to  America;  but  that  it 
was  possible  that  the  particular  American  in  Kalgan  had 
rubbed  him  the  wrong  way.  So  he  promised  to  write  the 
General  a  long  letter. 

A  short  time  later  he  called  on  me  and  reported  that  Gen- 
eral Tien  had  written  him  that  he  was  soon  coming  to  Peking 
and  would  be  very  glad  to  meet  me.  The  Tuchun  soon 
called  on  me,  with  Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi,  and  we  had  a  most 
friendly  talk.  Very  little  was  said  about  any  past  difficulties 
in  Kalgan,  but  a  great  deal  about  future  prospects  of  good- 
will and  mutual  help.  In  fact,  our  friendship  was  quite 
firmly  estabHshed,  and  there  was  no  further  room  for  mis- 
understanding. 

Tuchun  Tien  was  an  open-faced,  friendly  looking  person 
who,  though  he  had  straggling  side  whiskers  unusual  with 
the  Chinese,  had  nothing  of  the  berserker  in  his  bearing. 
Our  conversation  was  long  and  cordial.  When  it  had  already 
lasted  more  than  an  hour,  Mr,  Chow  looked  at  me  apologetic- 
ally and  said,  in  English:  **We  had  better  let  him  talk,  it 
does  him  good."     As  for  myself,  I  was  glad  to  hear  his  views. 

Mrs.  Reinsch  and  I  gave  a  dinner  to  Mr.  Robert  Gailey  of 
the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  on  the  eve  of  his  departure  for  America. 
About  thirty  guests  were  present,  all  members  of  the  Amer- 
ican mission  societies  in  Peking.  I  had  just  entered  the  re- 
ception room  to  be  ready  to  welcome  our  guests  when  much 
to  my  surprise  Prince  Pu  Lun  was  ushered  in.  It  was  evi- 
dent that  there  had  been  some  mistake  about  invitations, 
but  as  there  appeared  to  be  no  other  dinner  given  at  the 
Legation,  I  made  no  effort  to  clear  up  the  error  and  tried  to 
make  him  thoroughly  welcome.  I  had  the  table  rearranged 
so  as  to  seat  the  Prince  between  two  ladies  both  of  whom 


FOLK  WAYS  AND  OFFICIALS  119 

spoke  Chinese  very  well.  He  appeared  to  be  surprised  at  the 
composition  of  the  company  and  the  absence  of  wines,  but 
was  apparently  well  entertained  by  his  neighbours.  When 
the  dinner  was  about  half  through,  Kao,  the  head  boy,  came 
to  the  back  of  my  chair  and  whispered  to  me:  "Mrs.  Lee's 
boy  outside.  Say  Prince  belong  Mrs.  Lee  dinner."  So  after 
dinner  I  felt  in  duty  bound  to  tell  the  Prince  that  Mrs.  Lee 
had  sent  word  that  she  would  be  very  happy  if  he  could 
come  to  her  house  in  the  course  of  the  evening. 

After  a  short  conversation,  in  which  he  told  me  about  his 
children  of  whom  he  is  very  fond,  the  Prince  departed,  to 
recoup  himself  at  the  house  of  the  navy  doctor  for  the  absti- 
nences laid  upon  him  at  the  minister's  dinner. 


PART  II 
THE  PASSING  OF  YUAN  SHIH-KAI 


CHAPTER  XI 
THE  WAR:  JAPAN  IN  SHANTUNG 

On  August  8,  1914,  Japanese  war  vessels  appeared 
near  Tsingtau.  Japan  suggested  on  August  loth  that 
the  British  Government  might  call  for  the  cooperation  of 
Japan  under  the  terms  of  the  Alliance.  In  view  of  possible 
consequences  the  British  Government  hesitated  to  make 
the  call;  the  British  in  China  considered  it  important  that 
independent  action  by  Japan  in  that  country  should  be 
precluded. 

Acting  on  its  own  account  on  August  15th,  the  Japanese 
Government  sent  the  Shantung  ultimatum  to  Germany. 
The  British  Government  was  then  informed  of  the  action 
taken.  The  German  representative  at  Peking  had  discussed 
informally  with  the  Foreign  Office  the  possibility  of  im% 
mediately  returning  Kiaochow  directly  to  China;  but  the 
Chinese  Government  was  now  pointedly  warned  by  the 
Japanese  that  no  such  action  would  be  permitted. 

The  Chinese  Government  then  also  seriously  considered 
the  policy  of  declaring  war  on  Germany.  It  would  have 
been  as  easy  for  the  Chinese,  as  for  any  one  else,  to  take 
Kiaochow  from  the  Germans,  but  Japan  was  ready  and 
anticipated  them.  In  fact,  the  Japanese  minister  stated  to 
the  Chinese  Foreign  Office  on  August  20th  that  the  Kiao- 
chow matter  no  longer  concerned  the  Chinese  Government, 
which,  he  trusted,  would  remain  absolutely  passive  in  regard 
to  it.  The  ultimatum  to  Germany,  limited  to  August  23rd, 
demanded  the  delivery,  at  a  date  not  later  than  September 
1 5th  of  the  leased  territory  of  Kiaochow  to  the  Japanese 

■^  123 


124      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Government,  **with  a  view  to  the  eventual  restoration  of  the 
same  to  China." 

Basing  its  action  upon  the  language  of  this  ultimatum,  the 
American  Government  on  August  19th  made  a  communica- 
tion to  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office,  noting  with  satisfaction 
that  Japan  demanded  the  surrender  of  Kiaochow  with  the 
purpose  of  restoring  that  tract  to  China,  and  that  it  was 
seeking  no  territorial  aggrandizement  in  China. 

On  my  return  to  Peking  on  September  30th,  I  found  the 
Chinese  in  a  state  of  natural  excitement  over  the  action  taken 
by  Japan.  By  this  time  the  Japanese  had  invested  Tsingtau ; 
the  British,  who  had  also  sent  a  contingent  of  troops,  were 
kept  by  the  Japanese  in  a  very  subsidiary  position.  The 
scope  of  Japan's  plans  was  more  fully  revealed  on  September 
29th,  when  the  Chinese  Government  was  informed  that 
"military  necessity"  required  the  Japanese  Government  to 
place  troops  along  the  entire  railway  in  Shantung  Province. 
As  this  railway  had  never  had  German  military  guards,  and 
as  the  portion  near  Tsingtau  was  already  held  by  Japanese 
troops,  the  military  necessity  of  such  further  occupation  was 
by  no  means  apparent. 

Mr.  Liang  Tun-yen,  Minister  of  Communications,  called 
on  me  on  October  ist,  expressing  deep  concern  over  the  ac- 
tion of  the  Japanese  in  Shantung.  He  stated  his  conviction 
that,  in  departing  from  the  necessary  military  operations 
around  Tsingtau,  it  was  Japan's  plan  to  stir  up  trouble  in  the 
interior  of  China  with  a  view  to  more  extensive  occupation 
of  Chinese  territory.  From  Japanese  sources  he  had  informa- 
tion to  the  effect  that  the  Japanese  militarists  were  not 
satisfied  with  the  reduction  of  Tsingtau,  but  wished  to  take 
advantage  of  this  opportunity  to  secure  a  soHd  footing — 
political  and  military — ^within  the  interior  of  China.  He  was 
further  informed  that  they  were  ready  to  let  loose  large  num- 
bers of  bandits  and  other  irresponsible  persons  to  cooperate 
with  revolutionary  elements  in  an  attempt  to  create  wide- 


THE  WAR:  JAPAN  IN  SHANTUNG  125 

spread  uprisings,  in  order  to  furnish  a  pretext  for  military 
interference.  When  I  called  attention  to  the  declarations 
regarding  Kiaochow  in  Japan's  ultimatum  to  Germany,  the 
minister  shook  his  head  and  said:  "Unfortunately,  Japa- 
nese policy  cannot  be  judged  by  such  professions,  but  only 
by  the  acts  of  the  last  twenty  years,  which  make  up  a 
series  of  broken  pledges  and  attacks  upon  the  rights  of 
China." 

President  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  wished  to  see  me;  so  I  called 
on  him  informally  on  October  2nd.  In  stronger  terms  than 
Minister  Liang  he  set  forth  his  apprehensions.  "From  in- 
formation in  my  possession,"  he  stated,  "I  am  convinced  that 
the  Japanese  have  a  definite  and  far-reaching  plan  for  using 
the  European  crisis  to  further  an  attempt  to  lap  the  founda- 
tions of  control  over  China.  In  this,  the  control  of  Shantung 
through  the  possession  of  the  port  and  the  railway  is  to  be 
the  foundation  stone.  Their  policy  was  made  quite  apparent 
through  the  threatened  occupation  of  the  entire  Shantung 
Railway,  which  goes  far  beyond  anything  the  Germans  ever 
attempted  in  Shantung  Province.  It  will  bring  the  Japanese 
military  forces  to  the  very  heart  of  China." 

Thereupon  Yuan  Shih-kai  requested  that  I  ask  President 
Wilson  to  use  his  good  offices  in  conferring  with  the  British 
Government,  in  order  to  prevail  upon  Japan  to  restrict  her 
action  in  Shantung  to  the  military  necessities  involved  in  the 
capture  of  Tsingtau,  according  to  the  original  assurances 
given  the  Chinese  Government.  I  communicated  this  re- 
quest to  the  President  through  the  Department  of  State. 

With  great  promptness,  however,  the  Japanese  executed 
the  plan  they  had  adopted.  They  informed  the  Chinese 
that,  being  judges  of  their  own  military  necessities,  they 
would  occupy  the  railway  hy  force  majeure  immediately,  but 
would  leave  its  administration  in  Chinese  hands — ^with  the 
stipulation  that  Japanese  conductors  be  placed  on  the  trains. 
The  Chinese  found  no  means  to  resist  this  arrangement. 


126     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

•  Mr.  Eki  Hioki,  successor  of  Minister  Yamaza,  had  arrived 
during  the  summer.  He  had  for  many  years  been  minister 
in  Chile,  where  I  had  met  him  in  1910;  remembering  his 
genial  and  sociable  qualities,  I  was  happy  to  renew  this  ac- 
quaintance. Mr.  Hioki  differed  from  his  predecessor  in  his 
readiness  to  talk  freely  and  abundantly.  In  our  first  conver- 
sation, when  the  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Japan  came  up,  he  adduced  the  customary  argument  that  as 
the  United  States  was  preventing  the  Japanese  from  setthng 
in  America,  we  could  not  in  fairness  object  if  Japan  tried  to 
develop  her  activities  and  influence  on  the  Asian  continent. 
I  could  honestly  assure  him  that  American  goodwill  did 
go  out  in  full  measure  to  any  legitimate  development  of 
Japanese  enterprise  and  prosperity,  but  we  also  had  duties 
toward  our  own  citizens,  who  had  been  active  in  Chinese 
trade  for  more  than  1 30  years,  as  well  as  toward  China  her- 
self. We  could  not  be  expected  to  approve  any  action  which 
would  not  respect  the  rights  of  these. 

The  Chinese  people  were  becoming  more  and  more  farmed 
about  Japan  in  Shantung.  The  large  number  of  petitions 
and  manifestoes  which  came  to  me,  as  the  representative  of  a 
friendly  nation,  from  various  parts  of  China,  gave  me  an 
idea  of  how  widespread  was  this  anxiety.  Some  of  these 
protests  were  written  with  the  blood  of  the  petitioner. 

Count  Okuma's  declaration,  that  a  large  increase  in  the 
military  forces  of  Japan  was  needed  to  preser^^e  peace  in  the 
Far  East,  was  interpreted  as  meaning  that  Japan  would  take 
the  present  opportunity  to  make  good  her  actual  domination 
throughout  eastern  Asia.  The  Chinese  felt  that  any  under- 
standing with  Japan  would  inevitably  lead  to  the  total  sub- 
jection of  China  to  the  political  dominance  of  her  neighbour. 
They  distrust  all  professions  of  Japanese  friendship.  When- 
ever I  tried  to  argue  that  a  frank  understanding  between 
China  and  Japan  was  desirable,  I  was  told  that  China  could 
not  trust  Japan;  that  Japan  must  not  be  judged  by  her  pro- 


THE  WAR:  JAPAN  IN  SHANTUNG  127 

fessions,  but  by  her  past  acts,  all  of  which  show  a  determined 
policy  of  political  advance  veiled  by  reassuring  declarations. 

Thus  the  Chinese  feared  Japanese  intrigue  at  every  point. 
They  believed  that  revolutionary  activities,  as  in  the  past, 
were  getting  encouragement  from  Japan.  The  Japanese 
were  ready  to  take  advantage  of  and  to  aggravate  any  weak- 
ness which  might  exist  in  Chinese  social  and  political  life. 
They  would  fasten  like  leeches  upon  any  sore  spot.  The 
tendency  toward  rebellion  and  brigandage,  the  counterfeit- 
ing of  banknotes,  the  corruption  of  officials,  the  undermining 
of  the  credit  of  important  private  and  public  enterprises,  the 
furnishing  of  more  dangerous  drugs  when  opium  was  for- 
bidden— in  connection  with  such  mischiefs  individual  Japa- 
nese had  been  active  to  the  great  damage  of  the  Chinese. 
But  though  it  would  be  unjust,  of  course,  to  charge  up  this 
meddling  to  the  Japanese  nation  as  a  whole  the  connivance 
of  their  militarist  government  was  a  fact. 

The  British  looked  upon  the  new  adventure  of  Japan  with 
a  decided  lack  of  enthusiasm.  While  welcoming  the  losses 
inflicted  on  their  enemy  in  war,  they  were  evidently  fearful 
of  the  results  which  might  come  from  Shantung. 

It  was  plain  that  the  Russians,  too,  while  allied  with  Japan, 
were  quite  aware  of  the  dangers  inherent  in  the  Chinese 
situation.  Taken  with  recent  Japanese  advances  in  Inner 
Mongolia,  a  situation  was  created  in  northern  China  which 
would  be  regarded  as  dangerous  by  the  Russians.  Discussing 
the  unrest  in  China,  the  Russian  minister  said  to  me  signifi- 
cantly: "The  situation  itself  does  not  impress  me  as  serious; 
the  only  serious  thing  about  it  is  that  the  Japanese  say  it  is 
serious." 

In  fine,  the  general  temper  and  direction  of  Japanese  action 
was  not  relished  by  the  allies  of  Japan.  Japan  had  taken 
advantage  of  a  conflict  which  was  primarily  European,  into 
the  rigour  of  which  she  did  not  enter,  for  the  purpose  of 
gathering  up  the  possessions  of  Germany  in  the  Far  East 


128     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

and  the  Pacific  at  a  time  when  they  could  be  but  weakly 
defended. 

This  policy  of  Japan  deeply  affected  American  prospects 
and  enterprise  in  China,  as,  also,  that  of  the  other  leading 
nations.  Since  the  American  attitude  of  goodwill  toward 
China  had  in  the  past  been  understood  by  the  Chinese  to 
imply  a  readiness  to  give  them  a  certain  support  in  times  of 
need,  large  hopes  were  entertained  as  to  what  the  United 
States  would  do.  Rich  and  powerful  beyond  measure,  she 
would,  in  the  minds  of  the  Chinese,  help  China  to  maintain 
her  integrity,  independence,  and  sovereignty.  Other  nations, 
not  a  little  jealous  of  the  past  goodwill  of  the  Chinese  toward 
us,  were  not  slow  to  point  out  that  American  friendship  was  a 
bubble  which  vanished  before  such  concrete  difficulties  as  the 
violation  of  China's  neutrality.  But  the  Chinese,  after  all, 
saw  that  it  did  not  He  within  the  sphere  of  its  action  for  the 
United  States  to  come  to  the  rescue  with  direct  political  and 
military  support.  True,  the  Chinese  had  encouraged  Amer- 
ican activities  in  China.  They  had  looked  upon  them  as  a 
safeguard  to  their  own  national  Hfe.  Since  they  were  con- 
ducted in  a  fair  spirit  and  without  political  afterthought,  the 
Chinese  did  hope  and  expect  as  a  minimum  that  Americans 
would  stand  by  their  guns  and  not  let  themselves  be  excluded 
by  political  intrigue  or  other  means  from  their  share  in  the 
development  and  activities  of  China. 


CHAPTER  XII 
THE  FAMOUS  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS,  1915 

"Japan  is  going  to  take  advantage  of  this  war  to  get 
control  of  China."  In  these  words  President  Yuan  Shih-kai 
summed  up  the  situation  when  I  made  my  first  call  on  him 
after  returning  from  Europe  in  September.  Many  Chinese 
friends  came  to  see  me  and  tell  me  their  fears.  Admiral 
Tsai  said :  "  Here  are  the  beginnings  of  another  Manchuria. 
Aggressive  Japan  in  Shantung  is  different  from  any  European 
tenant." 

Events  had  moved  rapidly.  Tsingtau  had  been  taken, 
German  control  had  been  wholly  eliminated  from  the  lease- 
hold and  the  railway.  The  Chinese  Government  notified 
Japan  that  permission  to  use  part  of  the  Province  of  Shan- 
tung for  military  operations  would  be  withdrawn,  since 
occasion  for  it  had  disappeared.  This  the  Japanese  seized 
upon  as  a  calculated  and  mahgnant  insult;  it  was  made  the 
excuse  for  presentation  of  the  demands. 

The  blow  fell  on  January  i8th.  The  Japanese  minister 
sought  a  private  interview  with  Yuan  Shih-kai.  This  meet- 
ing took  place  at  night.  With  a  mien  of  great  mystery  and 
importance  the  minister  opened  the  discussion.  He  en- 
joined absolute  secrecy  on  pain  of  serious  consequences 
before  handing  Yuan  the  text  of  the  demands.  He  made 
therewith  an  oral  statement  of  the  considerations  which 
favoured  the  granting  of  them. 

The  Chinese,  fearing  greater  evils,  did  their  best  to  guard 
the  secret.  They  could  not,  however,  keep  in  complete 
ignorance  those  whose  interests  would  have  been  vitally 
affected;  also  memoranda  of  important  conversations  had  to 

iz9 


I30      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

be  set  down.  As  soon  as  I  received  the  first  inkling  of  what 
was  going  on,  I  impressed  it  on  the  Chinese  that,  since  the 
subjects  under  discussion  intimately  affected  American 
rights  in  China,  I  should  be  kept  fully  informed  in  order  that 
my  government,  relying  on  the  treaties  and  understandings 
concerning  Chinese  independence,  could  take  necessary  steps 
to  safeguard  its  interests.  The  Chinese  were  of  course  ready 
to  comply  with  my  request.  My  intercourse  with  Chinese 
cabinet  ministers  and  Foreign  Office  members  was  not  con- 
fined to  formal  interviews  and  dinners.  We  exchanged  many 
visits  during  which  we  conversed  far  into  the  night,  without 
wasting  time  over  formalities  or  official  camouflage. 

In  the  conversation  in  which  he  presented  the  twenty-one 
demands,  the  Japanese  minister  dropped  several  significant 
hints. 

The  minister  then  spoke  of  the  Chinese  revolutionists 
"who  have  very  close  relations  with  many  Japanese  outside 
of  the  Government,  and  have  means  and  influence";  further, 
"it  may  not  be  possible  for  the  Japanese  Government  to 
restrain  such  people  from  stirring  up  trouble  in  China  unless 
the  Chinese  Government  shall  give  some  positive  proof  of 
friendship."  The  majority  of  the  Japanese  people,  he 
continued,  were  opposed  to  President  Yuan  Shih-kai. 
"They  believe,"  he  went  on,  "that  the  President  is  strongly 
anti-Japanese,  and  that  his  government  befriends  the  distant 
countries  (Europe  and  America)  and  antagonizes  the  neigh- 
bour. If  the  President  will  now  grant  these  demands,  the 
Japanese  people  will  be  convinced  that  his  feeling  is  friendly, 
and  it  will  then  be  possible  for  the  Japanese  Government 
to  give  assistance  to  President  Yuan."  Yuan  sat  silent 
throughout  this  ominous  conversation.  The  blow  stunned 
him.  He  could  only  say:  "You  cannot  expect  me  to  say 
anything  to-night." 

Quite  aside  from  the  substance  of  the  twenty-one  de- 
mands, the  threats  and  promises  implied  in  this  statement 


/ 


THE  FAMOUS  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS    131 

convinced  the  Chinese  leaders  that  Japan  was  contemplating 
a  policy  of  extensive  interference  in  the  domestic  affairs  and 
political  controversies  in  China,  making  use  of  these  as  a 
leverage  to  attain  its  own  desires.  The  Chinese  considered 
it  an  ominous  fact  that  the  paper  on  which  the  demands  were 
written  was  watermarked  with  dreadnoughts  and  machine 
guns.  They  believed  that  the  use  of  this  particular  paper 
was  not  purely  accidental.  Such  details  mean  a  good  deal 
with  people  who  are  accustomed  to  say  unpleasant  things 
by  hints  or  suggestions  rather  than  by  direct  statements. 

A  Japanese  press  reporter  called  at  the  Legation  on  Janu- 
ary 19th,  and  related  his  troubles  to  one  of  the  secretaries. 
The  Japanese  minister  refused  absolutely,  he  said,  to  say 
anything  about  what  passed  between  him  and  the  President; 
therefore  he  had  sought  the  American  Legation,  which  might 
have  knowledge  which  could  help  him.  With  his  assumed 
naivete  the  man  possibly  hoped  to  get  a  hint  as  to  whether  a 
"leak"  had  occurred  between  the  Chinese  and  the  American 
minister.  But  it  was  not  until  January  22nd  that  I  learned 
the  astonishing  nature  of  the  Japanese  proposals.  Calling 
on  one  of  the  Chinese  ministers  on  current  business,  I  found 
him  perturbed.  He  finally  confided  to  me,  almost  with 
tears,  that  Japan  had  made  categorical  demands  which,  if 
conceded,  would  destroy  the  independence  of  his  country 
and  reduce  her  to  a  servile  state.  He  then  told  me  in 
general  terms  their  nature,  saying:  "Control  of  natural  re- 
sources, finances,  army!  What  will  be  left  to  China!  Our 
people  are  being  punished  for  their  peacefulness  and  sense  of 
justice."  The  blow  evidently  had  come  with  stunning  force, 
and  the  counsellors  of  the  President  had  not  been  able  to 
overcome  the  first  terrified  surprise,  or  to  develop  any  idea 
as  to  how  the  crisis  might  be  met. 

An  ice  festival  was  being  given  on  the  next  evening  at 
the  American  guard  skating  rink.  Mr.  B.  Lenox  Simpson 
sought  me  out  and  accosted  me  quite  dramatically,  with 


132     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

the  words : "  While  we  are  gambolling  here,  the  sovereignty  of 
the  country  is  passing  like  a  cloud  to  the  east.  It  is  Korea 
over  again."  He  had  received  accurate  information  as 
to  the  general  character  of  the  demands.  Two  days  later 
the  representative  of  the  London  TimeSy  who  had  been  out 
of  town,  asked  me  casually:  "Has  anything  happened?" 
"You  may  discover  that  something  has  happened,"  I  replied, 
"if  you  look  about."  That  evening  he  returned  to  me  with 
all  that  he  could  gather. 

Although  these  correspondents,  as  well  as  the  Associated 
Press  representative,  telegraphed  the  astounding  news  to 
their  papers,  nothing  was  published  for  two  weeks  either  in 
America  or  in  England,  The  Associated  Press  withheld  the 
report  because  its  truth  was  categorically  denied  by  the 
Japanese  ambassador  at  Washington.  Its  Peking  repre- 
sentative was  directed  to  send  "facts,  not  rumours."  On 
January  27th  it  was  given  out  "on  the  highest  authority" 
both  at  Tokyo  and  at  Washington  that  information  purport- 
ing to  outline  the  basis  of  negotiations  was  "absolutely  with- 
out foundation."  Only  gradually  the  truth  dawned  on  the 
British  and  American  press.  The  British  censor  had  held 
up  the  reports  for  a  fortnight,  but  on  February  5th  Mr. 
Simpson  wrote  me  in  a  hasty  note:  "My  editors  are  in 
communication  with  me,  and  we  have  beaten  the  censors." 
From  25th  January  on,  the  demands  began  to  be  discussed 
confidentially  among  members  of  the  diplomatic  corps  but 
publicly  by  the  press  in  Peking.  As  the  impossibility  of 
keeping  the  matter  secret  locally  was  now  universally  granted 
from  this  time  high  Chinese  officials  consulted  with  me  almost 
daily  about  their  difficulties.  The  acceptance  of  these  de- 
mands, of  course,  would  have  effectively  put  an  end  to  the 
equal  opportunities  hitherto  enjoyed  in  China  by  American 
citizens;  I  therefore  made  it  my  duty  to  watch  the  negotia- 
tions with  great  care. 

The  Japanese  were  avoiding  any  interference  with  the 


THE  FAMOUS  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS     133 

formal  "integrity,  sovereignty,  and  independence"  of  China; 
they  were  developing  special  interests,  similar  to  those 
enjoyed  by  Japan  in  Manchuria,  in  other  parts  of  China  as 
well,  particularly  in  the  provinces  of  Shantung  and  Fukien. 
They  could  place  the  Chinese  state  as  a  whole  in  vassalage, 
through  exercising  control  over  its  military  establishment 
and  over  the  most  important  parts  of  its  administration. 
There  would  be  three  centres  from  which  Japanese  influence 
would  be  exercised — Manchuria,  Shantung,  and  Fukien. 
Manchuria  was  to  be  made  more  completely  a  reserved  area 
for  Japanese  capital  and  colonization,  but  with  administra- 
tive control  wielded  through  advisers  and  through  priority 
in  the  matter  of  loans.  In  Shantung,  the  interest  formerly 
belonging  to  Germany  was  to  be  taken  over  and  expanded. 
A  priority  of  right  in  Fukien  was  demanded,  both  in  invest- 
ment and  development;  this  would  effectively  bar  other 
nations  and  would  assimilate  this  province  to  Manchuria. 
The  northern  sphere  of  Japan  was  to  be  expanded  by  includ- 
ing Inner  Mongolia.  From  the  Shantung  sphere  influence 
could  be  made  to  radiate  to  the  interior  by  means  of  railway 
extensions  to  Honan  and  Shansi.  Similarly,  from  the  Fukien 
sphere,  railway  concessions  would  carry  Japanese  influence 
into  the  provinces  of  Kiangsi,  Hupei,  and  Kwangtung.  The 
Japanese  interest  already  existing  in  the  Hanyehping  iron 
and  coal  enterprise,  which  was  a  mortgage  with  right  to 
purchase  pig  iron  at  certain  rates,  was  to  be  consolidated  into 
a  Japanese-controlled  company.  Added  to  these  was  the 
significant  demand  that  outsiders  be  denied  the  right  to  work 
any  mines  in  the  neighbourhood  of  those  owned  by  the 
Hanyehping  company  without  its  consent;  nor  were  they  to 
be  permitted,  lacking  such  consent,  to  carry  out  any  under- 
taking that  might  directly  or  indirectly  affect  the  interests 
of  that  company.  This  astonishing  proposal  sought  to 
make  the  Japanese  concern  the  arbiter  of  industrial  enter- 
prise in  the  middle  Yangtse  Valley. 


134      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Group  V  consisted  of  the  sweeping  demands  which  would 
have  virtually  deprived  the  Chinese  Government  of  the 
substance  of  control  over  its  own  affairs.  The  employment 
of  effective  Japanese  advisers  in  political,  financial,  and 
military  affairs;  the  joint  Chino-Japanese  organization  of  the 
police  forces  in  important  places;  the  purchase  from  Japan 
of  a  fixed  amount  of  munitions  of  war — 50  per  cent,  or  more; 
and  the  establishment  of  Chino-Japanese  jointly  worked 
arsenals,  were  embraced  in  these  demands.  The  latter  in- 
volved effective  control  over  the  armament  and  military 
organization  of  China. 

So  stunned  was  the  Chinese  Government  by  the  Japanese 
stroke  that  it  missed  its  first  opportunity.  It  might  have 
immediately  given  notice  to  the  friendly  Treaty  Powers  of 
the  demands,  which  affected  their  equal  rights  in  China,  as 
well  as  the  administrative  independence  of  the  Chinese 
Government. 

A  member  of  the  Foreign  Office  consulted  me  about 
the  best  method  of  dealing  with  the  demands;  I  expressed 
the  opinion — ^which  was  not  given  by  way  of  advice — 
that  the  detailed  negotiation  of  individual  demands,  with 
a  view  of  granting  only  the  least  objectionable,  would 
be  likely  to  give  most  force  to  considerations  of  equity. 
Time  would  be  gained;  the  other  nations  interested  would 
come  to  realize  what  was  at  stake.  If  certain  liberal 
grants  and  concessions  should  be  made,  China  could  then 
with  greater  force  refuse  to  create  rights  and  privileges 
incompatible  with  her  sovereignty.  The  situation  would 
then  be  more  fully  and  clearly  understood  by  foreign 
nations. 

As  the  negotiations  proceeded  the  Japanese  minister 
hinted  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  the  Japanese 
public  looked  askance  at  the  present  Chinese  administration, 
because  of  the  hostility  often  demonstrated  by  Yuan  Shih- 
kai;  still,  this  feeling  might  be  conciliated.     It  might  even 


THE  FAMOUS  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS    135 

be  possible  for  the  Japanese  Government  to  give  Presi- 
dent Yuan  assistance  against  rebel  activities.  The  sinister 
quality  of  this  hint  was  fully  appreciated.  It  was  at  this 
point  that  the  Japanese  minister  used  the  simile  which 
promptly  became  famous  throughout  the  Far  East.  He 
employed  this  picturesque  language:  "The  present  crisis 
throughout  the  world  virtually  forces  my  government  to 
take  far-reaching  action.  When  there  is  a  fire  in  a  jeweller's 
shop,  the  neighbours  cannot  be  expected  to  refrain  from 
helping  themselves." 

Notwithstanding  powerful  efforts  on  the  part  of  Japan 
to  enforce  silence  by  menacing  China  and  by  muzzling  the 
press  in  Japan,  accurate  information  got  abroad ;  whereupon 
the  Japanese  Government  presented  to  the  powers  an 
expurgated  version  of  its  demands,  from  which  the  more 
objectionable  articles  were  omitted.  Later  on,  it  was 
admitted  that  the  demands  of  Group  V  had  been  "dis- 
cussed," and  statements  were  again  issued  on  "the  highest 
authority"  that  these  so-called  demands  were  merely  over- 
tures or  suggestions,  which  violated  no  treaty  and  involved 
no  infringement  of  Chinese  territory  and  sovereignty.  The 
Japanese  Legation  in  Peking  asked  local  correspondents  to 
send  out  a  similar  statement,  which,  however,  was  refused 
by  them,  as  the  true  nature  of  the  demands  was  already 
known. 

The  British,  who  had  more  extensive  interests  at  stake 
than  any  other  foreign  nation,  had  shown  agitation.  British 
residents  and  officials  expressed  deep  concern  because  their 
government,  being  necessarily  preoccupied  with  events  in 
Europe,  could  not  give  full  attention  to  the  Far  East.  As 
the  action  of  Japan  had  been  taken  under  the  aegis  of  the 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  it  seemed  to  the  British  that  this 
was  being  used  to  nullify  any  influence  which  Great  Britain 
might  exercise,  as  against  a  plan  on  the  part  of  Japan  to 
seize  control  of  the  immense  resources  of  China  and  of  her 


136      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

military  establishment.*  It  was  believed  that  some  sort  of 
communication  relating  to  the  demands  had  been  made  to 
the  British  Foreign  Office  before  January  i8th.  When  the 
expurgated  summary  came  out,  the  Times  of  London  on 
February  12th  published  an  editorial  article  describing 
Japan's  proposals  as  reasonable  and  worthy  of  acceptance; 
it  was  understood  in  Peking  that  this  approval  related  to 
the  summary,  not  to  the  demands  as  actually  made.  But 
the  Chinese  officials  were  apprehensive  lest  a  ready  acquies- 
cence of  public  opinion  in  the  less  obnoxious  demands  might 
encourage  Japan  to  press  the  more  strongly  for  the  whole 
list.  As  late  as  February  19th,  the  State  Department  in- 
formed me  that  it  inferred  that  the  demands  under  Group 
V  were  not  being  urged.  The  full  text  of  the  actual  demands 
as  originally  made  had  now  been  communicated  to  the 
various  foreign  offices;  but  because  of  the  discrepancy  be- 
tween the  two  statements,  they  were  inclined  to  believe  that 
Japan  was  not  really  urging  the  articles  of  Group  V. 

The  Japanese  minister  had  at  first  demanded  the  ac- 
ceptance in  principle  of  the  entire  twenty-one  proposals. 
This  was  declined  by  the  Chinese  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  When  the  Japanese  asked  that  Mr.  Lu  express  a 
general  opinion  on  each  proposal,  he  readily  indicated  which 
of  them  the  Chinese  Government  considered  as  possible 
subjects  for  negotiation.  Forthwith  the  Japanese  minister 
replied  that  the  expression  of  opinion  by  Minister  Lu  was 
unsatisfactory;  that  negotiations  could  not  continue  unless 
it  were  radically  modified.  Mr.  Lu  was  evasive  and  Mr. 
Hioki   on    February    i8th    became    more    peremptory;   he 


•For  instance,  Putnam  Weale  wrote:  "Though  EngHshmen  believe  that  the  gallant  Japanese  are 
entitled  to  a  recompense  just  as  much  now  as  they  were  in  1905  for  what  they  have  done.  Englishmen 
do  not  and  cannot  subscribe  to  the  doctrine  that  Japan  is  to  dominate  China  by  extorting  a  whole 
ring-fence  of  industrial  concessions  and  administrative  privileges  which  will  ultimately  shut  out  even 
allies  from  obtaining  equal  opF>ortunities.  ...  In  China,  though  they  are  willing  to  be  reduced 
to  second  place  and  even  driven  out  by  fair  competition,  they  will  fight  in  a  way  your  correspondents 
do  not  yet  dream^of  to  secure  that  no  diplomacy  of  the  jiujitsu  order  injures  them  or  their  Chinese 
friends. " 


THE  FAMOUS  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS    137 

informed  Mr.  Lu  that  the  negotiations  might  not  be  confined 
to  the  first  four  groups — ^that  the  whole  twenty-one  demands 
must  be  negotiated  upon. 

Thereupon  I  telegraphed  inviting  President  Wilson's 
personal  attention  to  the  proposals  which  aflfected  the  rights 
and  legitimate  prospects  of  Americans  in  China.  The 
President  had  already  written  me  in  a  letter  of  February  8th: 
"I  have  had  the  feeling  that  any  direct  advice  to  China,  or 
direct  intervention  on  her  behalf  in  the  present  negotiations, 
would  really  do  her  more  harm  than  good,  inasmuch  as  it 
would  very  likely  provoke  the  jealousy  and  excite  the 
hostility  of  Japan,  which  would  first  be  manifested  against 
China  herself.  .  .  .  For  the  present  I  am  watching  the 
situation  very  carefully  indeed,  ready  to  step  in  at  any  point 
where  it  is  wise  to  do  so."      < 

Shantung  was  first  taken  up  in  the  negotiations.  The 
negotiators  were:  the  Chinese  Minister  for  Foreign  AiFairs, 
Mr.  Lu  Tseng-tsiang;  the  vice-minister,  Mr.  Tsao  Ju-lin; 
the  Japanese  minister,  Mr.  Eki  Hioki;  and  Mr.  Obata, 
Counsellor  of  Legation.  Vice-Minister  Tsao  had  been 
educated  in  Japan,  and  was  generally  considered  as  friendly 
to  that  country.  The  Japanese  minister,  genial  in  manner 
and  insistent  in  business,  was  aided  by  a  counsellor  noted 
for  tenacity  of  purpose  and  for  a  grim  dourness.  Point  by 
point  the  demands  on  Shantung  and  Manchuria  were 
sifted.  By  the  preamble  to  Group  II,  in  the  original  version, 
Japan  claimed  a  "special  position"  in  south  Manchuria  and 
in  eastern  Inner  Mongoha.  The  Chinese  took  decided 
objection.  The  Japanese  minister  complained  on  March  6th 
of  slow  progress,  giving  thenceforward  frequent  hints  that 
force  might  be  resorted  to.  Finally,  on  March  nth,  the 
Chinese  were  informed  that  a  Japanese  fleet  had  sailed  for 
ports  in  China  under  sealed  orders. 

After  agreeing  to  important  concessions  in  Manchuria  and 
Shantung,  the  Chinese  determined  to  resist  further  demands. 


138      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Just  here  the  American  Government  gave  the  Japanese 
ambassador  at  Washington  its  opinion  that  certain  clauses 
in  the  demands  contravened  existing  treaty  provisions. 
For  the  Japanese  ambassador  had  offered  a  supplementary 
memorandum  which  substantially  gave  the  proposals  of 
Group  V  as  "requests  for  friendly  consideration."  They 
were  "mere  suggestions"  to  the  Chinese!  This  method  of 
disarming  foreign  opposition  imposed  one  disadvantage — 
it  would  hereafter  hardly  do  actually  to  use  military  force  to 
coerce  China  into  accepting  the  "friendly  suggestions"  con- 
tained in  Group  V.  The  only  chance  of  getting  these 
concessions  was  to  keep  the  other  governments  in  uncertainty 
as  to  the  actual  demands,  that  they  might  not  take  them 
seriously,  and  meanwhile  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  in  order 
to  force  Peking  to  accept  these  very  proposals.  The  Chinese 
would  feel  themselves  abandoned  by  the  public  opinion  of 
the  world. 

The  Japanese  increased  their  military  forces  in  Manchuria 
and  Shantung  during  the  second  half  of  March;  for  a  time 
the  movement  stopped  the  ordinary  traffic  on  the  Shantung 
Railway. 

The  new  troops  were  "merely  to  relieve  those  now  sta- 
tioned in  Chinese  territory,"  it  was  stated.  Military 
compulsion  was  clearly  foreshadowed;  and  thus  beset,  the 
Chinese  had  by  the  end  of  March  almost  entirely  accepted 
the  Japanese  demands  in  Shantung  and  Manchuria.  I  had 
a  long  interview  with  President  Yuan  Shih-kai  on  March  23rd. 
He  seemed  greatly  worried  but  was  still  good-humoured.  He 
said:  "The  buzzing  gnats  disturb  my  sleep,  but  they  have 
not  yet  carried  off  my  rice.  So  I  can  live."  Then  growing 
serious  he  went  on:  "I  am  prepared  to  make  all  possible 
concessions.  But  they  must  not  diminish  Chinese  in- 
dependence. Japan's  acts  may  force  upon  me  a  different 
policy." 

I  wondered  whether  he  was  actually  contemplating  armed 


THE  FAMOUS  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS    139 

resistance.  "Against  any  action  taken  by  Japan,  America 
will  not  protest,  so  the  Japanese  officials  tell  us.  But  the 
Japanese  have  often  tried  to  discourage  the  Chinese  by  such 
statements,"  he  added.  "They  say :  'America  has  no  interest 
in  the  Chinese';  or,  'America  cannot  help  you  even  if  she 
wishes  to.'" 

Yuan  felt  that  if  America  could  only  say,  gently  but 
firmly:  "Such  matters  concerning  foreign  rights  in  China, 
in  which  we  have  an  interest  by  treaties,  policy,  and  tra- 
ditions, cannot  be  discussed  without  our  participation,"  the 
danger  would  largely  dissolve. 

Certain  possible  solutions  were  now  suggested  by  the 
Department  of  State.  They  aimed  to  bestow  desired 
benefits  on  Japan,  but  also  to  protect  China  and  the  interests 
of  other  nations  in  China.  Personally,  I  felt  that  the  de- 
mands of  Group  V  should  be  wholly  eliminated.  Any 
version  of  them  would  tangle,  would  more  inextricably  snarl, 
the  already  complicated  relationships  of  foreign  powers  in 
China,  and  choke  all  constructive  American  action. 

The  Japanese  demands  respecting  Manchuria  were  sub- 
stantially complied  with  during  early  April;  and  the  Chinese 
thought  this  part  of  the  negotiations  closed.  Not  so  the 
Japanese;  they  manoeuvred  to  keep  open  the  Manchurian 
question  on  points  of  detail.  Meanwhile,  they  persistently 
injected  Group  V  into  the  negotiations. 

For  over  two  months  the  negotiations  had  now  gone  on 
with  two  or  three  long  conferences  every  week.  The 
furnishing  of  war  materials,  Fukien  Province,  and  pointed 
references  to  a  "certain  power" — meaning  the  United  States 
— occupied  the  Japanese  part  of  the  discussion  on  April  6th. 
The  Japanese  minister  was  strikingly  peremptory  in  manner. 
Because  of  the  pretensions  of  this  "certain  power"  he  must 
insist  on  the  demands  regarding  harbours  and  dockyards. 
Control,  direct  or  indirect,  of  any  naval  base  in  Fukien  must 
be  frustrated,  for  the  sake  both  of  China  and  of  Japan. 


I40      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

The  present  American  administration  might  withdraw  its 
**  pretensions";  but  what  if  they  should  be  resumed  in  future? 
The  only  safe  course  was  to  exclude  this  power  from  any 
possibility  of  getting  such  a  foothold.  Meanwhile,  local 
Japanese-edited  papers  harped  upon  the  great  influence 
which  Ambassador  Chinda  was  alleged  to  wield  over  Secre- 
tary Bryan.  It  would  be  futile  to  hope,  they  insisted,  that 
America  might  in  any  way  assert  herself  in  support  of  China. 

At  this  time  I  informed  the  Chinese  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  that  should  the  attitude  or  policy  of  the  United  States 
be  mentioned  by  any  foreign  representative,  and  should 
statements  be  made  as  to  what  the  American  Government 
would  or  would  not  admit,  demand,  or  insist  upon,  the 
Chinese  Government  would  be  more  than  justified  in  taking 
up  such  a  matter  directly  with  the  representative  of  the 
United  States,  through  whom  alone  authoritative  statements 
as  to  the  action  of  his  government  could  be  made. 

The  American  Government  had  filed  with  the  Japanese 
strong  objections  to  the  granting  of  any  special  preference  to 
any  one  nation  in  Fukien.  It  had  also  emphasized  the  right 
of  its  citizens  to  make  contracts  with  the  central  and  pro- 
vincial Chinese  governments,  without  interference  and  with- 
out being  regarded  as  unfriendly  by  a  third  power.  So  far 
as  harbours  and  naval  bases  were  concerned,  as  stated 
previously,  the  American  Government  did  not  object  to  any 
arrangement  whereby  China  would  withhold  such  concessions 
from  any  and  all  foreign  powers.  But  Japan  needed  to 
allege  some  reason  for  making  special  demands  with  respect 
to  Fukien;  therefore  it  alleged  the  machinations  of  a  "certain 
power." 

No  cause  for  apprehension  existed.  The  talk  of  "pre- 
tensions" related  to  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Company's  con- 
tract, made  five  years  earlier,  which  did  not,  however,  touch 
Fukien,  although  a  spurious  version  of  the  contract,  circu- 
lated in  Peking  shortly  before,  gave  this  impression.     An 


THE  FAMOUS  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS    141 

unfounded  report  spread  by  interested  parties  was  thus  made 
the  basis  for  a  demand  against  the  Chinese  Government. 

Meanwhile,  what  the  Japanese  had  put  forth  for  foreign 
consumption  in  the  way  of  news  was  being  compared  with 
what  was  actually  done  in  Peking.  This  annoyed  the 
Japanese  press,  not  so  much  because  its  government  had 
been  caught  in  the  act  of  trying  to  mislead  its  own  allies, 
as  because  timely  publicity  and  strong  public  opinion  abroad 
were  defeating  the  attempt  to  impose  its  demands  on  the 
Chinese.  The  Chinese  relied  on  pubHc  opinion.  It  was 
their  great  desire,  as  they  often  said  to  me,  that  although 
the  American  people  and  its  government  might  not  furnish 
material  assistance  it  should  at  least  know  the  facts  about 
the  attack  made  on  Chinese  liberty;  for  they  saw  in  the 
public  opinion  of  the  world,  and  especially  of  the  United 
States,  the  force  which  would  ultimately  prevail.  Even 
with  Yuan  Shih-kai,  man  of  authority  though  he  was,  this 
hope  existed.  Mr.  Lu,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  said 
to  me:  "All  that  China  hopes  is  that  America  and  the  world 
may  know  and  judge." 

Finally  the  Japan  Maily  a  semi-official  Tok3^o  paper, 
published  on  April  ist  the  full  text  of  the  Japanese  demands 
in  English.  Thus  was  admitted  as  a  matter  of  course  what 
had  been  categorically  denied  upon  "the  highest  authority." 
While  the  secret  negotiations  were  going  on  there  was  a  by- 
play on  the  part  of  many  official  and  non-official  Japanese, 
who  were  evidently  trying  to  create  an  atmosphere  of 
antagonism  to  the  Western  nations.  I  received  daily  reports 
of  conversations  in  private  interviews,  at  dinners,  and  on 
semi-public  occasions,  in  which  Japanese  were  reminding 
the  Chinese  of  all  possible  grievances  against  the  West,  and 
picturing  to  them  the  strength  and  importance  that  a 
Chino-Japanese  alliance  would  have.  Thus  it  was  said 
many  times:  "Think  of  all  the  places  from  which  we  are  at 
present  excluded.     Should  we  stand   together,  who  could 


142     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

close  the  door  in  our  face?"  Or  again:  "Are  you  not  weary 
of  the  domineering  attitude  of  the  foreign  ministers  in  Peking? 
They  do  not  pound  the  table  in  Tokyo.  They  would  be  sent 
home  if  they  did."  It  was  constantly  repeated  that  all 
would  be  well  if  only  China  would  let  Japan  reorganize  her 
material  and  military  resources.  Visions  of  millions  under 
arms,  splendidly  drilled  and  equipped — an  invincible  Chinese 
army  officered  by  Japanese — were  conjured  up.  To  all  such 
siren  songs,  however,  the  Chinese  remained  deaf. 

A  complete  deadlock  developed  toward  the  end  of  April. 
The  Chinese  desired  to  dispose  of  the  grants  concerning 
Manchuria.  The  Japanese  would  not  agree  to  anything 
definite  without  including  the  demands  under  Group  V. 
As  a  prelude  to  an  ultimatum,  the  Japanese  minister  on 
April  26th  presented  "demands"  with  respect  to  Shantung 
and  Mongolia,  unchanged  except  for  the  wording  of  the 
preamble;  this  substituted  the  term  "economic  relations" 
for  "special  position."  With  respect  to  Hanyehping,  they 
were  softened  to  provide  that  the  Chinese  might  not  convert 
the  company  into  a  state-owned  concern,  nor  cause  it  to 
borrow  foreign  capital  other  than  Japanese.  Certain  rail- 
way concessions  were  to  be  granted,  and  the  most  important 
demands  under  Group  V  were  to  be  embodied  into  a  pro- 
tocol statement  by  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Mr.  Lu  pointed  out  that  the  railway  grants  sought  con- 
flicted with  the  concessions  already  given  to  British  interests; 
Mr.  Hioki  then  proposed  that  China  grant  these  same  con- 
cessions to  Japan,  letting  Japan  "fight  it  out"  with  Great 
Britain.  With  respect  to  Fukien,  China  was  to  state,  in  an 
exchange  of  notes,  that  no  foreign  nation  might  build  dock- 
yards or  naval  bases  there,  nor  should  foreign  capital  be 
borrowed  for  that  purpose.  Japan,  therefore,  abandoned 
her  attempt  to  secure  preferential  rights  in  Fukien  Province. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  AflFairs  handed  his  answer  to  the 
Japanese  minister  on  May  ist.    The  demands  under  Group 


THE  FAMOUS  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS    143 

V,  Mr.  Hioki  was  Informed,  could  not  possibly  be  accepted 
by  a  sovereign  power.  With  respect  to  the  other  demands,  a 
specific  answer  was  given  very  closely  approaching  acceptance 
of  the  demands  as  revised  by  Japan.  No  railway  con- 
cessions were  made,  however,  and  it  included  certain  techni- 
cal modifications  with  respect  to  the  Manchurian  demands. 
Everything  asked  with  respect  to  Shantung  was  granted, 
with  the  counter-proposal  that  China  take  part  in  the 
negotiations  between  Japan  and  Germany. 

This  was  conciliatory;  nevertheless,  the  Japanese  were 
moving  their  troops.  Everything  indicated  extreme  meas- 
ures. Japan's  reservists  in  Mukden  had  been  ordered  to 
their  station,  Japanese  residents  in  Peking  were  warned 
to  hold  themselves  ready.  At  Tsinanfu,  new  entrench- 
ments were  being  built.  When  it  was  known  that  an 
ultimatum  would  be  delivered,  the  Chinese  officials  were 
perplexed  and  undecided.  Should  they  await  its  delivery, 
or  try  to  placate  the  Japanese  by  further  concessions?  The 
Chinese  find  it  hard  to  obey  a  demand  backed  by  force; 
they  are  used  to  arrangements  based  on  persuasion,  reason, 
and  custom.  To  submit  to  positive  foreign  dictation  would 
be  the  greatest  conceivable  diminutio  capitis  for  the  Govern- 
ment. Chinese  officials  visited  me  frequently.  They  seemed 
comforted  in  discussing  their  difficulties  and  fears.  I  could 
not,  of  course,  give  them  advice,  but  I  expressed  my  personal 
conviction  that  Japan  could  hardly  find  it  feasible  to  include 
Group  V — ^which  she  had  explained  to  the  powers  as  sug- 
gestions of  friendship — in  an  ultimatum. 

The  position  of  the  American  minister  throughout  these 
negotiations  had  not  been  easy.  The  United  States  was 
the  only  power  that  had  its  hands  free.  The  Chinese  ex- 
pected its  resentment  and  strong  opposition  to  any  arrange- 
ments conflicting  with  Chinese  independence  and  the  equal 
rights  of  Americans  in  China.  I  could  reiterate  our  repeated 
declarations  of  policy  and  allow  the  Chinese  to  draw  their 


144      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

own  conclusions  as  to  how  far  our  national  interests  were 
involved.  But  when  the  minister  I  saw  most  frequently 
would  ask:  "But  what  will  you  do  to  maintain  these  rights 
you  have  so  often  asserted?"  I  had  to  be  particularly 
careful  not  to  express  my  own  judgment  as  to  what  our 
course  of  action  should  be,  in  order  not  to  arouse  any  hopes 
among  the  Chinese  as  to  what  my  government  would  do. 
Instructions  had  been  slow  in  coming. 

It  was  my  personal  opinion  that  America  had  a  sufficiently 
vital  interest  to  insist  on  being  consulted  on  every  phase  of 
these  negotiations.  The  Chinese  had  hoped  that  America 
might  lead  Great  Britain  and  France  in  a  united,  friendly, 
but  positive  insistence  that  the  demands  be  settled  only  by 
common  consent  of  all  the  powers  concerned.  But  the 
situation  was  complex.  The  state  of  Europe  was  critical. 
The  most  I  could  do,  and  the  least  I  owed  the  Chinese,  was  to 
give  a  sympathetic  hearing  to  whatever  they  wished  to  discuss 
with  me,  and  to  give  them  my  carefully  weighed  opinion. 
Our  own  national  interests  were  closely  involved.  It  was 
my  positive  duty  to  keep  close  watch  of  what  was  going 
on.  While  not  taking  the  responsibility  of  giving  advice 
to  the  Chinese,  I  could  give  them  an  idea  as  to  how  the 
tactical  situation,  as  it  developed  from  week  to  week,  im- 
pressed me.  Dr.  WeUington  Koo  all  through  this  time  acted 
as  liaison  officer  between  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and 
myself,  although  I  also  saw  many  other  members  of  the 
Ministry.  In  discussing  the  consecutive  phases  of  the 
negotiations,  as  they  developed.  Doctor  Koo  and  I  had  many 
interesting  hours  over  diplomatic  tactics  and  analysis, 
in  which  I  admired  his  keenness  of  perception.  Some 
objection  was  hinted  by  the  Japanese  Legation  to  Doctor 
Koo's  frequent  visits  to  my  office  and  house,  but  his  coming 
and  going  continued,  as  was  proper. 

Councils  were  held  daily  at  the  President's  residence  from 
May  1st  on.    Informally,  the  ministers  of  the  Entente  Powers 


THE  FAMOUS  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS    145 

advised  the  Chinese  not  to  attempt  armed  resistance  to 
Japan;  I  beheve  the  Government  never  seriously  contem- 
plated this,  although  some  military  leaders  talked  about  it. 
Indeed,  violent  scenes  took  place  in  the  Council;  it  was  urged 
that  submission  would  mean  national  disintegration.  It 
would  rob  the  Government  of  all  authority  and  public  sup- 
port, while  resistance  would  rally  the  nation.  The  advance 
of  Japan  might  be  obstructed  until  the  end  of  the  Great  War; 
then  European  help  would  come.  They  pressed  the  Presi- 
dent with  arguments  that  Japan  might,  indeed,  occupy 
larger  parts  of  China;  but  this  would  not  create  rights,  it 
would  expose  Japan  to  universal  condemnation.  However,  in 
the  existing  circumstances  of  World  War,  the  Government 
feared  that  to  defy  Japan  would  mean  dismemberment  for 
China. 

Then  President  Yuan  Shih-kai  and  the  Foreign  Office  made 
their  mistake.  They  were  panic-stricken  at  thought  of  an 
ultimatum.  They  were  ready  to  throw  tactical  advantage 
to  the  winds.  Losing  sight  of  the  advantage  held  by  China 
in  opposing  the  demands  of  Group  V,  they  offered  con- 
cessions on  points  contained  therein,  particularly  in  con- 
nection with  the  employment  of  advisers. 

But  when  the  Foreign  Office  emissary  came  to  the  Japa- 
nese Legation  with  these  additional  proposals  and  the 
Japanese  minister  saw  how  far  the  Chinese  could  be  driven, 
he  stated  calmly  that  the  last  instructions  of  his  government 
left  no  alternative;  the  ultimatum  would  have  to  be  pre- 
sented. This  was  done  on  May  7th  at  three  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon. 

The  Chinese  might  have  foreseen  that  the  demands  of 
Group  V  would  not  be  included  in  the  ultimatum.  Never- 
theless, they  were  astonished  at  their  omission,  and  annoyed 
at  unnecessarily  committing  themselves  the  day  before. 
At  first  sight,  the  terms  of  the  ultimatum  seemed  to  dispose 
of  these  ominous  demands.     In  the  first  sense  of  their  re- 


146      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

lief  from  a  long  strain,  the  Chinese  understood  the  stipu- 
lation of  the  ultimatum  that  "the  demands  of  Group  V  will 
be  detached  from  the  present  negotiations,  and  discussed 
separately  in  the  future,"  as  an  adroit  way  of  abandoning 
these  troublesome  questions.  They  were  soon  to  learn 
that  their  hopes  were  not  in  accord  with  the  ideas  of  the 
Japanese. 

Why,  when  the  Chinese  were  virtually  ready  to  agree  to 
all  the  demands  actually  included  in  the  ultimatum,  should 
the  Japanese  not  have  accepted  the  concessions,  even  if  they 
fell  slightly  short  of  what  was  asked?  Thus  they  would 
avoid  the  odium  of  having  threatened  a  friendly  govern- 
ment with  force;  a  matter  which,  furthermore,  would  in  its 
nature  tend  to  weaken  the  legal  and  equitable  force  of  the 
rights  to  be  acquired.  The  Japanese  made  two  fundamental 
mistakes.  The  first  was  in  their  disingenuous  denials  and 
misrepresentation  of  the  true  character  of  the  demands;  the 
second,  in  the  actual  use  of  an  ultimatum  threatening  force. 
That  these  mistakes  were  serious  is  now  quite  generally 
recognized  in  Japan.  Why  they  were  made  in  the  first 
place  is  more  difficult  to  explain. 

Possibly,  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events,  when  Yuan 
Shih-kai  realized  that  he  must  unavoidably  make  extensive 
concessions,  he  may  have  sought  a  certain  quid  pro  quo 
in  the  form  of  Japanese  support  for  his  personal  ambitions. 
This  would  accord  with  the  hint  dropped  by  the  Japanese 
minister  at  the  beginning  of  the  negotiations.  If  this 
explanation  be  correct,  one  might  possibly  understand  that 
Yuan  himself  in  his  inmost  thought  preferred  that  he  should 
be  forced  to  accept  these  demands  through  an  ultimatum. 
The  possibility  of  such  motives  may  have  to  be  considered, 
yet  from  my  knowledge  of  the  negotiations  from  beginning 
to  end,  I  must  consider  utterly  fanciful  the  charge  made  by 
Yuan's  enemies  that  it  was  he  who  originally  conceived  the 
idea  of  the  twenty-ooc  demands,  in  order  that  he  might 


THE  FAMOUS  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS    147 

secure  Japanese  support  for  his  subsequent  policies  and 
ambitions. 

A  reason  for  the  harsh  measure  of  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment is  admissible.  The  Japanese  may  have  feared  that 
public  opinion  throughout  the  world,  which  was  disapprov- 
ing the  character  and  scope  of  these  negotiations,  would 
encourage  the  Chinese  to  hold  out  in  matters  of  detail 
and  gradually  to  raise  new  difficulties.  Moreover,  the  men 
who  wielded  the  power  of  Japan  were  believers  in  military 
prestige  and  may  have  expected  good  results  from  basing 
their  new  rights  in  China  directly  on  military  power. 

The  ultimatum  gave  the  Chinese  Government  a  little 
over  forty-eight  hours,  that  is,  until  6  p.m.  on  May  9th, 
for  an  answer.  On  May  8th,  the  cabinet  and  Council 
of  State  met  in  a  session  which  lasted  nearly  all  day,  finally 
deciding  that  the  ultimatum  must  be  accepted  in  view  of  the 
military  threats  of  Japan. 

In  their  reply  to  the  ultimatum  a  serious  tactical  mistake 
was  made.  I  had  been  informed  that  it  would  be  accepted 
in  simple  and  brief  language;  that  the  Chinese  Government 
would  say  it  had  made  certain  grants  to  the  Japanese,  which 
would  be  enumerated,  making  no  mention  of  Group  V. 
Toward  evening  of  the  9th  a  member  of  the  Foreign  Office 
came  to  me,  quite  agitated,  saying  that  the  Japanese  Le- 
gation insisted  that  the  demands  of  Group  V  be  specifically 
reserved  for  future  discussion.  "What  form,"  I  asked, 
"has  the  Chinese  answer  taken?"  "This,"  he  replied: 
"*The  Chinese  Government,  etc.,  hereby  accepts,  with  the 
exception  of  the  five  articles  of  Group  V,  all  the  articles 
of  Group  I,  etc'  But,"  he  added,  "when  the  draft 
was  submitted  to  the  Japanese  Legation,  they  insisted  that 
after  the  words  *Group  V  there  be  added  the  clause 
'which  are  postponed  for  later  negotiation.'"  It  had  been 
thought  necessary,  my  visitor  explained,  to  state  in  the  reply 
that  something  had  been  refused,  in  order  to  save  the  face 


148      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

of  the  Government.  But  it  is  perfectly  plain  that  if  Group 
V  had  not  been  mentioned  at  all,  the  Japanese  would  have 
found  it  hard  to  insist  upon  its  being  kept  open;  for  it  could 
not  be  avowed  before  other  nations  as  part  of  the  matter 
covered  by  the  ultimatum.  As  it  was,  the  demands  in 
Group  V  were  given  the  character  of  unfinished  business, 
to  be  taken  up  at  a  future  date.  Thus  portentously,  they 
continued  to  hang  over  the  heads  of  the  Chinese. 

Partly  in  an  exchange  of  notes,  partly  in  a  convention, 
the  concessions  exacted  through  the  ultimatum  were  granted. 
None  of  these  was  ever  ratified  by  the  parliamentary  body, 
as  the  Constitution  requires.  Because  of  their  origin  and 
of  this  lack  of  proper  ratification,  the  Chinese  people  have 
looked  upon  the  agreements  of  191 5  as  invalid. 

The  State  Department  had  cabled  on  May  6th  counselling 
patience  and  mutual  forbearance  to  both  governments. 
The  advice  was  needed  by  Japan,  but  the  instructions 
came  too  late;  the  ultimatum  had  been  presented.  I  should 
have  found  that  its  delivery  would  have  seemed  like  whisper- 
ing a  gentle  admonition  through  the  keyhole  after  the  door 
had  been  slammed  to. 

The  Department  cabled  on  May  i  ith  an  identical  note  to 
both  governments,  which  I  delivered  to  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  on  the  13th.  It  was  published  in  the  Peking 
papers  on  the  24th,  together  with  a  telegram  from  Tokyo 
asserting  "on  the  highest  authority"  that  the  report  of  the 
existence  of  such  a  note  was  only  another  instance  of  machi- 
nations designed  to  cause  political  friction. 

When  he  received  the  note  Minister  Lu  said  that  he  had 
tried  throughout  to  safeguard  the  treaty  rights  of  other 
nations,  with  which  China's  own  rights  were  bound  up. 
To  a  question  from  him  I  replied  that  the  American  Govern- 
ment was  not  now  protesting  against  any  special  proposal, 
but  insisted  that  the  rights  referred  to  in  the  note  be  given 
complete  protection  in  the  definitive  provisions  of  the  Treaty. 


THE  FAMOUS  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS    149 

The  newly  acquired  privileges  of  the  Japanese  in  Manchu- 
ria were  touched  on  in  the  conversation;  I  pointed  out  that 
any  rights  of  residence  granted  to  the  Japanese,  by  operation 
of  the  most-favoured-nation  clause,  would  accrue  in  like  terms 
to  all  other  nations  having  treaties  with  China;  they  ought  to 
be  informed,  therefore,  of  all  the  terms  of  the  agreement 
affecting  such  rights.  On  May  15th  the  Department  con- 
firmed this  view  by  cabled  instructions,  which  I  followed 
with  a  formal  note  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

It  appeared  that  the  Chinese  Government  was  comforted 
by  an  expression  in  which  the  United  States  in  clear  terms 
reasserted  its  adhesion  to  the  fundamental  principles  of 
American  policy  in  the  Far  East. 

So  ended  the  famous  negotiations  of  the  Twenty-one 
Demands.  Japan  had  gained  from  the  unrepresentative 
authorities  at  Peking  certain  far-reaching  concessions. 
But  in  China  the  people,  as  an  anciently  organized  society, 
are  vastly  more  important  than  any  political  government. 
The  people  of  China  had  not  consented. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
GETTING  TOGETHER 

There  arrived  in  Peking  in  the  fall  of  191 5  the  members 
of  a  commission  sent  by  the  Rockefeller  Foundation,  to 
formulate  definite  plans  for  a  great  scientific  and  educa- 
tional enterprise  in  China.  They  were  Dr.  Simon  Flexner, 
of  the  Rockefeller  Institute  for  Medical  Reserch,  of  New 
York;  Dr.  George  A.  Welch,  of  Johns  Hopkins  University; 
and  Doctor  Buttrick,  the  secretary  of  the  Foundation.  By 
early  September,  1919,  the  cornerstone  of  the  Rockefeller 
Hospital  and  Medical  School  in  Peking  had  been  laid. 

The  China  Medical  Board  had  acquired  the  palace  of  a 
Manchu  prince.  When  their  plans  were  first  being  formu- 
lated, the  owner  had  just  died,  and  this  magnificent  property 
could  have  been  bought  for  $75,000  Mex.  I  cabled  to 
New  York  at  the  time,  advising  quick  action,  but  the 
organization  had  not  been  sufficiently  completed  to  make 
the  purchase.  When,  four  months  later,  they  were  ready 
to  buy,  the  price  had  risen  to  $250,000.  The  fact  that  a 
rich  institution  desired  to  acquire  the  property  had  undoubt- 
edly helped  to  enhance  the  price;  but  real  property  was 
then  so  rapidly  rising  in  value  all  over  Peking,  especially 
in  central  locations,  that  the  price  asked,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
was  not  excessive,  and  a  similar  site  could  not  have  been 
secured  for  less.  A  still  further  increase  of  values  through- 
out the  central  portion  of  the  city  was  soon  recorded;  in 
fact,  in  many  localities  of  China  land  values  have  risen 
after  the  manner  of  an  American  boom  town. 

The  stately  halls  of  the  palace  had  been  dismantled  and 
torn  down  because  they  did  not  suit  the  uses  of  the  hospital. 

150 


GETTING  TOGETHER  151 

The  materials  recovered,  however,  were  in  themselves  of 
great  value.  The  Board  had  decided,  in  consonance  with 
the  judgment  of  the  architects,  that  the  Chinese  style  of 
architecture  should  be  used,  modified  only  sufficiently  to 
answer  the  modern  purpose  of  the  buildings. 

We  gathered  on  a  sunny  day  of  early  September,  when  the 
air  of  Peking  has  the  fresh  balminess  of  spring,  to  dedicate 
the  cornerstone  of  the  first  building  to  be  erected.  Admiral 
Knight,  who  was  visiting  us  at  the  time,  accompanied  me. 
Mr.  Alston,  the  British  charge;  Dr.  Frank  BiUings,  who  had 
just  returned  from  Russia  where  he  had  been  chairman 
of  the  American  Red  Cross;  and  other  representatives  of 
the  American  and  British  community  were  present,  together 
with  many  Chinese.  Mr.  Fan  Yuen-lin,  Minister  of  Edu- 
cation, represented  the  Chinese  Government,  and  Bishop 
Norris,  of  the  Anglican  Church,  offered  prayer.  I  made  a 
brief  address  in  which  I  paid  tribute  to  the  achievements  of 
American  and  British  medical  missionaries,  and  expressed  my 
high  idea  of  the  value  and  significance,  for  science  and  human 
welfare,  of  the  great  institution  here  to  be  established. 

Incidentally,  it  had  seemed  to  me — and  I  so  expressed 
to  Doctors  Welch  and  Flexner  during  their  visit — that  much 
of  value  might  be  found  in  the  Chinese  materia  medica. 
In  my  own  experience  there  had  been  so  many  instances 
where  relief  had  been  afforded  in  apparently  hopeless  cases 
that  I  thought  it  worthy  of  special  study.  For  example, 
a  new  chauffeur  whom  I  had  engaged  accompanied  my  old 
chauffeur  in  the  machine  one  day;  as  he  jumped  out, 
his  arm  was  caught  between  the  door  and  a  telegraph  pole 
and  crushed.  We  immediately  had  him  taken  to  the  hos- 
pital, where  the  doctors  decided  that  only  an  immediate 
operation  afforded  any  prospect  of  saving  his  arm,  and 
that  even  a  successful  operation  was  doubtful.  I  was  told 
that  evening  that  his  mother  had  taken  the  young  man 
away,  notwithstanding  the  entreaties  of  our  Chinese  legation 


152     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

personnel.  We  gave  him  up  for  lost.  But  within  six 
weeks  he  reported  for  his  position,  only  admitting:  "My 
arm  is  still  a  little  weak."  A  Chinese  doctor  had  cured 
him  with   poultices. 

Similar  cases  often  came  to  my  attention.  Mr.  Chow  Tzu- 
chi  had  frequently  suffered  severely  from  rheumatism.  He 
had  tried  every  scientific  remedy  without  avail.  One  day 
I  was  glad  to  find  him  chipper  and  in  fine  spirits.  He  said, 
"I  am  cured'*;  and  he  told  me  that  a  Chinese  doctor  had 
fixed  golden  needles  in  different  parts  of  his  body.  Within 
a  day  his  pains  had  disappeared.  The  empirical  knowledge 
accumulated  by  Chinese  doctors  through  thousands  of 
years  may  be  worth  something. 

In  their  hours  of  leisure  from  the  scientific  tasks  of  their 
mission,  the  members  of  the  Rockefeller  board  saw  much 
of  Chinese  life  on  the  lighter  as  well  as  its  more  serious  side. 
One  evening  we  went  together  to  a  Chinese  restaurant  where 
we  met  some  native  friends  and  had  an  excellent  dinner,  of  the 
best  that  Peking  cooking  affords.  The  American  guests 
were  delighted  with  the  turmoil  in  the  courts  of  a  Peking 
restaurant.  We  were  entertained  after  dinner  by  a  well- 
known  prestidigitator.  This  man  often  performs  in  Peking, 
where  he  is  known  among  foreigners  by  the  name  of  Ega 
Lang  Tang.  These  words  mean  nothing,  being  only  an 
arbitrary  formula  which  he  uses  in  his  incantations.  His 
tricks,  many  and  astounding,  culminate  when,  after  turning 
a  somersault,  he  suddenly  produces  out  of  nothing  a  glass 
bowl  as  large  as  a  washtub  two  feet  in  diameter  filled  with 
water  in  which  shoals  of  fish  are  gaily  swimming  about. 

In  another  way  American  initiative  of  an  educational 
nature  was  welcomed  in  Peking.  Among  oflicials  and  liter- 
ary men  were  many  who  were  interested  in  the  scientific 
study  of  economic  and  political  subjects.  With  them  and 
with  American  and  European  friends  I  had  often  discussed 
the  desirability  of  establishing  an  association  devoted  to 


GETTING  TOGETHER  153 

such  work.  The  old  literary  learning  [which  had  up  to  a 
very  recent  time  organized  and  given  cohesion  to  Chinese 
intellectual  life  had  largely  lost  its  power  to  satisfy  men, 
whereas  the  scientific  learning  of  the  West  had  not  yet  be- 
come sufficiently  strong  to  act  as  the  chief  bond  of  intellectual 
fellowship. 

As  all  political  and  social  action,  and  all  systematic 
effort  in  industry  and  commerce,  depend  on  intellectual 
forces,  it  is  evident  that  disorganization  and  confusion 
would  soon  threaten  Chinese  life  unless  centres  were  formed 
in  which  the  old  could  be  brought  into  harmonious  and 
organic  relationship  with  the  new,  so  as  to  focus  intellectual 
effort.     Such  centres  would  wield  great  influence. 

With  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Mr.  Lu  Tsen- 
tsiang,  and  a  number  of  other  friends  who  were  equally 
impressed  with  the  need  for  such  a  centre  of  thought  and 
discussion,  we  decided  in  November,  191 7,  to  take  steps 
toward  forming  a  Chinese  Social  and  Political  Science 
Association. 

The  first  meeting  was  held  at  the  residence  of  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  on  December  5,  1915,  when  plans 
were  discussed.  In  an  address  which  I  made  on  this  oc- 
casion I  expressed  my  idea  of  the  significance  of  the  society 
as  follows: 

"The  founding  of  the  Society  is  an  indication  of  the 
entry  of  China  into  full  cooperation  in  modern  scientific 
work.  This  initial  step  foreshadows  a  continuous  effort 
through  which  the  experience  and  knowledge  of  China  will 
be  made  scientifically  available  to  the  world  at  large.  The 
voice  of  China  will  be  heard,  her  experience  considered, 
and  her  institutions  understood  by  the  world  at  large; 
she  will  be  represented  in  the  scientific  councils.  At  home 
the  work  of  such  an  association,  if  successful,  should  result 
in  a  clearer  conception  of  national  character  and  destiny. 
The  knowledge  gained  by  its  work  would  be  of  great  value 


154      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

in  constructive  administrative  reform.  But  its  greatest 
service  would  lie  in  the  manner  in  which  it  would  contribute 
to  a  more  deep  and  more  definite  national  self-conscious- 
ness.    .     .     ." 

Virtually  all  the  Chinese  officials,  of  modem  education, 
as  well  as  many  teachers  and  publicists,  interested  them- 
selves in  the  new  society.  The  idea  was  supported  by  men 
of  all  nations;  alongside  of  Americans  like  Doctor  Goodnow, 
Doctors  W.  W.  and  W.  F.  Willoughby,  and  Dr.  Henry  C. 
Adams,  were  the  British,  Dr.  George  Morrison,  Sir  Robert 
Bredon,  Professor  Bevan,  and  Mr.  B.  Lenox  Simpson;  the 
French,  M.  Mazot  and  M.  Padoux;  the  Russians,  M.  Konova- 
lov  and  Baron  Stael-Holstein;  and  the  Japanese,  Professor 
Ariga.  The  society  thereafter  held  regular  meetings, 
at  which  valuable  addresses  and  discussions  were  given; 
it  published  a  quarterly  review,  and  it  established  the  first 
library  in  Peking  for  the  use  of  officials,  students,  and  the 
public  in  general. 

Through  the  assistance  of  'the  Prime  Minister,  Mr. 
Hsu  Hsi-chang,  a  portion  of  the  Imperial  City  was  set  aside 
for  use  by  the  library — a  centrally  situated  enclosure,  called 
the  Court  of  the  Guardian  Gods.  This  had  been  used  as  a 
depository  for  all  the  paraphernalia  of  Imperial  ceremonies, 
such  as  lanterns,  banners,  emblems,  state  carriages,  and 
catafalques.  When  I  first  visited  it,  large  stores  of  these 
objects  still  remained.  They  were  not  of  a  substantial 
kind,  but  such  as  are  constructed  or  made  over  specially 
for  each  occasion;  and,  while  they  were  quite  interesting, 
they  had  no  intrinsic  value.  That  the  officials  and  the 
Imperial  Family  should  combine  to  set  aside  so  valuable  an 
area  for  a  modern  scientific  purpose  was  an  indication  that 
China  is  moving. 

Attached  to  the  French  Legation  was  the  brilliant  sinolo- 
gist Paul  Pelliot,  whose  explorations  in  Turkestan  had  se- 
cured such  great  treasures  for  the  French  museums  and  the 


GETTING  TOGETHER  155 

Bibliotheque  Nationale.  Though  he  acted  officially  as 
military  attache,  M.  Pelliot  really  had  a  far  broader  function, 
being  liaison  officer  between  French  and  Chinese  culture. 

Before  the  war  the  Germans  had  an  educational  attache. 
On  account  of  the  close  relationship  between  Chinese  and 
American  education  through  the  thousands  of  American 
returned  students,  I  strongly  urged  the  appointment  of 
an  attache  who  could  give  his  attention  to  educational 
affairs.  I  was  so  pressed  with  other  business  that  hundreds 
of  invitations  to  address  educational  bodies  throughout 
China  had  to  go  unaccepted.  If  there  had  been  an  assis- 
tant who  could  have  met  the  Chinese  on  these  occasions, 
he  could  have  been  exceedingly  helpful  to  them.  But  I 
was  told  from  Washington  that  there  was  no  provision  for 
an  attache  with  such  functions. 

The  intimate  feeling  of  cooperation  between  the  British 
and  American  communities  expressed  itself  in  many  meetings, 
in  some  of  which  the  Chinese,  too,  participated.  Thus,  on 
December  8,  1917,  there  was  held  a  reception  of  the  English- 
speaking  returned  students.  The  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs;  a  number  of  his  counsellors;  the  British  minister. 
Sir  John  Jordan,  and  his  staff;  the  American  Legation;  the 
missionaries;  all  who  had  received  their  education  in  the 
United  States  or  Great  Britain,  were  here  present.  It  was  a 
large  company  that  gathered  in  the  hall  of  the  Y.  M.  C.  A., 
including  a  great  many  Chinese  women. 

The  hum  of  the  preliminary  conversation  was  suddenly 
interrupted  by  a  loud  voice  issuing  from  a  young  man  who 
had  hoisted  himself  on  a  chair  in  the  centre  of  the  room.  He 
proceeded  to  give  directions  for  the  systematic  promotion  of 
sociability  and  conversation.  The  Chinese  guests  were  to 
join  hands  and  form  a  circle  around  the  room,  facing  inward; 
within  that  circle  the  British  and  American  guests  were  to 
join  hands,  forming  a  circle  facing  outward.  At  the  given 
word  the  outer  circle  was  to  revolve  to  the  right,  the  inner 


IS6     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

circle  to  the  left.  At  the  word  "halt,"  everyone  was  to  en- 
gage his  or  her  vis-a-vis  in  conversation.  To  eliminate  every 
risk  of  stalemate,  the  topics  for  conversation  were  given  out, 
one  for  each  stop  of  the  revolving  Hne,  the  last  being:  "My 
Greatest  Secret." 

The  young  man  who  proposed  this  thoroughly  American 
system  of  breaking  the  ice  had  just  come  out  from  Wisconsin, 
and  it  was  his  business  to  secure  the  proper  mixing  in  mis- 
cellaneous gatherings.  The  British  seemed  at  first  some- 
what aghast  at  the  prospect  of  this  rotary  and  perambulatory 
conversation;  yet  they  quite  readily  fell  in  with  the  idea, 
and  when  the  first  word  of  halt  was  given,  I  noticed  Sir  John 
duly  making  conversation  with  a  simpering  little  Chinese 
girl  opposite  him. 

A  little  later,  in  December,  there  was  formed  an  Anglo- 
American  Club,  which  celebrated  its  debut  with  a  dinner  at 
the  Hotel  of  Four  Nations.  This  was  the  beginning  of  the 
closest  relationship  that  has  ever  existed  between  the  Ameri- 
cans and  British  in  the  Far  East.  In  my  brief  speech  I 
expressed  my  genuine  feeling  of  satisfaction  that  this  coopera- 
tion should  have  come  about. 

My  relations  with  educational  authorities  and  activities 
in  Peking  were  most  pleasant.  When  Commencement  was 
celebrated  at  Peking  University  I  had  the  distinction  of  an 
honorary  LL.D.  conferred  upon  me.  This  courtesy  was 
performed  in  a  very  graceful  manner  by  Doctor  Lowry,  my 
wise  and  experienced  friend,  under  whose  presidency  this 
institution  had  been  built  up  from  small  beginnings.  I  was 
so  interested  in  the  promise  of  this  American  university  in 
the  capital  of  China  that  I  consented  to  act  as  a  member  of 
the  Board,  and  I  had  interested  myself  in  its  development 
as  far  as  my  official  duties  would  permit.  To  my  great  satis- 
faction, the  university  had  at  this  time  become  interdenomi- 
national, representing  four  of  the  Christian  mission  societies 
active  in  China.    A  liberal  spirit  pervaded  the  university. 


GETTING  TOGETHER  157 

Inspiring  its  members  with  a  desire  to  serve  China  by  spread- 
ing the  light  of  learning,  without  narrow  denominational 
limitations,  relying  on  Christian  spirit  and  character  to  exert 
its  influence  without  undue  insistence  on  dogma.  By  a  pleas- 
ant coincidence,  I  on  that  very  date  received  a  cablegram  tell- 
ing me  that  my  alma  mater,  the  University  of  Wisconsin, 
had  also  given  me  the  honorary  LL.D. 

An  opportunity  for  general  meetings  of  Americans  and 
British,  including,  also,  other  residents  of  Peking,  interested 
in  things  of  the  mind,  was  afforded  by  a  lecture  course  ar- 
ranged by  the  Peking  Language  School.  I  opened  the  course 
with  an  address  on  the  conservation  of  the  artistic  past  of 
China,  which  was  given  at  the  residence  of  the  British  minis- 
ter. Sir  John  Jordan  in  his  introductory  remarks  said  that 
the  time  was  at  hand  when  foreigners  residing  in  China  would 
take  a  far  deeper  and  more  intimate  interest  in  Chinese 
civilization  than  they  had  done  before.  I  spoke  of  the  dan- 
ger of  losing  the  expertness  and  the  creative  impulse  of  Chi- 
nese art  and  of  the  readiness  it  had  always  shown  in  the  past 
to  develop  new  forms,  methods,  and  beauties.  Subsequent 
lectures  were  given  alternately  at  my  residence  and  at  the 
theatre  of  the  British  Legation,  and  the  entire  course  empha- 
sized our  common  interest  in  Chinese  civilization. 

During  the  height  of  the  student  movement  in  1919  the 
Peking  police  closed  the  offices  of  the  Yi  Shik  Pao  (Social 
Welfare),  a  Hberal  paper  in  Peking.  The  paper  had  made 
itself  disliked  by  publishing  news  of  the  Japanese  negotiations 
and  criticizing  the  militarist  faction.  A  number  of  Amer- 
icans had  previously  interested  themselves  in  the  paper, 
because  of  its  liberal  tendencies  and  because  of  its  devotion 
to  social  welfare  work;  they  proposed  to  take  it  over,  but  the 
transfer  had  not  yet  been  carried  out.  The  Chinese  editor 
of  the  paper  appealed  to  me  to  assist  him  in  the  liberation  of 
an  associate  who  had  been  imprisoned.  As  no  legal  Ameri- 
can interest  at  the  time  existed  in  the  paper,  however,  it  was 


158      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

not  possible  to  use  my  good  offices  in  its  behalf,  although  I 
had  at  all  times  made  the  Chinese  officials  know  that  the 
suppression  of  free  speech  in  the  press  was  a  very  undesirable 
procedure.  The  suppression  of  the  Yi  Shih  Pao  was  a  result 
of  the  desire  of  the  reactionary  faction  in  Peking  to  choke 
every  expression  favourable  to  the  national  movement;  they 
had  been  encouraged  to  imitate  the  stringent  press  regula- 
tions of  Japan. 

Later  on  the  Americans  completed  their  purchase  of  the 
Yi  Shih  Pao.  The  question  as  to  how  far  American  protec- 
tion should  be  extended  over  newspapers  printed  in  Chinese, 
but  owned  by  Americans,  then  came  up  for  decision.  As 
Americans  had  become  interested  in  the  bona  fide  enterprise 
of  publishing  newspapers  in  Chinese,  it  was  not  apparent 
how  such  protection  as  is  given  to  others  for  their  legitimate 
interests  could  be  refused  in  this  case.  I  therefore  recom- 
mended to  the  Department  of  State  that  no  distinction 
be  made  against  such  enterprises,  and  several  vernacular 
papers  were  subsequently  registered  in  American  consu- 
lates. 

When  I  told  the  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that 
American  registry  had  been  given  the  Yi  Shih  Pao^  I  informed 
him  of  the  character  of  the  American  press  laws,  under  which 
newspapers  are  in  normal  times  entirely  free  from  censorship, 
but  are  responsible  in  law  for  any  misstatements  of  fact 
injurious  to  individuals.  Many  of  the  reactionary  officials 
had  persistently  opposed  the  idea  of  having  American- 
registered  vernacular  papers  in  China.  But,  manifestly, 
they  could  not  make  any  valid  protest  against  such  an  ar- 
rangement. In  fact,  we  never  had  any  expression  of  official 
displeasure;  on  the  contrary,  nothing  could  have  been  more 
welcome  to  the  people  of  China  and  to  the  great  majority  of 
officials  than  to  know  that  vernacular  papers  were  to  be 
published  in  China  by  Americans. 

The  publication  in  Peking  of  news  from  abroad  was  much 


GETTING  TOGETHER  159 

facilitated  by  wireless.  Early  in  1919  I  entertained  at  lunch 
several  American  newspapermen,  with  whom  I  had  a  con- 
ference on  the  press  and  news  situation  in  the  Far  East. 
They  were  Mr.  Fleisher,  of  the  Japan  Advertiser;  Mr. 
McClatchey,  of  the  Sacramento  Bee;  Mr.  Sharkey,  of  the 
Associated  Press;  and  Mr.  Carl  Crow,  representative  of  the 
American  Committee  on  Public  Information.  Mr.  Walter 
Rogers,  an  expert  in  this  matter,  had  been  in  Peking  shortly 
before. 

The  great  difficulty  with  which  we  were  confronted  in  any 
attempt  to  develop  the  news  service  between  China  and  the 
United  States  was  the  expense  of  telegraphing  by  cable, 
which  made  it  impossible  to  transmit  an  adequate  news  ser- 
vice. We  were  therefore  all  agreed  that  it  was  essential  to 
use  the  wireless  and  that  every  effort  should  be  made  for 
arrangements  whereby  the  wireless  system  of  the  American 
Government  would  carry  news  messages  at  a  reasonable 
rate. 

The  importance  of  a  direct  news  service  was  demonstrated 
during  the  war,  when  under  an  arrangement  by  the  Commit- 
tee on  Public  Information  a  budget  of  news  was  sent  by  wire- 
less daily  to  the  Far  East.  For  the  first  time  in  history  had 
there  been  anything  approaching  a  fairly  complete  statement 
of  what  was  going  bn  in  the  United  States.  The  service  of 
news  of  the  Peace  Conference  was  also  particularly  appre- 
ciated by  everybody  in  China.  China  had  never  been  so 
close  to  Europe  before. 

The  only  agency  supplying  news  in  China  is  Renter's. 
Its  news  budget  is  made  up  in  London.  It  proceeds  to  Spain, 
Morocco,  and  down  the  west  coast  of  Africa  to  the  Cape; 
thence  up  the  east  coast  of  Egypt,  Persia,  India,  and  Ceylon. 
At  each  of  the  main  stations  on  the  way  items  of  only  local 
interest  there  are  withdrawn.  What  is  left  at  Ceylon  as  of 
interest  to  the  Far  East  is  sent  on  to  Singapore  and  Hong- 
Kong,  as  well  as  by  another  route  to  Australia.     It  is  quite 


i6o     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

natural  that  with  such  a  source  and  such  a  routing,  this  ser- 
vice should  carry  next  to  nothing  about  America.  I  once  had 
it  observed  for  a  whole  month  in  June,  19 16,  when  the  only 
American  item  carried  was  that  Mr.  Bryan  had  shed  tears  at 
the  National  Democratic  Convention! 


CHAPTER  XIV 
WAR  DAYS  IN  PEKING 

During  my  first  absence  in  America  Mr.  Peck  had  been 
appointed  consul  at  Tsingtau,  and  Dr.  Charles  D.  Tenney 
had  been  sent  as  his  successor.  My  predecessor,  Mr.  W.  J. 
Calhoun,  in  a  letter  concerning  Doctor  Tenney,  bore  witness  to 
his  unusual  acquaintanceship  with  the  Chinese  and  knowl- 
edge of  Chinese  affairs.  Speaking  of  Doctor  Tenney's  joy  in 
returning  to  China,  Mr.  Calhoun  remarked:  "There  is  a 
strange  thing  about  foreigners  who  have  lived  very  long  in 
China :  they  never  seem  to  be  contented  anywhere  else.  They 
are  apparently  bitten  by  some  kind  of  bug  which  infuses  a 
virus  into  their  blood,  and  makes  life  in  that  country  the  only 
thing  endurable." 

Existence  of  a  state  of  war  deeply  affected  social  Hfe  in 
Peking.  The  mutual  enemies  could,  of  course,  not  see  each 
other.  Their  social  movements,  therefore,  were  considerably 
restricted.  The  neutrals,  however,  having  relations  with 
both  sides,  were  if  anything  more  busy  socially  than  at  other 
times.  Dinners  had  to  be  given  in  sets,  one  for  the  Entente 
Allies,  the  other  for  the  Central  Powers.  The  Austrian  min- 
ister decided  that  as  his  country  was  at  war  and  his  people 
were  suffering,  he  would  not  accept  any  dinner  invitations  at 
all,  except  for  small  parties  en  famille.  The  other  represen- 
tatives of  belligerent  powers  kept  up  their  social  life  on  a  re- 
duced scale.  Dancing  was  gradually  restricted,  and  finally 
passed  out  almost  entirely. 

Mr.  Rockhill  had  died  at  Honolulu  in  December,  191 4. 
He  had  been  retained  by  President  Yuan  as  his  personal  ad- 
viser, and  was  returning  to  China  from  a  brief  visit  to  the 

z6i 


i62      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

United  States.  I  felt  the  loss  of  a  man  of  such  unusual  ability 
and  experience,  to  whom  China  had  been  the  most  interesting 
country  in  the  world.  In  all  the  difficulties  which  followed, 
his  advice  would  have  been  of  great  value  to  the  Chinese 
President  and  Government. 

The  report  of  the  Engineers'  Commission  which  investi- 
gated the  Hwai  River  Conservancy  project  made  that  enter- 
prise look  even  more  attractive  than  I  had  anticipated.  The 
value  of  the  redeemed  land  alone  would  be  more  than  enough 
to  pay  the  cost  of  the  improvements.  I  felt  that  the  work 
would  give  great  credit  to  the  American  name.  Not  only 
would  it  assure  the  livelihood  of  multitudes  through  the  re- 
demption of  millions  of  the  most  fertile  acres  in  China,  but 
it  would  give  to  the  Chinese  a  living  example  of  how,  by  scien- 
tific methods,  the  very  foundations  of  their  life  could  be  im- 
proved. During  the  winter  of  1914-15  a  terrible  famine  was 
again  devastating  that  region,  threatening  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  peasants  with  extinction.  Never  had  the  sum 
of  twenty  millions  of  dollars  produced  such  benefits  as  would 
be  assured  here.  But  after  urgent  appeals  to  the  Depart- 
ment in  Washington,  the  National  Red  Cross,  and  the 
Rockefeller  Foundation,  it  was  found  impossible  to  secure  the 
necessary  capital  during  the  year  of  the  option.  The  best  I 
could  do  was  to  ask  for  an  extension,  which  was  granted, 
although  the  Chinese  themselves  were  impatient  to  see  the 
work  begun. 

We  received  reports  during  the  first  winter  of  the  war 
about  the  suffering  endured  by  German  and  Austrian  prison- 
ers in  Siberia.  They  had  been  captured  during  the  summer 
and  early  autumn,  and  transported  to  Siberia  in  their  summer 
uniforms.  Subjected  to  the  intense  cold  of  a  Siberian  winter, 
they  were  herded  in  barracks  unprovided  with  ordinary  ne- 
cessities; these  were  sealed  to  exclude  the  cold  and  all  kinds  of 
disease  were  soon  rampant.  The  Legation  at  Peking,  being 
nearest  to  Siberia,  superintended  the  relief  work  there  of  the 


WAR  DAYS  IN  PEKING  163 

American  Red  Cross;  there  was  also  a  German  relief  organiza- 
tion (called  Hilfsaktion),  of  which  a  capable  and  enterprising 
woman  of  Austrian  descent,  Madame  Von  Hanneken,  was  the 
moving  spirit.  The  Legation's  work  increased;  innumerable 
appeals  came  to  it  directly,  and  in  lending  its  good  offices  to 
the  German  association  care  had  to  be  taken  that  no  use  of 
it  be  made  that  could  be  properly  objected  to.  Madame 
Von  Hanneken  was  on  friendly  terms  with  the  Russian  Lega- 
tion, which  gave  her  society  needed  facilities.  Its  direct 
representatives  were  European  neutrals,  chiefly  Danes  and 
Swedes.  The  work  of  the  American  Red  Cross  among  the  war 
prisoners  in  Siberia,  as  well  as  the  efforts  of  the  Y.  M.  C.  A. 
to  introduce  among  them  industrial  and  artistic  activities 
to  alleviate  their  lot,  make  a  story  of  unselfish  effort. 

I  tried  to  encourage  the  Chinese  to  build  good  roads.  The 
Imperial  roads  around  Peking  were  surfaced  with  huge  flag- 
stones which,  through  rain  and  climate,  had  lost  alignment; 
they  tilted  and  sloped  at  angles  like  the  logs  of  a  corduroy 
road.  Vehicles  might  not  pass  them,  while  the  Chinese  carts 
picked  their  way  as  best  they  could  over  low-lying  dirt  tracks 
by  the  side  of  these  magnificent  causeways.  The  Chinese 
proverbial  description  of  them  is:  "Ten  years  of  heaven  and 
a  thousand  years  of  hell."  The  country  thoroughfares  have 
worn  deep;  it  is  a  Chinese  paradox  that  the  rivers  usually  flow 
above  and  the  highways  lie  below  the  surface  of  the  land. 
In  the  loess  regions  the  roads  are  often  cut  thirty  or  forty 
feet  deep  into  the  soil. 

I  first  suggested  the  building  of  a  road  from  Tientsin  to 
Peking,  but  the  railways  did  not  encourage  this  enterprise, 
and  it  was  delayed  several  years.  Mr.  E.  W.  Frazar,  an 
American  merchant  from  Japan  who  accompanied  me  to 
Tokyo  in  191 5,  had  successfully  established  motor-car 
services  in  Japan.  He  had  come  to  north  China  to  establish 
a  branch  of  his  firm  there;  he  was  wilHng  to  get  American 
capital  for  road  building  and  to  make  a  contract  therefor 


i64     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

with  the  Chinese  Government.  This  particular  contract 
was  not  concluded,  but  an  impetus  had  been  given  to  the 
idea  among  the  Chinese,  and  the  building  of  roads  was  grad- 
ually taken  up,  beginning  with  highways  around  Peking. 
The  leading  men  became  interested  when  they  began  to  real- 
ize its  effect  on  real  estate  values. 

Governor-General  Harrison  of  the  PhiHppine  Islands 
spent  a  week  in  Peking,  sightseeing,  making  many  purchases 
of  antiques  and  Peking  products.  He  was  much  taken  with 
the  Chinese  rugs  and  ordered  a  number  of  huge  carpets  to 
be  made  for  the  Malacafian  Palace.  We  both  strongly  felt 
that  something  should  be  done  to  prevent  the  total  disappear- 
ance of  the  American  flag  from  the  Pacific,  and  this  we 
knew  would  occur  if  the  existing  companies  carried  out 
their  threats  of  retrenchment  and  withdrawal.  Had  one 
been  able  to  foresee  the  enormous  demand  for  shipping 
which  was  soon  to  arise,  he  might  have  outdistanced 
the  richest  of  existing  millionaires.  The  Chinese  Govern- 
ment did  give  to  an  American  a  contract  to  establish  a 
Chino-American  steamship  line,  with  a  government  guar- 
antee of  $3,000,000;  unfortunately,  it  shared  the  all-too- 
common  fate  of  American  undertakings  in  China  and  was 
not  carried  out. 

The  lunar  New  Year  of  the  Chinese  Calendar  was  changed 
to  the  Republican  (Min  Kuo)  New  Year.  On  January  ist 
Peking  was  given  a  festal  aspect.  The  Central  Park,  a  part 
of  the  old  Imperial  City,  had  been  opened  to  the  public,  and 
under  innumerable  flags  crowds  streamed  along  the  path- 
ways, stopping  at  booths  to  buy  souvenirs  and  toys,  or  enter- 
ing the  always  popular  eating  places  where  both  foreign  and 
Chinese  music  is  played  by  bands  large  and  small.  On 
various  pubhc  places  fairs  were  held;  extensive  settlements 
of  booths  built  of  bamboo  poles  and  matting  sprang  up  over- 
night. There,  curios,  pictures,  brass  utensils,  wood  carvings, 
gold  fishes,  ming  eggs,  birdcages,  and  other  objects  useful  and 


WAR  DAYS  IN  PEKING  165 

ornamental  were  on  sale.  Wandering  troops  of  actors  and 
acrobats  performed  in  enclosures  to  which  the  public  was 
admitted  for  a  small  fee.  Before  one  of  these  stockades  I 
saw  a  large  sign  reading:  "Chow  and  Chang — champion 
magicians  educated  from  America."  So,  even  here,  Ameri- 
can education  was  valued.  The  art  collection  in  the  Im- 
perial City  was  open  at  half  the  usual  admission  fee;  the 
grounds  of  the  Temple  of  Agriculture  and  of  the  Temple  of 
Heaven  were  crowded  with  holiday  visitors,  and  at  all 
theatres  were  special  performances.  For  three  or  four  days 
the  city  wore  a  holiday  aspect. 

But  the  old  New  Year  was  not  abandoned.  On  the  days 
before  the  lunar  year  ended  the  streets  became  alive  with 
shoppers  preparing  for  the  grand  annual  feasting.  Quanti- 
ties of  fattened  ducks,  pigs,  chickens,  and  fishes,  loads  of 
baked  things  and  sweets  were  transported  in  carts,  rickshaws, 
and  all  sorts  of  vehicles  or  by  hand,  everyone  chattering  and 
smiling  in  happy  anticipation.  The  Chinese  New  Year  is 
the  traditional  time  for  settling  all  outstanding  accounts. 
Slates  are  wiped  clean,  partnerships  are  wound  up,  and  all 
balances  settled.  When  New  Year's  eve  comes,  having 
strained  themselves  to  meet  their  obligations,  all  cast  dull 
care  aside.  Families  and  clans  gather  for  a  gargantuan 
feasting,  the  abundance  and  duration  of  which  outdistances 
anything  seen  in  the  West. 

The  official  celebration  of  the  Republican  New  Year  at  the 
President's  Palace  had  to  be  modified.  Because  of  the  war 
the  diplomatic  corps  could  not  be  received  as  a  unit.  It  was 
therefore  arranged  that  the  President  receive  the  foreign 
representatives  in  three  groups:  the  Allies,  the  Neutrals, 
and  the  Central  Powers.  High  Chinese  officials  and  pictu- 
resque Mongolian  dignitaries  were  received  on  the  first  day, 
the  diplomatic  representatives  on  the  second.  As  the  Presi- 
dent chatted  informally  with  each  minister.  Madam  Yuan 
received  in  an  adjoining  apartment,  talking  quite  naturally 


i66     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

with  the  ladies  of  the  party  about  such  feminine  matters  as 
the  size  of  famiHes  and  the  choice  of  dress  materials. 

A  short  time  ago  a  young  American  teacher,  Hicks,  was 
murdered  and  his  two  companions  seriously  wounded  while 
they  were  ascending  the  Yangtse  River  in  a  boat.  The  attack 
was  at  the  dead  of  night;  the  survivors  recalled  only  flaring 
torches  and  swarthy  faces,  although  they  believed  that  their 
assailants  wore  some  sort  of  uniform.  The  Chinese  Govern- 
ment disavowed  responsibility,  considering  it  an  ordinary 
robbery,  and  asserting  that  if  the  assailants  wore  uniforms 
they  must  have  been  insurgents,  as  no  regular  troops  were 
near  that  place.  The  crime  was  revolting,  destructive  of 
the  sense  of  security  of  foreign  travellers,  and  I  insisted  ab- 
solutely on  payment  of  an  indemnity.  Money  payment  is 
by  no  means  satisfactory;  it  does  give  the  injured  parties 
redress  and  testifies  to  the  desire  of  the  Central  Government 
to  protect  foreigners,  but  does  not  bring  the  consequences  of 
the  crime  home  to  the  really  guilty  parties.  I  therefore 
always  tried  to  have  the  personal  responsibility  in  such 
matters  followed  up  and  specifically  determined;  in  this  case 
it  was  impossible.  The  Chinese  Government  finally  agreed 
to  the  very  handsome  indemnity  of  ^25,000  for  the  death  of 
young  Hicks,  the  largest  pecuniary  award  for  loss  of  life  ever 
made  in  China.  It  was  an  ironical  circumstance  that  just 
after  this  had  been  settled,  an  American  driving  his  automo- 
bile at  excessive  speed  in  the  Peking  streets  struck  and  killed 
an  old  Chinese  woman.  When  I  stated  to  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  that  I  would  ask  this  man  to  pay  ^jcxd  to  the 
relatives,  he  replied  with  a  twinkle:  "How  much  was  it  we 
paid  you  for  the  last  American  who  was  killed  ?" 

However,  he  did  not  really  intend  to  dispute  the  reason- 
ableness of  even  so  enormous  a  difference.  Foreigners  in 
China,  on  account  of  their  employment  as  managers  or  head 
teachers,  necessarily  have  to  be  considered,  from  a  purely 
pecuniary  point  of  view,  to  have  a  value  far  above  the  aver- 


WAR  DAYS  IN  PEKING  167 

age.  Moreover,  should  large  indemnities  be  paid  for  the 
death  of  poor  people  among  the  Chinese,  they  would  be  con- 
stantly tempted  to  let  themselves  be  injured  or  even  killed, 
in  order  to  provide  for  their  famihes. 

Among  the  Chinese  who  visited  me  during  the  first  year  of 
the  war  were  the  military  and  civil  governors  of  Chekiang 
Province.  Contrary  to  tradition,  both  were  natives  of  the 
province  they  governed,  and  good  governors,  too.  The  civil 
governor,  Mr.  Chu  Ying-kuang,  who  was  under  forty,  was  a 
man  of  great  public  spirit  and  wisdom,  eager  to  discuss  con- 
structive ideas  and  effective  methods  in  government  and 
industry.  Governor  Chu  wrote  me  a  letter  of  thanks,  which 
may  be  considered  an  example  of  Chinese  epistolary  style.  It 
ran: 

During  my  short  stay  in  the  Capital  I  hurriedly  visited  your  Excellency 
and  was  so  fortunate  as  to  draw  upon  the  stores  of  your  magnificence  and 
gain  the  advantage  of  your  instruction.  My  appreciation  cannot  be  ex- 
pressed in  words.  You  also  treated  me  with  extraordinary  kindness  in 
preparing  for  me  an  elaborate  banquet.  Your  kindness  and  courtesy  were 
heaped  high  and  your  treasures  were  lavishly  displayed.  My  gratitude  is 
graven  on  my  heart  and  my  hope  and  prayer  is  that  the  splendour  of  your 
merit  may  daily  grow  brighter  and  that  your  prosperity  may  mount  as 
high  as  the  clouds. 

I,  your  younger  brother,  left  Peking  on  the  29th  of  last  month  for  the 
South,  and  on  February  2nd  arrived  at  Hangchou.  The  whole  journey 
was  peaceful  so  that  your  embroidered  thoughts  need  not  be  exercised.  I 
reflect  fondly  on  your  refined  conversation  and  cannot  forget  it  for  an  in- 
stant. I  respectfully  offer  this  inch-long  casket  to  express  my  sincere 
gratitude  and  hope  that  you  will  favour  it  with  a  glance. 

Respectfully  wishing  you  daily  blessings. 

Your  younger  brother. 

The  new  German  minister.  Admiral  von  Hintze,  arrived 
shortly  after  the  New  Year.  I  saw  him  frequently  after  his 
first  visit,  as  he  had  few  colleagues  with  whom,  under  the 
conditions  of  war,  he  could  meet.  In  order  to  avoid  capture 
as  an  enemy,  Admiral  von  Hintze  had  come  from  the  United 


i68      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

States  incognito,  as  a  supercargo  on  a  Norwegian  vessel. 
He  had  been  minister  in  Mexico,  and  before  that  the  Emper- 
or's representative  at  the  court  of  the  Czar,  and  was  a  man 
of  wide  knowledge  of  European  affairs  and  of  diplomatic 
intrigue.  For  a  man  of  his  intelligence,  he  was  inclined  to 
give  undue  weight  to  rumours.  Peking  was  amused  shortly 
after  his  arrival  when  he  sent  orders  to  the  Germans  resident 
in  all  parts  of  the  capital  to  hold  themselves  ready  to  come 
into  the  Legation  Quarter  immediately  upon  notice  being 
given.  He  had  read  books  on  the  troubles  of  1900  and  on  the 
assassination  of  his  predecessor,  Baron  Kettler;  he  there- 
fore saw  dire  menaces  where  everything  seemed  quite  nor- 
mal to  older  residents.  Especially,  he  imagined  himself 
surrounded  by  emissaries  and  retainers  of  the  enemy.  Sev- 
eral times  he  would  say  to  me:  "My  first  *boy'  is  excellent. 
He  could  not  be  better.  The  Japanese  pay  him  well,  so  he 
has  to  do  his  best  to  hold  his  job." 

Being  himself  a  clever  man  and  familiar  with  opinion  out- 
side of  Germany,  Admiral  Hintze  thoroughly  disapproved 
of  the  acts  of  unnecessary  violence  by  which  the  Germans 
had  forfeited  the  good  opinion  of  the  world,  especially  the 
sinking  of  the  Lusitania  and  the  execution  of  Edith  Cavell. 
"What  a  mistake,"  he  exclaimed,  "for  the  sake  of  one 
woman!  Why  not  hold  her  in  a  prison  somewhere  in  Ger- 
many until  the  war  is  over.?"  The  stupidity  of  such  acts 
deeply  oflFended  him.  Had  he  become  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  at  an  earHer  date,  some  bad  mistakes  might  have 
been  avoided.  When  the  first  reports  of  the  resumption  of 
exacerbated  submarine  warfare  were  received,  he  remarked 
to  me:  "Do  not  beheve  these  reports  that  Germany  will  re- 
sume unHmited  submarine  warfare.  I  can  assure  you  that 
they  will  not  be  foolish  enough  to  do  such  a  thing." 

I  noticed  soon  after  Admiral  Hintze's  arrival  that  his  rela- 
tions with  his  Austrian  colleague  were  not  the  most  cordial; 
these  two  seemed  to  cooperate  with  difficulty.    They  were 


WAR  DAYS  IN  PEKING  169 

men  entirely  different  in  temperament.  The  German  was 
a  man  of  the  world,  inspired  with  the  ideal  of  German  mih- 
tary  power  and  looking  on  international  politics  as  a  keen 
and  clever  intellectual  game.  Concerning  Hindenburg,  he 
said  to  me:  "There  is  a  man  who  makes  no  excuses  for  his 
existence."  The  Austrian  minister  was  a  man  of  scholarly 
impulse,  with  a  broad  sympathy  for  humankind,  deploring 
the  shallow  game  of  poHtics,  and  hoping  for  a  more  humane 
and  reasonable  system  of  government  than  that  of  the  po- 
htical  state. 

Mr.  Sun  Pao-chi,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  resigned  on 
January  28th  to  head  the  Audit  Board,  and  was  succeeded  by 
Mr.  Lu  Tseng-tsiang.  Mr.  Lu  had  enjoyed  an  extensive 
experience  in  Europe.  He  had  acquired  a  thorough  mastery 
of  French  and  married  a  Belgian  lady,  to  whom  he  was 
deeply  devoted.  Like  his  predecessor,  he  abstained  from 
internal  politics.  He  was  called  to  office  when  the  exceed- 
ingly difficult  negotiations  with  Japan  concerning  the  twenty- 
one  demands  were  begun,  and  it  became  his  duty  to  carry 
through  a  very  painful  and  ungrateful  task.  Mr.  Lu  was 
interested  in  general  political  affairs  in  their  broader  aspects, 
and  gave  special  attention  to  international  law. 

I  was  frequently  a  guest  at  the  house  of  Mr.  Liang  Tun-yen, 
the  Minister  of  Communications.  He  was  easy-going,  pre- 
pared to  talk  business  there  rather  than  at  the  Ministry,  where 
I  would  see  him  frequently  also,  about  the  Hukuang  rail- 
ways. The  engineer  of  the  British  section  was  steadfastly 
trying  to  secure  standards  of  British  engineering  and  manu- 
facture, to  which  it  would  be  difficult  for  American  manufac- 
turers to  conform.  The  Legation  was  beset  with  protests 
concerning  orders  for  materials  which  Americans  did  not 
like,  since  they  embodied  the  special  practice  of  one  partner 
to  the  contract.  Thus  matters  of  a  technical  nature  had  to 
be  argued  between  the  Legation  and  the  Ministry  of  Com- 
munications.   Mr.  Liang  himself  was  not  a  railway  expert. 


I70      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

For  example,  he  once  spoke  enthusiastically  about  clearing 
up  the  Grand  Canal,  exclaiming:  "then  you  could  go  from 
Peking  to  Shanghai  in  a  houseboat."  We  often  fell  back  on 
the  more  general  features  of  the  political  situation  in  China, 
concerning  which  Mr.  Liang  displayed  a  gentle  skepticism 
for  all  proposed  reforms.  With  respect  to  railroad  conces- 
sions, he  was  hostile  to  the  idea  of  percentage  construction 
contracts,  believing  it  dangerous  to  measure  the  returns  of 
an  engineering  firm  by  the  sum  expended  on  the  works.  I 
argued  that  since  the  professional  standing  of  such  a  firm 
was  involved  it  could  not  afford  to  run  up  the  cost  of  the 
works  merely  to  increase  its  own  commission.  But  I  did  not 
overcome  his  skepticism. 


CHAPTER  XV 
EMPEROR  YUAN  SHIH-JCAI 

"Yuan  Shih-kai  is  trying  to  make  himself  emperor,  we 
hear  from  Peking,"  Mr.  E.  T.  WilHams  remarked  to  me  at  the 
Department  of  State  when  I  saw  him  there  in  July,  191 5. 
The  report  said  that  an  imperialist  movement  in  behalf  of 
Yuan  Shih-kai  had  been  launched  in  Peking.  As  there  had 
been  frequent  reports  during  the  year  of  such  attempts  to 
set  up  an  empire,  I  was  not  at  first  inclined  to  give  much 
credence  to  the  rumours. 

Upon  my  return  to  San  Francisco  in  September,  this  time 
to  take  steamer  for  China,  I  met  Dr.  Wellington  Koo,  who 
had  just  come  on  a  special  mission.  I  had  been  confiden- 
tially informed  that  he  would  probably  be  designated  as 
minister  to  the  United  States,  to  take  the  place  of  Mr.  Shah. 
The  Department  of  State  had  directed  me  to  delay  my  de- 
parture in  order  to  confer  with  Doctor  Koo  upon  recent  de- 
velopments in  China.  On  the  day  we  spent  together  we  went 
over  all  that  had  happened  since  my  absence.  The  reports 
which  had  already  been  received  that  a  movement  had  been 
started  to  make  Yuan  Shih-kai  emperor  I  then  considered  im- 
probable, in  view  of  all  the  difficulties  which  the  enterprise 
must  encounter,  both  internationally  and  from  the  Chinese  op- 
position. Doctor  Koo  confirmed  this  feeling  and  said  that 
Yuan  Shih-kai  himself  was  very  doubtful.  He  mentioned  the 
Goodnow  memorandum,  however,  as  a  possible  factor.  I  was 
considerably  surprised  later  to  discover  that  the  main  object 
of  Doctor  Koo's  mission  was  to  sound  public  opinion  in  Amer- 
ica and  Europe  concerning  the  assumption  of  the  imperial 
dignity  by  Yuan  Shih-kai,  and  to  prepare  the  ground  for  it. 

171 


172      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

During  my  return  voyage  to  China  the  matter  quickly  came 
to  a  head,  so  that  when  I  arrived  in  Peking  on  October  ist 
I  was  confronted  with  an  entirely  new  situation. 

To  understand  the  movement  it  is  necessary  to  review 
briefly  the  significant  facts  of  Peking  politics  during  the 
summer  of  1915.  A  concerted  eff'ort  had  been  made  to  com- 
bat the  Liang  Shih-yi  faction.  The  opposition  centred  in 
the  so-called  Anhui  Party,  which  was  largely  militaristic,  but 
in  which  civilian  leaders  like  the  Premier,  Hsu  Shih-chang, 
the  Chief  Secretary  of  the  cabinet,  Yang  Shih-chi,  the  Minis- 
ter of  Finance,  as  well  as  the  Minister  of  Communications, 
were  prominent. 

Charges  of  corruption  were  lodged  against  Chang  Hu, 
Vice-Minister  of  Finance;  Yeh  Kung-cho,  Vice-Minister  of 
Communications;  and  the  Director  of  the  Tientsin-Pukow 
Railway.  Including  these,  twenty-two  high  officials  were 
impeached  during  July,  besides  several  provincial  governors. 
The  Anhui  Party  was  trying  to  eliminate  radically  the  in- 
fluence of  the  so-called  Communications  Party,  which  had 
tried  to  maintain  itself  through  the  vice-ministers  and  coun- 
sellors of  several  important  ministries,  the  chiefs  of  which 
were  Anhui  men. 

It  appears  that  several  Anhui  leaders  were  involved  in  a 
movement  to  establish  a  monarchy,  with  Yuan  Shih-kai  as 
emperor.  Care  was  exercised  in  picking  the  Committee  of 
Ten  to  make  a  preliminary  draft  of  the  Permanent  Constitu- 
tion; it  was  believed  by  many  that  influences  were  at  work 
for  putting  into  that  instrument  provisions  for  reestablishing 
the  monarchy.  Report  had  it  that  on  July  7th  General 
Feng  Kuo-chang,  military  governor  at  Nanking,  had  urged 
that  the  President  assume  the  throne,  for  which  he  was  re- 
buked by  Yuan  in  severe  terms.  Dr.  Frank  J.  Goodnow, 
the  American  constitutional  adviser,  returned  to  Peking  in 
mid-July  for  a  short  stay;  he  was  asked  on  behalf  of  the 
President  to  prepare  a  memorandum  on  the  comparative 


EMPEROR  YUAN  SHIH-KAI  173 

adaptability  of  the  republican  and  monarchical  forms  of 
government  to  Chinese  conditions.  Doctor  Goodnow  com- 
plied. As  a  matter  of  general  theory,  he  took  the  view  that 
the  monarchical  form  might  be  considered  better  suited  to 
the  traditions  and  the  actual  political  development  of  the 
Chinese.  He  saw  special  merit  in  the  fact  that  under  the 
monarchical  system,  the  succession  to  power  would  be  regu- 
lated so  that  it  could  not  be  made  an  ever-recurring  object 
of  contention.  On  the  expediency  of  an  actual  return  at  the 
time  from  the  republic  to  the  monarchy  Doctor  Goodnow  ex- 
pressly refrained  from  pronouncing  a  judgment.  The  memo- 
randum was  prepared  simply  for  the  personal  information 
of  the  President.  Advisers  had  been  so  generally  treated  as 
academic  ornaments  that  Doctor  Goodnow  did  not  suspect 
that  in  this  case  his  memorandum  would  be  made  the  start- 
ing point  and  basis  of  positive  action. 

Meanwhile,  Mr.  Liang  Shih-yi  and  his  group,  seeing  their 
power  threatened,  decided  to  do  something  extreme  to  re- 
cover the  lead.  They  concluded  that  the  monarchical  move- 
ment was  inevitable;  thereupon  they  seem  to  have  persuaded 
Yuan  Shih-kai  that  the  movement  could  be  properly  handled 
and  brought  to  early  and  successful  issue  only  through  their 
superior  experience  and  knowledge.  It  was  they  who  ar- 
ranged for  the  memorandum  of  Doctor  Goodnow.  They  had 
remained  in  the  background  until  the  middle  of  August,  when 
an  open  monarchical  propaganda  began,  based  avowedly  on 
the  opinions  expressed  by  the  American  adviser  and  thus 
given  a  very  respectable  and  impartial  appearance. 

They  formed  the  Peace  Planning  Society  (Chou  An  Hui). 
Its  aim  was  to  investigate  the  advantages  and  disadvantages 
accruing  from  the  republican  form  of  government.  Doctor 
Goodnow's  views  were  widely  heralded  as  categorically 
giving  preference  to  monarchy  for  China,  notwithstanding 
disclaimers  which  he  now  issued.  The  fact  that  an  American 
expert  should  pronounce  this  judgment  was  cited  as  espe- 


174      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

cially  strong  evidence  in  favour  of  the  monarchical  form,  since 
it  came  from  a  citizen  of  the  foremost  repubhc  in  the  world. 
It  became  known  in  early  September  that  the  movement 
was  in  the  hands  of  capable  organizers.  Notwithstanding 
Yuan  Shih-kai's  repeated  disclaimers,  he  failed  to  take  posi- 
tive action  to  suppress  the  agitation;  he  was  therefore  believed 
to  be  at  least  in  a  receptive  mood.  The  high  officials  in 
Peking  with  few  exceptions  had  become  favourable  to  the 
movement.  The  Vice-President,  General  Li  Tuan-hung,  was 
at  first  opposed,  but  even  he  appeared  to  be  reconciled  at 
last,  being  not  entirely  a  free  agent.  The  members  of  the 
Anhui  faction,  now  that  the  lead  had  been  taken  out  of  their 
hands,  were  less  enthusiastic  for  the  change.  Several  politi- 
cal leaders  began  to  withdraw  from  affairs.  General  Tuan 
Chi-jui,  the  Minister  of  War,  and  Mr.  Liang  Chi-chao,  the 
Minister  of  Education,  resigned,  undoubtedly  because  of 
their  tacit  disapproval  of  the  movement,  although  other 
reasons  were  alleged.^  The  Premier  and  Mr.  Liang  Tung- 
yen,  the  Minister  of  Communications,  though  not  on  princi- 
ple opposed,  considered  that  on  account  of  his  previous  alle- 
giance to  the  Imperial  Family,  Yuan  Shih-kai  could  not  with 
propriety  assume  the  Imperial  office.  Within  the  inner 
circles  of  the  movement  there  was  no  question  of  the  desire 
of  the  President  to  have  it  put  through.     For  a  time,  early  in 

iMr.  Liang  Chi-chao  wrote  a  characteristic  letter  of  resignation  to  the  President: 

"On  a  previous  occasion,  I  had  the  honour  to  apply  to  Your  Excellency  for  leave  to  resign  and  in  an- 
»wer  to  my  request,  Your  Excellency  granted  me  two  months'  sick  leave.  This  shows  the  magnanimity 
and  kindness  of  Your  Excellency  toward  me. 

"The  recent  state  of  my  health  is  by  no  means  improved.  The  'pulses'  in  my  body  have  become 
swollen  and  I  am  often  attacked  by  fits  of  dizziness.  My  appearance  looks  healthy,  but  my  energy  and 
spirit  have  become  exhausted.  Different  medicines  have  been  prescribed  by  the  doctors,  but  none  has 
proved  effective.  My  ill-health  has  been  chiefly  caused  by  my  doctors'  'misuse  of  medicine.'  I  have 
lately  been  often  attacked  by  fits  of  cold,  which  cause  me  sleepless  nights.  I  am  quite  aware  of  the  grav- 
ity of  my  disease  and  unless  I  give  up  all  worldly  affairs,  I  am  afraid  that  my  illness  will  be  beyond 
hope  of  cure. 

"Id  different  places  in  America,  the  climate  is  mild  and  good  for  invalids.  I  have  now  made  up  my 
mind  to  sail  for  the  new  continent  to  recuperate  my  health.  There  I  shall  consult  the  best  physicians 
for  the  care  of  my  health.  I  am  longing  to  spend  a  vacation  in  perfect  ease  and  freedom  from  worldly 
cares  in  order  to  recuperate  my  health.  I  am  sailing  immediately.  I  hereby  respectfully  bring  this 
to  the  notice  of  Your  Excellency." 

He  did  not,  however,  proceed  to  America. 


EMPEROR  YUAN  SHIH-KAI  175 

September,  he  was  even  thinking  of  forcing  the  matter,  but 
began  to  be  apprehensive  regarding  the  action  of  certain  for- 
eign powers  who  might  attach  difficult  conditions  to  their 
recognition  of  the  new  regime. 

It  was  suggested  that  the  Legislative  Council  might  simply 
confer  the  title  of  emperor  on  the  President,  and  the  constitu- 
tion might  then  be  amended  to  make  the  presidency  heredi- 
tary. Thus,  it  was  naively  believed,  legal  continuity  could 
be  preserved  sufficiently  to  obviate  the  necessity  of  seeking 
a  new  recognition.  A  republic  with  a  hereditary  president 
seemed  to  some  politicians  the  key  to  the  difficulty.  This 
proposal  served  to  direct  the  minds  of  those  who  were  man- 
aging the  movement  to  the  importance  of  letting  a  represen- 
tative body  participate  in  it,  and  of  not  carrying  it  through 
by  a  coup  d'etat. 

On  my  return  to  China  Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi  and  other 
leaders  waited  on  me,  saying  that  present  uncertainties  in- 
volved such  drawbacks  to  peace  and  prosperity  that  from  all 
the  provinces  the  strongest  appeals  were  coming,  to  prevail 
upon  Yuan  to  sanction  the  movement.  Mr.  Chow  went  so 
far  as  to  say:  "There  is  such  a  strong  demand  for  this  step 
that  we  shall  have  great  trouble  if  it  is  not  taken.  There 
will  be  military  uprisings."  When  I  looked  incredulous, 
Mr.  Chow  proceeded:  "Yes,  indeed,  the  people  can  only  un- 
derstand a  personal  headship,  and  they  want  it,  so  that  the 
country  may  be  settled."  Though  I  took  this  all  with  a 
grain  of  salt,  I  was  surprised  at  the  apparent  unanimity  with 
which  the  inevitableness  of  the  change  seemed  to  be  accepted. 
When  I  asked  how  the  President  would  reconcile  such  a  step 
with  the  oath  he  had  taken  to  support  a  republican  govern- 
ment, I  was  told  that  this  was,  indeed,  the  great  obstacle; 
that  probably  it  could  not  be  overcome  unless  the  whole 
nation  insisted  and  made  it  a  point  of  duty  that  Yuan  Shih- 
kai  continue  to  govern  the  state  under  the  new  form. 

The  attempt  to  reestablish  the  monarchy  seemed  to  me  a 


176      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

step  backward.  I  had  always  felt  that,  whereas  the  Chinese 
had  no  experience  with  elective  representative  institutions, 
nevertheless  they  were  locally  so  largely  self-governed  that 
they  were  fitted  by  experience  and  tradition  to  evolve  some 
form  of  provincial  and  national  representation.  Yet  I  was 
strongly  convinced  that  it  is  under  any  circumstances  in- 
judicious for  one  nation  or  the  officials  of  one  nation  to  as- 
sume that  they  can  determine  what  is  the  best  form  of 
government  for  another  nation.  The  fundamental  principle 
of  self-government  is  that  every  people  shall  work  out  that 
problem  for  itself,  usually  through  many  troubles  and  with 
many  relapses  to  less  perfect  methods. 

The  Legation  had  during  my  absence  asked  for  instructions 
about  a  possible  eventual  decision  to  recognize  the  new  form 
of  government.  It  had  suggested  that  acceptability  to  the 
people,  and,  consequently,  ability  to  preserve  order,  should  be 
among  the  factors  determining  our  attitude.  This  position 
had  been  approved  by  the  State  Department.  In  the  many 
conversations  I  had  with  the  President  and  members  of  the 
cabinet,  I  confined  myself  to  expressing  the  opinion  that  the 
Government  would  strengthen  itself  and  gain  respect  at  home 
and  abroad  in  such  measure  as  it  made  real  use  of  representa- 
tive institutions  and  encouraged  local  self-government. 

The  Council  of  State  on  6th  October  passed  a  law  institut- 
ing a  national  referendum  on  the  question.  Each  district 
was  to  elect  one  representative.  The  delegates  from  each 
province  were  to  meet  at  the  respective  provincial  capitals 
and  to  ballot  upon  the  question.  The  election  was  fixed 
for  the  5th  of  November,  the  date  for  balloting  on  the  prin- 
cipal issue  on  November  15th.  Those  desiring  constructive 
and  progressive  action  had  alhed  themselves  with  the  monar- 
chical movement.  They  hoped  to  strengthen  constitutional 
practice  and  administrative  efficiency  after  the  personal  am- 
bitions of  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  been  realized.  With  Yuan  in 
the  exalted  position  of  Emperor,  Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi  explained 


EMPEROR  YUAN  SHIH-KAI  177 

to  me,  the  government  itself  would  be  in  the  hands  of  the 
prime  minister  and  cabinet;  they  would  carry  it  on  constitu- 
tionally and  in  harmony  with  the  legislative  branch.  As 
Mr.  Chow  put  it:  "We  shall  make  Yuan  the  Buddha  in  the 
temple." 

The  original  promoters  of  the  movement  were  not  wholly 
pleased  with  the  efforts  to  engraft  on  it  principles  of  constitu- 
tional practice  and  popular  consent.  As  certain  military 
leaders  might  resort  to  a  co^ip  d'etat  on  October  lOth,  the  anni- 
versary of  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution  in  191 1,  the  review 
of  troops  set  for  that  date  was  countermanded. 

Mr.  Liang  Shih-yi  and  Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi  afterward  ex- 
plained to  me  their  preference  for  the  monarchical  form. 
Mr.  Liang  said:  "Chinese  traditions  and  customs,  official  an^ 
commercial,  emphasize  personal  relationships.  Abstract 
forms  of  thinking,  in  terms  of  institutions  and  general  legal 
principles,  are  not  understood  by  our  people.  Under  an 
emperor,  authority  would  sit  more  securely,  so  that  it  would 
be  possible  to  carry  through  a  fundamental  financial  reform 
such  as  that  of  the  land  tax.  The  element  of  personal  loyalty 
and  responsibihty  is  necessary  to  counteract  the  growth  of 
corruption  among  officials.  The  Chinese  cannot  conceive 
of  personal  duties  toward  a  pure  abstraction.'* 

With  President  Yuan  Shih-kai  I  had  a  long  interview  on 
October  4th.  He  assumed  complete  indifference  as  to  the 
popular  vote  soon  to  be  taken.  "  If  the  vote  is  favourable 
to  the  existing  system,"  he  said,  "matters  will  simply  remain 
as  they  are;  a  vote  for  the  monarchy  would,  on  the  contrary, 
bring  up  many  questions  of  organization.  I  favour  a  repre- 
sentative parliament,  with  full  liberty  of  discussion  but  with 
Hmited  powers  over  finance."  Education  and  expert  guid- 
ance in  the  work  of  the  Government  were  other  things  about 
which  he  was  planning.  "There  is  a  general  lack  of  useful 
employment,"  he  added  with  some  hilarity,  "on  the  part  of 
the  numerous  advisers  who  hover  around  the  departments. 


178      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

With  an  administrative  reorganization  all  this  will  be 
changed.  These  experts  will  be  put  to  work  in  helping  to 
develop  administrative  activities."  And  he  reverted  to  his 
favourite  simile  of  the  infant:  **Even  if  we  feel  that  all  their 
medicine  may  not  be  good  for  the  child,  yet  we  shall  let  them 
take  it  by  the  hand  to  help  it  to  walk." 

It  was  plain  that  Yuan  Shih-kai,  while  seeming  very  de- 
tached, was  trying  to  justify  the  proposed  change  on  the 
ground  of  making  the  Government  more  efficient  and  giving 
it  also  a  representative  character. 

Doubtless  Yuan  Shih-kai  had  thought  originally  that  the 
Japanese  would  not  obstruct  the  movement,  though  ever 
since  the  time  of  his  service  in  Korea  he  had  not  been  favour- 
ably regarded  by  them.  His  supporters,  indeed,  claimed  that 
the  assurances  first  given  to  Yuan  by  the  Japanese  were 
strong  enough  to  warrant  him  in  expecting  their  support 
throughout.  By  the  end  of  October,  however,  the  Japanese 
Government  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  project  to  put 
Yuan  Shih-kai  on  the  throne  should,  if  possible,  be  stopped. 
/  A  communication  came  from  Japan  to  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia,  which  expressed  concern 
because  the  monarchical  movement  in  China  was  Hkely  to 
create  disturbances  and  endanger  foreign  interests.  Japan 
invited  the  other  powers  to  join  in  advising  the  Chinese 
President  against  continuing  this  policy.  The  American 
Government  declined  this  invitation,  because  it  did  not  de- 
sire to  interfere  in  the  internal  aflpairs  of  another  country. 
The  other  powers,  however,  fell  in  with  the  Japanese  sugges- 
tion, and  on  October  29th  the  Japanese  Charge,  and  the 
British,  French,  and  Russian  ministers,  called  at  the  Foreign 
Office  and  individually  gave  "friendly  counsel"  to  the  effect 
that  it  would  be  desirable  to  stop  the  monarchical  movement. 

The  British  minister  asked  whether  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  thought  disturbances  could  surely  be  pre- 
vented; whereat  the  Chinese  rejoiced,  believing  it  a  friendly 


EMPEROR  YUAN  SHIH-KAI  179 

hint  that  everything  would  be  well,  provided  no  disturbances 
should  take  place.  As  the  machinery  for  holding  the  elec- 
tions had  been  set  in  motion,  the  Chinese  leaders  beheved 
that  any  action  to  stop  them  would  bring  discredit  and  loss 
of  prestige. 

The  final  voting  in  the  convention  of  district  delegates  at 
Peking,  on  December  9th,  registered  a  unanimous  desire  from 
the  elections  of  November  5th  to  have  Yuan  Shih-kai  assume 
the  imperial  dignity.  Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi  remarked  to  me: 
"We  tried  to  get  some  people  to  vote  in  the  negative  just  for 
appearance's  sake,  but  they  would  not  do  it."  Prince  Pu- 
Lun  made  the  speech  nominating  Yuan  as  emperor,  which 
earned  him  the  resentment  of  the  Manchus.  On  the  basis 
of  these  elections,  the  acting  Parliament  passed  a  resolution 
bestowing  on  Yuan  Shih-kai  the  imperial  title,  and  calling 
upon  him  to  take  up  the  duties  therewith  connected.  He 
twice  rejected  the  proposal,  but  when  it  was  sent  to  him  the 
third  time  he  submitted,  having  exhausted  the  traditional 
forms  of  polite  refusal. 

When  Yuan  was  actually  elected  Emperor,  the  Entente 
Powers  were  puzzled.  They  announced  that  they  would 
await  developments.  The  Chinese  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  informed  them  that  there  would  be  some  delay,  as 
many  preparations  were  still  required  before  the  promulga- 
tion of  the  empire  could  be  made.  But  it  was  generally  be- 
lieved that  the  movement  had  reached  fruition.  The  Rus- 
sian and  French  ministers  had  already  expressed  themselves 
privately  as  favourable  to  recognition.  The  German  and 
Austrian  ministers  hastened  to  offer  Yuan  their  felicitations, 
which  embarrassed  the  Chinese  not  a  little.  The  majority  of 
foreign  representatives  at  Peking  were  favourable  to  recog- 
nizing the  new  order  on  January  ist,  when  the  promulgation 
was  to  be  made.  Messages  of  devotion  and  sometimes  of 
fulsome  praise  came  to  the  Emperor-elect  (already  called 
Ta  Huang  Ti)  from  foreigners.     Foreign  advisers,  including 


i8o     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

the  Japanese  but  not  the  Americans,  set  forth  their  devotion 
in  glowing  phrases.  Doctor  Ariga,  the  Japanese  adviser,  ex- 
pressed his  feehngs  in  the  traditional  language  of  imperial 
ceremony.  It  was  even  announced  that  the  new  emperor 
had  been  prayed  for  in  foreign  Christian  churches.  I  could 
not,  however,  verify  any  such  case. 

Suddenly,  on  Christmas  Day,  came  the  report  that  an 
opposition  movement  had  been  started  in  Yunnan  Province. 

A  young  general,  Tsai  Ao,  who  had  for  a  time  Hved  in 
Peking  where  he  held  an  administrative  post,  had  left  the 
capital  during  the  summer  and  had  cooperated  with  Liang 
Chi-chao,  after  the  latter  resigned  his  position  as  Minister  of 
Education.  Liang  Chi-chao  attacked  the  monarchical  move- 
ment in  the  press,  writing  from  the  foreign  concession  at 
Tientsin.  General  Tsai  Ao  returned  to  his  native  Yunnan, 
and  from  that  mountain  fastness  launched  a  military  expedi- 
tion which  was  opposed  to  the  Emperor-elect. 

So  the  dead  unanimity  was  suddenly  disrupted.  Now 
voices  of  opposition  came  from  all  sides.  The  Chinese  are 
fatalists.  The  movement  to  carry  Yuan  into  imperial  power 
had  seemed  to  them  irresistible;  many  had  therefore  sup- 
pressed their  doubts  and  fears.  But  when  an  open  opposi- 
tion was  started  they  flocked  to  the  new  standard  and  every- 
where there  appeared  dissenters. 

A  small  mutiny  took  place  in  Shantung  early  in  December. 
In  the  Japanese  papers  it  was  called  "premature." 

A  night  attack  was  executed  near  Shanghai  on  the  settle- 
ment boundary,  which  was  participated  in  by  several  Japa- 
nese. Being  easily  suppressed,  it  was  not  thought  impor- 
tant. 

Yuan  Shih-kai  had  long  been  in  training  for  the  emperor- 
ship, he  loved  to  use  the  methods  of  thought  and  expression 
of  legendary  monarchs.  Keeping  close  to  national  traditions 
in  the  days  of  his  power  he  always  took  care  to  use  words 
indicative  of  self-deprecation  and  consideration  for  his  sub- 


EMPEROR  YUAN  SHIH-KAI  i8i 

ordinates.  The  members  of  the  cabinet  repaired  on  Decem- 
ber 13th  tothe  President's  house  to  offer  their  congratulations. 
Replying,  the  Emperor-elect  said:  **I  should  rather  be 
condoled  with  than  congratulated;  for  I  am  giving  up  my 
personal  freedom  and  that  of  my  descendants  for  the  public 
service.  I  would  find  far  greater  satisfaction  in  leisurely 
farming  and  fishing  on  my  Honan  estate  than  in  this  con- 
stant tussHng  with  problems  of  state." 

When  one  of  the  ministers  suggested  that  there  should  be  a 
great  celebration  of  the  new  departure,  Yuan  Shih-kai  re- 
pHed :  "  It  would  be  better  not  to  think  of  celebrating  and  of 
glory  at  the  present  time,  but  only  of  work,  and  work,  and 
work.  My  government  should  be  improved  and  soundly 
established.  In  that  case,  glory  will  ultimately  come,  but 
otherwise,  if  artificially  enacted,  it  is  bound  to  be  shortlived." 

These  sayings  were  reported  by  his  faithful  ministers  as 
being  quite  in  keeping  with  the  character  of  a  self-sacrificing, 
benevolent  monarch. 

The  empire  to  be  established  was  to  be  quite  comme  ilfaut; 
it  was  to  have  a  complete  ornamentation  of  newly  made 
nobility.  The  Vice-President  was  to  have  the  title  of  prince, 
and  there  were  to  be  innumerable  marquises,  counts,  and 
barons.  The  military  governors  and  members  of  cabinet 
were  to  become  dukes  and  marquises,  while  the  barons 
would  be  as  many  as  the  sands  of  the  sea.  The  attitude  of 
Vice-President  Li  Yuan-hung  was  not  quite  plain.  Aside 
from  the  princedom  he  was  also  offered  the  marriage  of  one 
of  his  sons  to  one  of  Yuan's  daughters.  One  of  his  wives 
seemed  especially  fascinated  by  these  glittering  honours;  she 
was  said  to  have  virtually  prevailed  upon  General  Li  to  resign 
himself  to  the  situation.  The  President  was  very  kind  to 
him  and  had  supplied  him  with  a  bodyguard  which  watched 
his  every  movement — for  Yuan  Shih-kai's  information. 

New  styles  of  robes  for  the  Emperor  and  for  his  high  offi- 
cials and  attendants  were  designed  under  direction  of  Mr. 


i82      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Chu  Chi-chien.  They  were  fashioned  after  the  ceremonial 
robes  of  the  Japanese  Imperial  House.  The  great  coronation 
halls  in  the  Imperial  City  were  thoroughly  cleansed  and  re- 
painted. New  carpets  were  ordered;  the  making  of  a  nicely 
upholstered  throne  was  entrusted  to  Talati's,  a  general  mer- 
chandise house  in  Peking,  which  fact  greatly  amused  Coun- 
tess Ahlefeldt. 

Meanwhile,  with  foresight  and  astuteness,  General  Tsai  Ao 
and  Liang  Chi-chao  were  planning  their  movement  against 
Yuan.  By  establishing  the  first  independent  government  in 
the  remote  province  of  Yunnan  they  made  sure  that  Yuan 
Shih-kai  would  be  unable  to  vindicate  his  authority  over  all 
China  at  an  early  time.  With  Yunnan  as  starting  point,  it 
was  hoped  that  the  provinces  of  Kweichow,  Kuangsi,  and 
Szechuan  could  be  induced  to  associate  themselves  with  the 
anti-monarchist  movement.  Though  Canton  had  a  large 
garrison  of  Yuan's  troops,  it  was  hoped  that  inroads  would 
be  made  even  there. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
DOWNFALL  AND  DEATH  OF  YUAN  SHIH-KAI 

Everybody  thought  that  the  monarchy  was  to  be  pro- 
claimed on  New  Year's  Day,  1916.  Disaffection,  it  was 
realized,  though  hitherto  confined  to  a  remote  province, 
might  spread;  delay  was  dangerous.  Business  in  the  Yangtse 
Valley  and  elsewhere  was  dull.  Merchants  blamed  the 
Central  Government,  and  murmurings  were  heard.  General 
Feng  Kuo-chang,  who  had  at  first  encouraged  Yuan  Shih-kai, 
now  reserved  his  independence  of  action. 

The  revolt  remained  localized  in  Yunnan  throughout 
January.  With  the  rise  of  an  opposition,  Yuan  was  now 
more  ready  to  accentuate  the  constitutional  character  of  the 
new  monarchy.  His  Minister  of  Finance,  Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi, 
told  me  that  a  constitutional  convention  would  be  convoked 
when  the  monarchy  was  proclaimed.  This  would  provide 
a  representative  assembly  and  a  responsible  cabinet.  Con- 
structive reforms  were  to  be  announced.  No  further  patents 
of  nobility  were  to  be  awarded,  the  titles  already  granted 
would  be  treated  as  purely  military  honours. 

If  Yuan  and  his  advisers  had  acted  boldly  at  this  time  in 
promulgating  the  monarchy,  recognition  by  a  number  of 
powers  would  probably  have  followed,  especially  as  the  con- 
tinuity of  the  personnel  of  the  Government  made  recognition 
easier.  But  hesitation  and  delay  strengthened  the  opposi- 
tion. Yunnanese  troops  had  by  the  end  of  January  pene- 
trated into  the  neighbouring  provinces  of  Szechuan  and 
Kuangsi.  To  learn  what  was  going  on  in  these  provinces  I 
sent  the  military  attache.  Major  Newell,  up  the  Yangtse 
River  to  Szechuan,  and  the  naval  attache,  Lieut.-Commander 

183 


i84      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Hutchins,  to  Canton.  Efforts  of  the  generals  loyal  to  Yuan 
to  expel  the  Yunnanese  from  Szechuan  Province  were  un- 
successful. 

After  the  peculiarly  complex  manner  of  Chinese  political 
relationships,  Yunnan  began  to  exercise  an  influence  in 
Szechuan  Province  which  was  to  last  for  years.  The  Yunnan- 
ese were  protected  by  natural  barriers  of  mountains;  to  make 
headway  against  them  was  difiicult,  even  had  the  troops  of 
the  President  shown  greater  energy.  How  hollow  was  the 
unanimity  which  had  been  proclaimed  in  the  November 
elections  now  became  thoroughly  apparent.  Encouraged  by 
the  open  opposition,  ill-will  against  Yuan  Shih-kai  began  to 
be  shown  in  other  localities,  particularly  in  Hunan  and  in 
the  southernmost  provinces,  Kuangsi  and  Kuangtung. 
Rivalries  hitherto  held  in  check  by  Yuan's  strong  hand  also 
came  to  the  fore.  In  central  China  the  two  men  holding  the 
greatest  military  power.  Generals  Feng  Kuo-chang  and  Chang 
Hsun,  began  to  cherish  resentment  against  the  President; 
for,  in  exchanging  notes  upon  meeting,  they  discovered  that 
Yuan  had  set  each  of  them  to  watch  the  other. 

Even  now  the  monarchical  movement  might  have  gained 
strength  from  the  moderates,  who  feared  the  Japanese.  They 
did  not  wish  to  see  the  national  unity  disrupted.  "Get  a 
constitution  and  a  representative  legislature,'*  they  advised 
Yuan  Shih-kai;  "put  in  play  a  constructive  programme  of 
state  action;  reform  the  finances  and  the  audit,  simpHfy  the 
taxes,  extend  works  of  pubhc  use,  build  roads,  reclaim  lands, 
develop  agriculture  and  industry,  and  all  might  yet  be  well." 
Mr.  Liang  Shih-yi  and  Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi  hoped,  once  the 
question  of  succession  was  definitely  settled,  to  "put  in  com- 
mission "  the  dictatorial  power  of  Yuan.  As  Mr.  Chow  this 
time  put  it:  "Yuan  will  have  the  seat  of  honour  but  others 
will  order  the  meal." 

Toward  the  end  of  January  the  formal  proclamation  of 
the  empire  was  further  postponed.     Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi  was 


DOWNFALL  OF  YUAN  SHIH-KAI  185 

to  go  on  a  special  mission  to  Japan,  probably  to  induce  the 
Japanese  Government  to  be  more  favourable  to  the  new 
monarchy,  and  to  bear  handsome  concessions  to  the  Japanese. 
But  the  Japanese  Government  declared  that  for  personal 
reasons  the  Emperor  of  Japan  could  not  receive  a  Chinese 
embassy  at  that  time.  Possibly  various  other  concessionaire 
governments  intimated  to  Japan  that  they  did  not  expect  her 
to  entertain  any  special  proposals  at  this  time.  Nevertheless, 
the  Japanese  must  have  made  strong  representations  to  cause 
Yuan  Shih-kai,  who  was  a  decisive  and  determined  man,  to 
risk  all  by  hesitating  at  this  critical  moment. 

To  present  some  Americans  I  called  on  Yuan  Shih-kai  on 
February  i6th.  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Ulysses  S.  Grant  were  visiting 
Peking,  and  Yuan  was  glad  to  have  me  present  the  son  of  the 
famous  American  President  who  had  himself  visited  China 
and  established  cordial  relations  with  Li  Hung-chang,  Yuan's 
great  master.  Significantly  the  President  said  to  Mr.  Grant: 
"Your  honoured  father  had  great  power,  but  he  could  safely 
resign  it  to  others  when  the  time  came.  You  have  great 
political  experience  in  the  West."  It  was  quite  a  Httle  party, 
including  the  newly  appointed  commercial  attache,  Mr. 
Julean  H.  Arnold;  the  commandant  of  the  guard,  Colonel 
Wendell  C.  Neville;  and  two  young  writers.  Miss  Emerson 
and  Miss  Weil,  who  have  since  devoted  themselves  to  Far 
Eastern  studies  and  literary  work.  While  the  Emperor-elect 
betrayed  traces  of  strain  and  worry,  he  had  his  accustomed 
genial  manners.  Apropos  of  the  commercial  attache  and  the 
commandant  he  made  a  little  pleasantry  about  commerce 
and  war  coming  hand  in  hand.  After  a  brief  interview  the 
visitors  were  taken  by  the  master  of  ceremonies  to  see  the 
gardens,  while  I  remained  with  Yuan  Shih-kai  for  a  long  con- 
versation. This  was  interpreted  by  Doctor  Tenney  and  by 
Dr.  Hawkling  L.  Yen,  of  the  Foreign  Office;  it  was  understood 
by  us  all  that  the  conversation  was  personal  and  unofficial. 

**I  have  not  sought  new  honours  and  responsibilities,  but 


1 86      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

now  that  a  course  of  action  has  been  formally  decided  upon, 
it  is  my  duty  to  carry  it  out,"  Yuan  said.  "The  people  co- 
operated in  this,  I  desire  that  they  shall  cooperate  at  all 
times." 

I  asked  how  soon  he  would  announce  definitely  his  consti- 
tutional policy.  I  had  some  doubt  as  to  how  far  he  intended 
to  apply  any,  and  his  answer  was  evasive.  "It  is  hard," 
he  replied,  "to  make  a  constitution  before  the  monarchy  is 
actually  reestablished.  Then,  too,  if  the  Emperor  heads  the 
Government,  the  powers  of  departments  under  him  would 
need  to  be  more  restricted  than  under  a  repubhc."  His 
advisers,  it  seemed,  were  unduly  optimistic  in  expecting 
Yuan  to  stand  squarely  for  constitutional  government,  with 
power  devolving  on  the  parliament  and  the  different  de- 
partments. I  reminded  him  of  the  British  monarchy  in  its 
various  historic  forms  to  refute  his  idea. 

"Well,"  he  responded,  "the  new  constitution  must  wait 
for  a  People's  Convention.  This  is  soon  to  be  called;  its  ac- 
tion must  not  be  in  any  way  anticipated." 

He  then  fell  back  on  his  record,  stating  that  he  had  pressed 
the  Manchu  Government  to  adopt  a  constitution.  He  also 
referred  to  the  title  chosen  for  his  reign,  "Hung  Hsien," 
which  means  "great  constitutional  era." 

A  mandate  of  February  22nd  announced  the  postponement 
of  formal  accession  to  the  throne.  Mr.  C.  C.  Wu,  who 
brought  me  information  concerning  certain  state  plans  of 
Yuan  Shih-kai,  said  that  this  mandate  would  put  an  end 
to  the  innumerable  petitions  sent  to  accelerate  the  formal 
coronation.  He  added  that  essentially  the  Government,  so 
far  as  domestic  matters  were  concerned,  was  already  a  mon- 
archy, that  only  in  its  international  aspects  had  it  failed  to 
assume  this  character. 

Suddenly,  on  March  i8th,  the  Province  of  Kuangsi  de- 
manded the  cancellation  of  the  monarchy;  events  were  mov- 
ing more  rapidly. 


DOWNFALL  OF  YUAN  SHIH-KAI  187 

At  this  juncture  I  had  to  decide  whether  to  allow  the  Lee 
Higginson  loan  to  be  completed  without  a  caution  or  warning, 
or  to  assume  responsibility  of  virtually  stopping  that  transac- 
tion. As  soon  as  it  became  clear  that  open  opposition  to 
Yuan  Shih-kai's  government  was  no  longer  confined  to  one 
province  and  its  immediate  sphere  of  influence,  it  seemed  no 
longer  proper  for  any  American  institution  to  furnish  money  to 
the  Chinese  Government.  Many  appeals  had  been  made  by 
the  Opposition  based  on  the  demand  that,  since  the  country 
was  divided,  no  loans  should  be  made  to  the  Government.  In 
ordinary  circumstances  the  protests  of  factions  would  not 
have  weight,  but  when  several  provinces  expressed  their 
disapproval  of  a  basic  governmental  policy  the  case  was 
different.  To  have  to  counsel  delay  in  execution  of  the  loan 
agreement  was  intensely  disappointing  to  me,  fervently  as 
I  had  wished  the  American  financiers  to  participate  in  Chi- 
nese finance,  in  order  that  credit  and  resources  might  be  or- 
ganized and  developed  for  the  benefit  of  all.  Unfortunately, 
in  the  lull  after  the  disposal  of  the  twenty-one  demands  the 
Chinese  had  immediately  embarked  on  this  doubtful  politi- 
cal enterprise,  consuming  precious  energies  and  money.  The 
sums  spent  on  military  expeditions,  in  favourably  attun- 
ing doubtful  military  leaders,  and  in  the  creation  of  the 
alleged  unanimous  consent  through  a  popular  vote,  had 
been  thrown  away.  They  merely  added  to  the  burdens 
carried  by  the  Chinese  people. 

With  the  disaff"ection  of  yet  more  provinces  the  Govern- 
ment on  March  22nd  promulgated  a  decree  cancelling  the 
monarchy,  and  announcing  that  Yuan  Shih-kai  would  retain 
the  Presidency  of  the  Republic. 

This  sudden  and  unilateral  concession,  without  a  guaran- 
teed quid  pro  quo  by  way  of  submission  to  the  Central  Govern- 
ment by  the  revolting  forces,  came  as  a  surprise.  Doubtless 
the  step  was  taken  because  the  President  feared  that  the 
Province  of  Kuangtung,  whose  military  governor  had  urged 


1 88      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

him  to  compromise,  would  join  the  revolutionaries.  More- 
over, the  former  Secretary  of  State,  Hsu  Shih-chang,  who  had 
been  in  retirement,  advised  it.  The  Anhui  Party  in  Peking 
saw  an  opportunity  to  regain  control  and  oust  the  Canton- 
ese leaders,  in  whose  hands  the  monarchical  movement  had 
been  since  August.  The  President  believed  that  the  return 
of  such  men  as  Hsu  Shih-chang  and  Tuan  Chi-jui  would 
strengthen  him  in  the  eyes  of  the  revolutionists.  Hsu  Shih- 
chang  personally  had  lived  up  to  the  canons  of  Confucian 
morality  in  failing  to  approve  the  action  of  Yuan  Shih-kai 
when  he  tried  to  assume  the  rank  of  his  former  master,  the 
Emperor.  This  gained  him  universal  respect  in  China.  But 
his  impelling  motive  was  personal  loyalty  to  the  old  Imperial 
Family  rather  than  attachment  to  its  government. 

Of  course,  the  cancellation  of  the  monarchy  failed  to  satisfy 
the  revolutionists.  They  interpreted  it  as  a  confession  of 
weakness  and  defeat.  Nor  was  it  more  welcome  to  the  ad- 
herents of  the  President  in  the  provinces,  especially  the 
military,  who  felt  that  he  was  surrendering  without  getting 
anything  in  return.  Thus  the  President  lost  his  friends  and 
failed  to  placate  his  enemies.  Had  the  southern  leaders  been 
content,  the  chastened  Yuan  might  have  been  satisfied  to 
be  formal  head  of  a  constitutional  government.  But  they 
were  not.  His  authority  and  prestige  had  been  too  gravely 
compromised;  revolutionists  were  appearing  in  various  parts 
of  China;  Tsingtau  was  being  used  as  a  base  for  revolutionary 
activities  in  the  Province  of  Shantung  with  connivance  of  the 
Japanese  authorities.  The  Peking  Government  was  thrown 
into  confusion.  The  official  world  was  apprehensive  as  to 
what  the  President  would  do,  while  the  foreign  community 
feared  military  riots. 

The  leaders  of  the  so-called  Anhui  Party  had  evidently  ex- 
pected that  it  would  be  easy  to  proscribe  the  Cantonese 
leaders,  Liang  Shih-yi,  Chow  Tsu-chi,  lately  Minister  of 
Agriculture  and  Commerce,  and  Chu  Chi-chien,  Minister  of 


DOWNFALL  OF  YUAN  SHIH-KAI  189 

the  Interior,  and  have  them  banished  or  executed.  But 
contrary  to  their  expectations  these  men  did  not  at  that 
critical  time  take  to  the  woods.  To  the  amusement  of  every- 
one, the  leaders  of  the  other  party  then  became  frightened 
and  began  to  remove  their  families  from  Peking  and  to  plan 
for  places  of  safety  for  themselves.  With  somewhat  grim 
humour,  Minister  Chu  Chi-chien  declared  that  as  conditions 
in  Peking  were  perfectly  normal,  and  as  any  unwarranted 
show  of  nervousness  by  officials  would  tend  unnecessarily  to 
disturb  the  populace,  officials  would  no  longer  be  permitted 
to  remove  their  famihes  from  the  city. 

It  now  became  a  question  whether  Yuan  Shih-kai  could 
remain  even  as  President.  I  had  a  conversation  with  Mr. 
Hioki,  the  Japanese  minister,  who  spoke  at  length  about  the 
shortcomings  of  Yuan,  and  his  tendency  to  use  all  the  func- 
tions of  state.  Including  particularly  the  financial,  to  satisfy 
his  personal  ambitions.  Mr.  Hioki  did  not  believe  that 
Yuan  Shih-kai  could  possibly  restore  his  authority.  The 
month  of  April  was  a  period  of  great  depression  in  Peking. 
All  constructive  work,  and  even  planning  therefor,  had  been 
entirely  suspended.  The  new  ministry  came  in  on  April 
24th,  under  General  Tuan  Chi-jui  as  Minister  of  War.  This 
fact  indicated  shiftings  of  power,  as  General  Tuan  had  never 
supported  the  President  in  his  imperialist  ambitions.  The 
Cantonese  leaders  stepped  out  of  the  Government,  maintain- 
ing their  influence  thereafter  by  the  familiar  methods  of  Liang 
Shih->4.  Mr.  Tsao  Ju-Hn,  who  belonged  to  the  Communica- 
tions Party,  but  had  been  speciaHzing  in  establishing  closer 
relations  with  the  Japanese,  became  Minister  of  Communica- 
tions. The  President  agreed  to  turn  over  to  the  cabinet  full 
governmental  powers,  and  to  make  the  ministers  responsible 
to  the  national  parliament,  which  was  to  be  summoned  forth- 
with. Yuan  ceased  his  personal  control  over  all  important 
branches  of  the  Administration.  The  control  of  the  army  was 
transferred  from  the  President  to  the  Board  of  War.     He 


I90      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

was  stripped  of  all  military  forces  but  his  Honanese  body- 
guard, which  numbered  about  twenty  thousand. 

The  name  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  however,  was  retained  as  a 
symbol  of  authority,  for  all  the  military  leaders  owed  him 
allegiance.  Mr.  Liang  Shih-yi,  as  president  of  the  Bank  of 
Communications,  still  controlled  the  finances,  and  his  associ- 
ate, Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi,  was  placed  in  charge  of  the  Bank  of 
China. 

The  Government  was  driven  to  such  extremes  by  its  finan- 
cial needs  that  in  May  the  cabinet  declared  a  moratorium 
suspending  specie  payments  on  notes  of  the  government 
banks.  The  term  "moratorium,"  which  had  just  then  come 
into  prominence  in  Europe,  was  greeted  by  the  Chinese  finan- 
ciers as  the  password  to  save  them — a  respectable  name  for 
what  was  otherwise  not  so  honourable.  Through  this  step, 
whatever  confidence  still  remained  in  Yuan  Shih-kai  was 
dissipated.  Because  of  the  complex  nature  of  Chinese  affairs 
peculiar  consequences  followed.  Thus,  the  postal  adminis- 
tration ofiices  and  those  of  certain  railways  independently 
announced  that  they  would  not  accept  notes  but  would  de- 
mand payment  in  silyer. 

All  reports  of  local  troubles  coming  from  reliable  sources  in 
various  parts  of  China  spoke  of  the  participation  of  Japanese 
in  revolutionary  activities.  Specific  reports  from  Shantung 
indicated  that  the  revolutionaries  there  were  favoured  by  the 
Japanese.  At  Tsingtau  bandits  had  come  over  from  Man- 
churia and  were  openly  drilling  early  in  May  under  the  noses 
of  the  Japanese  military.  About  a  thousand  of  these  rebels 
left  Tsingtau  on  May  4th  over  the  Shantung  railway,  carry- 
ing machine  guns  to  the  centre  of  the  province,  where  they 
took  part  in  the  disturbances.  Meanwhile,  the  same  railway, 
under  Japanese  control,  had  refused  to  carry  Chinese  govern- 
ment troops  on  the  ground  that  neutrality  must  be  main- 
tained. When  questioned  about  the  rebels  transported, 
the  railway  officials  stated  that  the  rebels  must  have  been  in 


DOWNFALL  OF  YUAN  SHIH-KAI  191 

civilian  clothes  and  must  have  carried  their  armament  as 
baggage. 

It  is  not  clear  whether  the  Japanese  were  systematically 
working  for  the  establishment  of  an  independent  government 
in  the  south,  or  whether  they  were  merely  covertly  encourag- 
ing opposition  to  the  Central  Government,  to  foment  division 
and  unrest.  But  the  plans  of  Japan  for  gaining  a  dominant 
position  in  China  were  certainly  favoured  by  the  final  break- 
down of  the  authority  of  Yuan  Shih-kai. 

Japanese  correspondents  at  this  time  started  the  report 
that  Chinese  merchants  in  the  Yangtse  Valley  were  so  pro- 
voked with  Americans  for  making  a  loan  to  the  Chinese 
Government — the  Lee  Higginson  loan — that  they  were  plan- 
ning a  boycott  against  American  goods.  The  Japanese  paper, 
Shun  Tien  Shih  Pao,  incidentally  drew  on  its  imagination, 
and  published  a  yarn  to  the  effect  that  in  addition  to  the 
$5,000,000  loan  already  agreed  to,  the  American  firm  had 
promised  to  hand  over  to  the  Peking  authorities  $15,000,000 
before  the  end  of  July.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  beyond  the  orig- 
inal payment  of  $1,000,000,  nothing  was  ever  paid  over. 
The  Chinese  did  not  take  up  the  suggestion  of  a  boycott; 
although,  had  the  making  of  the  loan  proceeded,  such  a  result 
might  have  followed.  In  Peking,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Japanese  tried  to  impress  upon  Chinese  officials  that  the 
non-completion  of  the  Lee  Higginson  loan  offered  new  proof 
that  Americans  could  not  be  relied  upon  when  it  came  to  a 
showdown. 

Throughout  this  difficult  period  the  European  Allied  Pow- 
ers felt  that  they  lacked  a  free  hand,  and  that  any  joint 
action  undertaken  might  easily  assume  such  form  as  to  create 
a  Japanese  hegemony.  The  Japanese  at  all  times  urged 
that  as  they  were  on  the  spot  it  would  be  only  natural  to  en- 
trust them  with  the  representation  of  the  interests  of  the 
Allies.  Many  representative  Europeans  in  China  plainly 
intimated  to  us  the  hope  that  the  American  Government 


192     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

might  show  a  strong  interest  in  Chinese  affairs,  and  might 
not  fail  to  insist  on  the  maintenance  of  existing  treaty  rights 
and  of  Chinese  sovereignty. 

I  knew  from  the  Chinese  who  saw  him  daily  that  Yuan 
Shih-kai  suffered  under  the  strain  of  his  troubles  and 
disappointment.  As  early  as  March  Mr.  Liang  Tun-yen 
besought  me  to  visit  the  President  and  give  him  encourage- 
ment, as  worry  and  despair  were  breaking  him  down.  Yuan 
had  lived  a  sedentary  life  of  intense  work  and  great  respon- 
sibility. He  had  developed  Bright's  disease,  but  his  strong 
constitution  had  fought  it  off.  Now  when  great  trouble 
beset  him  his  strength  failed.  Mr.  Chow  Tzu-chi  remarked 
to  me:  "The  President's  power  of  quick  decision  has  left  him; 
he  is  helpless  in  the  troublesome  alternatives  that  confront 
him.  Formerly  it  was  *y^s'  or  'no'  in  an  instant,  to  my  pro- 
posals. Now  he  ruminates,  and  wavers,  and  changes  a  deci- 
sion many  times."  Yuan  contemplated  resignation,  and 
seemed  taken  with  the  idea  of  visiting  America.  I  was 
sounded  as  to  giving  him  safe  conduct  and  asylum.  The 
Opposition,  it  seemed,  would  make  no  objection  to  his  leaving 
the  country.  He  was  confined  to  his  room  during  the  latter 
half  of  May,  but  continued  to  give  his  personal  attention  to 
telegrams  and  important  correspondence.  In  the  first  days 
of  June  his  health  seemed  to  improve.  I  went  with  my  fam- 
ily to  Peitaiho  to  instal  them  in  their  summer  residence,  and 
to  rest  for  a  few  days.  I  had  left  a  special  code  with  Mr. 
MacMurray,  in  which  the  word  Pan  stood  for  Yuan  Shih-kai. 
I  was  shocked  on  the  afternoon  of  June  6th  to  receive  the 
brief  telegram:  "Pan  is  dead." 

By  the  night  train  I  returned  to  the  capital.  Yuan's  sons, 
the  ex-Premier  Hsu  Shih-chang,  and  several  officials  close 
to  the  President,  were  with  him  when  he  died.  During  the 
night  he  had  made  solemn  declaration  to  the  ex-Premier  that 
it  had  not  been  his  wish  to  become  Emperor;  he  had  been 
deceived  into  believing  that  the  step  was  demanded  by  the 


DOWNFALL  OF  YUAN  SHIH-KAI  193 

public,  and  was  necessary  to  the  country.  After  saying  this 
he  seemed  exhausted,  and  continued  to  sink  until  the  end 
came.  He  had  weakened  himself  and  further  aggravated  his 
illness  by  indiscriminately  taking  medicine  prescribed  by  a 
foreign  physician  together  with  all  sorts  of  Chinese  remedies 
which  his  women  urged  upon  him. 

The  ministers  of  the  Allied  Powers  at  once  called  on 
General  Tuan  to  inquire  whether  the  Government  was  pre- 
pared to  prevent  disorders.  Some  time  previously  the 
Japanese  minister  had  asked  me  whether  I  would  consider  it 
suitable  for  the  diplomatic  corps,  in  the  event  of  danger  of 
disturbances,  to  make  such  an  inquiry.  I  felt  it  unnecessary 
and  undesirable,  as  it  might  cause  apprehension  among  the 
public. 

The  German  and  Austrian  commandants  were  included  in 
the  conference  to  agree  en  measures  of  protection — probably 
the  only  instance  during  the  war  where  the  belligerents  of 
both  sides  met  to  consider  common  action.  Subsequently 
the  Belgian  minister  requested  the  American  Legation  to 
take  over  the  patrol  of  the  city  wall  immediately  back  of  the 
Belgian  Legation,  which  had  thus  far  had  German  sentinels. 
It  illustrates  the  complexity  of  all  things  in  China  that,  as 
late  as  1916,  German  troops  were  concerned  in  the  formal 
protection  of  the  Belgian  Legation. 

Yuan  Shih-kai  before  his  death  wrote  a  declaration  to  the 
effect  that  in  the  event  of  his  disability  the  Presidency  should 
devolve  on  General  Li  Yuan-hung.  The  accession  of  the 
Vice-President  was  announced  immediately.  The  members 
of  the  cabinet,  as  well  as  Prince  Pu-Lun,  as  chairman  of  the 
State  Council,  waited  on  President  Li  on  the  7th  of  June; 
with  a  simple  ceremonial,  including  three  deferential  bows, 
the  cabinet  expressed  its  allegiance  to  the  new  President. 
He  was  accepted  peaceably  and  with  unanimity  by  all  the 
provinces. 

General  Tuan  Chi-jui  and  Mr.  Liang  Shih-yi  cooperated  in 


194      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

arranging  for  the  transfer  of  authority  to  the  new  President. 
That  this  was  done  so  quietly  and  in  so  orderly  a  fashion 
caused  the  foreigners  to  regard  Chinese  republicanism  with 
much  higher  respect. 

The  body  of  Yuan  was  not  transferred  from  Peking  to 
his  Honan  home  until  June  28th,  when  the  mausoleum  on  the 
ancestral  estate  was  ready.  As  part  of  the  Imperial  move- 
ment, Yuan  Shih-kai  had  previously  begun  the  construction 
of  this  large  tomb.  The  commemorative  ceremony  took 
place  on  the  26th  in  Peking.  The  great  hall  of  the  Presiden- 
tial palace,  where  we  had  often  witnessed  New  Year  receptions 
and  other  festivities,  was  used.  There  were  gathered  the 
foreign  representatives  with  their  staffs  and  the  high  officials 
of  the  Chinese  Republic.  It  was  a  strange  mingling  of  old 
and  new.  The  President's  body  lay  on  a  high  catafalque,  in 
the  very  place  where  he  had  so  often  received  us.  In  front 
of  the  entrance  to  the  inner  apartments  stood  rows  of  tables 
bearing  the  usual  funeral  offerings  as  well  as  the  weapons, 
clothes,  and  other  objects  of  personal  use  of  the  departed. 
Here  were  gorgeous  Mandarin  coats  of  the  old  regime,  in- 
cluding the  famous  Yellow  Jacket,  and  generals'  uniforms 
of  the  new,  and  innumerable  decorations  sent  by  all  the  coun- 
tries bestowing  such  honours;  also  tall  riding  boots,  soft 
Chinese  slippers,  long  native  pipes  and  foreign  smoking  sets, 
swords,  and  pistols. 

The  service  was  a  litany  conducted  by  Lama  priests  from 
temples  in  Peking  and  Mongolia.  Some  of  the  priests  wore 
a  huge  headdress  resembling  a  dragoon's  helmet;  others,  a 
large  round  hat  not  unlike  that  of  a  cardinal.  As  they  in- 
toned the  ritual  their  deep  voices  rolled  as  if  they  issued  from 
an  underground  cavern.  The  music  accompanying  the  sing- 
ing was  Chinese,  supplied  by  flutes  and  stringed  instruments; 
but  at  the  beginning  the  President's  band  had  played  a 
Western  funeral  march.  The  second  part  of  the  service  con- 
sisted of  the  burning  of  incense  in  memory  of  the  departed. 


DOWNFALL  OF  YUAN  SHIH-KAI  195 

First,  the  sons  of  Yuan,  wearing  the  white  garments  of  mourn- 
ers, came  forth  from  an  inner  apartment  and  took  their 
station  before  the  catafalque.  They  prostrated  themselves, 
struck  their  foreheads  heavily  against  the  floor,  and  wailed 
with  loud  voices.  Yuan  Ko-ting,  as  chief  mourner,  offered 
sacrifice.  Meanwhile,  the  women  of  the  Presidential  house- 
hold peered  through  the  windows  of  the  apartments  which 
opened  into  the  central  hall. 

When  the  sons  of  Yuan  had  withdrawn,  the  singing  of  the 
priests  was  taken  up  again,  now  in  a  different  key  and  accom- 
panied by  the  tinkling  of  many  bells  clear  as  silver,  but  some 
of  them  as  deep  as  the  sea.  Buddhist  prayers  were  intoned 
in  voices  sonorous  and  deep  as  the  grave.  The  new  President 
next  offered  sacrifice  at  the  bier  of  his  predecessor. 

What  contrasts  of  character  and  aims,  what  mingling  of 
old  and  new  forces,  what  a  rush  of  incongruous  ideas  and 
practices  were  typified  in  this  ceremony,  with  all  its  accom- 
paniments! And  these  were  embodied,  too,  in  the  person- 
ality of  the  dead  leader  and  in  his  successor! 

The  foreign  representatives  next  paid  their  respect  to  the 
memory  of  Yuan.  We  rose  and  each  in  turn  deposited  before 
the  catafalque  a  huge  wreath,  and  returned  after  making  the 
customary  three  bows  of  high  ceremony.  Following  the 
diplomats  came  the  Secretary  of  State  and  high  Chinese 
officials,  as  well  as  the  foreign  advisers. 

The  procession  to  the  railway  station,  on  June  28th,  testi- 
fied to  the  genius  of  the  Chinese  for  pageantry.  They  had 
preserved  some  of  the  colour  and  brilliance  of  an  Imperial 
procession,  and  what  was  remarkable,  had  so  arranged  the 
parade  that  the  modern  elements — troops  in  modern  uniform, 
brass  bands,  officials  in  evening  dress,  and  diplomats  in  their 
varied  uniforms — myself  alone  wearing  ordinary  civilian 
dress — did  not  impart  to  the  pageant  a  jarring  note.  In 
fact,  throughout  the  ceremony  at  the  palace  and  the  subse- 
quent procession,  there  was  a  gratifying  absence  of  disso- 


196     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

nance,  notwithstanding  the  multifariousness  of  the  elements 
included. 

The  huge  catafalque  upon  which  the  body  of  Yuan  lay- 
was  borne  by  a  hundred  men  by  means  of  a  complicated  ar- 
rangement of  poles.  It  was  covered  with  crimson  silk  em- 
broidered in  gold;  its  imperial  splendour  accentuated  the 
tragedy  of  the  occasion.  Old  Chinese  funeral  customs,  such 
as  the  throwing  into  the  air  of  paper  resembhng  money,  were 
observed.  Heading  the  procession  rode  twenty  heralds, 
then  followed  in  succession  three  large  detachments  of  in- 
fantry, bearing  their  arms  reversed.  Between  each  two 
detachments  marched  a  band.  After  the  infantry  came 
Chinese  musicians,  playing  weirdly  plaintive  strains  on  their 
flutes.  Then  came  the  beautiful  and  fascinating  part  of  the 
cortege — a  large  squadron  of  riders  in  old  Chinese  costume, 
carrying  huge  banners,  long  triangular  pennants,  and  fretted 
streamers  of  many  colours,  which,  as  they  floated  gracefully 
in  the  air,  made  a  charming  picture.  The  Chinese  have  a 
genius  for  using  banners  with  dazzling  eff^ect.  Then  followed 
lancers  escorting  an  empty  state  carriage;  Buddhist  monks 
beating  drums  and  cymbals;  the  President's  band;  long  lines 
of  bearers  with  sacrificial  vessels  preceding  the  sedan  chair  in 
which  was  set  the  soul  tablet  of  Yuan;  then  still  other  lines  of 
men  bearing  the  food  off"erings,  the  mementoes  of  Yuan's 
personal  life,  and  the  wreaths,  all  from  the  funeral  ceremony 
of  two  days  before.  High  ofiicials  came  next,  on  foot,  in 
military  uniform  or  civilian  full  dress,  and  here  indeed  the 
frock  coats  and  top  hats  did  seem  somewhat  out  of  keeping. 
A  throng  of  white-clad  mourners  preceded  the  catafalque; 
the  sons  of  Yuan  walked  under  a  white  canopy.  Yuan 
Ko-ting  in  the  midst  of  it  all  seemed  a  pathetic  figure. 

The  vast  throngs  that  lined  the  route  behind  lines  of  troops 
looked  on  in  respectful  silence.  There  was  no  sign  of  grief, 
rather  mute  indiff"erence.  Yuan  had  not  won  the  heart  of 
the  people,  who  regarded  him  as  a  masterful  individual 


DOWNFALL  OF  YUAN  SHIH-KAI  197 

dwelling  in  remote  seclusion  whose  contact  with  them  came 
through  taxes  and  executions.  I  believe  a  Chinese  crowd  is 
incapable  of  the  enthusiastic  hero-worship  which  great  politi- 
cal leaders  in  the  Occident  receive.  The  people  have  not  yet 
come  to  look  upon  such  men  as  their  leaders.  The  Peking 
population,  imbued  still  with  traditions  of  imperial  splendour 
and  the  remoteness  and  semi-divinity  of  their  rulers,  are  as 
yet  only  onlookers  at  the  pageant  of  history. 

The  tragedy  of  the  great  man  who  had  died  as  a  conse- 
quence of  his  ambition  made  this  occasion  impressive  to  the 
foreigners  present,  even  to  the  most  cynical.  It  was  the 
last  act  in  one  of  the  most  striking  dramas  of  intrigue,  achieve- 
ment, and  defeat.  The  foreign  representatives  left  the  cor- 
tege before  it  issued  from  the  southernmost  gate  of  the  Im- 
perial City,  stopping  while  the  mourners  and  the  catafalque 
moved  past.  A  piece  of  paper  money  thrown  into  the  air  to 
pacify  the  spirits  fell  on  me,  and  I  kept  it  as  a  characteristic 
memento.  I  walked  back  to  the  Legation  Quarter  with  the 
Russian  minister.  Prince  KoudachefF,  who,  like  myself,  was 
deeply  impressed;  we  agreed  that  in  ceremony  and  pageantry 
the  Chinese  stand  supreme. 

Thus,  with  the  fluttering  of  bright  banners  and  'the  wailing 
of  the  reed  flutes,  another  crowded  chapter  in  the  history  of 
the  new  China  drew  to  its  close. 


CHAPTER  XVII 
REPUBLICANS  IN  THE  SADDLE 

The  passing  of  Yuan  Shih-kai  left  the  ground  clear  for  the 
nurturing  of  a  real  republic  in  China.  Would  those  in  con- 
trol be  real  republicans,  or  would  they  be  merely  politicians  ? 
Politics,  with  all  that  this  term  implies  in  modern  times,  was 
exotic,  its  importation  into  China  might  have  disastrous  re- 
sults. Concentration  on  industry,  on  local  government  by 
the  Chinese  people,  and  the  building  up  from  these  of  a 
sound  and  democratic  national  consciousness  were  needed. 
It  was  upon  this  foundation  that  Li  Yuan-hung  might  have 
founded  his  rule. 

His  first  reception  to  foreign  ministers  was  given  by  Presi- 
dent Li  Yuan-hung  shortly  after  the  funeral  of  Yuan  Shih- 
kai.  Li  had  removed  from  the  island  in  the  Imperial  City 
before  the  death  of  Yuan;  and  this  was  a  step  toward  free- 
dom, though  he  had  continued  to  be  surrounded  with  guards 
ostensibly  for  his  protection,  but  really  there  to  watch  him 
and  restrict  his  movements.  His  friends  were  still  apprehen- 
sive for  his  safety,  and  I  was  repeatedly  approached  with 
inquiries  as  to  whether  in  case  of  need  I  should  receive  him 
at  the  American  Legation,  or  possibly,  even,  send  a  guard 
detachment  to  bring  him  in.  The  latter  I  could  not  do;  but, 
while  it  is  not  proper  to  give  specific  assurances  of  protection 
in  advance,  I  could  say  that  it  was  customary  to  grant  asylum 
to  political  refugees.  I  learned  that  some  Americans  were 
ready  to  try  a  rescue  of  the  Vice-President  should  his  situa- 
tion become  perilous.  Upon  the  death  of  Yuan  Shih-kai, 
General  Li's  situation  of  uncertainty  and  danger  was  ended 
at  least  for  a  while. 

X98 


REPUBLICANS  IN  THE  SADDLE  199 

He  received  the  diplomats  in  a  private  residence,  whence 
he  did  not  remove  to  the  palace  for  several  months.  The 
ceremony  was  simple.  The  foreign  representatives  were 
introduced  in  three  groups:  Allies,  Neutrals,  and  Central 
Powers.  The  President  received  us  standing,  attended  by 
his  ministers  and  twelve  generals,  all  in  uniform.  General 
Tuan  Chi-jui  looked  disconsolate,  standing  with  bent  head 
and  with  epaulets  sloping  down  on  his  chest.  I  do  not  know 
whether  his  spirit  was  as  sad  as  his  outward  demeanour,  but 
he  probably  saw  many  difficulties  ahead.  The  President 
made  a  few  remarks  of  a  friendly  nature,  but  throughout  he 
looked  far  more  serious  than  was  his  wont;  and  his  face  was 
not  wreathed  in  smiles. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  day  of  Yuan's  funeral  I  visited  the 
new  President  informally;  passing  through  several  interior 
courts  where  soldiers  were  on  guard  and  through  a  smiling 
flower  garden  I  came  into  the  library,  simply  furnished, 
where  the  President  was  working.  Piles  of  papers  and 
books  on  the  desk  and  side  tables  indicated  that  he  had  been 
seeking  information  from  many  sources.  We  spent  an 
hour  or  so  discussing  the  political  situation.  He  felt  relieved 
at  being  no  longer  guarded  and  confined;  but  his  newly  ac- 
quired state  had  not  changed  his  simplicity  of  manner. 
Quite  in  his  usual  optimistic  mood,  he  said:  *' I  have  found 
a  way  to  secure  the  cooperation  of  all  factions.  I  will  declare 
the  Provisional  Constitution  of  191 2  to  be  in  force,  and  sum- 
mon the  old  parliament;  but  its  membership  should  be  re- 
duced by  one  half;  it  is  too  unwieldy.  It  will  be  summoned 
for  this  purpose  only  and  to  finish  the  Constitution;  the  reduc- 
tion will  come  by  amending  the  parliamentary  election 
law." 

I  asked  the  President  whether  he  did  not  consider  it  im- 
possible thus  to  limit  the  function  of  the  parliament,  when 
once  it  was  summoned.  Would  it  not,  I  asked,  almost  cer- 
tainly try  to  assume  a  controlling  power  in  the  Government, 


200      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

and  would  not  this,  in  the  absence  of  mature  leaders,  cause 
confusion  ? 

"No,"  the  President  insisted;  "the  parliament  will  be  con- 
fined to  the  specific  function  indicated  by  me." 

As  the  community  of  Americans  at  Shanghai  had  repeat- 
edly invited  me  to  come  to  that  city,  I  carried  out  a  long- 
delayed  intention  by  journeying  southward  to  celebrate  the 
Fourth  of  July  there.  My  chief  engagement — following, 
among  others,  an  address  at  the  Commencement  exercises  at 
St.  John's  University,  an  American  University  Club  lunch,  a 
reception  given  in  my  honour  on  the  Flagship  Brooklyn — ^was 
an  address  before  the  American  Chamber  of  Commerce  at 
dinner  in  the  Palace  Hotel,  on  July  ist.  I  spoke  about  the 
requirements  of  the  new  period  upon  which  American  com- 
mercial interests  in  the  Far  East  were  entering.  In  European 
countries  and  Japan,  I  said,  the  relation  between  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  large  industries  and  banking  institutions  is 
close.  Together  they  develop  national  enterprise  abroad. 
Not  so  in  America.  The  Government  and  the  concentrated 
capital  of  the  United  States  do  not  act  as  a  unit  in  foreign 
affairs.  We  believe  that  it  is  better  to  leave  the  initiative  to 
private  enterprise,  confining  the  action  of  the  Government  to 
protecting  opportunities  for  commerce  abroad.  In  their 
work  of  organization,  American  merchants  and  representa- 
tives have  the  function  of  discovering,  testing,  and  approving 
commercial  policies  and  projects  which  are  to  be  executed 
with  home  capital.  On  their  wisdom  and  experience  in 
China,  New  York  and  Chicago  have  to  rely. 

At  the  reception  given  by  the  Consul-General  in  Shanghai 
on  the  Fourth  of  July,  I  met  Mr.  Tang  Shao-yi,  the  Kuo  Min 
Tang  leader  who  had  been  Premier  and  Minister  of  Finance  in 
the  first  cabinet  under  the  Republic.  I  found  him  unprepared 
to  assume  any  responsible  part  in  politics,  although  the 
prominence  of  his  opposition  to  Yuan  Shih-kai  might  have 
made  him  ready  to  help.    As  President  Li  had  urged  him  to 


REPUBLICANS  IN  THE  SADDLE  201 

come  to  Peking,  Mr.  Tang  said  he  would  go  when  parliament 
had  been  reconvoked.  But  I  apprehended  and  understood 
from  others  that  he  was  loth  to  go  because  his  enemies  in 
Peking  were  still  too  powerful. 

After  a  brief  vacation  at  the  summer  residence  of  'my 
family  at  Peitaiho,  whither  I  had  proceeded  on  the  U.  S.  ship 
Cincinnati,  I  returned  to  Peking  on  the  27th  of  July,  as  much 
business  awaited  me  there. 

A  change  of  government  took  place.  The  appointment  of 
a  new  cabinet  was  announced  on  June  30,  1916,  with  a 
personnel  completely  different  from  that  under  Yuan  Shih- 
kai.  Mr.  Tang  did  not  leave  Shanghai.  A  provisional 
cabinet  was  therefore  constituted  under  General  Tuan 
Chi-jui,  Dr.  Chen  Chin-tao  acting  as  Minister  of  Finance  and 
Mr.  Hsu  Shih-ying  as  Minister  of  Communications.  I  had 
long  known  Doctor  Chen,  who  had  received  his  education  in 
the  United  States  and  had  lived  abroad  many  years  as 
Financial  Commissioner  of  the  Chinese  Government.  He 
was  one  of  the  few  men  in  Chinese  official  life  familiar  with 
Western  finance  and  banking — a  scholarly  man,  slow  and 
somewhat  heavy  in  speech  and  manner,  studious,  and  desirous 
of  carrying  modern  methods  of  efficiency  and  careful  audit 
into  all  branches  of  the  Administration.  Everyone  met  him 
with  confidence. 

The  southern  leaders  did  not  come  to  Peking  because  they 
wished  their  complete  ascendency  to  be  recognized  before 
taking  part  in  the  Government.  Their  demands  that  the 
Constitution  of  191 2  be  revived  and  that  Parliament  be 
restored  had  been  complied  with.  They  further  insisted  on 
punishment  for  the  leaders  of  the  monarchical  movement. 
Accordingly,  on  July  13th  a  mandate  was  issued  providing 
for  the  arrest  and  trial  of  eight  public  men,  including 
Liang  Shih-yi,  Chu  Chi-chien,  and  Chow  Tsu-chi.  All  of 
these  men  happened  to  be  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Chinese  Government,  so  the  mandate  had  the  effect 


202      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

only  of  a  decree  of  exile.  General  Tuan,  the  Premier, 
smilingly  remarked  in  cabinet  meeting  that  if  the  monarchists 
were  really  to  be  punished,  few  men  in  public  life  would 
go  free. 

With  an  entirely  new  personnel  of  government,  all  threads 
of  negotiations,  past  and  present,  had  to  be  taken  up  anew. 
I  was  already  acquainted  with  the  Premier  and  with  Doctor 
Chen,  but  the  other  cabinet  members  I  had  met  casually  or 
not  at  all.  With  Doctor  Chen  and  his  associate  of  the 
Ministry  of  Finance,  Mr.  Hsu  Un-yuen,  who  had  been 
appointed  managing  director  of  the  Bank  of  China,  and  with 
General  Hsu  Shu-cheng,  the  Premier's  chief  assistant,  I 
frequently  talked  over  the  financial  situation  of  China.  The 
monarchical  movement  had  been  defeated,  the  Republic  more 
firmly  established;  now,  they  suggested,  it  was  highly  ap- 
propriate for  America  to  support  China  financially.  They 
requested  that  the  loan  contract  made  by  Lee,  Higginson  & 
Company  be  carried  out,  and  further  steps  taken  for 
strengthening  and  organizing  Chinese  credit. 

I  told  the  Premier  about  the  railway  and  canal  negoti- 
ations. He  wished  to  encourage  American  participation  in 
Chinese  development,  but  did  not  commit  himself  on  the  new 
American  proposals.  On  the  matter  of  a  loan  he  reenforced 
the  position  taken  by  the  Minister  of  Finance  and  General 
Hsu.  General  Tuan  had  won  the  confidence  of  the  Chinese 
people  through  his  disapproval  of  Yuan's  monarchical 
ambitions,  and  now  occupied  a  strong  position.  **I  do  not 
expect  much  good,"  he  said,  "from  the  return  of  parliament; 
there  will  be  endless  party  struggles  and  interference  with 
the  Administration.  But  as  to  this  curious  modern  method 
of  governing  through  talk,  which  fundamentally  I  see  no 
virtue  in,  I  am  willing  to  give  it  a  fair  trial." 

When  I  called  on  the  Minister  of  Communications,  I  took 
care  that  the  conversation  should  be,  not  on  business,  but 
an  literature  and  the  surroundings  of  Peking.     He   liked 


REPUBLICANS  IN  THE  SADDLE  203 

calligraphy;  also,  he  had  written  short  literary  pieces,  one 
of  which  was  a  poetical  description  of  the  Summer  Palace. 
After  a  pleasant  hour  with  tea  the  minister  escorted  me  not 
only  through  all  the  various  gates  of  the  inner  courts,  but  to 
the  very  door  of  my  carriage.  One  of  my  colleagues  on  his 
initial  visit  to  the  minister  had  a  less  fortunate  experience. 
The  interview,  which  concerned  a  certain  action  long  de- 
layed, was  somewhat  spirited,  for  the  diplomat  insisted  with 
great  emphasis  that  something  be  done  forthwith.  By 
contrast  the  minister  made  me  specially  welcome,  pleased 
that  I  did  not  immediately  descend  upon  him  with  demands. 
When,  thereafter,  matters  of  business  had  to  be  taken  up, 
there  was  the  same  cordiality,  even  when  difficult  things 
were  discussed. 

During  the  first  month  of  its  renewed  life,  beginning  the 
1st  of  August,  the  parliament  did  nothing  to  justify  the 
unfavourable  expectations  of  its  critics.  It  was  not  rash  or 
irresponsible,  its  members  subordinated  their  private  and 
partisan  views  to  the  urgent  needs  of  national  unity  and 
cooperation.  The  military  party  pursued  a  waiting  policy, 
seeming  ready  to  give  parliament  a  chance  to  show  what  it 
could  do.  Meanwhile,  the  financial  situation  of  the  Govern- 
ment became  difficult,  as  the  provinces  had  not  yet  been  pre- 
vailed upon  to  give  adequate  support. 

Among  the  newly  arrived  leaders  of  the  democratic  party 
whose  abiHties  and  character  I  was  appraising  was  Mr.  Sun 
Hung-yi,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior.  I  went  to  him,  passing 
through  narrow  and  crooked  streets  to  his  house  in  a  remote 
part  of  the  city.  It  was  surrounded  by  military  guards, 
carriages,  and  automobiles.  The  courts  swarmed  with 
people;  soldiers  were  lounging  about,  while  countless  long- 
coated  individuals  hurried  to  and  fro  or  sat  in  conversation  in 
the  rooms  or  on  porches.  Mr.  Sun,  who  met  me  in  an 
interior  apartment,  was  tall,  broad  faced,  with  sparse 
whiskers  and  hair  standing  up  rebelliously  in  wisps.     He 


204      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

wore  a  long  brown  coat,  bestowing  little  care  on  his  appear- 
ance. "The  parliament,"  he  said,  "cannot  confine  itself 
to  its  principal  task,  the  finishing  of  the  Constitution;  it  must 
also  control  public  administration." 

A  contest  for  power  was  inevitable,  it  seemed,  between  the 
Premier  and  the  parliament. 

Mr.  Sun  was  a  typical  politician.  Here  he  was,  his 
innumerable  retainers  about  him,  all  intent  on  the  game, 
while  he  was  cunningly  deploying  his  forces  for  tactical  ad- 
vantage in  politics.  He  betrayed  no  ideas  of  statesmanship, 
only  a  desire  for  party  dominance;  though  later  he  did  show 
signs  of  developing  a  broader  vision. 

I  also  met  Mr.  Ku  Chung-hsiu,  the  Minister  of  Agriculture 
and  Commerce,  a  most  complacent  and  oily  person,  who 
would  be  recognized  the  world  over  as  the  suave  political 
manipulator. 

Of  such  calibre,  then,  were  the  men  who,  under  President 
Li  Yuan-hung,  were  to  lay  the  foundations  of  the  new 
government. 


PART  III 
THE  WAR  AND  CHINA 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
AMERICAN  ENTREPRENEURS  IN  PEKING 

As  THE  second  year  of  the  Hwai  River  conservancy  option 
was  about  to  expire,  something  positive  had  to  be  done  in 
order  to  make  an  actual  beginning  on  this  work.  Mr.  W.  F. 
Carey,  whose  various  enterprises  have  already  been  referred 
to,  had  arrived  in  Peking  in  December,  191 5,  with  his  family 
and  a  large  staff.  He  brought  over  his  whole  organization, 
for  his  firm's  arrangements  with  the  New  York  capitalists 
made  him  feel  ready,  not  only  to  negotiate,  but  to  start  work. 
He  had  completed  extensive  railway  construction  work  in 
Canada  and  the  United  States;  his  organization  was  ready 
for  China.  He  was  a  man  accustomed  to  attacking  his  work 
with  full  force  and  getting  it  out  of  the  way.  He  knew  there 
was  plenty  of  work  to  do  in  China,  and  he  was  ready  to  start 
doing  it  without  delay. 

Tested  and  highly  recommended  as  the  conservancy  under- 
taking had  been  by  the  engineering  commission  under  Colonel 
Sibert,  the  financiers  associated  with  the  Siems-Carey 
Company  yet  hesitated.  It  was  then  suggested  that  they  do 
part  of  the  work  and  reserve  an  option  on  the  entire  enter- 
prise. The  negotiations  with  Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi,  Minister 
of  Finance,  developed  that  the  only  part  which  might  be 
dissociated  from  the  whole  was  the  restoration  of  the  Grand 
Canal.  But  it  would  hardly  be  profitable  to  undertake  this 
unless  at  least  the  whole  portion  from  the  Yangtse  River 
to  Techow  were  to  be  made  navigable.  Enough  traffic 
might  then  be  counted  upon  to  afford  by  means  of  tolls 
security  for  the  loan,  together  with  certain  tracts  of  land 
which  would  be  drained.     A  period  of  four  months  was  given 

ao7 


208      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

to  investigate  the  feasibility  and  cost  of  this  work,  while  the 
option  on  the  more  extensive  enterprise  of  the  Hwai  River 
conservancy  was  extended. 

The  men  representing  American  firms  who  came  with  Mr. 
Carey  created  in  Peking  the  impression  of  an  onslaught  of 
American  enterprise.  The  International  Banking  Corpo- 
ration and  the  American  International  Corporation  had  sent 
a  new  representative.  The  firm  of  Anderson,  Meyer  & 
Company,  hitherto  Danish,  had  been  acquired  by  American 
capital,  and  a  representative  had  been  sent  to  Peking. 
Social  life  in  the  American  colony  was  visibly  enlivened  by 
this  influx.  It  was  amusing  to  see  how  large  groups  of 
people  from  St.  Paul,  Kansas  City,  Chicago,  and  various 
Eastern  towns,  suddenly  planted  in  these  entirely  foreign 
surroundings,  could  in  an  incredibly  short  time  make  them- 
selves thoroughly  comfortable,  and  establish  intimate  re- 
lations with  their  new  neighbours.  The  various  American 
representatives  took  large  houses  in  the  city  outside  of  the 
Legation  Quarter,  where  they  entertained  a  great  deal. 

But  by  the  legal  talent  mustered  for  the  negotiations  the 
Chinese  were  rather  taken  aback.  Not  much  given  to  legal 
refinements,  nor  to  setting  down  in  the  written  contract 
detailed  provisions  for  every  imaginable  contingency,  the 
meticulous  care  of  the  American  legal  draughtsmen  impressed 
the  Chinese  as  savouring  of  suspicion. 

Their  own  business  arrangements  are  more  simple  and 
general,  with  reliance  on  a  mutual  sense  of  equity;  moreover, 
all  contracts  with  foreigners  had  hitherto  been  made  in  a  less 
technical  manner.  An  American  lawyer  would  not  be 
satisfied  with  this.  He  would  think  of  the  other  corporation 
lawyers  at  home,  sitting  in  their  oifices  on  the  thirty-fifth 
floor,  to  whom  the  ordinary  Chinese  way  of  drawing  up  con- 
tracts would  seem  criminally  lax.  To  overcome  the  con- 
cealed resentment  of  the  Chinese  took  time,  together  with 
much  talk  about  how  the  common  interest  would  be  pro- 


AMERICAN  ENTREPRENEURS  IN  PEKING   209 

moted  by  completely  defining  all  responsibilities  assumed. 
The  argument  which  really  impressed  them  was  that  other 
foreign  nations  had  frequently  interpreted  simply  drawn 
contracts  entirely  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  Chinese. 

Mr.  Carey,  also,  did  not  personally  believe  in  much  legal 
refinement,  but  bowed  to  the  mature  judgment  of  the  pro- 
fession. He  had  won  his  way  from  the  ranks,  and  his  Irish 
originality  had  not  been  befogged  with  theoretical  discussion. 
He  immediately  felt  at  home  with  the  frank  and  human 
Chinese,  and  constantly  had  many  of  them  at  his  house, 
where  they  partook  of  true  American  hospitality  and  shared 
in  frolics  of  dancing  and  poker.  The  Chinese  are  fond  of  this 
American  game,  in  which  human  nature  plays  so  large  a 
part;  the  impassiveness  of  their  countenance  lends  itself 
admirably  to  the  tactics  of  poker.  It  was  amusing  to  hear 
Liang  Shih-yi,  who  otherwise  spoke  not  a  word  of  English, 
enunciate  from  behind  a  pile  of  chips,  in  staccato  tones: 
*'Full  house," — "Two  pair."  This  eminent  financier  was  a 
worthy  match  for  any  poker  expert. 

Mr.  Carey  brought  his  unwarped  intelligence  to  bear  with 
great  freshness  on  Chinese  aflfairs,  which  he  discussed  in  the 
language  of  an  American  contractor  and  business  man  who 
reduced  everything  to  terms  of  getting  something  done.  To 
observe  how  a  man  of  his  training,  instincts,  and  tradition, 
so  utterly  different  from  the  Chinese,  remained  in  constant, 
intimate  intercourse  and  joyous  mutual  understanding  with 
them,  made  one  believe  that  there  must  be  real  bonds  of 
sympathy  between  Americans  and  the  Chinese.  Mr.  Carey 
abbreviated  many  of  the  Chinese  names,  thus  making  them 
far  more  pronounceable.  Mr.  Chen  Pan-ping,  the  Minister 
of  Agriculture,  thus  became  Ping-pong;  the  Secretary  of 
State,  Hsu  Shih-chang,  was  Susie. 

When  the  preliminary  contract  for  the  Grand  Canal  had 
been  signed,  Mr.  Carey  and  all  his  associates  departed  for 
Shantung  and  Kian^su  under  the  guidance  of  Mr.  Pan  Fu,  a 


2IO      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

young  capitalist  and  official  from  Shantung  Province,  who 
was  anxious  to  have  the  constructive  work  begun  early. 

A  mistake  made  by  Americans  in  other  parts  of  the  world 
was  not  avoided  in  China.  Several  of  the  new  organizations 
that  came  in  at  this  time  and  during  the  war  made  their 
entry  with  a  considerable  blare  of  trumpets  and  pounding  of 
gongs,  announcing  the  millions  that  were  backing  them  and 
describing  the  manner  in  which  they  would  rip  things  up 
generally  when  they  got  started.  As  a  great  part  of  inter- 
national business  is  diplomacy,  such  methods  of  blatant 
advertisement  are  not  best  calculated  to  facilitate  the  early 
operations  of  a  new  enterprise.  They  raise  expectations  of 
**easy  money"  in  the  people  dealt  with,  and  they  engender 
cynicism  and  rock-ribbed  opposition  on  the  part  of  competi- 
tors. Great  enterprises  in  foreign  trade  are  usually  built  up 
with  quieter  methods.  My  observations  on  this  score  by  no 
means  refer  to  all  new  American  enterprise  in  China,  but 
there  was  enough  of  this  sort  of  brass-band  work  to  give 
people  an  idea  that  it  was  the  approved  method  of  American 
entry  into  foreign  markets.  The  subsequent  flattening  out 
of  several  of  these  loudly  heralded  ventures  did  not  help 
matters. 

I  had  on  February  29th  a  long  interview  with  Dr.  Jeme 
Tien-yow,  an  American-educated  engineer,  who  had  won 
repute  through  the  survey  and  construction  of  the  Peking- 
Kalgan  Railway,  of  which  he  was  chief  engineer.  He  was 
looked  upon  as  a  living  example  of  what  the  Chinese  could  do 
for  themselves  in  engineering.  At  this  time  he  was  managing 
director  of  the  Hukuang  railways.  I  had  had  extensive 
correspondence  with  him,  directly  and  through  the  Consul- 
General  at  Hankow  with  respect  to  the  engineering  standards 
to  be  applied  on  his  lines,  as  it  was  difl&cult  to  find  a  middle 
ground  between  the  American  and  British  manufacturers 
and  those  of  other  nations  concerned.  Doctor  Jeme  was  on 
the  whole  favourable  to  America,  but  clung  to  European 


AMERICAN  ENTREPRENEURS  IN  PEKING  211 

standards,  much  to  the  disadvantage  of  American  equipment. 
We  went  over  all  the  disputed  points  with  regard  to  solid 
cast  wheels  or  tread  wheels,  shapes  of  box  cars,  types  of 
engines,  and  so  on — a  curiously  technical  conversation  for  a 
foreign  minister  to  hold  with  a  railway  director  as  a  matter 
of  official  business.  Doctor  Jeme  was  slow,  undemonstrative, 
quite  willing  to  discuss,  but  not  ready  to  yield  any  point  in 
which  he  thoroughly  believed.  The  argument  cleared  up 
some  matters  and  left  others  the  subject  of  continued 
correspondence. 

I  was  trying  to  induce  the  American  group  to  take  the  lead 
in  furnishing  funds  so  that  the  building  of  the  Szechuan  line 
of  the  Hukuang  railways  could  be  undertaken.  I  also 
hoped  that,  notwithstanding  the  war,  the  British  and  French 
groups  might  continue  to  furnish  enough  funds  to  complete 
the  line  from  Hankow  to  Canton. 

Doubtless  the  greatest  national  need  of  China  was  the 
completion  of  these  trunk  hnes,  both  to  connect  the  north 
and  south  of  the  country,  and  to  open  a  land  route  to 
Szechuan  Province,  which  could  then  be  reached  only  by 
boat  on  the  Yangtse,  subject  to  all  contingencies  of  an  un- 
certain and  dangerous  navigation.  It  should  not  have  re- 
quired argument  to  induce  the  capitalists  to  advance  money 
for  a  short  railway  which  would  open  an  inland  empire  of 
forty  millions  of  people,  especially  when  they  had  already 
bound  themselves  by  contract  to  furnish  the  funds. 

The  $30,000,000  originally  advanced  had  been  spent, 
without  more  than  two  hundred  miles  of  actual  construction 
to  show  for  the  vast  sum.  This  was  due  partly  to  the  need 
of  buying  out  earlier  Chinese  companies  at  extravagant 
figures,  but  also  in  large  part  to  the  cumbersome  and  ex- 
pensive organization  of  this  international  enterprise.  Only 
by  actually  finishing  one  of  these  basically  important  lines 
and  putting  it  in  operation  could  the  money  already  ex- 
pended be  made  to  count. 


212      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

At  home  the  group  seemed  favourable  to  going  ahead  to  the 
completion  of  the  work.  Mr.  Willard  Straight  in  February 
went  to  London  to  seek  the  consent  of  the  British  and 
French  partners.  But  beyond  settling  some  minor  details 
about  alignments  no  definite  result  was  secured.  Chinese 
development  was  blocked  disastrously  through  this  failure 
to  complete  the  existing  contracts.  In  comparison  with  the 
amounts  spent  in  Europe  by  America,  the  cost  of  entirely 
carrying  out  this  enormously  important  work  would  have 
been  infinitesimal;  a  thousandth  part  of  our  war  expense 
would  have  permanently  changed  the  face  of  China. 

Indeed,  completion  of  such  an  enterprise  would  far 
transcend  mere  business.  What  the  Chinese  needed  was  the 
organization  of  their  national  Hfe.  In  every  particular  this 
depended  upon  communications — trunk  lines  north  and 
south,  east  and  west — which  would  have  largely  overcome 
obstacles  to  Chinese  progress.  The  nation's  mind,  instead  of 
being  focussed  on  building  up,  unifying,  and  organizing  the 
different  parts  of  the  country,  remained  localized  and  scat- 
tered. A  thousand  times  the  energy  needed  to  achieve  this 
unique  work  was  spent  by  us  in  Europe.  That  is  part  of 
the  cost  of  war. 

Mr.  Charles  Denby,  interested  in  automobile  manufacture, 
called  one  morning  and  asked  that  I  take  a  motor  ride  up  the 
Tartar  City  Wall — a  thing  which  had  never  before  been 
attempted.  I  yielded  to  the  idea,  and  without  further 
inquiry  joined  him,  together  with  the  commandant  of  the 
guard.  Colonel  W.  C.  Neville.  Leaving  the  rear  gate  of  the 
Legation  and  approaching  the  broad  ramp  leading  up  to  the 
wall,  I  was  surprised  to  see  gathered  there  all  the  American 
marines,  as  well  as  many  other  people,  including  motion- 
picture  men.  I  had  not  counted  on  this  publicity;  it  was, 
however,  too  late  to  have  any  regrets,  so  we  were  whisked  up 
the  steep  incline  and  took  a  ride  on  the  top  of  the  great  wall. 
This  first  automobile  ascension  of  the  monumental  structure 


AMERICAN  ENTREPRENEURS  IN  PEKING  213 

excited  a  good  deal  of  attention.  A  British  paper  tried  to 
raise  a  laugh  by  ironically  criticizing  the  British  minister 
for  not  supporting  British  industry  by  taking  air  flights,  or 
doing  other  things  which  might  serve  to  attract  attention  to 
national  products.  I  did  not  mind  what  was  said,  as  I  had 
enjoyed  the  excitement  of  the  ride. 

Mr.  Carey's  party  had  by  this  time  finished  its  survey. 
Laborious  negotiations  had  gone  on  for  an  acceptable  con- 
tract to  improve  the  ancient  Grand  Canal.  Mr.  Carey  also 
sought  a  contract  for  the  building  of  railways.  These 
matters  were  entrusted  to  Mr.  Roy  S.  Anderson,  who  carried 
on  the  detailed  negotiations.  I  had  given  Mr.  Carey  an 
introduction  to  the  various  officials  concerned,  and  had 
from  time  to  time  supported  his  efforts,  but  did  not  take  part 
in  the  details.  The  business  was  carried  on  with  Mr.  Tsao 
Ju-lin,  the  Minister  of  Communications,  while  the  canal 
matter  lay  with  Mr.  Chen  Pan-ping,  Minister  of  Agriculture 
and  Commerce,  a  younger  man,  educated  in  Japan  and  a 
member  of  the  Christian  Church.  Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi,  the 
Minister  of  Finance,  and  Mr.  Liang  Shih-yi,  wielded  a  direct- 
ing influence  in  the  negotiations.  I  was  careful  to  abstain 
from  anything  which  could  possibly  savour  of  pressure,  or  a 
desire  to  take  advantage  of  the  difficult  financial  necessities 
of  the  Government.  The  contracts  were  made  not  on  the 
basis  of  any  temporary  or  local  interest,  but  to  furnish  a 
foundation  for  long-continued  constructive  work. 

The  Chinese  Government  gave  to  the  American  concern 
the  right  to  build  fifteen  hundred  miles  of  railway,  to  be 
selected  from  five  alignments  mentioned  in  the  contract. 
Mr.  Carey  started  for  America  on  May  i8th,  to  secure 
ratification  of  the  agreements.  With  him  he  took  the  most 
favourable  concessions  which  the  Chinese  Government  had 
ever  granted  to  foreigners.  All  the  most  advantageous 
provisions  of  former  contracts  had  been  embodied;  the 
American  contractors  were  to  get  a  commission  of  10  per 


214      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

cent,  on  the  cost  of  construction  and  equipment,  and  were  to 
share,  also,  in  the  profits  of  operation.  A  broad  policy  of 
development  was  adopted,  embracing  the  encouragement  of 
industries  along  the  railways  to  be  built. 

The  Chinese  Government,  accustomed  to  financial  support 
from  nations  which  had  valuable  concessions,  hoped  that  the 
Americans  would  now  offer  such  assistance.  The  con- 
cessions were  in  no  sense  made  dependent  upon  loans,  but 
collateral  loan  negotiations  were  proceeding,  and  Mr.  Carey 
took  vsrith  him  proposals  concerning  loans  and  securities 
offered.  His  associates  made  every  effort  to  secure  a  loan  to 
China,  but  as  they  now  turned  over  their  holdings  to  the 
American  International  Corporation,  and  as  the  latter  was 
negotiating  to  take  over  the  American  group  agreements  with 
Great  Britain,  Russia,  France,  and  Japan,  the  matter  became 
hopelessly  tangled  up  with  international  affairs  and  no  action 
resulted.  The  Americans  understood  that  Japan  would  co- 
operate in  a  joint  loan  but  would  oppose  any  separate  action 
by  the  United  States.  American  finance  was  still  too  pro- 
vincial to  act  independently  in  such  a  matter.  Also  it  would 
approach  each  piece  of  business  as  a  separate  unit,  not  ready 
to  exert  itself  in  behalf  of  a  loan  in  order  to  create  a  more 
favourable  situation  for  other  transactions.  European  and 
Japanese  combinations  in  China  took  a  different  view;  they 
were  organized  to  represent  a  broad  national  interest  in 
Chinese  business.  While  the  attitude  of  individual  Amer- 
ican corporations  corresponded  to  the  individualism  of  our 
business,  yet  the  national  commercial  interest  of  America 
was  bound  to  suffer  because  an  organization  did  not  exist 
which  was  broadly  representative,  which  would  look  upon 
all  parts  of  Chinese  commerce  and  finance  in  their  interrela- 
tion, and  gather  from  every  individual  exertion  favourable 
cumulative  effects  in  other  fields  of  enterprise. 

In  yet  another  respect  American  practice  was  unsuited  to 
the  conditions  of  business  in  China.     After  negotiating  in  a 


AMERICAN  ENTREPRENEURS  IN  PEKING  215 

painstaking  manner  for  months,  the  corporation's  repre- 
sentatives had  finally  signed  a  formal  agreement  that  was 
more  advantageous  than  any  ever  granted  before.  The 
results  of  this  successful  negotiation  were  set  before  the  home 
office,  which  took  the  position  that  its  hands  were  still  com- 
pletely free.  The  provisions  of  the  contract  were  minutely 
reexamined;  on  several  points  it  was  concluded  that  still 
more  favourable  arrangements  might  be  made.  The  repre- 
sentatives were  instructed  to  reopen  the  negotiations,  making 
the  consent  of  the  home  corporation  dependent  on  the  accep- 
tance of  these  additional  terms. 

Such  a  method  could  not  be  used  in  China  more  than  once. 
The  Chinese  expect  that  when  an  agreement  is  arrived  at 
with  business  representatives  in  Peking,  it  will  be  adhered  to, 
unless  very  radical  changes  of  conditions  occur.  They  have 
been  dealing  on  this  basis  with  the  agents  of  European  cor- 
porations, whose  experience  is  considered  by  their  home 
offices  as  entitling  them  to  handle  the  details  of  the  negotia- 
tions without  reporting  minutely  to  home  officials  far  less 
informed  than  they.  To  disavow  the  activity  of  a  local 
representative  in  China,  except  under  absolute  necessity,  is 
to  discredit  the  whole  negotiation.  The  representative 
who  should  wield  great  influence  is  suddenly  reduced  to  the 
dimensions  of  a  clerk  with  whom  the  Chinese  will  not  take  up 
anything  of  importance  thereafter. 

That  the  Americans  would  not  make  a  loan  disappointed 
the  Chinese  officials.  They  were  used  to  looking  for 
financial  support  to  powerful  groups,  who  desired  or  had 
obtained  concessions.  When,  in  addition,  proposals  came 
for  many  changes  in  the  signed  contracts,  the  displeasure 
of  the  Chinese  knew  no  limits.  The  storm  broke  just  before 
the  funeral  of  Yuan  Shih-kai.  I  was  appealed  to  for  aid  in 
predisposing  the  Chinese  officials  to  look  upon  the  new  pro- 
posals with  more  favour.  The  Minister  of  Communications 
as  well  as  Mr.  Chu  Chi-chien,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior, 


2i6      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

whom  I  interviewed,  were  dejected  because  the  loan  had 
been  so  abruptly  refused.  They  had  counted  on  America 
to  take  part  in  Chinese  finance,  in  order  that  the  Chinese 
Government  might  not  be  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  the  Fiv^- 
Power  Consortium,  or  rather  of  Japan,  which  was  now  the 
only  active  member  of  that  group.  I  tried  to  explain  the 
action  of  the  Americans  on  the  basis  of  sound  business  prac- 
tice. I  pointed  out  that  in  the  United  States,  capital, 
industry,  and  commerce  are  not  mobilized  for  foreign  enter- 
prise as  is  the  case  with  the  big  foreign  banking  institutions 
of  Europe.  I  tried  to  encourage  them  to  set  American  firms 
to  doing  constructive  work  in  China,  and  assured  them  that 
out  of  such  relationships  there  would  naturally  grow  a  readi- 
ness to  afford  financial  support. 

They  did  not  dispute  my  point,  but,  in  the  words  of 
Cleveland,  they  felt  themselves  confronted  by  a  condition, 
not  a  theory. 


CHAPTER  XIX 
GUARDING  THE  "OPEN  DOOR" 

Negotiations  had  been  proceeding  all  through  the 
autumn  of  1916,  between  the  Corporation  and  the  Chinese 
Government,  concerning  the  modifications  which  the  former 
desired  to  introduce  into  the  Grand  Canal  contract  signed  in 
May.  The  negotiations  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  were 
in  the  hands  of  the  Minister  of  Agriculture,  and  of  Mr.  Pan 
Fu,  a  young  Shantung  capitalist  and  official  of  progressive 
ideas.  As  the  Minister  of  Agriculture  was  not  well  disposed, 
it  was  found  difficult  to  get  him  to  agree  to  the  additional 
advantages  which  the  Corporation  desired  to  secure  before 
finally  ratifying  the  contract.  Shortly  before  Christmas, 
however,  a  basis  of  agreement  had  been  reached.  Just 
at  this  time  there  came  from  America  the  astonishing 
news  that  the  American  corporation  had  invited  Japanese 
capitalists  to  cooperate  in  this  contract,  on  condition  that 
such  cooperation  would  be  acceptable  to  the  Chinese 
Government. 

The  representatives  of  the  American  corporation  in  Peking 
had  no  thought  nor  inkHng  whatsoever  of  this  change  in 
policy.  The  step  had  been  taken  without  warning  and 
without  consulting  either  the  American  Government  or  the 
representatives  of  the  company  in  China.  It  may  be 
imagined  in  what  position  it  left  the  latter,  to  whom  the 
Chinese  had  entrusted  these  important  rights  solely  because 
of  the  confidence  they  had  in  Americans,  both  as  to  their 
ability  to  carry  through  an  enterprise  of  this  kind,  and  as  to 
their  complete  freedom  from  all  political  after-thought. 
Unmindful  of  the  fiduciary  relationship  which  their  repre- 

217 


2i8      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

sentatives  had  established  in  China,  the  American  corpo- 
ration, without  first  sounding  the  Chinese  and  without  giving 
any  intimation  to  the  American  Government — through 
whose  approval  and  support  they  had  been  able  to  gain  these 
rights — turned  around  and  made  an  agreement  to  bring  the 
subjects  of  another  nation  into  the  contract.  It  is  to  be 
doubted  if  the  nationals  of  any  other  country  would  have 
acted  in  this  manner. 

If  the  action  had  been  taken  out  of  deference  to  rights 
which  the  Japanese  might  claim  in  the  future  as  a  part  of  a 
sphere  of  influence  to  be  asserted  in  Shantung,  then  indeed 
it  was  one  of  superlative  international  courtesy.  New  York 
bankers,  however,  were  at  this  time  still  notoriously  the 
most  timid  beings  known  to  experience,  when  it  came  to 
matters  of  foreign  investment.  To  make  up  for  this  they 
did,  when  they  once  got  started,  throw  away  American 
money  in  amazing  quantities  on  reckless  foreign  enterprises 
in  Europe  and  South  America. 

What  made  this  action  so  inexcusable  was  not  that  Japa- 
nese cooperation  had  been  invited  or  accepted,  but  that  the 
one  enterprise  selected  for  such  cooperation  was  the  one  in 
which  America,  through  the  National  Red  Cross,  had  long 
been  interested  and  which  had  been  committed  to  Americans 
as  a  special  mark  of  confidence.  One  might  have  thought 
that  goodwill  to  the  Japanese  might  have  been  amply  dem- 
onstrated had  our  people  declared  their  complete  readi- 
ness to  cooperate  on  any  one  of  the  numerous  unfinished 
enterprises  which  the  Japanese  controlled  in  Manchuria  and 
elsewhere. 

It  was  no  easy  task  for  the  representatives  of  the  American 
corporation  to  tell  the  Chinese  what  had  been  done  in 
New  York.  The  proviso  that  the  arrangement  was  con- 
ditional upon  its  being  acceptable  to  the  Chinese  was  of 
course  pathetically  ineffectual,  because  after  the  arrangement 
made  in  New  York  the  Chinese  could  certainly  not  refuse 


GUARDING  THE  "OPEN  DOOR"  219 

to  accept  any  outside  partners  without  giving  very  serious 
offence  to  them.  I  told  the  Chinese  that  we  wished  them  to 
act  with  perfect  freedom  and  consult  their  own  best  interests 
in  dealing  with  the  American  corporation.  But  the  Premier 
met  all  my  explanations  with:  "What  can  we  do.''  The 
corporation  has  tied  our  hands.'* 

The  Chinese  had  shown  special  favour  and  bestowed  their 
contracts  upon  the  American  nation;  by  their  own  act  Ameri- 
cans had  changed  this  disposal  in  such  a  way  as  to  let  in  a 
third  party.  Personally,  I  had  not  the  least  objection  to 
the  Japanese  or  any  other  nation;  although  it  seemed  that  in 
China  cooperation  with  the  Chinese  would  be  the  normal 
method.  Yet  my  experience  with  the  Hukuang  railways 
had  made  me  very  doubtful  of  the  practical  advantages  of 
international  cooperation  in  industry.  It  is  a  cumbersome, 
expensive  way  of  doing  business,  full  of  delay  and  circum- 
locution. I  felt  that  the  different  nations  should  mutually 
facilitate  each  other's  enterprises  and  cooperate  in  con- 
structive planning  from  which  all  might  derive  advantage; 
but  I  felt  strongly  that  individual  enterprises  should  be 
managed  by  a  particular  group  or  corporation  without 
comphcated  international  machinery. 

The  railway  concessions  made  to  the  Siems-Carey  Com- 
pany, which  were  to  be  financed  by  the  American  Inter- 
national Corporation,  were  also  making  trouble.  Protests 
were  made  by  the  Russian  Legation  with  regard  to  the 
alignment  from  Tatungfu  toward  Lanchow;  these  rested 
upon  an  old  assurance  given  by  the  Chinese  to  Russia  that 
any  line  northward  or  eastward  from  Peking  and  Kalgan 
should  first  invite  Russian  capital.  But  the  protests  had  a 
weak  leg  to  stand  on,  for  the  proposed  line  led  southwestward 
from  Kalgan,  away  from  Russia's  dominions.  They  had 
the  less  force  in  that  the  European  Powers  could  not  at  this 
time  furnish  money  for  the  construction  of  the  much-needed 
railways  which  had  been  committed  to  their  care;  the  more 


220     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

need,  therefore,  that  America,  which  had  means,  should 
build  other  necessary  railways  to  provide  China  with  inter- 
provincial  transit. 

But  that  was  the  method  of  diplomacy — to  hunt  about 
for  some  ground  of  protest  to  the  Chinese  Government,  in 
order  to  obtain  from  it  a  few  counterbalancing  advantages. 
The  American  policy  of  equal  opportunity  had  the  verbal 
agreement  of  the  other  important  powers,  but  we  had  to  be 
vigilant  if  Americans  were  to  be  protected  in  their  right  to 
do  business  in  various  parts  of  China  on  the  basis  of  this 
policy.  Everywhere  we  met  attempts  to  solidify  the  in- 
choate desires  and  lusts  to  secure  exclusive  rights,  until  the 
"spheres  of  influence**  should  be  firmly  outlined. 

I  always  took  the  position  with  the  Russian  minister  that 
the  American  concession  in  this  case  did  not  conflict  with  any 
promise  given  to  Russia.  He  spoke  to  me  about  the  wish  of 
Russia  to  use  Mongolia  as  a  protective  barrier.  If  Mongolia 
were  to  be  developed  through  railways  and  colonization,  he 
felt  that  friction  between  Russia  and  China  might  come 
about  through  this  mutual  approach  of  large  populations. 
To  keep  so  vast  a  territory  barren  and  unproductive  just  to 
serve  as  frontier  marches  seemed  to  me  unjustifiable.  But  I 
did  not  dispute  the  policy,  rather  insisting  that  a  railway  that 
connected  one  of  the  eighteen  provinces  of  China  with 
another  could  have  but  remote  bearing  on  the  fears  expressed 
by  my  Russian  colleague.  I  told  him  the  survey  would  go 
on,  but  whether  the  road  would  be  built  would  depend  upon 
the  judgment  of  the  engineers  as  to  whether  it  would 
be  commercially  profitable.  The  conversations  were  very 
leisurely.  He  did  not  say  so,  but  I  could  see  that  the 
minister  fully  expected  the  Americans  to  go  ahead,  while  he 
would  use  his  protests  as  a  means  of  getting  some  "compen- 
sation" out  of  the  Chinese. 

I  was  therefore  not  a  little  surprised  when  on  one  of  my 
visits  to  him  the  Russian  minister  met  me  with  a  quizzical 


GUARDING  THE  "OPEN  DOOR"  221 

smile,  and  handed  me  a  telegram  which  he  had  just  received 
from  Washington.  The  dispatch  was  from  the  Russian 
ambassador,  and  read  in  substance  as  follows: 

A  representative  of  the  American  International  Corporation  has  just 
called  on  me.  He  stated  that  the  corporation  regretted  beyond  measure 
that  the  impression  had  been  given  that  it  might  contemplate  undertakings 
in  China  which  would  be  unwelcome  to  the  Russian  Government,  and  to 
which  the  latter  would  object.  He  stated  that  it  was  far  from  the  inten- 
tion of  the  corporation  to  do  anything  in  China  that  would  thus  be  objec- 
tionable to  the  Russian  Government. 

Never  was  the  ground  cut  from  under  any  one  exerting 
himself  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  others  as  was  done  in 
this  case.  There  was  nothing  to  do  but  to  say:  "They  are 
very  courteous,  and  wish  to  save  your  susceptibility.  They 
would  probably  not  ask  for  any  branches  in  the  direction  of 
Urga,  and  confine  themselves  just  to  building  the  main  line 
to  Kansu."  The  Russian  minister  did  not  take  an  undue 
advantage  of  me. 

The  next  protest  came  from  the  French  Legation.  They 
had  dug  up  a  note  sent  them  on  September  26,  1914,  by 
the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  that  time.  This  note, 
conveying  an  entirely  unnecessary  gift  by  that  good-natured 
minister,  had  been  kept  secret;  it  acknowledged  the  hand- 
some manner  assumed  by  the  French  minister  during  the 
negotiations  about  a  small  frontier  incident.  Just  to  show 
absence  of  ill  feeling,  the  Foreign  Minister  assured  the 
French  minister  that  in  case  in  future  any  mining  or  railway 
enterprises  were  to  be  undertaken  in  the  Province  of  Kwangsi, 
French  capital  would  be  consulted  first.  It  was  a  grim  joke 
that  an  official  should  thus  light-heartedly  and  without  quid 
pro  quo  sign  away  important  rights  in  contravention  to  all 
the  announced  policies  of  his  and  other  governments,  in- 
cluding that  to  which  the  grant  was  made.  The  French 
protest  related  to  the  southern  part  of  the  line  from  Chuchow 
in  Honan,  to  Chinchow,  on  the  coast  of  Kwangsi. 


222      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

I  took  the  stand  that  the  note  which  had  turned  up  was 
contrary  to  the  expressed  poHcy  of  the  various  governments 
concerned,  and  could  have  no  bearing  on  the  relations  of 
American  citizens  with  China;  moreover,  it  had  been  secret, 
and  neither  the  public  nor  any  other  government  knew, 
about  it.  As  the  French  minister  whom  the  Chinese  had 
asked  the  French  Government  to  withdraw  because  of  his 
domineering  attitude  was  not  at  this  time  complacent  in 
this  or  any  other  matter,  I  suggested  that  the  Department  of 
State  take  up  this  question  directly  with  the  French 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  I  expressed  the  hope  that  the 
French,  our  military  and  diplomatic  associates,  would  wish 
particularly  to  adhere  "to  the  letter  and  the  spirit  of  the 
declarations  of  equal  commercial  opportunities." 

The  Continental  Commercial  Bank  Loan  had  been 
announced  in  November,  1916.  I  was  happy  that  this 
result  had  been  achieved.  An  advance  of  only  $5,000,000 
was  made,  but  even  that  small  sum  was  an  important  aid 
to  the  Chinese  Government.  The  fact  that  a  big  Western 
financial  institution  had  taken  up  relations  with  China  was 
promising.  What  foreign  banking  there  was  in  New  York 
was  tangled  up  with  European  interests,  followed  the  lead 
of  London,  and  had  not  manifested  much  readiness  to  exert 
itself  for  the  development  of  American  interests  abroad. 

The  French  protested  this  loan  because  it  carried  the 
security  of  the  tobacco  and  wine  tax  which  had  been  assigned 
to  some  previous  French  loans.  I  saw  Doctor  Chen,  and 
Count  Martel  called  on  me.  I  took  the  position  that  as  the 
French  loan — which  was  small  in  amount  and  would  require 
only  a  very  minor  portion  of  the  proceeds  of  the  tax — re- 
mained entitled  to  be  the  first  lien,  the  French  interests  were 
in  no  way  prejudiced.  I  imagine,  what  they  really  objected 
to  was  the  eventual  appointment  of  an  American  auditor 
or  co-inspector  for  this  revenue.  As  this,  however,  would  go 
to  strengthen  the  security  for  their  loan,  I  do  not  see  that 


GUARDING  THE  "OPEN  DOOR"  223 

they  had  any  reason  for  complaint.  The  representative  of 
the  French  bank  which  was  interested  saw  me  and  made  a 
tentative  suggestion  that  if  adviserships  were  established 
the  French  might  take  the  wine  tax,  and  the  Americans  the 
tobacco  tax.  I  felt,  however,  that  the  hands  of  the  Chinese 
were  perfectly  free  when  the  loan  was  made;  there  could  be 
no  objection,  except  on  the  supposition  that  wherever  the 
Chinese  do  business,  no  matter  how  small,  with  respect  to 
any  subject  matter,  they  impliedly  give  a  lien  on  all  future 
dealings.  To  the  general  suggestion  of  American-French 
cooperation  in  matters  for  which  both  parties  could  find 
capital,  I  was  by  no  means  averse. 

In  this  same  month  the  affairs  relating  to  the  Standard  Oil 
Company's  exploration  were  finally  wound  up.  The  geo- 
logical experts  they  sent  over  had  not  "struck"  oil  enough  to 
pay.  Drilling  expeditions  had  come  over,  which  by  the 
spring  of  191 5  had  found  traces  of  oil,  and  the  Chinese  were 
considering  giving  them  further  areas  for  investigation.  But 
as  they  wished  to  modify  their  contract  relating  to  production 
and  refining  activities,  Mr.  E.  W.  Bemis,  vice-president  of 
the  company,  came  on  and  negotiated  for  a  whole  summer 
with  the  officials.  He  left  without  concluding  an  agreement. 
Not  only  had  he  received  the  support  of  the  Legation  at 
Peking  and  of  the  American  Government,  but  the  Chinese 
were  anxious  to  extend  the  privileges  of  exploration;  his 
decision  to  abandon  the  negotiations  must  therefore  have 
been  based  on  a  total  change  of  policy.  The  company 
had  apparently  decided  not  to  develop  production  in  China, 
but  to  continue  merely  its  marketing  business.  It  was 
to  be  expected  that  competitors  would  be  discouraged  from 
undertaking  similar  explorations.  Mr.  Hsiung  Hsi-ling, 
ex-Premier  and  chief  of  the  National  Oil  Administration, 
called  on  me  at  this  time  and  gave  me  an  account  of  his 
final  negotiations  with  the  company.  He  had  offered  to 
establish  a  joint  Chinese  and  American  enterprise  if  more 


224     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

extensive  search  should  reveal  oil  deposits  of  great  value. 

The  mineral  situation  in  China  was  being  surveyed  during 
this  time  by  representatives  of  the  New  York  Orient  Mines 
Company,  Mr.  John  W.  Finch,  Dr.  F.  Bain,  and  Mr. 
Joseph  E.  Johnson,  Jr.  The  attitude  of  these  men,  whose 
training  as  observers  and  clean-cut  scientific  methods  gave 
their  conclusions  a  particular  cogency  and  definiteness, 
interested  me.  They  had  found  that  the  iron  deposits  of 
China  were  not  so  extensive  as  is  usually  supposed.  They 
believed,  also,  that  the  market  for  iron  products  could  only 
gradually  be  developed  with  the  growth  of  the  general 
industry.  They  had  analyzed  the  organization  of  the 
Hanyehping  Iron  Works,  and  learned  that  its  lack  of  success 
was  due  to  faulty  planning,  which  necessitated  the  bringing 
of  both  the  coal  and  iron  ore  from  a  distance  to  the  central 
point  of  manufacture.  They  believed  that  for  the  time 
there  was  room  for  only  one  first-class  iron  and  steel  enter- 
prise in  China.  As  smaller  enterprises  would  hardly  pay, 
they  favoured  a  national  industrial  plant,  to  be  equipped  on 
a  scale  to  assure  every  advantage  of  short  transport  and 
economic  production.  The  Premier  gave  them  permission 
to  investigate  China's  ore  deposits,  with  a  view  to  suggesting 
a  basis  upon  which  a  national  industry  could  be  founded  with 
temporary  American  financial  assistance. 

The  Chinese  Government  had  fully  decided  to  adhere  to 
its  policy  of  nationalizing  the  iron  deposits,  and  the  decree 
already  issued  by  Yuan  Shih-kai  was  to  be  reenacted  by 
parliament.  The  Chinese  were  eager  to  establish  a  national 
steel  industry.  It  should  help  supply  the  national  needs  for 
iron  products,  with  the  aid,  if  necessary,  of  foreign  capital. 
They  would  not  take  the  sole  assistance  of  the  Japanese, 
because  they  knew  that  in  that  case  the  Chinese  industry 
would  be  confined  to  the  production  of  pig-iron  and  would 
become  the  slave  of  the  steel  industry  of  Japan.  China 
would  furnish  raw  materials;  Japan,  the  finished  products. 


GUARDING  THE  "OPEN  DOOR"  225 

Another  secret  agreement,  this  time  with  Japan,  came  to 
light.  A  loan  of  3,ckx),ooo  yen  had  been  concluded  with 
Japanese  banks  in  the  latter  part  of  1916,  and  the  secret 
agreement  attached  thereto  gave  Japanese  interests  the  right 
to  meet  the  lowest  price  of  any  competitor  in  bidding  on  any 
materials  for  the  Chinese  telephone  and  telegraph  service. 
Of  course,  this  would  have  destroyed  the  equal  opportunity 
for  other  nationals  in  this  business.  The  contract  had  been 
signed  by  a  notoriously  corrupt  official,  who  was  completely 
under  Japanese  influence  and  had  since  fled  to  escape  prose- 
cution for  corruption. 

I  protested  strongly.  I  told  the  Minister  of  Communica- 
tions that  the  provision  was  monopolistic,  therefore  in  con- 
flict with  the  treaties.  His  answer  disavowed  the  existence 
of  the  provision.  But  I  knew  it  did  exist  among  the  original 
agreements;  nevertheless,  the  awards  actually  made  at  this 
time,  after  my  protest,  were  in  accordance  with  the  bids  sub- 
mitted, and  with  the  recommendations  of  the  experts. 

In  a  talk  I  had  with  the  Premier  during  the  spring  of  1917 
I  advised  him  to  take  up  quickly  the  offer  of  the  American 
International  Corporation  to  float  the  first  bond  issue  of 
$6,000,000  on  the  railway  to  be  constructed  by  the  Siems- 
Carey  Company.  The  Ministry  of  Communications  was 
obstructing  it,  acting  under  Japanese  influences.  I  told 
the  Premier  that  Mr.  Carey's  authority  to  conclude  the  loan 
might  be  revoked  at  any  time,  whereupon  he  promised  to 
instruct  the  acting  Vice-Minister  of  Communications  to  com- 
plete the  transaction  forthwith. 

The  Ministry  of  Communications  was  then  in  charge  of 
one  Chuan  Liang,  who  had,  in  fact,  long  been  considered  as 
representing  the  Japanese  element.  He  had  married  a  Japa- 
nese woman.  Chuan  refused  obstinately,  first,  to  take  up 
the  negotiations,  then,  to  advance  them  when  they  were 
begun.  The  rate  of  interest  and  terms  of  issue  oflFered  were 
fair,  considering  existing  market  values;  but  the  American 


226      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

company  agreed  to  make  a  concession  and  raise  the  issue 
price. 

Chuan  continued  to  be  stubborn.  I  spoke  to  the  Premier, 
General  Tuan,  about  it;  President  Li  himself  gave  his  sup- 
port, and  the  orders  to  make  the  loan  were  thus  reenforced. 
Still  delay.  After  General  Tuan's  retirement,  Dr.  Wu  Ting- 
fang  as  acting  Premier  again  issued  orders,  which  were  re- 
peated for  the  third  time  by  General  Chiang  when  he,  in 
turn,  displaced  Doctor  Wu.  All  these  high  officials  concurred. 
Yet,  in  an  astounding  manner,  the  acting  vice-minister, 
together  with  a  ring  of  petty  officials  in  his  ministry  and  in 
the  cabinet  office,  blocked  the  carrying  out  of  the  orders 
issued  by  the  President,  the  Premier,  and  the  whole  cabinet. 

But  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang  was  anxious  to  see  the  contract 
carried  out.  He  suggested  that  I  write  a  note  demanding 
its  execution,  which  I  did  on  June  6th.  Wu  intended  to  have 
the  successive  orders  published  in  the  Government  Gazette, 
and,  thus  published,  to  be  communicated  to  me  officially  by 
the  Foreign  Office  in  response  to  my  note.  But  the  petty 
ring  delayed  the  publication.  Meanwhile,  the  answer  of  the 
acting  vice-minister  was  prepared  and  inserted  in  the  Gov- 
ernment  Gazette  on  the  27th,  before  the  Foreign  Office  could 
communicate  it  to  me.  It  presented  unfairly  the  proposals 
of  the  American  company,  its  language  was  almost  insulting. 

During  all  this  time  the  high  Chinese  officials,  who  were 
my  friends,  were  at  a  loss  to  explain  to  me  how  this  subordi- 
nate's defiance  of  their  orders  could  be  successful.  They  inti- 
mated that  the  obstruction  must  be  due  to  Japanese  influence 
exercised  in  opposition  to  American  enterprise  in  China. 
We  noted  that  immediately  upon  publication  of  the  vice- 
minister's  answer  and  before  we  knew  about  it  ourselves,  a 
secretary  of  the  Japanese  Legation  quite  officiously  expressed 
to  one  of  the  American  secretaries  his  surprise  at  such  a 
publication. 

But  by  this  act  the  vice-minister  had  overstepped  the 


GUARDING  THE  "OPEN  DOOR"  227 

mark.  The  leaders  of  the  Communications  party,  who  were 
holding  aloof  from  politics  with  General  Tuan,  strongly  con- 
demned Chuan,  who  had  always  been  dependent  on  them. 
He  showed  a  remarkable  change.  He  even  sent  emissaries 
to  me,  pleading  for  forgiveness  and  stating  that  he  was  in  no 
way  animated  by  hostility  to  American  interests,  but  had 
acted  on  an  honest  though  mistaken  view  of  the  transaction. 

CaUing  on  me  on  July  2nd,  he  repeated  his  apology.  On 
the  30th  of  June  the  Ministry  of  Communications  had  for- 
mally accepted  the  offer  of  funds  by  the  American  company. 
Thereafter  negotiations  were  again  interrupted  by  political 
changes  and  disturbances. 

This  incident  will  serve  to  illustrate  the  complexity  of 
Chinese  affairs,  and  the  condition  of  disorganization  in  which 
the  Chinese  Government  was  at  this  time. 

The  creation  of  a  Chino-American  Industrial  Bank  was 
the  subject  of  many  discussions  I  had  with  Chinese  officials 
and  financiers.  This  occupied  a  good  deal  of  my  attention 
during  191 8,  while  Mr.  Hsu  Un-yuen,  after  his  retirement 
from  the  presidency  of  the  Bank  of  China,  was  devoting  his 
time  to  working  out  a  plan  and  securing  the  support  of 
prominent  Chinese  for  this  undertaking.  Mr.  Hsu  Sing-loh 
was  also  working  on  it  independently;  Mr.  Hsu  was  secretary 
of  the  Minister  of  Finance,  educated  in  England,  and  excep- 
tionally well  informed.  In  December  of  191 8  I  accompanied 
Mr.  Hsu  to  the  house  of  Mr.  Yang,  a  capitalist  interested  in 
the  China  Merchants  Steamship  Company,  where  we  met 
with  the  Premier, Mr.  Chien  Neng-hsun,and  Mr.Chou  Hsueh- 
hsi,  who  had  recently  been  Minister  of  Finance.  Here  we 
talked  over  matters  of  banking  and  finance,  with  Mr.  Chou 
leading  the  conversation.  He  was  sure  the  Government 
would  give  a  favourable  charter  that  would  enlist  the  neces- 
sary capital.  Chinese  ideas  about  an  industrial  bank  were 
vague;  in  some  mysterious  way  it  was  thought  that  it  could 
produce  capital  for  developing  industries,  or,  rather,  could 


228      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

manifold  its  capital  for  such  uses.  Three  industries  were 
ready — cotton,  steel,  and  scientific  agriculture — for  an  ex- 
tensive development.  He  did  not  know  how  bad  it  is  for  a 
bank  to  lock  up  its  capital  in  long-time  commitments.  I 
asked  those  present  as  to  how  ready  the  Chinese  public 
would  be  to  absorb  the  long-term  bonds.  Mr.  Chou  thought 
they  would  take  them,  if  strongly  backed,  at  a  relatively  low 
interest.  All  desired  to  go  ahead.  Ultimately  the  bank  was 
founded,  but  by  another  group. 

Before  parting  on  that  day  our  wealthy  host  brought  forth 
from  the  strong-boxes  many  great  treasures  of  Chinese  art, 
including  paintings  of  the  Sung  and  Ming  periods.  China 
boasts  only  one  museum.  Only  through  seeing  such  private 
collections  can  one  form  an  estimate  of  the  richness  and  ex- 
tent of  Chinese  art  treasures.  For  an  hour  I  looked  on  de- 
lightedly while  one  after  another  of  these  precious  works 
of  Chinese  painting  were  unrolled  before  us.  Chinese  pic- 
tures are  very  modest.  They  come  out  when  called,  but  retire 
again  readily  to  the  quiet  of  the  storeroom.  Also,  darkness 
has  not  the  dulling  effect  on  the  water-colours  used  by  Chinese 
painters  that  it  exercises  upon  pictures  done  in  oils. 

Incidentally,  Minister  Chow  and  other  prominent  officials 
had  been  interested  in  a  savings  bank  combined  with  a  lot- 
tery, which  announced  the  sale  of  so-called  premium  bonds. 
There  were  to  be  quarterly  drawings,  at  which  a  certain  num- 
ber of  the  bonds  would  receive  prizes,  ranging  as  high  as 
$ioo,<X)0.  Mr.  Chow  explained  to  me  that  it  would  be  futile 
for  a  Chinese  savings  bank  to  offer  a  matter  of  5  or  6  per 
cent,  interest  for  funds.  Nobody  would  heed  it,  because 
of  the  profitableness  of  commercial  enterprise.  In  order  to 
strike  public  attention  and  to  cause  people  to  bring  their 
money  for  deposit,  the  inducement  of  winning  a  large  amount 
must  be  provided.  The  assurance  that  the  original  deposit 
itself  would  not  be  lost,  but  would  ultimately  be  repaid,  would 
be  the  second  attraction. 


GUARDING  THE  "OPEN  DOOR"  229 

The  minister  said  that  it  was  the  plan  of  the  bank  to  reduce 
the  amount  of  prizes  and  to  increase  their  number  so  that 
gradually  the  payment  of  a  reasonable  interest  would  be 
approached,  as  the  people  got  accustomed  to  the  idea  of  plac- 
ing their  funds  in  such  an  institution.  The  fact  that  this 
country,  whose  people  are  so  frugal  and  parsimonious  and 
where  there  is  so  much  accumulated  capital,  should  hither- 
to have  been  without  savings  banks  appears  remarkable  to  a 
stranger.  But  the  high  return  on  commercial  loans,  and  the 
ever-present  gambling  instinct  of  the  Chinese,  account  to 
some  extent  for  this  absence. 


CHAPTER  XX 
A  DIARY  OF  QUIET  DAYS,  AUTUMN  OF  1916 

September  j:  Judge  Elbert  H.  Gary  has  just  been  in  Pe- 
king for  ten  days  with  Mrs.  Gary  and  a  small  party.  I 
took  them  to  call  on  President  Li  who  is  now  living  in  a  pri- 
vate residence  with  extensive  rockeries  and  gardens,  in  the 
East  City.  We  threaded  our  way  to  a  central  paviUon  where 
the  President  received  us.  He  talked  amiably  about  his 
desire  to  see  the  great  resources  of  China  developed  with 
American  cooperation.  In  the  evening  I  gave  a  dinner  to 
Judge  Gary  and  the  new  Ministers  of  Finance  and  Com- 
munications. Charles  A.  Coolidge,  the  Boston  architect, 
was  also  present.  On  the  following  day  I  arranged  for  the 
American  guests  to  see  the  Winter  Palace;  Mr.  Coolidge 
afterward  said  to  me  that  the  trip  through  the  palace 
grounds  had  been  the  most  interesting  experience  of  his  life 
from  the  point  of  view  of  architectural  beauty.  Someone 
with  Judge  Gary  told  me  that  every  lunch,  afternoon  re- 
ception, and  dinner  engagement,  for  the  entire  stay  in  Japan, 
was  already  arranged  for,  together  with  many  engagements 
for  breakfast;  adding:  "The  Japanese  certainly  know  a 
great  man  when  they  see  him,  more  than  the  Chinese." 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Chinese  are  so  unartificial  that  they 
do  not  think  of  organizing  their  hospitality  to  any  distin- 
guished guest.  What  they  do  is  quite  spontaneous;  they  are 
truly  hospitable,  but  they  do  not  understand  the  first  ele- 
ments of  the  art  of  advertising. 

September  g:  I  took  a  trip  to  Dajessu  with  the  Austrian 
minister.  This  temple  lies  about  twelve  miles  beyond  the 
summer  palace.    We  walked  part  of  the  way;  a  Chinese  fell 

330 


QUIET  DAYS,  AUTUMN  OF  1916  231 

in  with  us,  and,  as  is  customary,  opened  conversation.  With- 
out seeming  unduly  inquisitive  he  eHcited  information  about 
the  size  of  our  famiUes,  our  age,  income,  and  the  cost  of  our 
clothing,  the  material  of  which  he  greatly  admired.  When 
the  Austrian  minister  told  him  that  he  had  about  four  hun- 
dred men  under  him,  our  companion  looked  rather  dubious, 
and  finally  asked:  *'Why,  then,  if  you  have  so  many  atten- 
dants, are  you  walking?"  The  explanation  that  we  pre- 
ferred to  walk  did  not  seem  to  remove  his  doubts.  He  told 
us  in  turn  all  the  details  of  his  family  and  business  affairs. 

We  spent  the  week-end  at  the  beautiful  temple,  from  which 
we  took  walks  to  the  surrounding  mountainside.  A  deserted 
temple  on  a  high  hill  overlooking  the  valley  is  picturesque 
as  any  castle  on  the  Rhine.  W^e  ascended  to  the  summer 
residence  of  Mr.  Hsu  Un-yuen,  a  temple  perched  on  a  precipi- 
tous spur  of  the  main  mountain  range.  The  temple  had 
evidently  been  erected  originally  for  a  semi-residential  pur- 
pose, though  it  was  in  a  quite  inaccessible  place,  where  neither 
worshippers  nor  vacationists  would  ordinarily  have  sought 
it  out.  We  found  Mr.  Hsu  and  his  wife  enjoying  the  magnifi- 
cent view  from  a  terrace  opening  out  from  the  living  apart- 
ments. 

September  13:  I  gave  a  dinner  to  Mr.  C.  T.  Wang,  the 
vice-president  of  the  senate,  and  a  few  representative  mem- 
bers of  parliament.  We  engaged  in  a  general  after-dinner 
discussion  of  politics.  Most  of  the  men  present  were  Pro- 
gressives. They  argued  volubly.  The  arguments  and  illus- 
trations were  such  as  one  would  hear  in  a  Western  country. 
I  missed,  as  usual,  a  thorough  discussion  of  underlying  facts, 
traditions,  and  practices  of  Chinese  life,  out  of  which  institu- 
tions should  develop.  I  mentioned  this;  Mr.  Wang  said  that 
they  needed  a  guiding  principle  of  organization,  which  they 
must  get  from  the  experience  of  constitutional  countries. 
The  question  uppermost  was  the  proposed  election  of  pro- 
vincial governors  by  the  people  of  the  respective  provinces. 


232      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

instead  of  their  appointment  by  the  Central  Government. 
Most  of  those  present  considered  this  change  necessary,  as 
through  union  and  mutual  support  the  appointive  miHtary 
governors  could  exercise  great  power  and  defeat  the  aims  of 
Parliament. 

September  14:  Failing  to  get  financial  assistance  from 
America,  the  Chinese  have  been  considering  Japanese  offers 
of  loans.  Dr.  Chen  Chin-tao,  forced  by  the  situation  and 
the  importunities  of  the  ministers,  who  need  money,  has 
signed  a  preliminary  agreement  for  a  loan  of  eighty  million 
yen,  on  which  an  advance  of  five  million  yen  is  to  be  paid 
over  immediately. 

September  18:  The  House  of  Representatives  to-day  in 
secret  session  discussed  the  Japanese  loan.  I  am  informed 
that  it  was  strongly  attacked  on  the  ground  that  certain 
mines  in  Hunan  Province  had  been  pledged  to  secure  the 
advance.  The  Minister  of  Finance  was  not  present,  the 
vice-minister  appearing  to  answer  questions.  The  minister 
was  violently  condemned  for  signing  the  preliminary  agree- 
ment without  the  consent  of  parliament.  The  argument  was 
made  that  it  related  to  an  advance,  but  not  to  the  main  loan 
itself.     That  argument  was  not  considered  valid. 

September  ig:  Negotiations  were  concluded  with  the 
Minister  of  Communications  for  a  satisfactory  adjustment  of 
the  American  railway  contract.  Most  of  the  proposals  made 
were  accepted,  so  that  the  American  corporation  ought  cer- 
tainly to  be  thoroughly  well  satisfied,  considering  all  the 
changes  and  difficulties  that  have  occurred  since  the  original 
contract  was  made.  That  of  the  17th  May  was  allowed  to 
stand,  the  changes  being  introduced  by  way  of  annexes. 
After  the  Chinese  have  thus  gone  to  the  limit  of  making  the 
undertaking  attractive  to  Americans,  it  is  to  be  hoped  that 
there  will  be  no  further  delay;  that,  at  least,  some  important 
constructive  work  will  be  done  by  Americans. 

September  21.    We  welcomed  a  little  son  to-day  in  the 


QUIET  DAYS,  AUTUMN  OF  1916  233 

family.  I  do  not  know  that  any  children  were  born  to  any 
American  minister  in  Peking  before  our  little  daughter 
Pauline  came,  in  February,  1915.  The  two  little  ones  were 
born  into  a  strange  world  in  which  parents  may  well  fear 
for  the  health  of  their  children,  because  of  frequent  epidemics. 
Still,  aside  from  such  visitations,  the  Peking  climate  seems 
to  be  most  favourable  to  children;  they  thrive  and  grow 
apace.  Claire,  the  eldest  daughter,  aside  from  a  terrible 
attack  of  appendicitis  in  which  Dr.  M.  A.  Stewart,  of  the 
Navy,  saved  her  life,  has  been  the  very  spirit  of  health. 
The  faithful  Chinese  servants  surround  the  children  with 
every  care. 

October  5;  I  gave  a  men's  dinner,  attended  by  the  minis- 
ters of  Portugal,  Russia,  and  Japan,  and  by  Mr.  Obata,  the 
Japanese  counsellor;  Count  Martel,  the  French  first  secre- 
tary; Mr.  Aglen,  Inspector-General  of  Customs;  Mr.  Alston, 
the  British  counsellor;  Mr.  Herrera  de  Huerta,  formerly 
Mexican  Charge;  Mr.  Mitrophanow,  of  the  Russian  Lega- 
tion; Doctor  Willoughby,  Doctor  McElroy  of  Princeton,  and 
other  guests.  It  was  really  a  dinner  of  welcome  to  the  new 
Japanese  minister,  Baron  Hayashi,  who  has  recently  arrived 
to  take  the  place  of  Mr.  Hioki.  It  was  probably  thought 
better  to  displace  the  minister  upon  whom  had  fallen  the 
disagreeable  duty  of  forcing  through  the  Twenty-one  De- 
mands of  191 5.  Baron  Hayashi,  who  had  been  ambassador 
in  Italy,  brings  a  long  diplomatic  experience  and  very  care- 
ful methods.  He  is  very  silent,  speaks  little  except  when 
few  or  only  one  other  person  are  present.  In  a  larger  com- 
pany or  at  a  meeting,  he  gives  the  impression  of  detachment 
and  deep  reflection.  In  social  intercourse  he  is  more  retiring 
than  his  predecessor.  He  impresses  me  as  a  thoughtful,  fair- 
minded  man. 

October  4:  I  am  told  that  a  guest  at  last  night's  dinner,  a 
visitor  from  a  distant  country,  complained  because  he  had 
not  been  ranked  with  the  ministers.     As  I  had  no  informa- 


234     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

tion,  nor  have  it  now,  that  he  was  entitled  to  such  ranking, 
I  shall  not  worry.  This  is  the  first  instance  of  any  dissatis- 
faction with  the  seating.  My  predecessor  related  to  me  that 
a  secretary  of  the  British  Legation  once  took  his  sudden  de- 
parture before  dinner  for  this  reason.  I  have  not  always 
closely  adhered  to  rank  in  seating,  particularly  at  dinners 
where  there  are  Chinese,  in  order  to  avoid  a  grouping  which 
should  make  conversation  impossible;  but  in  such  cases,  of 
course,  I  always  speak  to  whichever  guest  is  slightly  preju- 
diced by  the  arangement  and  explain  the  reason  to  him. 
I  have  never  noticed  the  least  sign  of  displeasure.  At  a  very 
formal  dinner,  it  is  of  course  always  safer  to  follow  rank  and 
let  the  conversation  take  care  of  itself.  Any  enjoyment 
people  get  out  of  such  a  dinner  they  set  down  as  pure  profit, 
anyhow. 

October  7;  Ambassador  and  Mrs.  Guthrie  arrived  to-day. 
They  will  be  our  guests  for  several  weeks.  Mr.  Guthrie  has 
not  been  very  well,  so  has  come  for  a  rest.  We  spent  the  day 
together,  talking  over  Chinese  and  Japanese  affairs  and  rela- 
tions.    We  agree  on  most  points. 

'  In  the  evening  we  dined  at  the  officers'  mess,  after  which 
there  was  dancing.  Mrs.  Ollie  James  and  Mrs.  Hall  of 
Washington  came  with  the  Guthries.  They  were  at  the 
dinner,  at  which  great  cheer  prevailed.  Colonel  Neville, 
the  new  commandant  of  the  marines,  radiates  good  fellow- 
ship. He  is  sociable,  efficient,  and  ready  to  cooperate  in  all 
good  causes.  His  officers  and  men  seem  to  revere  him,  and 
a  very  fine  spirit  reigns  in  the  marine  compound. 

October  li:  I  presented  Ambassador  Guthrie  to  the 
President,  who  had  invited  us  for  luncheon.  We  were  only 
six  at  the  table.  Mr.  Quo  Tai-chi,  the  youthful  English- 
speaking  secretary  of  the  President,  interpreted.  The  Presi- 
dent had  many  questions  to  ask  about  Japan.  Then,  he 
spoke  quite  hopefully  about  the  outlook  in  China.  Financial 
difficulties  will  be  overcome  through  cooperation  of  parha- 


QUIET  DAYS,  AUTUMN  OF  1916  235 

ment  and  the  cabinet,  so  that  the  Government  may  count  on 
popular  consent  to  an  increase  in  taxes. 

President  Li  now  occupies  the  palace  where  Yuan  Shih-kai 
had  lived.  We  met  in  a  small  apartment  in  the  building 
constructed  for  the  Empress  Dowager,  which  was  tastefully 
furnished  in  the  best  Chinese  style. 

October  ij:  The  dinner  season  has  fully  set  in.  There  are 
dinners  every  night,  and  will  be,  throughout  the  winter. 
This  evening  we  entertained  for  the  Guthries,  having  Prince 
KoudachefF,  Baron  Hayashi,  and  the  wives  of  the  Russian 
and  Danish  ministers,  who  are  themselves  absent. 

October  2y.  The  Political  Science  Association  met  at  my 
house.  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  presided.  Doctor 
W.  W.  Willoughby  and  Senator  Yen  Fu,  the  noted  scholar, 
read  papers.  Over  a  hundred  men  were  in  attendance — 
the  cream  of  the  Western-educated  officials,  as  well  as  Euro- 
pean and  American  members. 

October  29;  The  Guthries  left  yesterday.  To-day  arrived 
General  and  Mrs.  Liggett,  who  will  be  our  guests  for  a  few 
days.  General  Liggett  is  tall  and  impressive-looking.  We 
had  a  long  initial  conversation  about  the  effects  of  the  war  in 
the  Far  East.  The  Philippines  are  beginning  to  be  prosper- 
ous on  account  of  the  war  demand  for  their  products. 

October  ji:  I  presented  General  Liggett  to  President  Li. 
In  a  long  conversation  the  President  was  frank  in  his  state- 
ment concerning  the  international  difficulties  of  China.  He 
expressed  himself  in  strong  terms  as  desirous  of  close  coopera- 
tion with  America.  I  gathered  that  he  feared  that  certain 
foreign  influences  might  stir  up  trouble  between  the  parlia- 
ment and  the  Government,  and  otherwise  seek  to  cause  em- 
barrassment, 

November  5;  I  went  with  a  small  party  to  the  mountain 
temple  Djetaissu.  Mrs.  Chadbourne,  the  sister  of  my  friend 
Mr.  Charles  R.  Crane;  Miss  Ellen  Lamotte  the  writer;  Mr. 
and  Mrs.  Burns  of  Shanghai;  and  Mr.  Charles  Stevenson 


236     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Smith,  of  the  Associated  Press,  took  this  excursion  riding  on 
donkeys,  with  many  spills  as  the  animals  slipped  on  the 
rocky  road.  The  temple  is  near  the  top,  commanding  a  mag- 
nificent view  of  the  plains  and  of  the  higher  mountains  far- 
ther inland.  It  rises  tier  above  tier,  its  platforms  shaded  by 
huge  trees,  with  enchanting  vistas  of  architecture  and  a 
broad  sweep  of  view  in  all  directions. 

November  g:  The  Continental  Commercial  Bank  Loan  is 
announced.  I  am  happy  that  this  result  has  been  achieved. 
An  advance  of  only  $5,cxx5,cxx)  will  be  made,  but  even  that 
small  sum  will  be  an  important  aid  to  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment. The  fact  that  a  big  Western  financial  institution  has 
taken  up  relations  with  China  is  promising.  What  foreign 
banking  there  is  in  New  York  is  tangled  up  with  European 
interests,  follows  the  lead  of  London,  and  has  not  manifested 
much  readiness  to  exert  itself  for  the  development  of  Amer- 
ican interests  abroad. 

November  lo:  I  attended  the  balloting  for  the  election  of 
the  Vice-President  of  the  Republic,  at  a  joint  session  of  the 
two  houses  of  parliament.  While  no  speeches  were  made, 
with  the  exception  of  brief  discussion  on  points  of  order,  yet  it 
was  of  interest  to  see  the  general  aspect  of  parliament.  The 
procedure,  certainly,  was  businesslike.  Balloting  was  by 
written  and  signed  vote;  after  each  ballot,  the  individual 
votes  are  read  off  from  the  tribune.  I  had  the  impression 
that  a  true  election  was  going  on.  General  Feng  Kuo-chang, 
the  Military  Governor  of  Kiangsu,  had  the  lead  from  the 
start,  which  was  gradually  increased  by  the  balloting  until 
finally  he  got  the  necessary  majority.  I  could  not  stay  until 
the  result  was  announced,  when  there  was  a  demonstration 
to  honour  the  nomineee.  But  I  saw  before  me  a  body  which 
had  evidently  mastered  the  procedure  of  parliamentary  ac- 
tion, so  that  things  were  done  with  a  smoothness  and  ease 
which  implied  long  experience.  Many  people  witnessed  the 
election,  among  them  several  of  my  colleagues.     I  had  a  brief 


QUIET  DAYS,  AUTUMN  OF  1916  237 

conversation  with  Mr.  C.  T.  Wang,  who  was  hopeful  that, 
now  the  Vice-Presidential  succession  was  settled  legally  and 
peacefully,  the  future  of  the  Republic  was  assured. 

General  Feng  has  occupied  a  pivotal  position  at  his  post  at 
Nanking.  He  is  shrewd  and  clever.  Like  a  boy  standing 
over  the  centre  of  a  seesaw,  he  used  his  weight  to  balance 
either  side  according  as  the  pendulum  movement  required. 
He  was  at  first  believed  to  have  given  Yuan  Shih-kai  encour- 
agement to  be  emperor,  but  when  asked  to  express  himself, 
had  allowed  the  report  that  he  was  neutral  to  gain  currency; 
then,  as  the  opposition  gained  strength,  he  added  his  weight 
with  gradually  increasing  force  to  its  side,  although  never  at 
any  stage  coming  out  with  positive  statements.  His  selec- 
tion was  an  attempt  to  form  a  compromise  between  the  mili- 
tarist and  the  progressive  parties. 

November  10:  I  took  a  long  excursion  with  Prince  Kouda- 
cheff.  We  rode  to  the  foothills  by  automobile,  then  climbed 
to  the  top  of  a  lofty  range  back  of  his  temple,  where  one 
can  promenade  for  six  or  eight  miles  along  the  crest  of  the 
ridge  with  glorious  views  of  mountain  country  on  either 
side. 

November  13:  I  had  a  long  conversation  with  Baron 
Hayashi  to-day. 

November  20:  Admiral  and  Mrs.  Winterhalter  arrived  for 
a  few  days'  visit.  The  Admiral  is  tall,  gray-haired,  strong- 
featured,  of  energetic  movements.  He  has  always  manifested 
a  deep  interest  in  what  is  going  on  in  China;  we  sat  down  for 
a  long  talk  immediately  after  his  arrival. 

November  22:  I  presented  the  Admiral  to  President  Li 
and  we  had  a  pleasant  conversation,  although  the  President 
was  not  quite  so  expansive  and  confidential  as  during  my 
last  call.  As  we  made  the  rounds  of  calls  on  the  cabinet 
ministers,  I  took  the  conversation  beyond  the  ordinary  civil- 
ities, so  as  to  give  the  visitor  an  opportunity  of  getting  more 
insight  into  the  affairs  now  engaging  our  attention;  also,  to 


238      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

use  this  valuable  time  for  an  exchange  of  ideas  with  the 
Chinese  leaders. 

November  25:  The  French  are  protesting  against  the 
Continental  Commercial  Bank  Loan,  in  so  far  as  the  security 
is  concerned.  The  security  of  the  tobacco  and  wine  tax  had 
been  assigned  to  some  previous  French  loans.  I  saw  Doctor 
Chen,  and  Count  Mattel  called  on  me.  I  take  the  position 
that  as  the  French  loan — which  is  small  in  amount  and  will 
require  only  a  very  minor  portion  of  the  proceeds  of  the  tax 
— remains  entitled  to  be  the  first  lien,  the  French  interests 
are  in  no  way  prejudiced.  I  imagine  what  they  really  object 
to  is  the  eventual  appointment  of  an  American  auditor  or 
co-inspector  for  this  revenue.  As  this,  however,  would  still 
strengthen  the  security  for  their  loan,  I  do  not  see  that  they 
have  any  reason  for  complaint.  The  representative  of  the 
French  bank  which  is  interested,  saw  me  and  made  a  tenta- 
tive suggestion  that  if  advisorships  were  established,  the 
French  might  take  the  wine  tax,  and  the  Americans  the 
tobacco  tax.  I  feel,  however,  that  the  hands  of  the  Chinese 
were  perfectly  free  when  the  loan  was  made;  there  can  be  no 
objection,  except  on  the  supposition  that  whenever  the 
Chinese  do  business,  no  matter  how  small,  with  respect  to 
any  subject  matter,  they  impliedly  give  a  lien  on  all  future 
dealings. 

December  4:  I  called  on  Doctor  Morrison  to  take  a  look 
at  his  library.  This  unusual  collection  contains  about 
twenty  thousand  books  in  European  languages,  dealing 
with  China.  The  rare  editions  of  early  works  are  almost 
completely  represented.  Doctor  Morrison,  who  lives  in  a 
Chinese-style  house,  has  built  a  fireproof  building  for  his 
books.  He  has  devoted  the  last  fifteen  years  to  getting  them 
together,  and  I  believe  has  spent  the  larger  part  of  his  in- 
come on  them.  Recently  he  married  a  lady  who  had  been 
for  a  while  his  secretary.  They  now  have  a  little  boy.  I  am 
told  that  his  marriage  and  fatherhood  have  greatly  aug- 


QUIET  DAYS,  AUTUMN  OF  1916  239 

mented  Doctor  Morrison's  standing  and  influence  among  the 
Chinese.  A  bachelor  does  not  fit  into  their  scheme  of  life. 
We  repaired  to  his  study,  and  for  a  long  time  were  discussing 
affairs.  We  spoke  particularly  about  the  railway  situation 
and  the  fact  that  construction  on  all  the  lines  contracted  for 
has  practically  been  stopped.  This  is  an  enormous  disad- 
vantage to  the  Chinese.  They  have  to  pay  heavy  interest 
charges  on  the  initial  loans,  for  which  there  is  as  yet  no 
income-paying  property  to  show,  but  only  surveys  and  partial 
construction.  We  agreed  that  the  Four-Power  bankers, 
for  instance,  have  a  very  weak  case  if  China  should  decide 
to  cancel  their  contract  for  non-performance,  as  money  to 
continue  the  building  is  not  forthcoming.  On  the  British 
concession  of  the  Pukow-Singyang  Railway,  on  which  vir- 
tually no  work  has  yet  been  done,  the  Government  neverthe- 
less has  to  pay  interest  on  a  million  dollars  of  capital  that 
has  been  advanced. 

December  y:  I  visited  Prince  KoudachefF,  the  Russian 
minister.  I  jokingly  asked  him  whether  he  found  that  the 
Chinese  thought  of  the  Russians  as  half-Asiatic,  therefore  as 
brothers.  "No,"  he  repHed;  "they  count  us  with  you  and 
with  the  other  Europeans,  as  a  scourge  and  pestilence." 
In  this  conversation  the  Prince  uttered  a  prophecy.  "As 
a  result  of  this  war,"  he  said,  "the  empire  will  be  abolished 
in  Germany." 

(Neither  of  us  at  this  time  dreamed  of  the  enormous  sub- 
versions and  convulsions  which  were  soon  to  take  place  in 
Russia.) 

December  8:  I  called  on  President  Li  in  order  to  present 
a  personal  letter  from  President  Wilson,  in  which  the  latter 
sends  his  good  wishes.  We  discussed  the  American  loan 
policy.  The  President,  like  other  Chinese,  finds  it  difficult 
to  understand  why  America,  with  her  great  capital  strength 
and  industrial  development,  is  so  slow  in  taking  advantage 
of  opportunities  for  investment  and  development  in  China. 


240      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

The  President  said:  "Americans  love  pioneering.  In  China 
there  is  pioneering  to  do,  with  the  added  advantage  of  having 
a  ready  labour  supply  and  local  capital,  which  may  be  en- 
listed. Why  are  they  so  slow  to  come  in?"  I  agree  with 
him  that  it  is  difficult  to  understand. 

December  i6:  Mr.  Victor  Murdock  is  in  Peking,  bringing 
a  breeze  of  American  good-fellowship,  and  a  vision  unob- 
structed by  theories.  He  finds  China  interesting,  but,  I 
fear,  he  will  suffer  the  usual  disability  of  the  passing  visitor, 
that  Is,  he  will  see  the  unfavourable  aspects  of  Chinese  life 
and  will  not  stay  long  enough  to  appreciate  the  deeper  vir- 
tues. 

This  diary  account  of  some  of  the  happenings  during  the 
fall  of  1916  contains  nothing  of  the  daily  work  of  conferences, 
discussions,  interviews,  dictations  dealing  with  the  Innumer- 
able problems  that  come  up  from  the  consulates,  or  that  arise 
In  the  capital  directly,  or  referring  to  general  policies  which 
are  hammered  out  and  formed  for  action. 

A  great  part  of  the  work  of  a  legation  Is  concerned  with 
foreseeing  trouble  and  trying  to  avoid  It.  Such  work  usually 
does  not  appear  at  all  in  the  record.  In  a  country  where  con- 
ditions are  complicated  as  they  are  in  China,  where  there  is 
such  a  crisscrossing  of  influences.  It  is  easy  to  make  a  mistake 
If  constant  care  be  not  exercised  to  keep  Informed  of  every 
detail  and  to  head  oflF  trouble. 


CHAPTER  XXI 
CHINA  BREAKS  WITH  GERMANY 

The  time  came  for  the  United  States  to  sever  relations 
with  the  German  Kaiser's  government.  I  had  taken  advan- 
tage of  the  clear  sunshine  and  mild  air  on  Sunday,  February 
4,  191 7,  to  visit  Doctor  Morrison  at  his  cottage  outside  of 
Peking  near  the  race-course.  After  lunch  a  messenger  came 
from  the  Legation,  bringing  word  that  an  important  cable- 
gram had  arrived  and  was  being  decoded.  I  returned  to 
town,  and  at  the  Legation  Mr.  White  handed  me  the  decoded 
message  which  said  that  the  American  Government  had  not 
only  broken  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany,  but  that 
it  trusted  the  neutral  powers  would  associate  themselves 
with  the  American  Government  in  this  action  of  protest 
against  an  intolerable  practice;  this  would  make  for  the  peace 
of  the  world.  I  was  instructed  to  communicate  all  this  to 
the  Chinese  Government. 

After  a  conference  with  the  first  secretary,  Mr.  Mac- 
Murray,  and  the  Chinese  secretary.  Doctor Tenney,  I  made  an 
engagement  to  see  the  President  and  the  Premier  on  that 
same  evening.  I  felt  justified  in  assuming  that  the  invita- 
tion to  the  neutrals  to  join  the  United  States  was  more  than  a 
pious  wish  and  that  there  was  some  probability.that  the  Euro- 
pean neutrals  would  support  our  protest.  As  to  China 
I  had  already  informed  the  Government  that  we  could  reas- 
onably expect  support  there.  I  therefore  considered  it  to  be 
the  policy  of  the  Government  to  assure  a  common  demonstra- 
tion on  the  part  of  all  neutral  powers,  strong  enough  to  bring 
Germany  to  a  halt.  So  far  as  my  action  was  concerned,  I 
therefore  saw  the  plain  duty  to  prevail  upon  China  to  asso- 

24X 


242      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

date  herself  with  the  American  action  as  proposed  by  my 
government. 

I  found  President  Li  Yuan-hung  resting  after  dinner  in  his 
palace  and  in  an  amiably  expectant  mood.  With  him  was 
Mr.  Quo  Tai-chi,  his  English  secretary.  He  was  plainly 
startled  by  the  prospect  of  having  to  consider  so  serious  a 
matter,  and  did  not  at  first  say  anything,  but  sat  silently 
thinking.  His  doubts  and  objections  were  revealed  rather 
through  questions  than  by  direct  statements.  "What  is  the 
present  state  of  the  war,  and  what  the  relative  strength  or 
degree  of  exhaustion  of  the  belligerent  parties.?"  "Could 
the  Allies,  even  with  the  assistance  of  the  United  States,  win 
a  decisive  victory.?'*  Finally,  he  said:  "The  effect  of  such  a 
far-reaching  international  act  upon  the  internal  situation 
in  China  will  have  to  be  carefully  considered." 

The  President's  secretary  appeared  strongly  impressed 
with  the  favourable  aspects  of  our  proposal,  so  that  he  began 
to  argue  a  little  with  the  President.  On  my  part,  I  pointed 
out  the  effects  which  a  positive  act  of  international  assertion 
in  behalf  of  a  just  cause  and  well-disposed  associates  would 
have  upon  China  by  taking  attention  off  her  endless  fac- 
tional conflicts.  When  I  touched  upon  the  ethical  phases 
of  the  matter,  the  President  fully  agreed  with  me.  I  had  par- 
ticularly impressed  upon  him  the  need  of  prompt  action  in 
order  that  counsels  might  not  be  confused  by  adverse  influ- 
ences from  without. 

We  next  drove  to  the  residence  of  the  Premier,  General 
Tuan  Chi-jui,  who  was  then  playing  an  important  part  in 
the  politics  of  China.  I  recalled  my  first  interview  with  him 
when  he  had  received  me  in  a  dingy  room,  himself  wearing  a 
frowzy  long  coat  and  exhibiting  a  general  air  of  tedium  and 
lack  of  energy.  There  was  no  suggestion  of  the  military  man 
about  him.  The  qualities  upon  which  General  Tuan's  great 
influence  is  founded  become  apparent  only  upon  a  longer 
and  more  intimate  acquaintance.     Despite  his  real  indolence, 


CHINA  BREAKS  WITH  GERMANY         243 

his  wisdom,  his  fundamental  honesty,  and  his  readiness  to 
shield  his  subordinates  and  to  assume  responsibility  himself 
have  made  this  quiet  and  unobtrusive  man  the  most  promi- 
nent leader  among  the  Chinese  militarists.  His  interest 
centres  chiefly  in  the  education  of  military  officers.  He  is 
no  politician  and  is  bored  by  poHtical  theory.  He  is  always 
ready  to  turn  over  the  handling  of  affairs  to  subordinates,  by 
whom  he  is  often  led  into  a  course  which  he  might  not  him- 
self have  chosen.  This,  coupled  with  extraordinary  stubborn- 
ness, accounts  for  his  influence  often  tending  to  be  dis- 
astrous to  his  country.  His  personality,  however,  with  its 
simplicity  and  pensiveness,  and  his  real  wisdom  when  he  lets 
his  own  nature  guide  him,  make  him  one  of  the  attractive 
figures  of  China. 

Though  in  himself  the  principal  influence  in  the  Govern- 
ment, Tuan  left  all  details  to  his  assistants,  Mr.  Tsao  Ju-lin 
and  General  Hsu  Shu-cheng.  He  preferred  to  play  chess. 
He  was,  however,  always  ready  to  shoulder  responsibility  for 
what  his  subordinates  had  done.  Often  when  he  was  deep  in 
a  game  of  Chinese  chess,  his  mind  focussed  on  the  complexi- 
ties of  this  difficult  pastime.  General  Hsu  would  approach 
him  with  some  proposal.  Giving  only  half  an  ear  to  it,  the 
Premier  would  respond,  "All  right"  {How  how).  When, 
later,  the  results  of  the  action  thus  taken  turned  out  to  be 
bad  and  the  Premier  asked  for  an  explanation,  he  was  re- 
minded that  he  had  himself  authorized  it.  He  would  then 
faintly  recollect,  and  would  make  a  gesture  toward  his 
shoulder,  which  indicated  that — very  well — he  took  the 
responsibility. 

But  on  this  occasion  General  Tuan  was  all  attention.  He 
had  with  him  Mr.  C.  C.  Wu  of  the  Foreign  Office,  who  con- 
tinued throughout  these  negotiations  to  act  as  interpreter. 
The  circumstance  that  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Dr. 
Wu  Ting-fang,  was  ill  and  had  to  be  represented  by  his  son, 
and  that  in  all  important  interviews  both  the  Premier  and 


244      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

young  Mr.  Wu  were  present,  greatly  facilitated  the  business 
and  saved  time  which  would  have  been  needed  to  carry  on 
parallel  conversations  in  the  Foreign  Office  and  with  the 
Premier.  General  Tuan  was  far  from  accepting  the  proposal 
at  first  sight.  "It  would  be  wise  for  Germany  to  modify 
her  submarine  policy,"  he  stated,  "  because  in  land  warfare 
she  could  press  her  opponents  so  seriously  that  her  absolute 
defeat  would  be  difficult  unless  the  United  States  entered  the 
war."  He  appeared  to  contemplate  the  possibility  of  China 
taking  so  unprecedented  a  step  as  the  breaking  of  relations 
with  a  great  power  with  less  concern  than  did  the  President. 
We  arranged  for  a  longer  discussion  on  the  following  day. 

Far  into  that  night  I  was  in  conference  with  the  legation 
staflF,  and  with  certain  non-official  Americans  and  Britishers 
of  great  influence  among  the  Chinese.  These  men  looked 
with  enthusiasm  upon  the  idea  of  an  association  with  the 
United  States,  aligning  against  Germany  the  vast  popula- 
tion of  China.  While  the  energies  and  resources  of  China 
were  not  sufficiently  mobiHzed  to  be  of  immediate  use  in  the 
war,  yet  by  systematic  preparation  they  might  bring  an 
enormous  accession  of  strength  to  the  AlHes  if  the  war  should 
last  long.  We  felt,  also,  that  through  positive  alliance  with 
the  declared  poHcy  of  the  United  States,  China  would  greatly 
strengthen  herself  internally  and  externally. 

Dr.  John  C.  Ferguson  addressed  himself  directly  to  the 
Premier  and  the  President;  his  thorough  knowledge  of  Chi- 
nese enabled  him  to  bring  home  to  them  the  essential  points 
in  favour  of  prompt  action.  Mr.  Roy  S.  Anderson  and  Mr. 
W.  H.  Donald,  an  Australian  acting  as  editor  of  the  Far 
Eastern  Review^  who  were  close  to  the  members  of  the  Com- 
munications Party  and  the  Kuo  Min  Tang,  addressed  them- 
selves especially  to  the  leaders  in  parliament.  Dr.  G.  E. 
Morrison,  the  British  adviser  of  the  President  of  China, 
had  long  worked  to  have  China  join  in  the  war:  he  quietly 
used  all  his  influence  with  the  President  and  high  officials, 


CHINA  BREAKS  WITH  GERMANY         245 

in  order  to  make  them  understand  what  was  at  stake.  Other 
Americans  and  British  newspapermen,  Hke  Charles  Steven- 
son Smith  and  Sam  BIythe,  who  happened  to  be  in  Peking, 
all  tirelessly  working  in  their  own  way  with  men  whose  con- 
fidence they  enjoyed,  urged  the  policy  proposed  by  America. 
These  men  made  a  spontaneous  appeal  based  upon  the  fun- 
damental justice  of  the  poHcy  of  resisting  an  intolerable  prac- 
tice, and  on  the  beneficent  effect  which  a  great  issue  like  this 
would  have  in  pulling  the  Chinese  nation  together  and  in 
making  it  realize  its  status  as  a  member  of  the  family  of  na- 
tions. However,  what  counted  most  with  the  Chinese  was 
the  fact  that  America  had  acted,  and  had  invited  China  to 
take  a  similar  step. 

At  a  second  long  interview  with  the  President,  he  asked 
me:  "Would  not  a  positive  acrive  foreign  policy,  particularly 
if  it  should  lead  to  war,  strengthen  the  militarist  party?" 

I  replied  that  in  my  opinion  such  a  contingency  would 
strengthen  decisively  the  Central  Government,  enabling  it  to 
keep  the  military  in  their  proper  place  as  an  organ  of  the  state 
and  preventing  the  further  growth  of  the  pseudo-feudalism 
inherited  from  Yuan  Shih-kai. 

"But  would  the  American  Government  assist  China  in 
bearing  the  responsibilities  of  such  a  step  ? " 

Before  replying  to  this  question,  I  had  to  cable  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  for  instructions  as  to  what  assurances  I  would 
be  authorized  to  give  to  the  Chinese  Government  in  the  event 
of  their  taking  the  action  suggested  by  the  United  States. 
Unfortunately,  as  was  several  times  the  case  during  some 
critical  situation,  the  cable  connection  was  broken  and  I 
failed  to  get  any  reply  to  assist  me  during  the  negotiations. 

With  a  map  the  Premier  and  I,  later  that  afternoon,  ana- 
lyzed the  military  situation  of  the  European  Powers.  From 
the  analogy  of  the  American  Civil  War,  I  expressed  to  him 
the  belief  that  Germany  could  not  resist  the  enormous  pres- 
sure from  all  sides.     "What,"  the  Premier  asked,  "may  be 


246      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

expected  of  America  by  way  of  direct  military  action  ?  Bear 
in  mind  that  I  wish  for  nothing  more  than  for  a  strong  Amer- 
ica, able  to  exercise  a  guiding  influence  in  the  affairs  of  the 
world." 

My  positive  belief  that  America  would,  if  necessary,  follow 
the  severance  of  relations  with  the  strongest  kind  of  military 
action  interested  him.  America  had  been  represented  to  the 
Chinese  as  a  big,  over-rich  country  which  lacked  energy 
for  a  supreme  military  effort. 

"What,  then,  will  happen  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war?" 
he  asked. 

The  fact  that  Japan  had  already  made  efforts  to  assure 
for  herself  the  right  to  speak  for  China  was  worrying  the 
Chinese.  With  the  Premier,  as  with  the  President,  the  idea 
that,  through  breaking  with  Germany,  China  could  assure 
herself  of  an  independent  position  at  the  peace  table,  had 
much  weight.  Both  men  also  faced  the  possibility  of  being 
drawn  into  the  war.  The  Premier  appeared  to  regard  this 
with  a  certain  degree  of  positive  satisfaction ;  to  the  President 
it  seemed  a  less  agreeable  prospect.  I  made  it  plain  that  the 
American  proposal  did  not  go  beyond  breaking  off  diplomatic 
relations  with  Germany,  and,  that  by  taking  that  step,  China 
would  effectually  rebuke  and  discourage  the  illegal  and  in- 
human acts  of  Germany  on  the  high  seas,  keeping  her  hands 
entirely  free  as  to  future  action.  Should  further  steps  be 
later  needed,  the  road  would  be  open. 

Intensive  discussions  were  going  on  all  day  Monday  and 
deep  into  the  night  among  the  Chinese  officials  and  the 
leaders  of  parliament.  I  received  calls  on  Tuesday  from 
many  Chinese  leaders  who  wished  to  talk  over  the  situation. 
The  progressive,  modern-minded,  and  forward-looking  among 
the  Chinese  readily  supported  the  idea  that  China  should 
range  herself  alongside  the  United  States  in  this  action. 
Admiral  Tsai  Ting-kan,  who  was  very  close  to  the  President, 
laboured  in  company  with  Doctor  Morrison  to  bring  before  Li 


CHINA  BREAKS  WITH  GERMANY         247 

Yuan-hung  all  the  considerations  favouring  positive  action. 
The  President,  however,  still  adhered  to  his  idea  that  it  was 
safer  for  China  to  remain  entirely  neutral. 

In  the  cabinet.  Dr.  Chen  Chin-tao,  the  Minister  of  Fi- 
nance, and  Mr.  C.  C.  Wu,  representing  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  from  the  earliest  moment  associated  them- 
selves with  those  of  the  opinion  that  China  must  act,  and  they 
led  the  younger  ofl&cials.  In  the  Kuo  Min  Tang,  Mr.  C.  T. 
Wang,  vice-president  of  the  senate;  Dr.  Wang  Chung-hui, 
the  leading  jurist  of  China;  and  General  Niu  Yung-chien,  of 
revolutionary  fame,  were  the  first  to  become  active.  The 
Peking  Gazettey  with  its  brilliant  editor,  Eugene  Chen,  came 
out  strongly  in  favour  of  following  the  United  States.  A 
powerful  public  opinion  was  quietly  forming  among  the 
Chinese.  The  Young  China  party  was  beginning  to  see  the 
advantage  which  lay  in  having  China  emerge  from  her 
passivity. 

When  I  returned  from  a  dinner  with  the  Alstons  at  the 
British  Legation  on  Tuesday  night,  Mr.  C.  C.  Wu  brought 
me  word  from  the  cabinet  that  it  would  be  quite  impossible 
to  take  action  unless  the  American  Government  could  ade- 
quately assure  China  assistance  in  bearing  the  responsibilities 
which  she  might  incur,  without  impairment  of  her  sovereign 
rights  and  the  independent  control  of  her  national  forces. 

The  Chinese  ministers  had  in  mind  two  things:  In  the  first 
place,  the  need  of  financial  assistance,  in  order  to  make  it 
possible  for  China  eventually  to  participate  in  the  war,  if 
that  should  be  desired;  and,  second,  the  prevention  of  all 
arrangements  whereby  Chinese  natural  resources,  military 
forces,  arsenals,  or  ships,  would  be  placed  under  foreign  con- 
trol incompatible  with  her  undiminished  national  indepen- 
dence. 

All  through  Wednesday  I  struggled  with  this  difficult 
problem.  I  had  to  act  on  my  own  responsibility,  as  I  could 
not  reach  the  Department  of  State  by  cable.     If  all  the  in- 


248      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

fluences  unfavourable  to  the  action  proposed  were  given 
time  to  assert  themselves,  the  American  proposal  would  be 
obstructed  and  probably  defeated.  The  Chinese  Govern- 
ment would  act  only  on  such  assurances  as  I  could  feel  justi- 
fied in  giving  to  them  at  this  time;  if  I  gave  them  none,  no 
action  would  be  taken.  It  seemed  almost  a  matter  of  course, 
should  China  follow  the  lead  of  the  American  Government, 
that  the  latter  would  not  allow  China  to  suffer  through  lack 
of  all  possible  support  in  aiding  China  to  bear  the  responsi- 
bilities she  assumed,  and  in  preventing  action  from  any  quar- 
ter which  would  impose  on  China  new  burdens  because  of  her 
break  with  Germany.  Unable  to  interpret  my  instructions 
otherwise  than  that  a  joint  protest  of  the  neutrals  had  actually 
been  planned  by  the  American  Government,  and  feeling  that 
the  effect  upon  Germany  of  the  American  protest  depended 
on  the  early  concurrence  of  the  important  neutral  powers,  I 
considered  prompt  action  essential.  I  was  sure  that  all  sorts 
of  unfavourable  and  obstructive  influences  would  presently 
get  to  work  in  Peking. 

When  discussion  had  reached  its  limit,  on  the  afternoon  of 
February  yth,  I  felt  it  necessary  to  draw  up  a  note  concerning 
the  attitude  of  the  American  Government.  The  tenor  of 
this  note  I  communicated  to  the  Premier  and  the  Foreign 
Office,  with  the  understanding  that  I  should  send  the  note  if 
favourable  action  were  decided  upon  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment. 

I  believed  that  without  such  assurances  the  instructions  of 
the  American  Government  could  not  be  carried  out,  and  that 
it  would  act  in  all  respects  in  a  manner  consonant  with  its 
position  as  a  powerful  government  and  as  a  leader  of  protest 
among  the  neutrals;  moreover,  that  its  relations  with  those 
who  gave  support  in  a  policy  of  such  fundamental  importance 
would  be  determined  by  principles  of  equity  and  justice.  I 
felt  that  the  United  States  could  not  be  less  liberal  toward  a 
country  coming  to  its  support  than  toward  those  countries 


CHINA  BREAKS  WITH  GERMANY         249 

which  the  American  Government  was  now  going  to  help. 
It  was  only  these  self-evident  conclusions  which  I  cautiously 
expressed  in  my  note.  The  text  of  this  note,  in  its  essential 
part,  had  the  following  form: 

Excellency: 

In  our  recent  conversation  concerning  the  policy  of  your  Government  in 
associating  itself  with  the  United  States  in  active  opposition  to  the  un- 
restricted submarine  warfare  by  which  Germany  is  indiscriminately  jeop- 
ardizing the  lives  of  neutral  citizens,  you  have  with  entire  frankness  pointed 
out  to  me  that,  whereas  the  Chinese  Government  is  in  principle  disposed 
to  adopt  the  suggestion  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  in  that  re- 
gard, it  nevertheless  finds  itself  in  a  position  in  which  it  would  not  feel  safe 
in  so  doing  unless  assured  that  it  could  obtain  from  American  sources  such 
financial  and  other  assistance  as  would  enable  it  to  take  the  measures 
appropriate  to  the  situation  which  would  thus  be  created. 

With  like  candour  I  have  stated  to  you  that  I  have  recommended  to 
my  Government  that  in  the  event  of  the  Chinese  Government's  associating 
itself  with  the  President's  suggestion,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  should  take  measures  to  put  at  its  disposition  the  funds  immediately 
required  for  the  purposes  you  have  indicated,  and  should  take  steps  with 
a  view  to  such  a  funding  of  the  Boxer  Indemnity  as  would  for  the  time 
being  make  available  for  the  purposes  of  the  Chinese  Government  at  least 
the  major  portion  of  the  current  indemnity  instalments;  and  I  have  indi- 
cated to  you  my  personal  conviction  that  my  Government  would  be  found 
just  and  liberal  in  effecting  this  or  other  such  arrangements  to  enable  the 
Chinese  Government  to  meet  the  responsibilities  which  it  might  assume 
upon  the  suggestion  of  the  President.  I  should  not  be  wholly  frank  with 
you,  however,  if  I  were  to  fail  to  point  out  that  the  exact  nature  of  any 
assistance  to  be  given  or  any  measure  to  be  taken  must  be  determined 
through  consultation  of  various  administrative  organs,  in  some  cases  in- 
cluding reference  to  Congress,  in  order  to  make  effective  such  arrangements 
as  might  have  been  agreed  to  in  principle  between  the  executive  authori- 
ties of  the  two  countries;  and  I  therefore  could  not  in  good  faith  make  in 
behalf  of  my  Government  any  definite  commitments  upon  your  suggestions 
at  the  present  time. 

I  do,  however,  feel  warranted  in  assuming  the  responsibility  of  assuring 
you  in  behalf  of  my  Government  that  by  the  methods  you  have  suggested, 
or  otherwise,  adequate  means  will  be  devised  to  enable  China  to  fulfill  the 
responsibilities  consequent  upon  associating  herself  with  the  action  of  the 


250      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

United  States  Government,  without  any  impairment  of  her  national  in- 
dependence and  of  her  control  of  her  military  establishment  and  general 
administration. 

Final  presentation  of  everything  that  had  to  be  considered 
in  making  a  decision  was  arranged  with  the  Premier  for 
Wednesday  evening.  I  found  General  Tuan  alone.  We 
spoke  awhile  about  the  news  of  the  day,  then  I  began  to  go 
into  the  main  matter.  But  General  Tuan  appeared  weary 
and  worried.  This  may  have  been  the  reason  for  the  failure 
of  the  interpreters  to  make  smooth  connection :  I  suggested, 
as  the  Premier  had  had  an  excessively  long  day,  that  we  meet 
again  the  following  morning.  It  was  arranged  for  ten  o'clock 
at  the  cabinet  office,  just  before  the  Thursday  morning  cabi- 
net conference. 

I  had  just  dined  with  Mr.  C.  T.  Wang  and  a  number  of 
parliamentary  leaders.  They  were  keen  on  the  policy  of 
following  the  United  States.  They  had  seen  President  Li 
during  the  day;  he  was  still  full  of  doubts,  but  stated  that  he 
would  leave  the  decision  in  the  hands  of  the  cabinet,  and 
would  abide  by  the  results.  Mr.  Wang  believed  that  the 
President  was  gradually  coming  around  to  the  American  point 
of  view,  and  that  his  acceptance  of  it  would  be  the  stronger 
and  heartier  because  of  the  conscientious  doubts  which  he 
was  overcoming. 

The  negotiations  of  these  three  days  had  gone  on  quietly. 
The  men  upon  whom  rested  the  responsibility  of  making  the 
decision  were  constantly  in  conference.  Several  men  of  in- 
fluence worked  with  officials  of  the  Government  and  leaders  in 
parhament.  But  the  outside  foreign  public  was  not  fully 
alive  to  what  was  going  on,  and  those  who  knew  and  were 
interested  generally  believed  that  ancient  China  would  not 
take  so  unprecedented  a  step.  The  Japanese  minister. 
Baron  Hayashi,  was  absent  from  Peking.  The  German 
official  representatives  apparently  had  no  idea  that  any  radi- 
cal action  could  come  from  the  Chinese  Government. 


CHINA  BREAKS  WITH  GERMANY         251 

I  arrived  at  the  cabinet  office  on  Thursday  morning,  at 
ten,  and  was  shown  to  the  room  where  the  Premier  was  to 
receive  me.  As  he  had  told  me  that  Mr.  C.  C.  Wu  would 
be  present  to  interpret,  I  had  not  brought  an  interpreter  for 
this  informal  and  intimate  interview.  The  Premier  soon 
entered  unattended  and  we  sat  down  together,  smoking 
cigarettes,  and  observing  an  enforced  silence,  as  Mr.  Wu  had 
not  appeared.  We  were  without  an  interpreter,  but  even  in 
such  circumstances  the  perfection  of  Chinese  manners  allows 
no  embarrassment  to  arise.  We  had  been  sitting  in  mute 
thought  a  little  while,  when  Admiral  Chen,  the  Minister  of 
the  Navy,  came  in;  he  spoke  English  quite  well,  so  that  our 
conversation  could  begin;  soon  we  were  in  the  midst  of  earnest 
discussion.  Within  another  ten  minutes  Dr.  Chen  Chin-tao, 
the  Minister  of  Finance,  arrived,  and  shortly  after  him  came 
Mr.  C.  C.  Wu.  Thus,  quite  by  chance,  I  had  the  opportu- 
nity of  talking  over  these  momentous  matters  jointly  with  the 
representatives  of  the  four  departments  of  government  most 
nearly  concerned :  Foreign  Affairs,  Finance,  War,  and  Navy. 

We  could  now  once  more  thoroughly  go  over  all  doubts 
and  objections,  and  look  at  the  proposed  policy  in  all  its  mani- 
fold aspects  and  probable  results.  In  this  intense  and  earnest 
conversation  no  formal  interpreting  was  needed.  Whoever 
replied  to  my  remarks  would  first  repeat  in  Chinese  what  I 
had  said  for  the  benefit  of  the  Premier.  When  the  Premier 
had  spoken,  Mr.  Wu  would  interpret  his  thought  for  me. 
All  the  others  addressed  me  directly  in  English.  I  advanced 
arguments  on  every  point,  of  which  the  following  is  a  memo- 
randum: 

The  American  Government  has  taken  the  present  action  because  the  wil- 
ful disregard  of  neutral  rights  went  to  the  extent  of  imperilling  not  only- 
neutral  property,  but  the  lives  of  our  citizens.  In  this  matter  the  interests 
of  China  are  entirely  parallel  to  those  of  the  United  States;  both  nations 
are  peaceful  and  see  in  the  maintenance  of  international  right  and  peaceful 
conditions  a  vital  guarantee  of  their  national  safety.    Through  association 


252      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

with  the  United  States,  China  would  enter  upon  this  controversy  with  a 
position  consonant  with  every  tradition  and  interest  of  her  national  life,  a 
position  which  would  have  to  be  respected  by  friends  and  foes  alike,  as 
dictated  by  the  highest  principles  which  could  guide  national  action. 
By  taking  this  action,  China  would  improve  her  independent  standing 
among  the  nations,  she  would  have  to  be  consulted  during  the  course  of 
the  controversy  and  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war;  she  would,  in  all  this, 
be  most  closely  associated  with  that  nation  which  she  has  always  looked 
upon  as  peculiarly  friendly  and  just  to  her.  In  addition  to  these  argu- 
ments, many  favourable  results  were  discussed  which  China  would  obtain 
in  international  diplomacy. 

Many  arguments  were  advanced  by  the  Chinese  officials  in  doubt  of  the 
policy  suggested;  it  was  stated  that  China  had  not  led  up  to  a  breach  with 
Germany  by  notes  of  protest,  such  as  had  made  the  action  of  the  United 
States  seem  natural  and  unavoidable;  Germany  had  of  late  years  always 
been  considerate  in  her  treatment  of  China,  a  sudden  breach  might  seem 
treacherous;  it  might  also  be  taken  by  Japan  as  so  surprising  an  action  as 
to  give  a  favourable  pretext  for  pressing  the  dreaded  demands  of  Group  V. 
It  was  also  apparent  that  the  representatives  of  the  European  Allies  were 
not  in  a  position  to  give  China,  at  the  present  time,  any  advice  favourable 
to  the  action  suggested. 

I  pointed  out  in  turn  that  were  the  action  suggested  once  taken  by 
China,  the  representatives  of  the  Allied  Powers  would  have  no  choice  but 
to  applaud  it,  which  some  of  them,  at  least,  would  do  from  the  fulness  of 
their  hearts.  As  far  as  Japan  was  concerned,  the  situation  would  be  such 
as  to  indicate  that  that  country,  too,  would  decide  to  express  approval 
of  the  action.  Having  taken  a  definite  position  on  this  side  of  the  contro- 
versy, without  yet  entirely  associating  herself  with  the  Allies,  China  would 
be  in  a  position  to  command  their  goodwill;  any  interference  with  China's 
sovereign  rights  would  be  rendered  more  difficult  because  of  the  situation 
thus  created.  It  was  almost  inconceivable  that  coercive  action  should  be 
taken  against  the  friend  who  had  declared  himself.  Moreover,  the  United 
States  having  taken  the  initiative  in  inviting  China  to  participate  in  the 
protest,  it  would  be  unlikely  that  any  action  could  be  taken  over  the 
head  of  the  United  States  or  without  consulting  the  American  Government. 

As  to  the  suddenness  of  the  action  suggested,  I  urged  that  the  action  of 
the  German  Government  in  announcing  unrestricted  submarine  warfare 
was  itself  so  astounding  in  its  disregard  of  neutral  rights  that  no  action 
taken  in  reply  could  be  considered  too  drastic.  It  was  virtually  a  threat  to 
kill  Chinese  citizens  navigating  certain  portions  of  the  high  seas;  and  injury 
could  be  prevented  only  by  taking  a  determined  and  forceful  position. 


CHINA  BREAKS  WITH  GERMANY  253 

We  continued  our  discussion  until  nearly  twelve  o'clock, 
when  I  took  my  leave,  thanking  the  ministers  for  their  cour- 
tesy and  goodwill.  The  cabinet  sat  until  six  in  the  evening. 
Shortly  after  six  I  received  a  telephone  call  from  Mr.  C.  C. 
Wu,  who  said:  "I  am  very  happy  to  tell  you  that  the  cabinet 
has  decided  to  make  a  protest  to  Germany,  and  to  indicate 
that  diplomatic  relations  will  be  broken  off  unless  the  present 
submarine  warfare  is  abandoned." 

It  is  interesting  to  remember,  as  the  publication  of  the 
Russian  secret  archives  has  shown,  that  on  this  very  day  the 
Japanese  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  was  urging  the 
Russian  ambassador  at  Tokyo  to  get  from  his  government 
assurances  of  various  benefits  (including  Shantung)  to  come 
to  Japan  if  she  undertook  the  supposedly  diifficult  task  of 
inducing  China  to  join  the  Allies.  Japan  was  thus  asking  a 
commission  for  persuading  the  Chinese  to  join  the  Allies, 
although  they  were  willing  to  do  so  freely  of  their  own  accord, 
as  their  action  this  day  showed. 

The  Chinese  had  made  a  great  decision.  These  men  had 
acted  independently  upon  their  judgment  of  what  was  just 
and  in  the  best  interests  of  their  own  nation.  It  was  the  act 
of  a  free  government,  without  a  shadow  of  attempt  at  pres- 
sure, without  a  thought  of  exacting  compensations  on  their 
part.  When  it  is  considered  in  comparison  with  the  manner 
in  which  some  other  governments  entered  the  war,  it  will 
stand  as  an  honour  to  China  for  all  time.  Incidentally,  this 
was  China's  first  independent  participation  in  world  politics. 
She  had  stepped  out  of  her  age-long  aloofness  and  taken  her 
place  among  the  modern  nations. 

I  now  sent  the  note  to  the  Chinese  Government  which 
contained  the  simple  assurance  of  fair  treatment  by  the 
United  States.     In  return  I  received  this  promise: 


In  case  an  act  should  be  performed  by  the  German  Government  which 
should  be  considered  by  the  American  Government  as  a  sufficient  cause  for 


254      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

a  declaration  of  war,  the  Chinese  Government  will  at  least  break  oflF  its 
diplomatic  relations  with  Germany. 

In  his  formal  note  to  me,  dated  February  9th,  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  declared : 

The  Chinese  Government  being  in  accord  with  the  principles  set  forth 
in  Your  Excellency's  note  and  firmly  associating  itself  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  America,  has  taken  similar  action  by  protest- 
ing energetically  to  the  German  Government  against  the  new  measures  of 
blockade.  The  Chinese  Government  also  proposes  to  take  such  action  in 
the  future  as  will  be  deemed  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  the  principles 
of  international  law. 


On  the  same  day  a  formal  note  of  protest  was  dispatched 
to  the  German  minister. 

The  entire  cabinet  reported  on  February  loth  to  a  secret 
session  of  parliament  on  the  diplomatic  action  it  had  taken. 
The  report  was  well  received;  only  a  few  questions  were 
asked  concerning  the  procedure  which  had  been  followed. 
Parliament  did  not  take  a  vote  on  this  matter,  as  it  was 
considered  to  be  an  action  by  the  cabinet  within  the  range 
of  its  legal  functions. 

A  wave  of  exultation  passed  over  the  country.  There 
seemed  to  be  hope  for  harmony  among  factions;  the  self- 
respect  of  the  Government  was  visibly  heightened.  That 
China  had  without  coercion  or  sordid  inducement  taken  a 
definite  stand  on  so  momentous  a  matter  inspired  the  Chinese 
with  new  hope.  In  coming  to  the  support  of  international 
right,  they  felt  that  they  were  strengthening  the  forces  which 
make  for  the  independence  of  their  own  country. 

Expressing  themselves  unofficially  the  representatives  of 
the  Allied  governments  during  these  negotiations  cautiously 
favoured  the  step  proposed.  When  the  decision  had  once 
been  taken,  the  approval  of  the  Chinese  action  was  unani- 
mous.    My  Belgian  colleague  remarked  to  me:  "The  air  has 


CHINA  BREAKS  WITH  GERMANY  255 

been  cleared,  a  weight  has  been  lifted  off  China  and  the 
powers.     The  stock  of  America  has  risen  100  per  cent." 

Mr.  Sam  Blythe  gave  a  dinner  on  the  evening  of  February 
9th,  at  which  Dr.  George  Morrison  and  many  other  American 
and  British  friends  were  present.  The  dinner  became  a 
celebration.  Greeting  me,  Doctor  Morrison  said :  "This  is  the 
greatest  thing  ever  accomplished  in  China.  It  means  a  new 
era.  It  will  make  the  Chinese  nationally  self-conscious;  and 
that,  not  for  narrow,  selfish  purposes,  but  to  vindicate  hu- 
man rights." 

But  the  thing  was  not  yet  accomplished.  I  knew  well 
enough  that  the  decision  of  the  Central  Government  would  not 
be  immediately  accepted  in  all  parts  of  China.  Opposition 
might  crop  out.  In  certain  regions  men  of  strong  German 
sympathies  were  in  control,  or  political  intrigues  to  cause  em- 
barassment  and  difficulties  to  the  Central  Government  were 
going  on.  All  China  must  understand  and  support  the  deci- 
sion taken  by  the  Government. 

Of  the  leaders  in  the  provinces  the  Vice-President,  General 
Feng,  at  Nanking,  was  most  important;  as  the  blunder  had 
been  committed  of  not  consulting  him,  he  was  predisposed 
against  the  decision;  moreover,  General  Feng  had  several 
German  advisers  in  whom  he  placed  confidence,  and  who  had 
given  him  a  strong  notion  of  German  invincibility. 

Fortunately,  Mr.  Sam  Blythe  was  going  to  stop  at  Nanking 
on  his  way  to  Shanghai,  in  order  as  a  journalist  to  interview 
the  Vice-President.  Blythe  argued  the  matter  out  with  him. 
He  found  that  General  Feng  really  felt  injured.  This  was 
smoothed  over.  With  Mr.  W.  H.  Donald  as  an  able  second, 
Sam  Blythe  impressed  upon  the  General  that  China  had 
merely  been  asked  to  break  off  relations,  which  did  not 
imply  going  to  war.  After  a  long  and  serious  conversation, 
with  some  side-flashes  from  Sam  Blythe,  the  Vice-President 
declared  himself  fully  satisfied,  and  he  came  out  in  favour  of 
the  Government's  policy.    (Thus,  as  has  often  been  the  case, 


256      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

an  unofficial  visit  by  private  individuals  accomplished  the 
good  results.) 

In  other  ways  and  by  other  persons,  different  leaders  were 
visited  and  familiarized  with  the  underlying  reasons  for  the 
act  of  the  Central  Government.  These  influences  interplayed 
with  cumulative  effect;  no  concerted  opposition  was  formed; 
by  a  sort  of  football  "interference"  the  policy  to  condemn 
German  submarine  warfare,  and,  if  necessary,  to  break  rela- 
tions with  Germany,  scored  its  touchdown. 

Intelligent  teamwork  and  American  energy  were  in  a  fair 
way  to  give  China  the  backing  she  needed,  having  first  assured 
her  concerted  action  with  the  United  States.  At  a  diploma- 
tic dinner  which  I  gave  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in 
February,  the  absorbing  talk  was  about  the  diplomatic  action 
taken  by  China.  Count  Martel  and  M.  Pelliot  of  the 
French  Legation,  Miles  Lampson  of  the  British  Legation, 
Mr.  Konovalov,  Russia's  financial  adviser  for  China,  and 
other  Allied  representatives  all  came  to  me  during  the  even- 
ing to  say  how  enormously  gratified  they  were  at  the  initiative 
of  the  United  States  and  the  stand  taken  by  China.  For 
once  nobody  could  disapprove  of  Chinese  action. 

The  Japanese  also  expressed  approval,  but  immediately 
tried  to  get  China  to  take  the  further  step  of  declaring  war, 
and  the  French  minister,  too,  worked  actively  for  this.  Japan 
was  eager  to  recover  the  lead.  A  great  campaign  of  intrigue 
and  counter-intrigue  resulted  among  the  various  factions  in 
China  which  threatened  to  destroy  the  unifying  and  inspiring 
effects  of  China's  action.  The  question  of  joining  the  Allies 
out  and  out  was  thrown  into  politics.  From  all  this  most 
of  the  ministers  held  aloof.  When  Liang  Chi-chao  sounded 
me  on  this  question,  I  told  him,  while  lacking  instructions 
from  my  government,  that  I  thought  the  rupture  of  diplo- 
matic relations  would  be  enough,  if  it  should  come  to 
that.  Within  a  few  days  instructions  came  from  the  State 
Department  to  the  same  effect. 


CHINA  BREAKS  WITH  GERMANY  257 

During  March  I  repeatedly  saw  Vice-President  Feng  and 
President  Li.  Feng,  small  and  slender,  intelligent  in  appear- 
ance, bald,  with  keen  but  shifty  eyes,  was  courtesy  itself.  I 
was  specially  delighted  with  the  refinement  and  musical 
quality  of  his  diction.  I  went  over  the  whole  ground  with 
him,  satisfying  him,  especially,  on  the  question  of  the  specific 
American  objections  to  the  German  U-boats.  "I  approve 
heartily  and  completely,"  he  finally  assured  me,  "of  the  pro- 
posed break  with  Germany." 

I  found  that  General  Li  was  not  only  in  favour  of  breaking 
with  Germany,  but  of  an  internal  break  with  his  own  premier. 
General  Tuan.  "I  cannot  trust  him,"  said  Li;  "he  wishes  to 
eliminate  me  from  real  power."  This  friction  within  dis- 
tressed me  not  a  little,  as  I  had  sincerely  hoped  that  these 
two  men  would  come  to  cooperate. 

Then  I  saw  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang.  Besides  being  China's 
foreign  minister.  Doctor  Wu  is  a  spiritualist.  When  I 
entered,  he  followed  his  usual  bent,  bundled  the  morning's 
business  details  over  to  the  counsellor  in  attendance,  and 
devoted  himself  to  philosophizing.  Spiritualism,  longevity, 
and  the  advantages  of  a  vegetarian  diet,  were  to  him  topics 
for  real  thought  and  speculation.  In  mystic  language,  he 
remarked:  "There  is  an  aura  gradually  spreading  from 
Europe  over  the  entire  surface  of  the  world.  It  enters  the 
brains  of  the  people  and  penetrates  them,  making  them  war- 
mad.     We  are  having  the  first  signs  here." 

By  March  loth,  submarine  warfare  had  not  been  modified. 
Parliament  then  formally  approved  the  breach  of  diplomatic 
relations  with  Germany. 

I  had  almost  belaboured  the  department  for  instruc- 
tions during  the  progress  of  our  work.  But  it  was  not 
until  the  13th  of  March,  the  very  day  the  break  of  diplo- 
matic relations  was  formally  notified,  that  the  instructions 
came.  These  rather  implied  that  the  circular  inviting 
cooperation  on  the  part  of  the  neutral  powers  had  been  too 


258      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

strongly  acted  upon  by  me.  I  could  not  but  be  inwardly 
amused. 

When  a  government  takes  a  step  involving  life  and  death 
and  all  the  interests  of  its  own  and  of  general  civilization; 
when,  in  connection  therewith,  it  calls  upon  other  powers  to 
associate  themselves  with  it — it  ought  to  be  safe  to  presume 
that  the  government  means  what  it  says.  It  should  see 
that  the  action  it  invokes  involves  great  sacrifices,  and  it 
must  not  invoke  it  lightly.  A  responsible  official  would  not 
be  justified  in  interpreting  such  a  note  in  a  platonic  sense. 

At  once  questions  of  finance  arose.  Ancient  China  had 
taken  her  brave  step  in  modern  world  affairs.  She  might 
now  have  to  go  to  war.  That  would  take  money,  and  money 
would  be  needed  to  guard  such  a  contingency — indeed,  intern- 
ally and  externally  China  had  need  to  put  her  financial 
house  in  order.  Yuan  Shih-kai's  imperialism  had  left  a  bur- 
den of  debt.  The  Republic  required  strengthening  by  a  new 
system  of  national  credit  and  by  the  building  up  of  its  natural 
resources.  Now  the  public  debt  was  relatively  still  small, 
the  rate  of  taxation  upon  the  hundreds  of  millions  of  citizens 
low.  The  situation  was  basically  sound.  The  question  had 
been  asked  since  last  summer:  Would  America  supply  China 
with  an  investment  loan  of  a  hundred  millions,  thus  deliver- 
ing her  of  lenders  who  were  seeking  to  dominate  her  and  to 
split  her  up  into  "spheres  of  influence"? 

Minister  Wellington  Koo,  who  had  journeyed  to  the  United 
States  in  behalf  of  Yuan  Shih-kai's  imperial  ambitions, 
now  worked  for  the  Republic  there.  I  suggested  at  first  that 
the  firm  of  Lee,  Higginson  &  Company,  which  still  held  its 
option,  should  complete  its  loan.  This  was  not  done.  Then 
other  capitalists  were  approached  and  in  November,  191 6, 
Doctor  Koo  arranged  for  a  large  loan  with  Mr.  John  J.Abbott, 
president  of  the  Continental  and  Commercial  Savings  Bank 
of  Chicago.  Mr.  Abbott,  wishing  to  study  the  Chinese  finan- 
cial situation,  arrived  in  Peking  during  April,  19 17,  bringing 


CHINA  BREAKS  WITH  GERMANY  259 

his  lawyer.  I  got  him  acquainted  with  the  Chinese  ministers, 
and  took  him  and  Mr.  Joy  Morton,  also  of  Chicago,  to  lunch 
with  President  Li  and  Dr.  Chen  Chin-tao  and  Hsu  Un-yuen. 
The  President  said:  "I  will  back  all  financial  legislation  which 
American  experts  may  find  necessary  for  the  proper  organiza- 
tion of  China's  credit." 

Doctor  Chen  was  arrested  and  put  in  prison  through  the 
plotting  of  his  enemies,  but  Hsu  Un-yuen  remained,  with  his 
sound  financial  training.  Finally  Mr.  Abbott  proposed  an 
ingenious  scheme,  with  the  wine  and  tobacco  taxes  as  the 
basis — for  every  $i,ooo,ocxd  of  annual  revenue  there  should 
be  a  loan  of  $5,000,000;  if  the  taxes  amounted  to  ten  millions, 
they  would  serve  as  security  for  a  loan  of  fifty  millions. 
Mr.  Abbott  left  behind  him  a  plan  for  reorganizing  these 
taxes,  and  a  promise  to  take  up  at  any  time  the  question  of 
loans  on  this  basis,  in  addition  to  five  millions  lent  the  pre- 
ceding November  and  an  option  for  twenty-five  millions 
more. 


CHAPTER  XXII 
CHINA'S  BOSSES  COME  TO  PEKING 

I  HAVE  noted  that  Dr.  Chen  Chin-tao,  Chinese  Minister 
of  Finance,  was  put  in  prison.  Doctor  Chen  had  adminis- 
tered Chinese  finances  strictly  and  well,  in  a  most  difficult 
period.  For  the  military  governors  or  Tuchuns,who  were  the 
real  bosses  of  China's  vast  population,  he  was  too  honest  and 
too  strict.  The  Tuchuns  looked  upon  the  Minister  of  Fi- 
nance as  in  duty  bound  to  procure  funds  for  them  by  hook  or 
crook. 

When  the  government  banks  were  broken  and  had  declared 
a  moratorium,  their  large  over-issues  of  notes  were  worth 
only  one  half  their  face  value.  Working  with  Doctor  Chen 
was  Hsu  Un-yuen,  managing  director  of  the  Bank  of  China. 
Mr.  Hsu  managed  judiciously  to  bring  the  notes  of  his  bank 
virtually  to  par.  The  Tuchuns,  aided  by  the  pro-Japanese 
clique,  which  formed  part  of  the  Premier's  entourage,  at- 
tacked both  Hsu  and  Doctor  Chen.  For  the  latter  the  cabal 
laid  a  trap.  It  was  made  to  appear  that  he  gave  support  to  a 
certain  company  in  return  for  having  his  brother  employed. 
So  the  cabal,  using  this  pretext  to  satisfy  their  grievances, 
got  him  arrested  and  jailed,  thus  ending  his  negotiations  with 
the  Chicago  bank  of  John  J.  Abbott.  President  Li  was  in- 
terested and  distressed.  When  I  asked  Premier  Tuan  about 
Doctor  Chen,  he  smilingly  stated  that  he  should  have  a 
chance  to  clear  himself. 

Meanwhile,  the  breach  between  the  Premier  and  the 
President  widened.  To  strengthen  himself  in  his  policy  of 
favouring  a  declaration  of  war,  the  Premier  called  all  the 
Tuchuns  to  Peking  for  a  conference.     Nine  governors-general 

260 


CHINA'S  BOSSES  COME  TO  PEKING        261 

came,  and  all  the  other  provinces  sent  delegates.  General 
Tuan  was  successful  with  them,  and  by  April  28th  they  had 
decided  to  support  his  war  policy. 

The  Tuchun  of  Shantung  was  bulky,  coarse-looking.  I 
had  some  idea  of  his  views  on  representative  government 
from  his  inaugural  address  to  the  Shantung  Assembly. 
"Gentlemen,"  the  Tuchun  said  with  genial  frankness, "you 
resemble  birds  who  are  in  a  large  cage  together.  If  you 
behave  well,  and  sing  songs  that  are  pleasing,  we  shall  feed 
you;  otherwise,  you  shall  have  to  go  without  food." 

Several  of  the  Tuchuns  called  on  me  by  appointment,  and 
later  I  gave  them  a  formal  reception,  at  which  I  saw  all  who 
had  come  to  Peking,  observed  their  personalities,  and  tried 
to  fathom  the  source  of  their  personal  prominence  and  power. 
I  talked  with  them  individually  and  in  groups,  chiefly  about 
the  progress  of  the  war  and  the  relative  strength  of  the  com- 
batants. My  guests  were  full  of  smiles  and  good  cheer, 
particularly  did  the  Tuchun  of  Fukien  radiate  joy.  In  their 
sociability  they  were  true  Chinese,  and  here,  where  they  had 
been  received  with  the  military  honours  due  to  their  position 
and  in  the  spirit  of  hospitality,  they  could  show  themselves 
in  a  more  amiable  light  than  when  maintaining  their  power 
in  their  provinces.  To  a  brief  speech  of  welcome  which  I 
made  when  they  had  all  arrived  General  Hsu  Shu-cheng 
replied  with  a  most  emphatic  expression  of  friendship  for 
America. 

That  so  many  of  these  governors  should  have  risen  from 
the  lowliest  position  was  indeed  strong  evidence  of  the  under- 
lying democracy  of  Chinese  life.  But  that  a  mere  handful 
of  men  should  wield  such  power,  each  in  his  province,  did  not 
bespeak  strength  in  representative  government. 

Some  of  the  military  commanders  were  men  of  education, 
although  most  of  them  had  risen  from  very  modest  surround- 
ings: Yen  Hsi-shan,  of  Shansi;  Chu  Jui,  of  Chekiang;  Tang 
Chi-yao,  of  Yunnan;  Chen  Kuang-yuan,  of  Kiangsi;  Ni  Tze- 


262      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

chung,  of  Anhwei;  Li  Shun,  of  Nanking,  a  fisherman's  son; 
Li  Ho-chi  of  Fukien,  Tien  Chung-yu  of  Kalgan,  both  of 
middle-class  families — all  these  were  fair  scholars.  General 
Wu  Pei-fu,  who  rose  from  the  post  of  a  private  in  the  Chino- 
Japanese  War,  had  through  great  intelligence  and  industry 
acquired  a  good  education,  as  likewise  had  General  Feng 
Yu-hsiang;  both  of  these  generals  professed  the  Christian 
religion.  President  Feng  Kuo-chang  came  of  a  poor  family, 
and  as  a  young  man  played  a  fiddle  in  a  small  local 
theatre. 

Among  the  other  Tuchuns  were  many  to  whom  the  Chinese 
applied  the  proverb:  "A  good  man  will  never  become  a  sol- 
dier." These  men,  indeed,  deserve  credit  for  having  risen 
from  their  original  state  as  coolies,  bandits,  or  horse-thieves, 
but  they  often  owe  their  prominence  to  qualities  which  by  no 
means  make  for  the  good  of  the  state.  Chang  Tso-lin,  the 
Viceroy  of  Manchuria,  commenced  his  career  as  a  bandit; 
he  was  pardoned  by  Chao  Er-shun,  and  became  a  govern- 
ment oflScer.  Chang  Huai-chi  was  a  coolie,  and  never  got 
much  education.  Tsao  Kun,  of  Chihli,  was  a  huckster. 
Wang  Chan-yuan  was  a  hostler.  The  trio,  Chang  Hsun, 
Lu  Yung-ting,  and  MuYung-hsing,  headed  the  so-called  Black 
Flag  Band;  at  one  time  the  partners  put  up  fifty  thousand 
taels  to  enable  Chang  Hsun  to  buy  himself  an  office  and  be- 
come respectable.  But  he  spent  it  all  in  high  living.  With 
the  antedecents  of  some  of  these  men  one  marvels  not  only 
at  the  position  they  have  acquired,  but  at  the  personal  polish 
and  air  of  refinement  of  many  of  them. 

All  of  them  dealt  with  political  power  as  a  commodity, 
secured  through  the  use  of  money  and  soldiers.  They  were 
somewhat  like  the  condottieri  of  the  Italian  renaissance, 
looking  ahead  only  to  the  goal  of  their  personal  ambition  for 
wealth  and  power.  Even  among  these  militarists,  however, 
there  were  those  who  gave  some  attention  to  matters  of 
public  policy,  and  the  idea  of  national  welfare  and  unity  had 


CHINA'S  BOSSES  COME  TO  PEKING       263 

begun  to  dawn  upon  their  consciousness.  Moreover,  in  them 
I  felt  a  mixture  of  the  old  and  the  new.  They  had  suddenly 
come  into  great  power,  thought  in  terms  of  airplanes  and 
modern  armaments,  but  had  as  yet  few  other  modern  ideas 
to  inspire  their  action  with  anything  beyond  personal  motives. 
In  their  human  qualities,  however,  several  of  them  excelled; 
and  some,  even,  showed  a  real  spirit  of  public  service  and 
ability  as  administrators. 

The  Japanese  Government  was  still  trying  to  get  China 
into  the  war,  and  its  minister  called  on  President  Li  to  urge 
it.  I  talked  on  May  9th  with  the  President,  who  said  that 
he  favoured  a  declaration  of  war  provided  parliament  was 
not  overridden  in  the  process.  Then  I  saw  the  Premier. 
"If  parliament  is  obstinate,"  General  Tuan  said  bluntly, 
"it  will  be  dissolved." 

I  told  him  it  would  make  a  very  bad  impression  in  the 
United  States  and  with  other  Western  powers  if  parliament 
were  ignored  in  so  important  a  matter.  I  knew  that  parlia- 
ment did  not  oppose  declaring  war,  but  desired  to  control  the 
war  poHcy.  "But,"  the  Premier  urged,  "the  opposition  of 
parliament  disregards  national  interests.  It  desires  merely 
to  secure  partisan  advantage."  Tuan  discussed  the  attitude 
of  Japan.  "The  Japanese  have  assured  me,"  he  declared, 
"that  if  I  follow  a  strong  policy  I  may  count  on  their  support. 
Now  circumstances  force  the  Chinese  Government  to  be 
friendly  to  Japan.  Of  course,  I  will  not  give  up  any  valuable 
rights  to  anybody,  and  I  will  strengthen  China  in  every  way 
so  that  resistance  may  be  oflFered  to  any  attempted  injustice." 

Ironically,  he  asked  whether  confidence  could  be  placed  in 
the  southern  leaders  of  the  Kuo  Min  Tang.  "  I  have  proof," 
he  continued,  "that  both  Sun  Yat-sen  and  Tsen  Liang-kuang 
have  given  written  assurances  to  the  Japanese  Consul-Gencral 
at  Shanghai  that  if  either  of  them  becomes  President  of  China 
he  will  conclude  a  treaty  granting  to  Japan  rights  of  supcrvi- 
sicai  of  military  and  administrative  affairs  more  extensive 


264      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

than  those  sought  in  Group  V  of  the  twenty-one  demands." 
So  each  party  believed  the  worst  of  the  other. 

Events  were  tending  to  a  dimax.  The  Government  was 
demorahzed.  Doctor  Chen  was  in  prison;  Mr.  Li  Ching-hsi, 
a  nephew  of  Li  Hung-chang,  who  was  to  take  Chen's  place, 
would  not  assume  office  while  affairs  remained  so  unsettled. 
The  Ministry  of  Communications  was  in  charge  of  an  under- 
ling. The  Minister  of  Education,  who  also  acted  as  Minister 
of  the  Interior,  was  seriously  ill.  The  Kuo  Min  Tang  minis- 
ters had  lost  their  influence  with  their  party  in  parliament 
because  of  their  failure  effectively  to  oppose  the  Tuchuns' 
policy.  It  was  believed  that  the  Tuchuns,  with  the  followers 
of  General  Tuan,  were  planning  a  coup  against  Parliament. 

In  the  midst  of  this  I  had  a  personal  chat  with  Chen  Lu, 
the  Vice-Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  at  an  evening  reception 
at  the  British  Legation.  I  told  him  of  my  surprise  that  the 
Tuchuns,  instead  of  attending  to  the  urgent  business  in  their 
provinces,  should  be  gathered  here,  interfering  with  the  Cen- 
tral Government.  I  let  it  be  distinctly  understood  that  any 
movement  to  overthrow  parliament  in  order  to  carry  out  the 
war  policy  could  not  be  expected  to  receive  the  sympathy 
of  the  United  States.  The  vice-minister  was  in  close  touch 
with  the  Tuchuns.  I  expected  that  he  would  repeat  my  re- 
marks to  them.     He  did. 

As  I  was  leaving  the  chancery  a  few  evenings  later  Mr. 
Roy  Anderson  appeared  with  the  news  that  something  was 
happening  and  drove  me  over  to  the  railway  station.  We 
went  through  the  Chenmen  gate.  Along  the  main  street 
were  many  carts  rapidly  driven,  loaded  with  mihtary  stores 
and  household  goods.  Automobiles  were  rushing  by  them 
to  the  station.  On  the  platform  was  a  turmoil  of  troops 
busily  transferring  the  various  military  possessions  to  cars. 
In  a  parlour  car  our  friends  the  Tuchuns  were  assembling. 
I  left  Mr.  Anderson  there  to  observe  and  to  get  information. 

It  appeared  that  the  Tuchuns  had  all  of  a  sudden  decided 


CHINA'S  BOSSES  COME  TO  PEKING       265 

to  leave  Peking  for  their  various  capitals,  taking  their  body- 
guards with  them.  Two  or  three  were  to  remain  in  Tientsin 
a  little  longer  to  watch  developments.  Their  precipitous 
exit  seemed  to  indicate  that  President  Li  had  at  last  got  the 
upper  hand. 

As  a  farewell  courtesy  to  Doctor  Willoughby,  the  American 
legal  adviser,  the  President  had  invited  him  and  me  to  lunch- 
eon on  the  following  day.  President  Li  was  cheerful.  The 
discomfiture  of  the  Tuchuns  filled  him  with  glee.  **All 
danger  is  passed,"  he  announced;  **I  will  dismiss  General 
Tuan,  appoint  a  new  cabinet,  and  have  parliament  decide 
the  war  question  without  compulsion." 

In  order  to  inform  myself  as  to  what  was  behind  the 
President's  confidence,  I  asked  him  what  he  had  to  put  in 
the  place  of  his  cabinet  and  General  Tuan,  and  whether  he 
believed  that  the  Government  could  be  carried  on  without  the 
concurrence  of  that  important  party. 

"Oh,  yes,"  the  President  assured  me,  "it  is  all  arranged." 

Pressing  him  a  little  further,  and  asking  upon  whom,  in 
particular,  he  was  relying,  to  my  unspeakable  surprise,  he 
said:   "General  Chang  Hsun  will  assist  me." 

Now  General  Chang  Hsun  was  an  old-time  bandit  and 
militarist.  His  ideas  were  devoid  of  any  understanding  of 
representative  institutions.  It  passed  my  power  of  imagina- 
tion to  see  how  reliance  could  be  placed  in  this  general  for 
the  vindication  of  parliament.  As  I  looked  dubious,  the 
President  repeated:  "Yes,  you  may  believe  me.  I  can  rely 
on  General  Chang  Hsun." 

It  was  not  what  Chang  Hsun  stood  for  that  the  President 
relied  on,  but  on  his  enmity  to  General  Tuan.  Li  Yuan-hung, 
though  quite  modern  in  his  conception  of  government,  in 
this  instance  followed  a  strong  Chinese  instinct  which 
aims  to  prevail  by  setting  off  strong  individuals  against  each 
other. 

After  I  had  heard  that  the  dismissal  of  General  Tuan  had 


266      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

been  announced,  General  Chin  Yun-peng  called  on  me.  He 
was  agitated  and  much  worried.  "Do  you  not  think  that 
General  Tuan  should  leave  Peking?"  he  asked.  "His  ene- 
mies will  undoubtedly  wish  to  take  his  life." 

I  tried  to  cheer  him  up  by  telling  him  that  in  a  modern 
government  such  ups  and  downs  must  be  expected.  " Let  the 
other  side  now  develop  their  policy,  and  show  what  they  can 
do;  let  General  Tuan  use  this  time  for  quiet  recuperation, 
after  the  strain  he  has  been  through.  Then,"  I  said,  "the 
time  will  come  again  when  Tuan  will  be  called  back  to  power." 
The  eyes  of  the  good  general  lit  up  with  gratitude.  General 
Ni  Tze-chung,  most  notorious  and  active  among  the  military 
party,  declared  on  the  26th  of  May  that  the  dismissal  of 
General  Tuan  had  been  illegal.  His  province  of  Anhwei  dis- 
approved; it  would  act  independently  of  the  Central  Govern- 
ment. 

This  was  the  crucial  point  in  the  development  of  the 
situation. 

Expert  observers  said  that  had  the  President  immediately 
dismissed  Ni  and  ordered  his  punishment,  appointing  a  junior 
commander  in  his  place,  the  rest  of  the  militarists  would 
have  fallen  away  from  Ni,  and  the  President  could  have 
dealt  with  them  individually.  Instead,  he  was  persuaded  to 
send  a  conciliatory  letter  to  General  Ni. 

This,  of  course,  confirmed  the  leadership  of  Ni  over  the 
military  party;  further,  it  encouraged  the  majority  of  the 
Tuchuns  to  declare  their  independence. 

A  so-called  provisional  government  was  set  up  at  Tientsin. 
The  older  and  wiser  heads  of  the  military  party,  men  like 
General  Tuan  Chi-jui  and  Mr.  Hsu  Shih-chang,  held  them- 
selves entirely  aloof  from  this  new  organization. 

General  Ni  Tze-chung  was  the  leading  spirit.  By  dint  of 
force  the  so-called  government  helped  itself  to  the  deposits  of 
the  Chinese  Government  in  the  Tientsin  branch  of  the  Bank 
of  China.    The  men  greatly  in  evidence  were  the  members  of 


CHINA'S  BOSSES  COME  TO  PEKING        267 

the  pro-Japanese  clique,  Mr.  Tsao  Ju-lin  and  General  Hsu 
Shu-cheng.  General  Aoki,  the  Japanese  military  adviser  to 
the  Government,  was  also  on  the  ground. 

In  Peking  a  paralysis  crept  over  the  Government.  The 
President  lost  his  advantage  as  quickly  as  he  had  gained  it. 
On  the  railways  all  orders  of  the  Tuchuns  for  transportation 
were  implicitly  obeyed.  When  at  this  time  the  question  of 
the  movement  of  revolutionary  troops  and  their  stationing  at 
Tientsin  and  along  the  railway  came  up,  the  Japanese  minis- 
ter persisted  in  the  position  that  it  would  be  highly  undesir- 
able to  make  any  objection  on  the  ground  of  any  possible 
conflict  with  the  protection  of  the  railway  by  foreign  troops. 
Two  months  before,  the  Japanese  Legation  had  strongly 
objected  to  the  stationing  of  a  few  government  troops  along 
the  same  railway. 

The  President  issued  a  mandate  inviting  Chang  Hsun  to 
Peking  as  arbitrator. 

When  I  interviewed  the  President,  he  looked  disconsolate. 
His  youthful  English  secretary,  Mr.  Kuo,  tried  his  best  to 
give  a  more  cheerful  and  confident  note  to  Li's  conversation, 
but  Doctor  Tenney,  who  was  with  me,  easily  compared  the 
President's  doleful  Chinese  with  the  more  buoyant  EngHsh 
translation. 

The  plan  of  the  Tuchuns  was  directed  toward  isolating 
and  strangling  Peking.  They  controlled  the  railways  leading 
there,  and  were  preventing  the  shipment  of  foodstuflfs.  The 
ministry  that  controlled  the  railways,  it  must  be  remembered, 
was  controlled  by  Japanese  influence.  Constitutional  gov- 
ernment in  China  was  paralyzed  through  the  lack  of  military 
and  financial  authority. 

The  war  issue  worried  the  Chinese.  First,  they  feared  that 
the  militarist  party  would  take  advantage  of  it,  through  the 
support  of  Japanese  influence,  to  fasten  its  hold  upon  China; 
second,  that  China  might  by  the  Allies  be  made  a  field  in 
which  to  seek  compensations.     But  if  local  political  troubles 


268      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

had  not  entirely  upset  the  situation,  it  might  have  been  possi- 
ble to  arrange  for  a  joint  declaration  of  the  powers  that 
would  have  allayed  suspicion  and  made  it  feasible  for  China 
to  enter  the  war  with  a  sense  of  security. 

Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang,  acting  on  the  suggestion  of  Mr.  Lenox 
Simpson  and  liberal-minded  Chinese  publicists,  made  a  move 
to  have  the  American  Government  do  something.  He  sent 
advices  to  Minister  Koo  in  Washington  telling  him  about 
General  Ni  and  his  leadership  of  the  revolt  of  the  Tuchuns. 
The  southern  provinces  were  still  loyal  to  the  President  and 
parliament,  and  the  civil  and  commercial  population  disap- 
proved of  the  rebellion.  President  Wilson  and  Secretary 
Lansing  were  asked  to  make  a  statement  in  behalf  of  repre- 
sentative government  in  China.  This  was  followed  by  a 
direct  appeal  to  President  Wilson. 

But  the  American  Government  had  already  instructed  me 
on  the  5th  of  June  to  communicate  to  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment a  statement  evincing  a  sincere  desire  for  internal  politi- 
cal harmony.  The  question  of  China's  entry  into  the  war, 
it  said,  was  secondary  to  continuing  the  political  unity  of 
China  and  the  laying  aside  of  factional  disputes.  I  accom- 
panied it  orally  with  a  personal  statement  that  the  United 
States  conceived  the  war  to  be  one  for  the  principles  of  democ- 
racy; that  it  would  deplore  any  construction  of  its  invitation 
which  would  lend  itself  to  the  idea  that  it  contemplated  any 
coercion  or  restriction  upon  Chinese  freedom  of  action.  I 
made  plain  that  no  matter  how  much  the  United  States 
wished  the  cooperation  of  China  in  the  war,  it  did  not  desire 
to  bring  this  about  by  using  the  political  dissensions  or  work- 
ing with  any  one  faction  in  disregard  of  parhament. 

General  Tuan  Chi-jui  at  once  stated  to  Doctor  Ferguson, 
who  unofficially  informed  him  of  the  American  note  at  Tient- 
sin, that  he  had  totally  withdrawn  from  all  politics.  The 
Chinese  press  gave  a  very  favourable  reception  to  the  note; 
the  Chinese  people  welcomed  America's  advice     General 


CHINA'S  BOSSES  COME  TO  PEKING       269 

Feng  Kuo-chang,  later  when  he  had  become  President,  spoke 
of  the  note  to  me,  and  remarked  on  the  salutary  influence  it 
had  wielded  upon  public  opinion  in  China. 

While  the  political  dissensions  in  the  Chinese  state  were  too 
personal  to  be  overcome  by  any  friendly  suggestions  from  the 
outside,  nevertheless.the  American  note  had  set  up  a  standard 
for  all  the  Chinese.  It  had,  furthermore,  given  convincing 
proof  of  the  fact  that  the  true  interests  of  China  were  im- 
partially weighed  by  the  American  Government,  and  were 
not  entirely  subordinated  to  any  war  policy  which  America 
might  desire  to  advance.  From  all  parts  of  China  came 
expressions  of  gratitude  and  satisfaction  that  the  American 
Government  should  have  spoken  to  China  so  justly  and 
truly.  The  Chinese  appreciated  the  spirit  of  justice  of  the 
American  Government  in  not  desiring  to  have  the  war  issue 
used  for  the  purposes  of  enabling  any  faction  or  party  to 
override  the  free  determination  of  the  Chinese  Government 
and  people.  As  America  was  itself  at  war  and  would  there- 
fore have  welcomed  cooperation,  this  just  policy  particularly 
impressed  the  Chinese. 

The  Japanese  press  both  in  Japan  and  China  immediately 
launched  forth  into  a  bitter  invective  against  the  American 
action.  The  United  States  should  have  consulted  Japan. 
Its  action  constituted  interference  in  the  domestic  affairs  of 
China.  "If  China  listens  to  advice  from  America,"  a  Japa- 
nese major-general  declared  in  an  excited  speech  at  a  dinner  in 
Peking  on  the  7th  of  June,  "she  will  have  Japan  to  deal 
with." 

The  Japanese  ambassador  at  Washington  protested  in- 
formally. Had  not  Secretary  Bryan,  in  a  note  dated  the 
13th  of  March,  191 5,  recognized  the  special  and  close  rela- 
tions, political  and  economic,  between  Japan  and  China  ?  It 
was  impossible  that  the  American  minister  at  Peking  was 
taking  a  part  in  political  affairs  in  China,  but  the  Japanese 
public  was  sensitive  about  the  note  sent  by  the  American 


270      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Government  to  China.  Would  it  not  be  useful  if  the  Ameri- 
can Government  would  confirm  Mr.  Bryan's  statement  ? 

The  reply  to  this  communication  did  not  come  until  the 
6th  of  July.  Mr.  Bryan's  statement,  the  reply  said,  referred 
only  to  the  special  relations  created  by  territorial  contiguity 
in  certain  parts  of  China.  Even  with  respect  to  them  it  in 
no  way  admitted  that  the  United  States  might  not  in  future 
be  justified  in  expressing  itself  relative  to  questions  that 
might  arise  between  China  and  Japan.  The  United  States 
could  not  be  indifferent  to  matters  affecting  the  welfare  of 
the  Chinese  people,  such  as  the  unrest  in  China. 

The  first  detachments  of  Chang  Hsun's  troops  arrived  in 
Peking  on  the  9th  of  June.  Chang  Hsun's  theory  was  that 
it  is  the  business  of  a  trooper  to  make  himself  terrible.  These 
wild  horsemen,  wearing  loose-fitting  black  uniforms,  with 
their  cues  rolled  up  on  the  back  of  the  head,  rode  about  Pe- 
king with  the  air  of  conquerors.  The  "Mediator"  was  com- 
ing with  sufficient  military  force  to  back  his  judgment. 

When  General  Chang  himself  arrived,  the  streets  from  the 
railway  station  to  the  Mediator's  house  in  the  Manchu  city 
were  entirely  shut  off.  Mounted  troopers  blocked  the  way 
as  my  automobile  came  along  a  side  street  to  cross  one  of 
these  thoroughfares.  They  nearly  collided  with  the  front  of 
my  machine,  drew  their  guns,  and  would  not  budge.  To 
explain  to  them  my  right  to  pass  would  have  meant  sending 
someone  to  the  Foreign  Office;  even  then  in  order  to  go  on 
I  might  have  to  run  over  them,  for  the  Foreign  Office,  un- 
doubtedly, meant  nothing  at  all  to  them.  I  told  my  com- 
panion not  to  let  them  know  my  position.  We  tried  to 
pass  through  on  the  ground  that  we  had  business  on  the 
other  side,  but  they  reared  their  horses  up  and  down,  and 
nearly  came  into  the  machine  with  us.  We  were  held  up 
until  the  great  man  had  arrived  and  had  raced  from  the 
station  to  his  residence. 

When  I  was  with  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang  a  few  days  later  the 


CHINA'S  BOSSES  COME  TO  PEKING       271 

card  of  a  secretary  of  the  cabinet  was  brought  in.  I  knew 
that  he  was  trying  to  induce  Doctor  Wu  to  sign  a  decree  dis- 
solving parliament.  I  had  heard  in  the  morning  that  Presi- 
dent Li  had  finally  caved  in;  for  Chang  Hsun's  first 
prescription  for  restoring  China  was  to  declare  that  parlia- 
ment must  be  dissolved.  The  President  relied  on  Chang's 
assistance.  He  could  not  help  himself,  he  must  accept  the 
dictation  of  the  man  he  had  summoned. 

I  rejoined  a  friend  who  awaited  me  outside  in  the  automo- 
bile. He  had  just  overheard  the  chauffeur  of  the  cabinet 
secretary  and  the  doorman  of  the  Foreign  Office.  The  chauf- 
feur had  said :  "  Is  your  old  man  going  to  sign  up .?  You  had 
better  see  to  it  that  he  does,  else  something  might  happen  to 
him." 

These  subordinates  were  keeping  their  eyes  open. 

The  Japanese  minister,  on  whom  I  called  that  morning,  said 
to  me:  "General  Chang's  mediation  is  the  last  hope  of  peace. 
It  is  desirable  that  parliament  be  gotten  rid  of,  it  is  obstruct- 
ive, and  makes  the  doing  of  business  well-nigh  impossible." 

Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang  stood  out  against  countersigning  the 
mandate  that  would  dissolve  the  parliament.  In  matters  of 
spiritualism,  vegetarianism,  and  longevity,  I  had  perhaps  not 
always  been  able  to  take  him  quite  seriously.  But  I  admired 
his  quiet  courage  in  not  allowing  himself  to  be  bowled  over, 
after  even  President  Li  had  given  in.  Before  daylight  on 
the  13th  of  June  Doctor  Wu  was  roused  from  his  bed  and 
now  asked  to  countersign  a  Presidential  mandate  designating 
the  jovial  General  Chiang  Chao-tsung,  commander  of  the 
Peking  gendarmerie,  to  act  as  Premier,  and  accepting  Doctor 
Wu's  resignation.  Before  daybreak  General  Chiang  signed 
the  mandate  dissolving  parliament.  The  President  con- 
sented to  its  issue,  for  he  had  been  told  it  would  be  impossible 
to  prevent  disturbances  in  Peking  unless  this  were  done. 

So  wore  on  the  early  summer  of  ipi7.  Affairs  seemed  to 
have  arrived  at  a  stalemate. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 
AN  EMPEROR  FOR  A  DAY 

My  family  had  gone  to  Peitaiho  for  the  summer.  I  was 
staying  at  the  residence  alone  with  Mr.  F.  L.  Behn,  who  had 
recently  come  to  Peking  to  join  my  staff.  I  slept  rather  late 
on  Sunday,  July  ist,  as  the  morning  was  cool.  When  Kao, 
the  first  boy,  came  in  to  take  orders  he  appeared  excited  and 
cried:   "Emperor  has  come  back  again!'* 

I  did  not  immediately  grasp  the  significance  of  this  aston- 
ishing announcement;  but  he  went  on  volubly  telling  me  that 
it  was  true,  that  the  Emperor  had  returned,  that  all  the 
people  were  hanging  out  the  yellow  dragon  flag.  I  sent  out 
for  information  and  soon  learned  that  the  little  emperor,  in 
some  mysterious  way,  had  been  restored  during  the  night. 

The  monarchical  movement  came  as  a  complete  surprise 
to  everybody,  for  it  was  entirely  the  personal  act  of  General 
Chang  Hsun.  The  men  whose  names  were  recited  in  his 
proclamations  as  assisting  him  had  known  nothing  about  it; 
it  was  undreamed  of  even  by  those  who  found  themselves 
forced  to  assist,  such  as  the  Chief  of  Staff  and  the  heads  of 
the  gendarmerie  and  of  the  police. 

Kang  Yu-wei,  the  "Modern  Sage"  of  China,  arrived  in 
Peking  on  June  29th,  and  with  him  the  restoration  was 
planned.  Kang  Yu-wei,  who  had  been  the  leader  of  the 
first  reform  movement  in  1898,  when  he  made  a  stand  against 
absolutism,  had  always  remained  a  consistent  believer  in 
constitutional  monarchy.  He  encouraged  Chang  Hsun  with 
philosophical  theory,  and  wrote  all  his  edicts  for  him.  The 
two  believed  that  the  Imperial  restoration  would  immediately 
bring  to  the  active  support  of  the  Government  all  the  military 

373 


AN  EMPEROR  FOR  A  DAY  273 

governors,  whose  true  sentiments  were  notoriously  imperial- 
istic. Their  consent  was  taken  for  granted,  and  the  edicts, 
as  drawn  up,  expressly  assumed  that  it  had  been  given. 

It  became  known  to  me  that  Chang  Hsun  had  also  dis- 
cussed the  possibility  of  an  Imperial  restoration  with  the 
Japanese  minister.  The  latter  expressed  the  opinion  that 
the  movement  should  not  be  undertaken  without  first  making 
sure  of  the  assent  of  the  chief  military  leaders.  Chang  Hsun 
had  no  doubt  of  this  support;  he  evidently  regarded  the  ad- 
vice of  the  Japanese  minister  as  encouraging,  and  believed 
that  his  movement  would  have  diplomatic  countenance. 

Chang  Hsun  had  his  intimate  advisers,  particularly  Kang 
Yu-wei,  draw  up  the  requisite  Imperial  edicts  on  the  30th  of 
June.  In  these  it  was  stated  that  leading  governors,  like 
Feng  Kuo-chang,  Lu  Yung-ting,  and  others  of  equal  promi- 
nence, had  petitioned  for  the  restoration  of  the  monarchy. 
Lists  of  appointments  to  the  highest  positions  in  the  Central 
Government  and  the  provinces  were  prepared.  The  existing 
military  governors  were  in  most  cases  reappointed.  In  the 
Central  Government  the  important  men  designated  were  Hsu 
Shih-chang  as  Guardian  of  the  Emperor,  Liang  Tun-yen  as 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  Chu  Chi-pao  as  Minister  of 
the  Interior.  Wang  Shih-chen  was  retained  as  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff. 

As  an  amazing  instance  of  how  consent  was  taken  for 
granted,  it  was  recited  in  an  Imperial  edict  that  President 
Li  Yuan-hung  had  himself  petitioned  for  the  reestabHshment 
of  the  Empire;  this  edict  appointed  Li  a  duke  of  the  first 
class. 

So  soon  as  these  edicts  were  prepared  and  ready  for 
presentation,  a  dinner  was  arranged  for  the  evening  of  the 
same  day,  to  which  the  heads  of  the  Peking  military  and 
poHce  estabhshments  were  invited.  They  met  at  the  Kiang- 
su  Guild  Hall.  After  great  quantities  of  wine  had  been 
consumed,  Chang  Hsun  broached  his  project  for  the  sal- 


274     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

vation  of  China,  stating  that  all  preparations  had  been  made 
and  that  military  and  diplomatic  support  was  assured. 
Then,  pointing  to  the  Chief  of  Staff,  he  said :  "Of  course,  you 
are  supporting  the  movement." 

General  Wang,  completely  taken  aback,  saw  no  way  to 
refuse — since  he  was  in  the  presence  of  an  accomplished  fact. 
In  the  same  way  the  consent  of  General  Chiang,  head  of  the 
gendarmerie,  and  of  General  Wu,  head  of  the  police,  was 
obtained. 

Thus  the  enterprise  was  launched.  Chang  Hsun  directed 
General  Wang  and  four  others  to  proceed  immediately  to 
the  residence  of  President  Li,  to  wake  him  up,  and  to  obtain 
his  consent  to  a  memorial  asking  for  reestablishment  of  the 
monarchy.  Chang  Hsun  himself  proceeded  to  the  Imperial 
City.  Not  being  able  to  obtain  the  support  of  the  Imperial 
dukes  for  his  movement,  he  had  lavishly  bribed  the  eunuchs 
in  charge  of  the  palace,  who  opened  the  gates  for  him  and  his 
retinue,  and  took  him  to  the  private  residence  of  the  young 
Emperor.  Chang  Hsun  prostrated  himself,  and  informed 
the  Emperor  that  the  whole  nation  demanded  his  return  to 
the  throne.  Thereupon  he  took  the  frightened  boy  to  the 
great  throne  room,  and,  in  the  presence  of  his  retainers  and 
members  of  the  Imperial  Family,  who  had  been  summoned, 
formally  enthroned  the  Emperor.  Then  the  edicts  which 
had  been  prepared  were  formally  sealed. 

As  may  be  imagined,  there  were  some  comic  incidents. 
A  rather  distinguished  man  had  been  summoned  by  the 
Premier  to  discuss  with  the  President  his  assumption  of  one 
of  the  cabinet  portfolios.  A  Chinese  friend  of  mine  who  had 
just  heard  of  the  restoration  saw  him  at  the  hotel  about  ten 
o'clock  in  the  morning.  On  being  asked  what  was  his 
errand  in  Peking,  the  distinguished  personage  stated  con- 
fidentially that  he  was  awaiting  a  carriage  to  take  him  to  the 
President's  palace.  "There  is  no  President,"  he  was  told. 
"This  is  now  an  Empire;  the  Emperor  was  enthroned  at  four 


AN  EMPEROR  FOR  A  DAY  275 

o'clock  this  morning."  The  great  man's  astonishment  was 
amusing. 

As  the  miHtary  chiefs  were  deceived  on  the  preceding  night, 
so  Peking  was  deceived  for  one  day.  As  the  news  spread,  the 
population  showed  an  almost  joyous  excitement.  Every- 
where the  yellow  dragon  flags  appeared,  soon  the  entire  city 
took  on  a  festive  appearance.  Revived  memories  of  past 
splendour  seemingly  made  the  population  of  Peking  im- 
perialist to  a  man.  But  the  height  of  this  movement  was 
reached  as  early  as  the  morning  of  the  2nd  of  July. 

I  had  avoided  receiving  General  Chang  Hsun.  Mr. 
Liang  Tung-yen  came  to  assume  office  as  Minister  for  Foreign 
Afi^airs;  I  also  abstained  from  seeing  him,  as  well  as  the  rest 
of  General  Chang's  ministers,  asking  Doctor  Tenney  to  talk 
with  those  who  presented  themselves.  Mr.  Liang  had  always 
been  an  imperialist,  and  was  in  high  spirits,  believing  that  at 
last  China  was  saved.  He  had  been  led  to  believe  that  the 
foreign  diplomats  would  readily  recognize  the  restoration. 

Strong  doubts  as  to  the  character  of  the  movement  became 
manifest  on  Monday,  the  2nd  of  July.  Tuan  Chi-jui  did  not 
figure  in  the  Imperial  official  lists.  When  asked  about  this, 
Chang  Hsun  declared  that  General  Tuan  was  unimportant, 
having  no  troops  under  his  command.  But  Liang  Chi-chao 
had  been  playing  cards  with  friends  at  about  2  a.  m.  on  the 
fateful  night,  when  the  news  was  telephoned  to  Tientsin. 
Liang  immediately  went  to  General  Tuan's  residence,  where 
the  latter  was  similarly  engaged  at  cards.  General  Tuan,  who 
was  thoroughly  weary  of  public  affairs,  was  difficult  to  rouse; 
he  begged  to  be  spared  the  trouble  of  thinking  of  what  might 
be  occurring  in  Peking.  More  details  came  in,  and  it  be- 
came apparent  what  a  thoroughly  one-man  affair  the  move- 
ment was.     Then  Tuan  roused  himself. 

Tuan  was  at  that  time  actually  only  a  private  citizen, 
without  authority  or  command.  But  I  learned  later  that 
Liang  Chi-chao  had  gone  to  Japanese  friends  for  funds  to 


276      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

enlist  the  military  against  the  Imperial  movement,  and  he 
got  1,000,000  yen  as  a  loan  to  himself  and  General  Tuan  for 
this  purpose.  It  was  to  be  treated  as  a  government  loan 
upon  restoration  of  normal  conditions. 

The  two  proceeded  on  Tuesday  to  Machang,  where  the 
Eighth  Division  had  been  encamped  since  the  attempt  to 
overawe  President  Li  Yuan-hung.  General  Tuan,  it  was 
stated,  felt  nervous  as  to  the  outcome  of  his  venture,  but  he 
called  the  commanders,  declaring  that  he  had  always  been 
opposed  to  a  restoration  of  the  monarchy,  and  that  it  was 
now  being  attempted  by  a  single  general.  To  resist  this  act 
he  proposed  to  take  command  of  the  republican  troops. 

General  Tuan  was  at  once  recognized  as  commander-in- 
chief.  President  Li,  on  his  part,  did  not  yield  to  the  impor- 
tunities of  Chang  Hsun.  He  gave  out  an  absolute  denial  of 
the  statement  that  he  favoured  the  restoration.  After 
issuing  a  mandate  that  turned  over  the  Presidential  powers 
to  the  Vice-President  and  appointed  General  Tuan  Chi-jui 
Premier  and  Commander-in-Chief,  he  took  refuge  in  the 
Legation  Quarter.  I  sent  a  personal  representative  to 
General  Tuan  at  Tientsin,  who  declared  that  he  already  had 
complete  control  of  the  military  situation  and  could  finish 
Chang  Hsun  inside  of  ten  days. 

As  hostilities  threatened  in  and  around  Peking,  and  as  the 
danger  of  looting  was  always  present,  I  discussed  the  pre- 
cautions to  be  taken  with  several  of  my  colleagues,  and 
agreed  with  the  Japanese  minister  that  we  would  each  bring 
a  company  of  reinforcements  from  Tientsin.  Meanwhile, 
the  movements  of  Tuan's  troops  began.  To  hinder  their 
advance,  Chang  Hsun's  men  broke  the  railway  at  a  point 
about  one  third  of  the  way  from  Peking  to  Tientsin. 

Certain  members  of  the  diplomatic  corps  urged  that  we 
give  notice  that  no  fighting  should  take  place  on  or  near  the 
railways.  As  we  had  made  no  objection  to  the  bringing  in  of 
Chang  Hsun's  troops  and  to  their  being  stationed  in  Peking 


AN  EMPEROR  FOR  A  DAY  277 

and  along  the  railway,  I  took  the  position  that  we  were  not 
justified  in  objecting  to  the  troops  of  the  government  to  which 
we  were  accredited  taking  necessary  action  against  Chang 
Hsun.  We  might,  however,  insist  upon  the  right  of  keeping 
the  railway  open.  This  met  with  approval.  On  the  5th  of 
July  a  demand  was  made  upon  the  beUigerent  generals  that 
the  railway  must  be  kept  open,  and  that  at  least  one  train 
be  allowed  to  pass  in  each  direction  every  day. 

The  damaged  line  was  reconstructed,  and  on  July  6th,  the 
American  infantry  arrived  in  Peking;  on  the  7th,  the  first 
trains  travelled  between  Peking  and  Tientsin — one  train 
actually  passing  between  the  armies  during  a  battle.  Fight- 
ing went  on  during  these  days  between  the  troops  of  General 
Tuan,  directly  commanded  by  General  Tuan  Chi-kwei,  and 
Chang  Hsun's  forces;  there  was  much  firing  but  small  loss  of 
life,  and  the  latter's  forces  were  finally  driven  back  toward 
Peking.  The  troops  of  General  Tsao  Kun  also  advanced 
upon  Peking  from  the  west. 

Mr.  Grant,  of  the  National  Printing  Bureau,  on  Friday 
rushed  into  the  legation  compound  in  his  automobile,  with 
the  report  that  looting  was  going  on  in  the  southern  part  of 
the  city.  We  ascended  the  wall.  From  the  Chenmen 
Tower  we  saw  excited  groups  moving  up  and  down  the  main 
streets,  but  nothing  was  happening  save  the  bringing  in  of  at 
few  wounded  men.  To  investigate  the  cause  of  the  excite- 
ment I  went  with  Mr.  Belin  in  our  private  rickshaws  to  the 
Chinese  city,  passing  to  the  end  of  the  broad  Chenmen 
thoroughfare.  The  street  was  still  crowded,  the  people 
were  excited  though  well  behaved;  the  shops  all  had  their 
shutters  up.  Near  the  south  end  of  the  street  some  shop- 
keepers posted  in  front  of  their  shops  told  us  that  the  return 
of  Chang  Hsun's  troops  from  outside  the  walls  had  been 
reported.  Looting  had  been  expected  but  had  not  taken 
place.  We  proceeded  to  the  Temple  of  Heaven,  where  great 
crowds  were  walking  about  among  the  tents  of  the  troops. 


278      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

On  returning,  we  entered  a  shop  to  look  at  some  antiques, 
remaining  half  an  hour.  When  we  came  out  our  rickshaws 
had  disappeared.  Doctor  Ferguson  joined  us  as  we  searched 
for  our  men.  Suddenly,  Belin  shouted  to  a  rickshaw  man, 
who  with  a  dozen  others  was  conveying  some  of  Chang 
Hsun's  petty  officers  southward.  We  insisted  that  the  non- 
commissioned officer  occupying  the  rickshaw  get  out,  and 
he  finally  complied. 

The  rickshaws  had  been  requisitioned  by  these  bandits. 
Upon  our  return  to  the  Legation,  my  rickshaw-runner  had 
just  arrived,  excited  to  the  point  of  tears.  Our  two  coolies 
had  drawn  the  men  who  originally  commandeered  them  up 
to  the  Imperial  City;  there  they  were  requisitioned  again 
to  convey  other  men  back  to  the  Temple  of  Heaven.  But 
my  man,  when  opposite  the  entrance  to  Legation  Street,  had 
upset  his  bandit  into  the  road  and  made  a  quick  entry  into 
the  Legation  Quarter,  where  the  angry  and  sputtering 
trooper  dared  not  follow  him.  That  the  rickshaws  belonging 
to  foreigners  should  thus  be  pressed  into  service  shows  the 
disregard  which  these  troopers  had  for  everything  but  their 
own  desires. 

As  we  returned  to  the  Legation  we  noticed  a  wonderful 
colour  effect.  Coal-black  clouds  were  banked  against  the 
western  sky,  above  which  were  lighter  clouds  or  angry  shreds 
of  flaming  colour.  Against  this  the  dark  walls  and  towers  of 
Peking  stood  out  in  sharp  relief.  In  the  streets  the  crowds 
still  surged,  in  restless  expectancy.  Suddenly  the  sunset 
light  disappeared;  the  sky  became  black  with  clouds;  a 
sharp  gust  of  wind  whirled  the  dust  of  the  Chinese  city 
northward;  then  came  a  flash  of  lightning,  a  clap  of  thunder, 
and  a  heavy  downpour,  which  cooled  the  excited  heads  and 
drove  all  to  shelter.  The  late  afternoon  had  been  weird  and 
fantastic,  and  appeared  to  presage  the  happening  of  still 
stranger  things. 

I  was  lunching  with  a  friend  at  his  race-course  house  on 


AN  EMPEROR  FOR  A  DAY  279 

Sunday,  the  8th  of  July,  when  word  was  brought  to  me  that 
a  certain  Colonel  Hu,  coming  from  Chang  Hsun,  had  per- 
suaded the  French  minister  that  the  city  was  in  imminent 
danger  of  sacking,  fighting,  and  general  disturbances.  The 
only  salvation,  Colonel  Hu  had  said,  lay  in  asking  Hsu 
Shi-chang  to  come  from  Tientsin  to  mediate.  The  French 
minister  thereupon  induced  his  Entente  colleagues  to  agree 
to  transmit  a  note  to  General  Tuan  Chi-jui  urging  him  to 
prevail  upon  Hsu  Chi-chang  to  come  as  mediator.  This 
seemed  to  me  ill-advised.  It  meant,  at  a  time  when  Chang 
Hsun  was  already  as  good  as  defeated,  that  he  would  be 
solemnly  treated  as  entitled  to  dictate  the  terms  and  per- 
sonnel of  mediation  by  influential  members  of  the  diplomatic 
corps.  I  returned  to  Peking  and  saw  my  colleagues,  urging 
my  opinion  strongly.  The  British  charge  withdrew  his  con- 
sent; he  had  just  received  a  telegram  from  his  consul  in  Tien- 
tsin reporting  that  General  Tuan  was  absolutely  opposed  to 
mediation.  The  action  contemplated  was  not  taken,  though 
Chang  Hsun  persisted  in  his  attempts  to  gain  recognition 
from  the  diplomatic  corps.  The  French  minister,  who 
hated  Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang — this  would  explain  his  support 
of  Chang  Hsun — gradually  came  to  see  the  obverse  side  of 
his  policy  as  certain  Germanic  affiliations  of  Chang  Hsun 
became  known. 

Kang  Yu-wei  presented  himself  at  my  house  on  the  8th, 
seeking  refuge,  and  I  assigned  him  rooms  in  one  of  our  com- 
pounds. He  informed  me  that  Chang  Hsun  had  had  full 
assurances  of  support  on  the  part  of  Hsu  Chi-chang  and 
other  important  monarchists.  Next  day  he  informed  me 
that  Prince  Tsai  Tze  was  anxious  to  consult  me. 

I  arranged  to  have  the  Prince  come  to  the  house  assigned 
to  Mr.  Kang,  where  I  had  two  hours'  conversation  with  the 
Manchu  and  the  sage.  Kang  Yu-wei  commenced  with  a  long 
disquisition  on  the  advantages  of  a  constitutional  monarchy. 
He  wished  to  explain  his  action  and  to  prove  to  me  that  he 


28o      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

was  not  a  reactionary,  but  was  aiming  only  for  progress  under 
the  monarchical  form,  which  he  considered  most  suitable  to 
China. 

All  this  time  the  Prince  was  silent.  He  seemed  greatly 
depressed,  not  inclined  to  say  anything  at  first.  After  in- 
quiries about  his  health,  I  asked  him  what  he  would  like  to 
say  to  me.  With  eyes  of  real  sadness  he  looked  me  full  in 
the  face,  saying:  "What  shall  we  do?  My  house  has  been 
drawn  into  this  affair  without  our  consent.  It  has  been 
forced  on  us.  We  did  not  wish  to  depart  from  the  agree- 
ments we  had  made  with  the  RepubHc.  But  Chang  Hsun 
would  not  listen  to  us.  He  thought  he  saw  the  only  way. 
Now  what  shall  we  do?" 

I  told  him  that  I  appreciated  the  difficulty  in  which  the 
Imperial  Family  found  itself,  but  that  I  of  course  could  not 
know  the  details  of  the  situation  sufficiently  to  give  any 
opinion.  One  thing,  however,  seemed  to  me  certain :  if  the 
leaders  of  the  republican  government  knew  the  true  attitude 
of  the  Imperial  Family,  and  if  the  Emperor  would  formally 
and  absolutely  dissociate  himself  from  the  movement  of 
Chang  Hsun,  I  believed  that  they  would  not  make  the 
Imperial  Family  suffer.  I  asked  him  whether  they  had  con- 
sidered having  the  Emperor  issue  a  decree,  absolutely  and 
for  all  time  renouncing  all  rights  to  the  throne  and  declar- 
ing his  complete  fealty  to  the  Republic. 

The  Prince  regarded  me  aghast.  "Oh,  no  !  No  matter 
how  desirable  that  might  be  from  many  points  of  view,  it 
is  not  in  the  power  of  the  Emperor  to  do  it.  The  rights  he 
has  inherited  are  not  his.  They  came  to  him  in  trust  from 
his  ancestors.  He  will  have  to  maintain  them,  and  hand 
them  on  to  his  descendants.  He,  and  we  of  his  family,  shall 
not  do  anything  to  make  these  rights  prevail  against  the 
State,  but  as  the  sons  of  our  ancestors,  we  cannot  repudiate 
them." 

Never  had  I  been  so  deeply  impressed  with  the  complexity 


AN  EMPEROR  FOR  A  DAY  281 

of  Chinese  affairs  as  by  this  answer — an  Imperial  family 
maintaining  traditions  of  empire  in  the  midst  of  a  republic, 
an  emperor  continuing  to  reside  in  the  Imperial  Palace,  a 
neighbour  of  the  republican  President  in  his  residence,  and 
yet  no  desire  to  enter  again  into  politics  and  to  grasp  the 
sovereign  power!  I  could  now  understand  why  the  Chinese 
had  allowed  the  Emperor  to  remain  in  the  palace;  it  was  the 
house  of  his  ancestors,  from  which  he  might  not  be  driven. 
That  common  reverence  was  the  one  point  of  understanding 
between  Chinese  and  Manchus. 

Prince  Tsai  Tze  evidently  still  hoped  that  Hsu  Shih- 
chang,  the  loyal  friend  of  the  Imperial  Family,  might  be 
brought  to  Peking  to  mediate,  and  that  he  might  be  prevailed 
upon  to  preserve  the  favourable  treatment  hitherto  accorded 
the  Imperial  Family.  I  could  not  give  Prince  Tsai  Tze  any 
encouragement  on  this  point,  on  which  I  had  very  definite 
opinions,  but  had  to  content  myself  with  general  expressions 
of  sincere  sympathy  with  the  strange  fate  of  this  family. 

The  question  of  mediation  was  again  taken  up  by  the 
diplomatic  corps  on  the  afternoon  of  this  day.  Some  of 
the  ministers  feared  that  the  city  would  suffer  greatly  if 
things  should  be  allowed  to  go  on.  I  was  strongly  of  the 
opinion  that  our  interference  in  this  matter  could  have  no 
good  result,  but  would  only  further  confuse  and  complicate 
the  situation.  For  once,  the  Chinese  must  settle  it  them- 
selves, regardless  of  any  incidental  inconvenience.  From 
what  I  knew  of  the  strength  of  the  contending  forces  and  of 
the  whole  situation,  I  had  no  doubt  whatsoever  that  if  left 
alone  the  republican  forces  would  be  easily  successful  and 
that  there  would  be  no  disturbances.  I  was  on  principle 
against  any  action  which  would  be  in  substance  intervening 
in  behalf  of  a  general  who  had  attacked  the  Republic  and 
whom  nothing  could  now  save  from  overthrow  except  such 
diplomatic  action. 

I  was  approached  on  the  loth  of  July  by  a  representative 


282      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

of  General  Chiang,  chief  of  the  gendarmerie.  He  stated 
that  it  was  desired  to  bring  Chang  Hsun  into  the  American 
Legation,  for  his  own  safety  though  against  his  will,  and  that 
an  agreement  to  this  effect  had  been  made  among  the 
different  commanders.  I  stated  that  in  the  circumstances 
it  would  be  better  for  the  diplomatic  corps  to  discuss  what 
protection  could  be  extended  to  Chang  Hsun.  An  informal 
meeting  was  held,  at  which  the  British  charge  agreed  that 
he  would  receive  Chang  Hsun  if  he  were  brought  in. 

The  legations  were  notified  by  General  Tuan,  late  in  the 
afternoon  of  July  i  ith,  that  during  the  night  the  troops  would 
move  against  Chang  Hsun's  forces  in  the  city,  and  bombard- 
ment of  the  Temple  of  Heaven  and  the  quarters  near  the 
Imperial  Cityheld  byChang  Hsunwould  begin  at  dawn  on  the 
1 2th  of  July.  In  conjunction  with  the  commandant  of  the 
legation  guard,  I  sent  notice  to  the  American  residents  in 
the  quarters  particularly  affected,  directing  them  to  seek 
safety.  Eighteen  refugees  came  to  the  Legation,  where  they 
were  cared  for  during  the  day  at  the  Students*  Mess.  A 
company  of  the  Fifteenth  Infantry,  which  had  been  brought 
up  from  Tientsin,  was  encamped  in  the  compound  in  front  of 
my  residence,  to  which  their  tents  and  military  equipment 
imparted  an  aspect  of  great  military  preparedness. 

I  was  awakened  at  daybreak  on  July  12th  by  the  sound  of 
artillery  and  rifle  fire.  As  the  fighting  commenced  people 
went  out  of  curiosity  upon  the  city  wall.  But  stray  bullets 
frequently  fell  on  the  wall,  and  the  commandant  ordered 
it  cleared.  Unfortunately,  several  of  these  onlookers — 
among  them  three  Americans — ^were  injured.  During  the 
battle  I  received  word  from  the  Imperial  tutors  that  the 
Dowager  Empresses  were  preparing  to  bring  the  Emperor  to 
my  residence.  Since  the  9th  of  July  they  had  wished  to  re- 
move the  Emperor  to  this  legation  for  safety.  While  the 
Empresses  and  some  of  the  dukes  desired  this,  the  eunuchs 
under  Chang  Hsun's  influence  opposed  the  removal.    The 


AN  EMPEROR  FOR  A  DAY  283 

Prince  Regent,  also  influenced  by  Chang  Hsun,  took  the 
same  view.  Thus  on  various  occasions  the  eunuchs,  whose 
existence  had  almost  been  forgotten,  came  out  on  the 
stage  of  action  in  this  curious  affair. 

About  eleven  o'clock,  while  the  firing  was  at  its  height  and 
after  several  bombs  had  been  dropped  from  aeroplanes  upon 
the  Imperial  City,  telephone  messages  came  to  the  effect  that 
several  friends  of  the  Imperial  Family  and  Doctor  Ferguson 
of  the  Red  Cross  were  about  to  rescue  the  Emperor  from 
danger  and  bring  him  to  the  Legation.  I  had  the  house 
prepared.  Half  an  hour  later  two  automobiles  with  the  Red 
Cross  flag  flying  entered  the  legation  compound.  Mr.  Belin 
ran  to  the  door,  expecting  to  see  the  Emperor  and  Empress 
emerging  from  the  automobiles,  but  he  returned  with  only 
Mr.  Sun  Pao-chi,  who  was  shivering  with  excitement.  I 
took  him  to  the  reception  room  and  comforted  him  with  tea. 
He  still  expected  the  Emperor  to  come.  The  automobiles 
left  again  for  the  Imperial  Palace,  but  as  the  aeroplanes  had 
ceased  dropping  bombs  and  the  artillery  fire  was  decreasing 
in  violence,  the  people  in  the  palace  decided  against  carrying 
out  the  flight. 

As  I  sat  in  the  library  all  through  the  forenoon  receiving 
reports  and  giving  directions,  there  was  a  constant  hissing 
of  bullets  and  shells  overhead.  No  shell  dropped  in  our 
legation,  although  two  or  three  fell  in  the  British.  The 
Chinese  artillery  fire  was  remarkably  accurate.  Sitting 
there  and  listening  to  the  tumult  of  shouting  and  firing  from 
the  Chenmen  gate  and  the  volleys  of  guns  and  artillery 
exceeding  in  volume  of  sound  any  Fourth  of  July  I  had  ever 
experienced,  I  felt  thankful  to  have  seen  a  day  when  the 
Chinese  would  stand  up  and  fight  out  a  big  issue.  I  soon 
found  that  the  battle  was  not  commensurate  with  its  sound. 

Shortly  before  noon  Chang  Hsun  was  brought  to  the 
Dutch  Legation,  accompanied  by  a  German  employe  of  the 
Chinese  police     Chang  Hsun  had  been  persuaded  to  come 


284     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

by  his  generals  almost  with  the  use  of  force.  He  was  still 
under  the  illusion  that  he  could  mediate.  When  the  Dutch 
minister  informed  him  that  this  was  impossible,  he  wished 
to  return  to  his  troops.  This,  of  course,  could  not  be  per- 
mitted. 

Firing  was  violent  from  dawn  until  nearly  noon.  The 
field  guns,  machine  guns,  and  rifles  filled  the  air  with  enor- 
mous tumult,  but  from  eleven  o'clock  on  the  firing  gradually 
diminished,  and  it  entirely  ceased  at  four  in  the  afternoon. 
Immediately  thereafter  I  proceeded  by  motor  car  to  the 
various  centres  of  fighting.  I  found  that  Chang  Hsun's 
house  had  been  struck  by  several  shells  and  that  the  indirect 
artillery  firing  of  the  government  troops  had  been  managed 
with  considerable  accuracy.  The  human  dead  had  already 
been  removed  from  the  neighbourhood  although  numerous 
carcasses  of  horses  remained.  Thence  I  proceeded  to  the 
Temple  of  Heaven,  where  I  was  astonished  to  find  Chang 
Hsun's  troops  encamped  with  all  their  guns  and  artillery, 
eating,  drinking,  and  talking  in  the  best  of  spirits.  They 
told  me  that  five  of  their  men  had  been  killed,  and  that  their 
bodies  were  still  there.  The  absence  of  visible  results  from 
the  enormous  expenditure  of  ammunition  during  the  day  was 
astonishing.  I  found,  however,  that  the  method  of  fighting 
employed  by  the  troops  was  to  creep  up  as  closely  as  possible 
behind  a  high  wall,  and  fire  into  the  air  in  the  general  direc- 
tion where  the  enemy  might  be.  Hence,  the  bystanders 
were  in  rather  greater  danger  than  the  combatants  them- 
selves. In  fact,  the  total  number  of  killed  as  a  result  of 
the  fighting  of  July  I2th  was  twenty-six;  seventy-six  were 
seriously  wounded,  and  more  than  half  of  these  were  ci- 
vilians. 

The  Chang  Hsun  contingents  in  the  Temple  of  Heaven  had 
hoisted  the  republican  flag  at  lo  a.  m.  An  agreement  was 
reached  by  which  they  were  to  be  paid  $60  per  man  upon  the 
delivery  of  their  arms.    Chang  Hsun's  troops  about  the 


AN  EMPEROR  FOR  A  DAY  285 

Imperial  City  held  out  for  a  larger  payment.  To  my  as- 
tonishment, as  late  as  Saturday,  the  14th  of  July,  I  saw  fully 
armed  soldiers  of  Chang  Hsun  on  guard  at  the  central  police 
headquarters.  Asking  the  reason  for  this — for  Chang  Hsun's 
troops  were  supposedly  routed  in  pitched  battle  on  the  12th 
of  July — I  was  told  that  the  commanders  had  not  yet 
settled  upon  the  sum  these  contingents  were  to  be  paid. 
Eighty  dollars  per  man  was  finally  agreed  upon,  and  by  the 
15th  of  July  Chang  Hsun's  troops,  deprived  of  their  arms 
and  their  pigtails,  had  left  Peking  with  their  money,  and  were 
on  their  way  to  their  rural  homes  in  Shantung. 

The  dragon  flags  disappeared  on  the  12th  of  July  as 
suddenly  as  they  had  appeared  on  the  2nd.  The  city  quickly 
resumed  its  ordinary  life. 

The  swift  failure  of  Chang  Hsun's  enterprise  was  due  to  no 
inherent  weakness  of  monarchical  sentiment  in  north  China. 
In  fact,  monarchist  leanings  among  the  northern  military 
party  are  quite  well  known.  It  had  been  assumed  that 
such  a  movement  would  be  launched,  and,  if  it  had  been 
more  prudently  planned  and  prepared,  it  might  easily  have 
succeeded,  at  least  for  a  time.  Its  total  failure  was  due  to 
the  fact  that  Chang  Hsun,  counting  on  monarchist  ten- 
dencies among  the  northern  military  men,  neglected  to  make 
those  preparatory  negotiations  which  would  have  turned  the 
potential  support  into  real  strength.  While  this  is  true, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  Chang  Hsun's  failure  gave  an 
enormous  setback  to  the  cause  of  monarchism  in  China. 
After  two  failures  to  reestablish  the  empire,  ambitious  men 
will  think  many  times  before  embarking  on  such  a  venture 
again.  Which  is  to  say  that  the  efforts  to  restore  the 
Empire  actually  served  to  entrench  more  deeply  the  re- 
publican form  of  government. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 
WAR  WITH  GERMANY:  READJUSTMENTS 

"It  has  been  decided  by  the  Chinese  Government  to 
declare  war;  on  this  very  day  the  decision  has  been  formally 
adopted  by  the  cabinet." 

Thus  General  Tuan  Chi-jui,  then  Premier,  conveyed  to  me 
on  the  2nd  of  August  the  news  of  China's  further  entrance 
into  world  politics.  I  had  known  about  this  from  other 
sources.  General  Tuan  had  announced  it  as  his  policy  when 
I  visited  him  on  the  14th  of  July.  He  had  then  stated  that 
Vice-President  Feng  Kuo-cheng  would  assume  the  functions 
of  President,  which  President  Li  would  relinquish,  and  that 
it  would  be  a  war  government. 

The  American  Government  had  held  to  its  view  that  China 
should  not  be  pressed  to  declare  war.  It  believed  that  the 
breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations,  for  the  time  being,  was 
sufficient  contribution  to  our  cause  in  the  war.  But  the 
Japanese,  aided  especially  by  the  French,  had  strongly  urged 
the  Chinese  Government  to  join  them.  Not  until  much 
later  did  the  Chinese  learn  of  secret  treaties  made  between 
France,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  and  Japan,  giving  assurance  to 
the  Japanese  that  no  effective  resistance  would  be  offered  by 
those  powers  to  anything  which  Japan  might  desire  in  China 
at  the  end  of  the  war. 

In  their  ignorance  of  these  secret  arrangements,  the 
Chinese  thought  that  association  with  the  war  powers  would 
put  them  on  the  footing  of  an  ally.  Also,  doubtless,  the 
militarist  party  surrounding  Tuan  hoped  to  increase  its 
power  through  war  activities.  For  my  part,  I  allowed  the 
Chinese  to  feel  that  the  American  Government,  desiring 

a86 


WAR  WITH  GERMANY:  READJUSTMENTS   287 

them  to  decide  this  question  according  to  their  own  best 
judgment,  hoped  that  a  way  might  be  found  to  bring  the 
war  situation  into  harmony  with  justice  to  China. 

When  he  announced  the  cabinet's  decision,  Premier  Tuan 
took  up  with  me  the  matter  of  finance.  He  evidently 
expected  that  the  American  Government,  or  the  Consortium, 
together  with  independent  banks,  would  now  furnish  China 
the  money  needed  for  her  war  preparations.  The  powers 
were  considering  what  assurances  to  offer.  In  previous 
discussions  with  Chinese  officials  I  had  repeatedly  dwelt  on 
the  fact  that  should  China  take  this  step,  she  would  be 
entitled  to  specific  and  strong  assurances  from  the  powers 
guaranteeing  her  political  and  administrative  integrity,  in 
terms  that  could  not  easily  be  evaded  in  future.  I  had  made 
continued  efforts  to  effect  an  agreement  upon  a  declaration 
favourable  to  the  full  maintenance  of  the  sovereign  rights 
of  China.  My  conversations  with  the  Japanese  minister 
during  1916  and  1917  had  this  in  view.  Now  that  China 
was  considering  entry  into  the  war,  I  again  suggested  the 
desirability  of  such  a  declaration,  and  hinted  to  the  Chinese 
officials  that  they  might  be  successful  upon  this  occasion  in 
obtaining  a  statement  which  would  fortify  the  sovereign 
rights  of  China  and  prevent  the  further  growth  of  special 
privileges  and  spheres  of  influence. 

My  colleagues  all  appeared  to  be  favourable  to  the  idea. 
It  would  undoubtedly  have  been  possible  for  the  Chinese 
Government  to  secure  such  a  specific  and  effective  decla- 
ration. Instead,  however,  of  taking  advantage  of  the  po- 
sition which  their  readiness  to  declare  war  gave  them,  and 
boldly  proposing  such  a  declaration  as  a  necessary  condition, 
they  became  tangled  up  in  long  discussions.  The  substance 
originally  proposed  was  worn  down  to  a  rather  empty 
formula. 

The  first  proposal  was  that  the  governments  should  de- 
clare their  policy  to  "  favour  the  independent  development  of 


288      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

China,  and  in  no  way  to  seek  in  China,  either  singly  or 
jointly,  advantages  of  the  nature  of  territorial  or  preferential 
rights,  whether  local  or  general."  The  Chinese  had  sug- 
gested, in  addition,  a  statement  that  the  other  governments 
would  accord  to  China  their  full  assistance,  in  order  to  "help 
it  obtain  the  enjoyment  of  the  advantages  resulting  from  the 
equality  of  powers  in  their  international  relations."  As 
finally  adopted,  the  declaration  simply  gave  assurance  of 
friendly  support  in  "allowing  China  to  benefit  in  its  inter- 
national relations  from  the  situation,  and  from  the  regard  due 
a  great  country."  Vague  and  unmeaning  as  it  was,  the 
latter  term  was  undoubtedly  flattering  to  Chinese  amour 
propre.  These  assurances  were  given  to  China  on  August 
14th,  and  the  United  States  participated  in  them. 

China's  internal  political  situation  had  not  improved 
greatly  as  a  result  of  the  overthrow  of  the  monarchical  move- 
ment. On  his  return  to  Peking  as  restorer  of  the  republican 
government.  General  Tuan  had  the  chance  to  rally  all  ele- 
ments in  Chinese  politics  to  a  poHcy  of  constructive  action. 
With  whom  would  he  ally  himself?  As  his  distrust  of  the 
Kuo  Min  Tang  was  great,  he  constituted  his  new  govern- 
ment without  regard  to  that  party,  and  sought  instead  to 
govern  through  a  combination  of  the  Chin  Pu  Tang  and  the 
so-called  Communications  Party.  Of  the  latter  the  real 
leaders,  Liang  Shih-yi  and  his  immediate  associates,  were  still 
living  in  exile  under  the  mandate  issued  by  President  Li. 
Mr.  Tsao  Ju-lin  controlled  the  new  wing  of  the  Communi- 
cations Party,  and  he  had  a  disproportionate  prominence 
through  Japanese  support.  Both  he  and  Liang  Chi-chao, 
the  leader  of  the  Chin  Pu  Tang,  were  under  the  Japanese 
thumb.  This  influence  could  thus  act  strongly  and  ex- 
tensively on  Chinese  afi^airs.  It  was  a  Japanese  loan  that 
had  facilitated  the  overthrow  of  Chang  Hsun  and  made  the 
leadership  of  General  Tuan  possible. 

These  two  factions,  while  they  supported  General  Tuan, 


WAR  WITH  GERMANY:  READJUSTMENTS    289 

were  mutually  antagonistic.  Mr.  Liang  Chi-chao  is  a  liter- 
ary man  and  a  theorist.  Long  befriended  by  the  Japanese, 
he  doubtless  believed  himself  to  be  a  patriotic  Chinese  who 
was  ready  to  use  Japanese  aid,  but  would  not  surrender  any 
essential  national  rights.  Not  being  a  man  of  affairs,  he 
may  not  always  have  seen  the  bearing  upon  the  ultimate 
independence  of  China  of  the  measures  which  he  proposed. 
Some  Chinese  as  well  as  foreigners  thought  him  merely  the 
venal  instrument  of  Japan;  others  regarded  him  as  es- 
sentially honest,  but  subject  to  being  misled  because  of  his 
theories.  As  Minister  of  Finance,  his  administration  tended 
to  bring  about  a  great  increase  of  Japanese  influence  in 
China. 

Mr.  Tsao  Ju-lin,  cynical,  practical-minded,  and  keen,  is  a 
different  type  of  man.  He  was  closely  associated  with  Mr. 
Lu  Tsung-yu,  himself  the  most  pliable  instrument  of  Japa- 
nese policy  in  China.  Mr.  Tsao  was  educated  in  Japan;  one 
ormoreof  his  wives  were  Japanese,  and  in  business  and  pleas- 
ure he  was  constantly  in  Japanese  company.  He  was  out- 
spokenly skeptical  about  his  own  country  and  about  re- 
publican institutions. 

The  Government  felt  dependent  upon  assistance  from 
abroad,  for  it  had  financial  difficulties  due  to  inherited 
burdens  and  present  military  expenses.  It  was  made  to 
believe  that  assistance  could  come  only  from  the  Japanese. 
The  Americans  had  left  the  Consortium  four  years  ago;  they 
had  every  opportunity  to  interest  themselves  in  China,  but 
they  had  done  nothing  substantial  beyond  the  loan  of  the 
Chicago  bank.  In  China,  the  margin  between  tolerable 
existence  and  financial  stress  is  so  narrow  that  a  few 
million  dollars  may  wield  an  enormous  influence  for  good 
or  bad. 

These  needs  were  accentuated  because  the  southern 
republicans  were  holding  aloof.  They  felt  themselves 
excluded    from  the  Government;   they  doubted  General 


290      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Tuan's  honesty  of  purpose,  and  they  planned  to  remain 
independent  of  the  central  authorities.  From  Shanghai 
Mr.  C.  T.  Wang,  the  most  prominent  of  the  younger  re- 
publicans, wrote  that  Tuan  Chi-jui  and  his  cabinet  repre- 
sented the  reactionary  element;  that  they  were  strongly 
backed  by  undesirable  foreign  influence,  and  that  the  latter 
would  virtually  control  the  Government.  He  ascribed  to 
General  Tuan  the  ambition  of  paving  the  way  to  make  him- 
self emperor.  The  opposition  to  Tuan,  he  said,  would 
continue  the  fight  until  the  Chinese  Republic  was  indeed  a 
republic.  As  to  American  action  in  China,  he  noted  that 
America  plays  the  game  as  a  gentleman,  therefore  it  is 
likely  to  be  outmanoeuvred  by  another  country  less  squeam- 
ish about  its  methods.  Another  letter  from  Mr.  C.  C.  Wu, 
dated  July  19,  1917,  I  will  give  textually,  in  part: 

.  .  .  When  General  Tuan  arrived  at  the  head  of  his  troops  in  Peking, 
he  had  a  good  opportunity  to  gain  the  goodwill  and  cooperation  of  the 
whole  country  if  he  had  proclaimed  his  adherence  to  the  constitution  at 
present  in  force,  and  to  reassemble  the  dissolved  parliament  in  order  that 
the  Permanent  Constitution  may  be  completed  and  the  organization  of  the 
future  parliament  provided  for;  in  other  words,  that  the  basis  for  a  legal 
and  constitutional  government  may  be  found.  Unfortunately,  other 
counsels  seem  to  have  prevailed.  Another  assembly,  without  any  sem- 
blance of  legality,  is  to  be  convened  and  the  future  regulation  of  the  Re- 
public is  to  be  left  in  its  hands.  This  will  only  mean  fresh  internal  dissen- 
sion and  strife.  It  is  to  be  admitted  that  there  is  much  fault  to  be  found 
with  the  old  parliament,  but  as  I  once  told  General  Tuan,  it  is  the  name, 
the  signboard,  of  parliament  that  we  must  respect.     .     .     . 

Meanwhile,  the  papers  are  full  of  the  inquiry  which  the  Entente  Powers 
are  alleged  to  have  made  in  regard  to  the  declaration  of  war  against  Ger- 
many, and  the  reply  made  by  the  Waichiao  Pu  that  the  step  will  be  taken 
almost  immediately.  Now,  it  is  unnecessary  to  tell  you  of  my  opinion  in 
regard  to  this  question  ever  since  the  interview  we  had  on  that  fateful 
Sunday  in  February,  of  my  firm  conviction  of  the  many  advantages,  both 
material  and  moral,  that  such  a  step  would  confer  on  China,  nor  of  th« 
•fforts  I  have  exerted  in  the  cause.  And  my  week's  stay  in  Shanghai  has 
not  altered  my  opinion.    At  the  same  time  I  a^ee  oitirely  with  the  view 


WAR  WITH  GERMANY:  READJUSTMENTS   291 

expressed  in  the  note  you  recently  presented  to  the  Waichiao  Pu  on  behalf 
of  your  government  to  the  effect  that  the  paramount  need  of  the  moment 
is  the  consolidation  of  the  country  and  the  establishment  of  an  effective 
and  responsible  government,  and  that,  compared  with  this,  the  demarche 
against  Germany,  desirable  though  it  is,  is  of  secondary  importance.  In- 
deed, it  is  nothing  short  of  ridiculous  to  declare  war  against  a  foreign  power 
when  every  man  and  every  resource  has  to  be  kept  in  hand  to  meet  possible 
civil  strife  and  when  the  authority  of  the  Central  Government  is  effective 
in  only  a  doubtful  half  of  the  country.  It  is  difficult  to  see  what  benefit 
the  Entente  Powers  expect  to  derive  by  urging  such  a  government  to  take 
such  a  step,  a  step  which  is  detrimental  to  the  best  interests  of  China  and 
contrary  to  the  good  advice  tendered  by  the  U.  S.,  with  whom  Great 
Britain,  at  least,  associated  herself.  It  is  enough  to  make  one  almost  sus- 
pect that  it  is  for  these  very  two  reasons  that  the  war  measure  is  being 
urged  on  the  Government. 

Quite  plainly,  the  southern  leaders  believed  that  the  party 
of  General  Tuan  was  in  its  war  policy  animated  with  the 
purpose  of  building  up  its  power  at  the  expense  of  the  rest 
of  the  country — particularly  of  subduing  the  southern  re- 
publicans. Even  less  unselfish  purposes  were  attributed  to 
those  who  based  their  policy  on  foreign  financial  support. 
In  a  speech  in  Parliament,  Senator  Kuang  Yen-pao  makes 
the  officials  who  contract  ill-advised  public  loans  say:  "We 
are  planning  for  the  conservation  of  the  property  of  our 
sons  and  grandsons;  why  should  we  have  compunctions 
about  driving  the  whole  people  to  the  land  of  death .?  What 
matters  the  woe  of  the  whole  nation  by  the  side  of  the  joy 
and  happiness  of  our  own  families?"  But  the  southern 
leaders  did  not  disavow  the  act  of  the  Central  Government 
in  declaring  war.  Their  political  opposition  continued;  but 
they  accepted  the  international  action  of  Peking  as  binding 
on  the  whole  country. 

In  such  matters  China  has  not  the  hard-and-fast  ideas  of 
sovereign  authority  and  legality  which  reign  in  the  West. 
It  was  therefore  possible  for  a  local  government  to  be  inde- 
pendent in  most  matters,  and  yet  to  allow  itself  to  be  guided 


292      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

by  the  central  authority  in  some.  A  declaration  of  inde- 
pendence by  no  means  implies  that  there  are  no  relationships 
whatever  between  the  recalcitrant  ones  and  the  central 
authorities.  For  this  reason,  too,  the  visit  of  a  foreign 
representative  to  any  one  of  the  governors  who  had  declared 
his  independence  would  not,  as  in  other  countries,  be  re- 
garded as  an  affront  to  the  Central  Government.  Circum- 
stances might  occur  under  which  the  Central  Government 
itself  might  favour  such  a  visit,  as  incidentally  relieving  the 
strain.  I  felt  quite  free  to  send  attaches  of  the  Legation  to 
the  governors  of  disaffected  provinces,  and  should  quite 
freely  have  gone  myself. 

In  all  my  interviews  with  high  officials  the  prime  subject 
was  finance.  Not  that  China,  as  an  associate  in  the  war, 
was  to  get  such  aid — ^which  was  taken  as  a  matter  of  course — 
but  how  it  was  forthcoming  supplied  the  only  question. 
Mr.  Liang  Chi-chao,  Minister  of  Finance,  who  called  on  me 
on  the  4th  of  August,  talked  in  favour  of  a  big  loan  by  the 
Consortium.  With  this  he  hoped  that  the  United  States 
would  again  associate  itself.  When  he  spoke  of  independent 
American  loans,  I  called  his  attention  to  the  difficulty  of 
concluding  them  or  of  calhng  up  the  option  under  the 
Chicago  loan,  unless  there  were  a  parliament  whose  authority 
was  recognized  by  the  country.  Shortly  after  this  I  saw  the 
Acting  President,  General  Feng.  "China,"  he  said — un- 
doubtedly to  tell  me  something  pleasant,  but  also  because 
all  Chinese  do  prefer  association  with  America — "China  has 
followed  the  United  States  in  the  poHcy  of  declaring  war 
upon  Germany.  Now  will  not  the  United  States  inde- 
pendently finance  China  ?  Or,  if  that  is  out  of  the  question, 
then,  surely  America  will  join  the  Consortium  since  that  is 
the  only  way  the  Chinese  Government  can  be  safely  and 
effectively  supported," 

"The  republican  form  of  government,"  he  vowed,  "is  now 
eternally  secure  in  China."    I  could  not  but  remember  his 


WAR  WITH  GERMANY:  READJUSTMENTS   293 

previous  monarchist  leanings.  -The  Acting  President  spoke 
of  General  Tuan.  "I  have  a  very  cordial  understanding 
with  the  Premier,"  he  assured  me. 

I  went  to  the  Premier  on  the  21st  of  August.  In  this  dis- 
cussion the  Chinese  iron  industry  came  up.  The  Premier 
asked:  "Why  not  go  ahead  with  the  development  of  mining 
and  iron  manufacture?  Create  a  national  Chinese  iron 
industry,  and  it  will  form  the  basis  of  a  general  loan  for 
industrial  purposes."  He  thought,  at  first,  that  the  Chinese 
Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Commerce  should  summon 
experts  and  start  the  enterprise.  I  told  him  about  the 
enormous  technical  difficulties  of  such  a  project.  Then  he 
seemed  to  recognize  that  a  contract  with  an  experienced  and 
powerful  organization,  which  could  be  held  responsible, 
would  be  more  effective  in  estabHshing  a  national  iron 
industry  for  China.  "I  am  not  sure  about  the  ore  deposits 
near  Nanking,"  he  added;  "they  may  not  be  included  in  such 
cooperative  enterprises." 

I  suspected  that  he  was  trying  to  get  financial  support  from 
another  source,  and  was  leaving  his  hands  free  to  make  them 
a  grant  there.  I  put  in  a  caveat  against  any  grant  of  iron  ores 
to  foreign  nationals.  Americans  had  in  the  past  been 
invariably  informed  that  iron  deposits  could  not  be  leased 
or  granted  to  individuals  because  they  had  been  reserved 
for  national  uses. 

I  visited  General  Tuan  on  August  22nd  and  found  him 
more  talkative,  more  anxious  to  discuss  the  general  aspects 
of  policies  than  ever  before.  "We  must  first  of  all  estabhsh 
the  authority  of  the  Central  Government,"  he  said;  "this  can 
be  done  only  through  a  defeat  of  the  opposition.  My 
purpose  is  that  military  organization  in  China  be  made 
national  and  unified,  in  order  that  the  peace  of  the  country 
shall  not  at  all  times  be  upset  by  local  military  commanders. 
The  military  power  thus  unified  I  intend  to  take  entirely 
out  of  politics  and  confine  it  to  its  specific  mihtary  purposes. 


294      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

At  present  the  military  is  used  in  factional  and  political 
disputes.  When  this  is  no  longer  possible,  then  we  shall  leave 
the  public  mind  in  civil  life  entirely  free  to  settle  all  questions 
of  the  Constitution  and  of  the  public  policy." 

I  believe  the  Premier  was  sincere  in  these  views,  and  in  his 
efforts  to  vindicate  the  authority  of  the  National  Govern- 
ment, but  he  thought  only  in  terms  of  military  authority. 
He  did  not  realize  what  the  organization  of  public  opinion 
and  of  a  civilian  administration  require.  His  opponents  feared 
that  a  consolidated  military  power  would  be  used  by  him, 
after  all,  to  accomplish  the  reestablishment  of  a  military 
dictatorship,  such  as  that  of  Yuan  Shih-kai. 

The  personal  wisdom  and  integrity  of  General  Tuan  com- 
manded respect,  but  he  was  not  fortunate  in  selecting  his 
assistants.  Both  in  Peking  and  in  the  provinces  his  im- 
mediate advisers  gave  him  trouble.  When  he  appointed 
General  Fu  Liang-tso  governor  of  Hunan  Province,  he 
expected  the  ready  settlement  of  all  difficulties  there; 
General  Fu  would  know  how  to  handle  the  situation.  But 
the  people  of  Hunan  did  not  welcome  General  Fu.  Soon  his 
authority  and  that  of  the  Central  Government  were  ques- 
tioned throughout  that  province.  But  the  Premier  never 
disavowed  or  deserted  his  representatives.  He  was  loyal  to 
them,  which  accounts  for  the  strong  personal  influence  which 
Tuan  enjoyed. 

The  country  could  not  be  unified,  of  course,  until  railways 
were  built,  and  representatives  of  the  Chinese  Government 
often  approached  me  to  ascertain  whether  some  action  could 
not  be  taken  in  regard  to  the  Hankow-Canton  Railway,  long 
delayed  in  construction.  This  trunk  line  would  have 
joined  the  north  and  south.  A  trip  from  Peking  to  Canton 
by  existing  routes  took  from  ten  days  to  two  weeks:  by  direct 
railway  it  should  be  possible  to  make  it  in  two  days.  Not 
only  the  movement  of  passengers,  but  of  mail  and  freight, 
would  stimulate  an  intercourse  that  would  be  sure  to  over- 


WAR  WITH  GERMANY:  READJUSTMENTS   295 

come  separatist  tendencies.  But  China  had  entrusted  the 
building  of  this  railway  to  foreigners,  who  had  played  with  the 
concession,  had  lost  it,  and,  after  reacquiring  part  of  it,  were 
now  delaying  its  execution.  Europe  was  preoccupied  with 
the  war.  And  now  that  China  was  herself  entering  the  war, 
it  seemed  a  prime  need  of  national  preparedness  to  have  this 
comparatively  short  remaining  gap  in  the  communications 
of  China  filled  out.  Good  friends  of  America  among  the 
officials — among  them  Mr.  Pan  Fu,  Mr.  T.  C.  Sun,  the 
managing  director  of  the  Siems-Carey  railway  offices,  and 
Mr.  J.  C.  Ho — argued  with  me,  as  did  their  superiors,  to 
have  America  lead  in  completing  this  essential  highway  of 
commerce. 


CHAPTER  XXV 
THE  CHINESE  GO  A-BORROWING 

The  time  was  come  for  China  to  put  money  in  her  purse. 
She  was  sure  she  could  do  it,  and  sure  that  the  United  States, 
her  great,  rich  sponsor  and  friend,  would  help  her  to  the 
means  commensurate  with  her  needs  of  development  for  war. 
A  suggestion  to  this  effect  had  been  made  to  the  Chinese 
minister  at  Washington  by  the  Department  of  State.  It 
was  undreamt  of  that  no  assistance  whatever  could  be  given 
to  China. 

During  the  fall  of  191 7  all  my  powers  were  devoted  to 
securing  for  our  Far  Eastern  associate  in  the  war  the  best 
form  of  American  assistance.  I  wished  to  avoid,  if  possible, 
a  loss  of  the  chance  for  giving  Chinese  financial  affairs  a  sound 
basis.  Above  all,  it  was  essential  to  aid  in  steering  China 
beyond  earshot  of  the  financial  sirens  that  were  luring  her 
upon  the  Japanese  rocks.  China  invited  American  leader- 
ship, relied  upon  it.  No  other  nation  in  the  circumstances 
could  justly  take  exception  to  it.  It  involved  no  vast  enter- 
prise of  immediately  raising  a  huge  army  in  China,  but  of 
preparing  the  way  for  such  mobilization,  if  need  should 
arise.  This  could  be  done  by  facilitating  works  which  would 
endure  and  which  would  contribute  to  the  welfare  of  China 
and  the  world,  war  or  no  war.  It  meant  building  means 
of  communication  and  improving  the  food  supply.  It 
meant  reconstruction  after  the  war.  It  meant  an  ex- 
penditure of  money  that  would  be  infinitesimal  compared 
with  the  sums  spent  in  Europe.  America  had  lent  billions 
to  the  Entente  Allies;  the  hundred  millions  that  would  have 
served  to  make  China  fit  were  a  mere  trifle.     Nor  was  it 

296 


THE  CHINESE  GO  A-BORROWING         297 

necessary  to  insist  upon  independent  American  action  in  this 
matter.  America's  leadership  in  behalf  of  the  common  inter- 
est and  in  cooperation  with  her  associates  could  produce  the 
results  desired  of  putting  the  situation  in  the  Far  East  on  a 
sound  basis.  I  had  always  desired  American  independent 
enterprise  in  individual  cases,  free  from  all  entanglements 
and  semi-political  arrangements  with  other  nations,  whose 
favour,  fortunately,  we  did  not  require.  But  in  the  great 
task  of  the  World  War  joint  action  with  others  was  natural, 
and  action  in  China,  given  only  positive  American  leadership, 
could  have  produced  fine  results.  The  war  powers  did  get 
together  for  some  action.  They  suspended  the  Boxer 
indemnity  payments  for  China,  and  she  got  the  benefit  of 
the  twentieth  oiad  valorem  duty  which  the  treaties  provided; 
on  the  basis  of  reckonings  two  decades  back,  the  5  per  cent, 
had  really  shrunk  to  3.  To  restore  the  rate  fixed  by  the 
treaties  was  hardly  a  beginning  of  justice. 

Here  was  China,  ready,  willing  to  take  her  part  in  the 
war.  What  should  she  do  ?  In  America  the  slogan :  **  Food 
Will  Win  the  War"  was  in  vogue,  and  China  could  furnish 
food.  She  could  supply  coolies,  millions  if  necessary,  as 
workmen  and  as  soldiers.  The  war  had  proved  that  the 
training  of  men  as  soldiers  could  be  a  matter,  not  of  years, 
but  of  months.  Plans  were  drawn  up,  at  first  for  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  Chinese  soldiers,  then  for  half  a  million. 

I  urged  my  proposals  on  the  State  Department.  The 
Canton-Hankow  Railway  needed  finishing.  The  Chinese 
arsenals  and  shipyards  could  be  refitted.  I  asked  the 
consular  officers  and  attaches  for  a  rapid  survey  of  China's 
food  resources;  their  returns  showed  that  a  large  surplus 
could  be  produced,  if  steps  were  taken  at  once  to  assure  a 
market.  The  Chinese  have  a  genius  for  growing  food; 
among  them  they  have  the  world's  most  skilful  gardeners. 
But  they  needed  added  credit  if  they  were  to  put  in  more 
seed  and  harvest  bigger  crops.     In  these  estimates  Professor 


298      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Tuck  of  Cornell,  who  was  up  in  Manchuria,  and  Professor 
Bailey,  in  Nanking,  gave  their  expert  aid. 

England  and  her  European  allies,  it  was  determined,  had 
"gone  broke";  if  there  was  to  be  a  Consortium  of  lenders  to 
China,  would  America  lead  the  way?  Liang  Chi-chao, 
Minister  of  Finance,  proposed  it.  There  was  China's  public 
credit,  with  such  vast  human  and  material  resources  as  to 
stagger  belief,  waiting  to  be  organized.  There  was  the 
supreme  opportunity  to  send  scattering  all  of  the  promoters 
of  the  unseemly  scramble  to  get  special  advantages  through 
Chinese  financial  deals.  I  spared  no  pains — for  four  years, 
indeed,  I  had  laboured  for  this  very  thing — to  impress  upon 
America  the  new  vision  of  a  developed  China.  Two  things 
halted  action.  Outside  influences  working  in  America  itself 
were  aimed  to  stop  the  free  play  of  financial  enterprise  in 
China;  next,  there  was  the  provincialism  of  the  New  York 
financiers.     They  would  only  follow  where  other  nations  led. 

Then  there  was  the  alternative — cooperation  between  the 
war  powers.  By  hoops  and  barrages  of  steel  we  were  bound 
to  our  brothers  of  Britain,  France,  and  Italy;  Japan  was  an 
allied  and  associated  power;  at  every  point  our  gold  and  war 
bonds  were  mingled  with  theirs.  We  were  powerful  enough 
to  hold  our  associates  to  a  policy  of  developing  China  for 
the  benefit  of  all  participants;  an  end  might  be  put  there  to 
"special  interests."  I  suggested  a  new  consortium  on  this 
basis. 

I  went  to  the  Chinese  President.  "I  know,"  he  declared, 
"that  America  will  spare  no  means  whereby  China  may 
carry  out  her  purpose  to  stand  by  the  side  of  the  Allies  on 
the  battlefields  of  Europe." 

From  the  President  I  went  to  the  Premier.  By  this  time 
he  was  not  so  friendly.  Time  had  elapsed;  the  glitter  of 
Japanese  money  had  been  made  to  catch  his  eye.  I  inquired 
concerning  the  Japanese  loan  of  20,000,000  yen,  and  in- 
cidental  arrangements   connected   therewith.     "Does   not 


THE  CHINESE  GO  A-BORROWING         299 

China  need  to  keep  a  credit  balance  in  a  foreign  country,**  he 
asked;  "and  would  not  the  same  arrangements  be  made  with 
the  United  States  if  a  loan  were  made  there  ? "  Curiously,  he 
added,  "There  is  no  need,  yet,  of  convoking  parliament;  no 
time  has  been  set  for  it.'*  A  militarist  leader,  he  was  being 
comforted  by  hopes  of  Japanese  backing.  But  he  was  quite 
willing  to  send  a  big  army  to  Europe. 

The  Japanese  were  alive  to  this  situation.  Professor 
Hori  was  sent  to  lecture  on  finance  before  an  association 
which  Liang  Chi-chao  had  helped  form.  The  theme  of  his 
opening  lecture  was  the  bankruptcy  of  the  Western  powers. 
China  must  rely  on  Japan  for  money.  Following  Hori  came 
a  commission  of  ten  ofl&cials  from  Tokyo  to  study  Chinese 
financial  administration.  Then  came  Doctor  Kobayashi  to 
act  as  Japan's  expert  in  China.  Prominent  posts,  it  was 
freely  said,  were  to  be  created  for  "currency  reform,"  posts 
which  would  be  held  by  Japanese.  Later  on  Baron  Sakatani 
came,  to  study  Chinese  finance. 

From  Japan  came  loans  and  offers  of  loans.  They  lent 
10,000,000  yen  through  the  Yokohama  Specie  Bank.  This 
was  merely  an  advance  on  a  future  reorganization  loan. 
Then  a  loan,  labelled  "Industrial,"  of  20,000,000  yen,  was 
made  through  the  Bank  of  Communications.  Two  Japanese 
financial  cliques  sprang  up  and  flourished.  Liang  sat  at  the 
receipt  of  customs  at  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  dealing  with 
the  Yokohama  Specie  Bank;  the  other  clique,  headed  by  Tsao 
Ju-lin  and  Lu  Tsung-yu,  played  in  with  the  tri-fold  group  of 
the  Industrial  Bank  of  Japan,  the  Bank  of  Chosen,  and  the 
Bank  of  Taiwan  (Formosa).  With  the  loan  dubbed  "In- 
dustrial"— this  to  evade  the  provisions  of  the  reorganization 
loan — came  Japanese  advisorships  in  the  Chinese  Bank  of 
Communications.  Not  by  the  remotest  chance  would  the 
loan  be  used  by  the  bank  to  strengthen  its  depreciated  notes. 
It  went  for  politics  and  the  military. 

The  Japanese  financiers  coolly  calculated  that  the  British 


300      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

and  French  banks  would  fail  to  take  up  their  option  on  the 
currency  reform  loan,  which  they  had  held  since  191 1.  That 
would  leave  the  field  clear  for  Japan.  The  French  and  Brit- 
ish legations  got  busy  about  this,  and  so  did  we.  As  a  con- 
sequence the  American  Government  resumed  its  interest  in 
currency  reform  in  China,  and  the  sigh  of  relief  was  almost 
audible.  I  called  on  Minister  Liang.  Did  he  not  remember 
the  Treaty  of  1903  and  America's  long-continued  interest  in 
Chinese  currency  betterment  ?  There  was  the  Jenks-Conant 
Monetary  Commission;  there  were  the  long  negotiations 
conducted  by  Willard  Straight,  and  the  resultant  Currency 
Loan  Agreement  of  191 1.  "I  remember  all  these  things," 
Liang  responded;  "America  should  lead  in  this  matter. 
Our  banknote  issues  are  being  shot  to  pieces  by  local  issuance 
of  worthless  paper.  The  Tuchuns  have  bent  the  national 
banks  to  their  purposes.  The  books  of  the  banks  must  be 
kept  and  made  public.  I  suggest  appointing  three  principal 
foreign  experts  on  a  reform  of  the  entire  currency.  Let  them 
be  an  American,  a  European,  and  a  Japanese." 

The  currency  loan  option  was  extended  until  the  following 
April. 

But  Japan  had  other  shots  in  her  locker.  Suddenly  the 
Japanese  press  bristled  with  news  of  a  projected  "arms  alli- 
ance" with  China.  It  sounded  almost  menacing.  The 
Tai  Hei  Company,  originally  organized  by  the  Japanese 
Government  to  supply  arms  to  Russia,  was  going  to  furnish 
China  with  her  armament.  General  Tuan  said  that  he  had 
long  been  urged  to  buy  a  "limited  amount"  of  war  material 
from  Japan.  The  Japanese  minister  chimed  in  with  the 
statement  that,  inasmuch  as  the  United  States  refused  to  sell 
steel  to  Japan — under  the  war  trade  restriction — the  time 
was  come  for  Japan  to  control  China's  ore  deposits.  "Japan 
is  to  sell  China  arms.  Why  may  she  not  have  the  raw  ma- 
terials for  them?"  he  asked. 

The  disproportion   involved   in   this  demand  served  to 


THE  CHINESE  GO  A-BORROWING         301 

amuse  the  Chinese.  The  deposits  on  which  Japan's  eyes 
were  fixed  amounted  to  from  forty  to  fifty  miUion  tons  of  ore 
— enough  to  make  several  guns. 

Along  with  these  negotiations  came  proposals  to  establish 
Japanese  military  and  arsenal  advisorships. 

I  asked  the  Premier  about  these  reports.  I  told  him  we 
could  not  object  to  the  purchase  of  arms  by  China  from  any 
source  whatever.  But  in  negotiations  for  loans  and  conces- 
sions the  United  States  had  held  unswervingly  to  the  princi- 
ple of  the  "open  door"  and  no  special  privileges.  As  it 
sought  no  control  of  this  kind,  it  was  equally  interested  that 
none  should  be  given  to  any  other  power. 

"Have  you  not,"  the  Premier  asked  me,  "found  me  always 
candid  and  true?"    Most  sincerely  I  assured  him  I  had. 

"Then,"  he  replied,  "we  have  bought  of  Japan  40,000  rifles, 
160  machine  guns,  and  80  field  guns.  There  will  be  no  in- 
cidental commitments.  I  can  rely  implicitly  on  my  mili- 
tary associates  [General  Hsu  Shu-cheng,  the  Vice-Minister  of 
War;  Ching  Yun-peng,  Acting  Chief  of  Staff;  and  Fu  Liang- 
tso,  Tuchun  of  Hunan].  They  would  not  sanction  such  a 
thing." 

But  the  next  day  I  got  positive  evidence  that  they  had. 
The  negotiations  were  in  full  blast  for  Japanese  military 
advisorships,  control  of  the  Nanking  Arsenal,  and  rights  to 
specific  iron  deposits.  I  saw  General  Hsu,  telling  him 
everything  before  giving  him  a  chance  to  answer.  I  was  not 
then  solely  concerned  about  the  encroachment  on  Chinese 
independence.  American  and  European  interests  had  been 
told:  "Hands  off  the  national  iron  ore  reserve;  all  remaining 
iron  deposits  are  to  be  held  for  the  nation."  Respecting 
this  decision,  we  had  told  our  people  that  concessions  for  iron 
ores  could  not  be  obtained.  We  could  not  in  justice  to  them 
now  consent  to  a  change  of  policy,  without  protecting  our 
interests.  Japan  had  already  one  half  of  China's  iron  ore 
deposits.   Was  she  to  get  the  rest  ?  Also,  were  Chinese  arma- 


302      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

ments  to  be  standardized  without  consulting  the  experts  of 
the  AUied  Governments,  so  that  the  arms  might  be  used  in 
the  present  war? 

"We  have  been  hard  pressed,"  General  Hsu  explained. 
"The  Japanese  wished  us  to  do  something  for  them  and  we 
need  the  arms.  They  will  be  of  the  larger  calibre,  such  as 
China's  armament  now  has.  The  Japanese  did  demand  the 
assignment  of  new  ore  deposits;  they  needed  security  for 
the  contract.  They  compromised  by  reducing  the  amount 
of  ore  we  are  to  furnish.  But  we  must  supply  it  under  a 
contract  of  1916,  between  the  Japanese  and  a  company 
formed  by  Chow  Tsu-chi,  whereby  a  million  dollars  was  paid 
in  advance  on  iron  ores  from  deposits  near  Nanking.  This 
is  the  best  we  can  do.  They  demanded  at  first  the  grant  of 
new  ore  deposits." 

"I  should  like  to  visit  you  more  often,"  General  Hsu  re- 
marked later;  "but  my  movements  are  closely  watched." 
I  stated  I  hoped  he  entertained  no  fear  that  would  keep  him 
from  seeing  the  minister  of  a  friendly  power  at  any  time  he 
wished. 

The  real  trouble  lay  in  the  rivalries  between  the  north 
and  south.  The  Premier  and  General  Hsu  were  willing  to 
barter  the  nation's  birthright  in  the  form  of  concessions  in 
order  to  impose  an  internal  unity  of  their  own  making.  For 
China  was  torn.  The  situation  in  October,  191 7 — how 
different  from  that  of  April  and  May,  191 5,  when  the  twenty- 
one  demands  came  to  their  climax !  Then  the  Chinese  people 
and  Government  were  united  as  one  man.  The  sentiment  of 
the  nation  was  now  the  same;  nearly  all  the  members  of  the 
Governmentwere  unchanged,  yet  a  small  pro-Japanese  minor- 
ity were  in  the  saddle.  The  men  who  had  Japanese  funds 
under  their  control  had  the  advantage  over  the  mass  of  offi- 
cials. They  succeeded  in  muzzling  the  Chinese  press.  By 
Japanese  insistence,  aided  in  this  case  by  the  French  minister 
— some  of  the  Chinese  papers  had  criticized  his  attitude — 


THE  CHINESE  GO  A-BORROWING         303 

news  of  diplomatic  negotiations  had  been  absolutely  sup- 
pressed. Without  information,  the  public  was  disturbed  and 
confused.  The  editor  of  the  Japanese  Kokumiriy  Mr.  Toku- 
tomi,  in  an  interview  in  Peking,  advocated  still  more  stringent 
press  control.  Japan  was  using  the  war  to  displace  the  in- 
fluence of  her  associates  in  China  and  to  make  her  own  power 
predominant. 

Bad  as  the  situation  was  it  might  have  been  saved  by  an 
adequate  loan  from  America.  Liang's  first  proposal  was  for  a 
reorganization  loan  of  ^200,000,000,  which  was  vetoed  by 
Europe;  this  shrivelled  to  the  mess  of  pottage  of  10,000,000 
yen  offered  by  the  Yokohama  Specie  Bank.  General  Hsu  had 
unfolded  to  me  in  September  a  comprehensive  scheme  of 
equipping  500,000  soldiers,  and  providing  for  the  immediate 
transport  of  at  least  500,000  to  Europe,  further  detachments 
were  to  go  as  fast  as  ships  could  be  had.  Later  came  more 
specific  plans  for  1,000,000  men,  out  of  which  the  best  contin- 
gents were  to  be  sent  to  France.  It  was  planned  ultimately 
to  send  the  whole  million,  if  needed.  Then  came  a  modified 
proposal  for  outfitting  500,000  men  and  the  completion  of 
the  industrial  plants  needed  for  war  materials  and  ships. 
The  European  ministers  were  all  anxious  to  secure  China's 
active  participation;  the  French  Legation,  through  its 
military  attache,  was  cooperating  with  special  energy  in 
planning  for  the  eventual  use  of  Chinese  forces.  From  my 
conversations  with  the  President,  the  Premier,  and  his  most 
active  assistant,  there  was  no  doubt  that  the  Chinese  were 
in  earnest.  Now  it  was  all  simmering  down  to  a  few  millions 
of  Japanese  money,  supplied  for  politics  and  internal  dis- 
sension, with  Japan  seeking  special  advantages. 

Work  was  to  be  done.  The  United  States  could  still  bring 
relief  and  a  strong  call  for  united  action  into  this  troubled 
situation  without  giving  just  cause  for  complaint  or  for  tak- 
ing offence.  The  French  were  especially  desirous  of  bringing 
the  Chinese  actually  into  the  war.     The  Belgians  wished 


304      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

the  mobilization  of  Chinese  material  resources,  particularly 
foodstuffs.  The  British  were  in  general  accord,  though  they 
doubted  whether  Chinese  troops  could  be  soon  transported 
to  the  theatre  of  war.  Dr.  George  Morrison* who  had  just 
goneoverthewholesituation  with  the  President  and  cabinet, 
came  to  me  saying:  **The  Chinese  will  apply  to  you  for  ad- 
vice.    You  have  a  freer  hand  than  the  British  minister." 

But  an  event  of  profound  significance  was  impending,  and 
it  interrupted  my  efforts  along  these  constructive  lines.  It 
was  at  this  time  that  the  results  of  Japan's  efforts  to  reach  an 
agreement  with  the  State  Department  in  Washington  became 
known  to  China. 


PART  IV 
LAST  YEAR  OF  WAR  AND  AFTERMATH 


CHAPTER  XXVI 
THE  LANSING-ISHH  NOTES 

It  was  in  rather  an  indirect  way  that  I  learned  of  the  secret 
negotiations  which  had  been  going  on  between  the  head  of 
the  State  Department  in  Washington  and  the  Japanese 
Government.  Since  these  negotiations  concerned  some  of 
the  most  vital  problems  in  the  whole  Chinese  situation,  it 
was  surprising  that  everyone  had  been  kept  in  ignorance  of 
them.  I  learned  of  them,  I  confess  with  mingled  emotions, 
from  none  other  than  Baron  Hayashi  himself.  I  called  on 
him  on  the  evening  of  November  4th ;  and,  after  going  over 
the  matter  of  routine  which  I  had  wished  to  take  up  with 
him,  I  remained  chatting  pleasantly  with  him.  In  the  course 
of  our  talk  the  Baron  remarked:  '*I  have  just  received  some 
information  that  is  quite  important,  and  I  want  you  to  know 
about  it.     Let  me  get  the  cablegram." 

He  brought  a  paper  and  handed  it  over  to  me  without  com- 
ment. It  was  a  cablegram  from  Tokyo  that  informed  him  of 
the  signing  of  the  Lansing-Ishii  notes,  and  gave  a  summary 
of  their  text.  The  first  paragraph  contained  the  vital  clause: 
"The  Government  of  the  United  States  recognizes  that 
Japan  has  special  interests  in  China,  particularly  in  the  part 
to  which  her  possessions  are  contiguous."  This  naturally 
struck  me  in  the  face  with  stunning  force,  before  I  had  time 
to  weigh  its  meaning  in  relation  to  the  remainder  of  the 
declaration.  I  read  the  dispatch  twice  and  made  an  effort 
to  impress  its  salient  points  on  my  memory,  and  then 
turned  to  my  Japanese  colleague  attempting  to  retain  my 
composure. 

"Yes,"  I  managed  to  say,  "this  is  quite  interesting.     It  is 

307 


3o8      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

somewhat  in  line  with  conversations  we  have  had,  yet  differs 
in  some  respects." 

I  forced  myself  to  remain  a  httle  longer  and  tried  to  con- 
tinue the  matter-of-fact  conversation  which  this  astounding 
piece  of  news  had  interrupted.  When  I  finally  took  my 
leave,  I  was  uncertain  whether  Baron  Hayashi  did  or  did  not 
know  that  I  had  been  unaware  of  this  exchange  of  notes. 
Hurrying  to  the  Legation,  I  dispatched  a  cablegram  to  the 
Department  asking  that  I  be  informed. 

It  had  been  agreed,  so  the  cable  from  Tokyo  had  stated, 
that  an  announcement  of  the  parley  should  not  be  given  out 
until  November  7th.  But  the  Japanese  minister  had  already 
informed  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office  on  Sunday  night;  and 
early  on  Monday  its  representative  called  to  get  my  version 
of  the  matter. 

No  word  had  been  sent  me.  It  was  inexcusable  to  fail 
to^give  the  local  representative  the  earliest  possible  informa- 
tion, and  I  intimated  as  much  in  my  cablegram  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  State.  As  the  Foreign  Office  had  been  fully  informed, 
I  could  only  state  to  my  visitor  that  I  was  not  authorized 
to  deliver  the  text  until  later,  and  that  I  was  myself  still  con- 
sidering the  full  import  of  the  document,  which  in  certain 
respects  followed  lines  of  policy  that  had  been  discussed  in 
the  past. 

As  I  could  plainly  see,  the  notes  had  been  paraded  in  the 
Chinese  Foreign  Office  as  yielding  important  concessions  from 
the  United  States  and  as  a  diplomatic  triumph  for  Japan. 
I  knew  nothing  of  the  motives  which  had  animated  the  Presi- 
dent and  Secretary  of  State  when  they  agreed  to  the  paper. 
I  could  not  explain  its  purposes;  but  when  my  visitor  asked: 
"Does  this  paper  recognize  the  paramount  position  of  Japan 
in  China.?"  I  could  and  did  answer  with  an  emphatic  "No." 
Beyond  that  I  said  nothing. 

All  that  day  and  the  next  reports  streamed  in  from  many 
quarters  that  the  Japanese  were  "crowing  over  their  vie- 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  NOTES  309 

tory  "  in  their  talks  with  the  Chinese.  More  Chinese  officials 
and  many  Americans  applied  at  the  Legation  for  authentic 
word.  But  no  help  came  from  the  Department  of  State. 
Indeed  no  word  reached  me  until  the  morning  of  the  7th. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  the  American  secrecy  pledge  was  not 
punctiliously  observed — even  to  the  extent  of  keeping  in 
ignorance  the  American  minister,  who  would  have  to  bear 
the  brunt  of  the  consequences  of  this  diplomatic  manoeuvre. 
The  Japanese,  meanwhile,  had  given  the  note  not  only  to  the 
Chinese  Government  several  days  in  advance,  but — was  it 
out  of  abhorrence  for  secret  diplomacy? — even  before  the 
notes  had  been  signed  their  text  was  communicated  to  the 
representatives  of  Great  Britain,  Russia,  France,  and  Italy. 
This  was  done  at  Tokyo. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  this  procedure  produced  upon  the 
Chinese  the  impression  that  the  Japanese  had  got  what  they 
wanted.  They  thought  the  declarations  made  by  the  United 
States  contained  admission  of  a  special  position  held  by 
Japan  in  China,  not  desired  by  the  latter,  but  forced  through 
by  the  military  and  political  power  of  Japan. 

The  reception  given  the  note  by  Far  Eastern  experts  and 
by  the  public  indicated  that  it  would  be  interpreted  in  widely 
varying  fashion.  The  first  impression  only  gradually  gave 
way  to  a  calmer  judgment  when  the  specific  terms  of  the 
notes  were  carefully  read  and  the  ambiguous  character  of  the 
instrument  was  realized.  In  the  first  place,  the  Japanese 
Legation,  in  translating  for  the  benefit  of  the  Chinese  Minis- 
try, had  used  for  "special  interest"  a  Chinese  term  which 
implied  the  idea  of  "special  position."  Doctor  Tenney's 
more  direct  translation  of  the  term  was  without  this  extra 
shade.  The  Department  authorized  me  to  deliver  an  ex- 
planatory note  to  the  effect  that  the  interests  referred  to 
were  of  an  economic,  not  a  political,  nature.  It  referred  to 
"Japan's  commercial  and  industrial  enterprises  in  China"; 
these,  it  added,  "manifestly  have,  on  account  of  the  geogra- 


3IO      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

phical  relation  of  the  two  countries,  a  certain  advantage  over 
similar  enterprises  on  the  part  of  citizens  or  subjects  of  any 
other  country.'* 

I  could  not  avoid  the  feeling  that  the  form  which  the  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Washington  had  taken  was  unfortunate. 
It  was  indeed  desirable  that  the  friendly  attitude  of  the 
United  States  toward  all  Japan's  economic  activities  in  China 
should  be  stated  strongly.  This  had  been  the  tenor  of  the 
conversations  between  successive  Japanese  ministers  and 
myself,  which  had  been  communicated  to  the  State  Depart- 
ment. It  was  necessary,  if  the  Japanese  really  entertained 
it,  to  disabuse  them  of  the  conception  that  the  political  in- 
fluence of  the  United  States  was  being  used  to  discourage 
close  business  relationships  between  China  and  Japan,  and 
to  frown  upon  Japanese  enterprises  in  China.  On  the  basis 
of  such  an  understanding,  it  was  hoped  that  Japan  would 
join  with  the  United  States  in  agreeing  that  special  privi- 
leges in  any  part  of  China,  or  any  sort  of  economic  advantage, 
would  not  be  sought  by  political  means;  that  the  Manchurian 
regime,  to  be  more  specific,  would  not  extend  to  other  parts 
of  China. 

But  the  notes  definitely  stated  that  Japan  would  not  use 
her  special  interests  in  a  way  to  "discriminate  against  the 
trade  of  other  nations,  or  to  disregard  the  commercial  rights 
heretofore  granted  by  China  in  the  treaties  with  other 
powers."  This  might  give  rise  to  the  idea  that  "special 
interests"  did  not  refer  merely  to  specific  economic  interests 
and  enterprises.  It  might  include  also  a  certain  political 
influence  or  preference. 

The  Japanese  minister,  though  disclaiming  a  reading 
which  would  imply  a  paramount  interest,  evidently  saw  in 
the  notes  an  endorsement  of  the  principle  of  spheres  of  in- 
fluence. "The  notes  speak  for  themselves,"  he  said  in  an 
interview  on  the  8th  of  November;  "they  simply  again  place 
on  record  the  acknowledged  attitude  of  the  United  States 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  NOTES  311 

and  Japan  toward  China.  They  are  simply  a  restatement 
of  an  old  position.  Even  the  term  'special  interests'  is 
doubtless  used  in  the  same  sense  here  as  in  the  past.  Several 
other  countries  have  territory  that  borders  on  China;  this 
fact  gives  them  a  special  interest  in  these  parts  of  China 
which  they  touch.  In  exactly  the  same  way,  Japan  has 
special  rights  in  China." 

The  non-official  Japanese  statements  claimed  much  more 
than  this.  They  did  "crow  over"  the  Chinese.  Was  not 
here  a  vindication  of  distinct  priority  enjoyed  by  Japan  in 
China?  In  Japan  the  veteran  Okuma,  who  is  never  back- 
ward in  airing  his  opinions  in  the  press,  also  seemed  to  have  a 
rather  broad  idea  of  the  notes.  "Hitherto,"  he  said, 
"America's  activities  in  China  were  often  imprudent  and 
thoughtless.  For  instance,  Secretary  Knox's  proposal  to 
neutralize  the  Manchurian  Railway  was,  indeed,  a  reckless 
move.  The  United  States  also  relegated  Japan  to  the  back- 
ground when  she  sent  the  note  of  June  7th  to  China,  advising 
that  country  concerning  domestic  peace.  Thus  America 
disregarded  Japan's  special  position  in  China.  We  may 
understand  that  she  will  not  repeat  such  follies,  in  the  light 
of  the  new  convention." 

Of  course,  there  is  nothing  in  the  notes  to  interfere  with  the 
fullest  and  freest  interchange  of  communications  between  the 
American  Government  and  the  Chinese,  on  any  topic  what- 
ever. 

In  reporting  his  conversation  on  the  notes  with  the  Japa- 
nese Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  before  they  were  signed,  the 
Russian  ambassador  at  Tokyo  hit  it  off  in  this  way:  "Never- 
theless, I  gain  the  impression  from  the  words  of  the  minister 
that  he  is  conscious  of  the  possibility  of  misunderstandings, 
also,  in  the  future;  but  is  of  the  opinion  that  in  such  a  case 
Japan  would  have  at  her  disposal  better  means  than  the 
United  States  for  carrying  into  effect  her  interpretation." 

To  show  how  different  people  were  affected,  I  shall  cite 


312      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

from  some  letters.  Dr.  George  Morrison  wrote  to  a  friend 
from  southern  China:  "Relays  of  Chinese  have  thronged 
to  see  the  American  consul,  all  sounding  one  note — that  they 
have  been  betrayed  by  America.  After  all  her  valiant  pro- 
testations, what  earthly  good  did  America  gain  by  making 
such  a  concession  to  Japan,  giving  recognition  to  that  which 
every  American  and  Englishman  in  China  had  been  en- 
deavouring to  prevent?  Carried  to  its  logical  conclusion 
this  agreement  gives  recognition  not  only  to  Japan's  'special 
interests'  in  Manchuria,  but  also  to  those  in  Fukien  Province 
which  lies  in  'geographical  proximity'  to  Formosa.  Surely 
the  British  will  now  claim  recognition  of  similar  rights  in 
Kwangsi  Province.     It  is  all  very  deplorable." 

Another  Britisher,  Mr.  W.  H.  Donald,  took  a  different 
view.  "When  I  saw  the  notes,"  he  wrote,  **I  was  delighted, 
because  I  read  into  them  the  fact  that  America  had,  to  use 
an  Americanism,  'put  one  over'  Japan.  Ishii  went  to  Amer- 
ica to  get  acquiescence  in  Japan's  predominance  in  China; 
to  get  America  to  admit  Japan's  hegemony  of  the  Pacific. 
He  got  neither.  Instead,  he  had  to  reaffirm  adherence  to  the 
previous  undertakings — undertakings  which  were  discarded 
when  Japan  put  in  her  twenty-one  demands." 

The  Chinese  papers  generally  pronounced  the  notes  incon- 
sistent. The  Chung  Hua  Hsin  Pao  saw  no  need  for  having 
the  "special  interests"  of  Japan  particularly  recognized  any 
more  than  those  of  other  nations,  like  Great  Britain,  France, 
Russia,  and  the  United  States,  all  of  which  have  territory 
adjacent  to  China.  The  paper  thought  that  the  assurance 
that  Japan  seeks  no  special  rights  or  privileges,  should  be 
taken  at  its  face  value  when  the  point  of  the  whole  agreement 
was  the  recognition  of  "special  interests"  enjoyed  by  Japan. 
The  tenor  of  the  note,  therefore,  appeared  to  favour  "special 
interests,"  consequently  the  division  of  China  into  spheres  of 
influence — contrary  to  the  traditional  policy  of  the  United 
States. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  NOTES  313 

Personally,  from  my  knowledge  of  the  situation  in  the  Far 
East,  I  could  not  see  any  urgent  reason  for  making  this  dec- 
laration. I  learned  later  that  the  notes  had  been  drawn  up 
in  consultation  between  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
State,  without  other  reference  to  the  Department  of  State 
and  without  the  knowledge  of  its  staff.  Also,  the  Secretary 
had  acted  upon  the  belief  and  understanding  that  the  first 
statement  concerning  special  interests  was  simply  a  self- 
evident  axiom,  but  that  its  restatement  would  clarify  the 
situation.  Certainly,  on  the  other  hand,  the  positive  affirm- 
ative pledge  against  "the  acquisition  by  any  government  of 
any  special  rights  or  privileges"  was  clearer  and  went 
further  than  any  previous  declaration. 

To  safeguard  its  rights  under  any  construction  that  might 
be  given  to  the  document,  the  Chinese  Government  declared 
that  it  could  not  recognize  any  agreement  relating  to  China 
entered  into  between  other  powers. 

I  have  said  that  I  could  not  see  the  need  of  these  notes. 
Failing  to  receive  instructions  which  I  sought  from  the  De- 
partment of  State,  I  continued  to  take  the  position  that  the 
policy  of  the  American  Government  remained  unchanged 
with  respect  to  the  existence  of  a  special  position  or  special 
privileges  on  the  part  of  any  other  power  in  China.  But  the 
immediate  effect  of  the  notes  on  the  Chinese  Government 
was  to  make  its  high  officials  feel  that  nothing  very  positive 
could  be  expected  from  the  United  States  by  way  of  assis- 
tance out  of  the  nation's  difficulties. 

The  general  and  continuing  effect  of  the  notes  was  seen  in 
the  behaviour  of  the  Japanese  in  China.  The  Japanese 
papers  boldly  declared  that  Japan  would  interpret  the  term 
"special  interests"  in  a  way  to  suit  herself,  and  that  it  im- 
plied the  supremacy  of  Japanese  political  influence  in  China. 
The  thrusting  forward  of  this  view  did  not  strengthen  the 
government  of  General  Tuan.  Several  more  provinces 
followed  those  which  had  declared  their  independence  with 


314      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

acts  that  made  their  allegiance  at  least  doubtful.  General 
Tuan's  appointee  as  military  governor  of  Hunan  suffered 
defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  southern  troops.  The  governors 
of  the  Yangtse  Valley,  under  the  leadership  of  General  Li 
Shun,  addressed  to  the  Government  pointed  inquiries  about 
financial  dealings  with  the  Japanese  and  the  purchase  of 
arms,  which  was  reported  to  involve  an  arms  alliance. 

As  the  attacks  were  directed  at  him  personally.  General 
Tuan  felt  that  he  must  resign.  Notwithstanding  an  outward 
show  of  amity.  General  Feng  Kuo-chang  and  the  Premier 
had  actually  not  agreed.  The  Premier  wished  to  make  war 
on  the  south  and  conquer  it.  The  Acting  President,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  in  constant  correspondence  with  southern 
leaders  in  an  attempt  to  bring  about  reconciliation.  Tuan 
sent  in  his  resignation.  The  Japanese  worked  for  his  reten- 
tion. The  President  did  ask  him  to  reconsider,  but  his 
resignation  finally  took  effect  on  the  20th  of  November. 
General  Wang  Shih-chen,  who  was  close  to  the  President  as 
chief  of  staff,  became  acting  premier.  But  Tsao  Ju-lin, 
who  headed  the  Japanese  clique,  was  retained. 

Peace  and  unity  did  not  result.  The  northern  Tuchuns 
gathered  at  Tientsin  on  December  4th,  and  decided  to  push 
the  war  against  the  south  with  200,000  men.  This  was  to 
be  made  a  pretext  for  getting  more  funds. 

I  kept  in  touch  with  General  Tuan,  in  whose  personal 
character  and  honesty  of  purpose  in  wishing  China  to  take 
part  in  the  war  I  placed  reliance.  Also  his  friend,  Mr.  Chu 
Ying-kuang,  who  had  made  a  fine  record  as  civilian  governor 
of  Chekiang,  had  kept  his  eye  mainly  on  this  goal.  Through 
them  I  kept  in  touch  with  all  of  the  Chinese  who  fostered 
such  action.  If  the  Chinese  of  their  own  initiative  should 
create  services  for  supplying  urgent  needs  of  the  Allies,  and 
should  train  a  model  division  for  use  on  the  battlefields  of 
Europe,  I  felt  that  the  United  States  and  her  associates  would 
find  a  way  to  transport  them  to  Europe.    General  Tuan  was 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  NOTES  315 

now  free  of  politics.  In  the  conversations  I  had  with  the 
Premier  and  his  associates,  the  idea  of  a  special  organization 
for  preparedness  was  talked  over.  The  upshot  of  this  was 
the  creation  of  a  War  Participation  Office,  with  General  Tuan 
as  its  president.  The  Office  was  to  make  constructive  plans 
for  developing  resources  iseful  in  the  war,  and  for  training 
troops  for  Europe. 

Meanwhile,  the  Japanese  were  *'cutting  loose"  in  Shan- 
tung. Quite  openly  they  were  trying  to  set  up  an  administra- 
tion in  what  they  called  the  railway  zone.  The  agreements 
between  China  and  German}^  contained  no  provision  for 
such  a  zone.  The  Germans  merely  had  the  railway  itself, 
and  certain  specific  mining  enterprises,  together  with  the 
port  of  Tsingtao.  A  general  priority  in  the  mining  districts 
within  a  zone  of  ten  miles  along  each  side  of  the  railway  had 
been  abandoned  some  time  previous  to  the  war.  Now  the 
Japanese  asserted  in  this  "zone"  general  administrative 
power,  including  policing,  taxation,  forestry,  and  education. 
With  this  encroachment,  the  Chinese  noted  evidences  of 
Japanese  toleration  of  revolutionary  and  bandit  activities 
wherever  they  served  the  purposes  of  the  invaders. 

People  came  frequently  from  Shantung  to  see  me  in  order 
to  lay  before  me  their  complaints  and  petitions.  They  were 
distressed,  but  I  could  not  help  them,  save  where  American 
rights  were  involved.  The  Shantung  men  reported  that  the 
Japanese  were  making  the  Lansing-Ishii  notes  the  basis  of 
their  propaganda,  stating  that  Japan's  special  position  had 
now  been  recognized.  This  penetration  into  the  interior  of 
one  of  the  provinces  of  China  proper  by  a  foreign  political 
administration  was  undoubtedly  the  most  serious  attack  ever 
made  on  Chinese  sovereignty. 

A  member  of  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office  called  on  me  on 
the  21  St  of  December,  and  spoke  earnestly  about  the  Japa- 
nese inroads  in  Shantung.  He  said  nothing  could  stop  the 
Japanese.     Their  minister  had  stated  that  it  would  be  diffi- 


3i6      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

cult  to  change  an  ordinance  signed  by  the  Premier  and  sanc- 
tioned by  the  Emperor. 

Among  both  Chinese  officials  and  the  general  public  all  was 
discouragement  and  depression.  The  first  effect  of  the 
Lansing-Ishii  notes,  the  strong  influence  exercised  by  the  pro- 
Japanese  chque  in  the  government  because  of  the  financial 
backing  they  got,  the  knowledge  that  such  backing  had  to 
be  bought  with  valuable  national  concessions,  the  increasing 
disunion  between  north  and  south,  the  general  despair  of 
any  constructive  and  unifiying  policy  being  possible,  made 
the  Chinese  individually  and  collectively  paralysed  with 
doubt,  fear,  and  a  feehng  of  impotence.  It  was  plain  that 
Japanese  influences,  making  a  politico-commercial  campaign 
in  China,  were  everywhere  actively  taking  advantage  of  this 
demoralized  state  of  the  public  mind  and  intensifying  it 
through  their  manipulations. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 
AMIDST  TROUBLES  PEKING  REJOICES 

The  Armistice  meant  the  end  of  the  Great  War.  Would  it 
also  mean  the  end  of  sinister  intrigue  in  China? 

In  the  joy  of  the  world  victory  everybody  felt  so.  But 
when  I  returned  to  Peking  early  in  October,  191 8,  I  found 
that  things  had  gone  from  bad  to  worse.  Money  had  been 
squandered  on  war  expeditions  which  had  torn  the  country, 
not  united  it.  The  unofficial  Japanese  financial  agent,  Mr. 
Nishihara,  a  borer  in  the  rotten  trunk  of  Chinese  finance,  had 
been  at  work  all  summer.  The  fact  of  his  loan  negotiations 
was  denied  to  the  very  last  by  the  Japanese  Legation.  Sud- 
denly, on  October  ist,  Japan's  Minister  of  Finance  announced 
that  his  government  had  arranged  a  number  of  loans  to 
the  Chinese.  They  involved  commitments  in  the  sum  of 
320,000,000  yen,  ostensibly  to  build  railways  and  iron  works; 
of  this  amount  40,000,000  yen  would  be  immediately  ad- 
vanced. 

The  earlier  loans  had  all  gone  to  the  inept  militarists.  The 
advances  on  these  so-called  industrial  loans  were  in  the  same 
way  dissipated  in  partisanship,  division,  distraction.  The 
new  parliament  had  been  elected.  It  was  to  elect  a  new 
president.  Money  was  poured  into  the  contest  between 
Feng,  the  Acting  President,  and  Hsu  Shih-chang.  General 
Tuan  had  his  army  of  small  political  adherents,  who  battened 
on  the  funds  supplied  by  the  chief  manipulators.  They 
formed  the  Anfu  Club — from  y^whui,  the  province  of  the 
army  clique,  and  Fwkien,  the  province  whence  the  navy  drew 
most  of  its  admirals. 

The  inner  military  ring  was  operating  from  the  War  Par- 

317 


3i8      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

ticipation  Bureau,  which  had  preempted  the  control  of  fi- 
nance, natural  resources,  and  police.  The  ministries  were 
powerless.  The  Government  was  debauched  with  the  easy 
money  from  Japan.  With  a  sardonic  grin,  the  Japanese 
offered  to  lend  China  2CO,ooo,ooo  paper  yen,  not  redeemable, 
on  which  the  Chinese  Government  should  base  a  gold-note 
issue.  On  this  paper  of  the  Bank  of  Korea  China  should 
repay  Japan,  with  interest  annually. 

Using  the  militarists,  they  tried  hard  to  put  it  through. 
But  the  foreign  press,  and  such  Chinese  papers  as  dared, 
succeeded  in  laughing  it  down.  Redeemable  in  Korean  or 
Japanese  banknotes,  which  the  Chinese  never  use  in  daily 
trade,  the  proposed  government  gold  notes  could  not  have 
been  forced  into  circulation.  They  would  only  have  worse 
confounded  the  already  existing  monetary  confusion. 

The  police  terrorized  and  bullied  the  papers  that  opposed 
Japan's  loan  negotiations  and  printed  the  facts  about  them. 
Nearly  a  dozen  were  suppressed.  The  Anfu  gang  had  cowed 
the  Government  and  people  in  north  China.  Without  moral 
and  legal  authority,  it  made  the  Government  impotent  in  its 
prime  functions,  such  as  levying  taxes  and  protecting  lives. 

The  diplomatic  corps  had  to  consider  whether  the  customs 
and  salt  revenues  should  be  released  to  such  a  government. 
The  best  interests  not  only  of  China,  but  of  all  the  friendly 
nations,  including  Japan  herself,  were  being  bhghted.  The 
prostitution  of  the  War  Participation  Bureau  by  the  gold- 
lust  of  the  militarists,  with  Japan  as  pander,  fostered  the 
brawls  of  faction  and  disunion.  Public  opinion  was  throt- 
tled and  the  corrupt  elements  found  no  organized  popular 
opposition. 

Tsao  Ju-lin,  Minister  of  Finance,  advocated  the  spurious 
gold-note  project,  which  had  been  dubbed  the  "gold-brick 
scheme."  Tsao  had  represented  that  the  diplomatic  corps 
had  approved  this  scheme.  Four  ministers  jointly  informed 
the  Chinese  Government  that  Mr.  Tsao's  methods  tended  to 


AMIDST  TROUBLES  PEKING  REJOICES     319 

destroy  confidence  between  the  Government  and  the  lega- 
tions, and  one  minister  said  his'  legation  would  thenceforward 
accept  no  statement  coming  from  the  Minister  of  Finance 
until  the  Foreign  Office  had  vouched  for  its  truth. 

The  Finance  Minister  unblushingly  tried  to  suspend  the 
renewal  of  the  currency  loan  option  until  the  foreign  banks 
should  consent  to  the  gold-note  scheme.  Here  I  protested, 
saying  that  under  the  Currency  Loan  Agreement  the  Amer- 
ican Government  had  a  right  to  be  consulted  before  any 
such  proposals  could  be  considered. 

His  Excellency  Hsu  Shih-chang  was  elected  President — a 
v^eteran  statesman  of  the  old  regime.  In  my  first  interview 
with  him  he  complained : "  I  am  trying  to  deal  with  the  south ; 
but  they  have  nobody  to  bind  them  together  and  represent 
them.  We  are  demobilizing  most  of  our  superfluous  troops, 
but  I  am  worried  because  the  Government  lacks  financial 
support." 

I  talked  with  him  again  often.  General  Li  Shun,  of  Nan- 
king, had  been  asked  to  mediate.  The  southern  leaders 
needed  to  be  "grubstaked"  to  pay  off  their  troops,  then  an 
agreement  with  them  could  be  reached.  The  President's 
solution  smacked  of  buying  them  off.  But  this  would  not 
end  the  militarist  intriguing.  President  Hsu  issued  on  October 
25th  a  peace  mandate,  taking  President  Wilson's  statement 
about  reconstituting  international  unity  as  his  point  of  de- 
parture. The  President  had  cabled  this  to  Hsu  when  he  was 
inaugurated.  The  press  was  reporting  that  the  British  and 
American  ministers  were  working  for  internal  peace;  our 
mediation  would  have  been  popular.  It  would  have  pulled 
the  leaders  of  north  and  south  out  of  their  impasse.  Presi- 
dent Hsu  cabled  back  to  Mr.  Wilson:  "Though  we  are 
separated  by  a  great  distance,  yet  I  feel  your  influence  as  if 
we  were  face  to  face." 

President  Hsu  had  gotten  a  report  from  Dr.  George  E. 
Morrison,  who  had  returned  from  investigations  in  south 


320      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

China.  Doctor  Morrison  made  the  point  that  internal  strife 
must  be  ended  if  China  was  to  do  anything  in  the  Great  War 
and  to  hold  up  her  rights  strongly  at  the  Peace  Conference. 
I  will  quote  this  report  somewhat  at  length: 

China  under  the  advice  of  several  of  her  more  powerful  ministers  looks 
to  Japan  for  guidance,  Japan  having  in  an  incredibly  short  space  of  time, 
by  the  energy  and  patriotism  of  her  united  people  and  the  wisdom  of  her 
rulers,  raised  herself  to  an  important  position  among  the  nations.  But 
Japan  is  no  longer  one  of  the  great  world  powers.  Japan  lacks  experience 
of  modem  war.  Her  army  and  navy  are  much  out  of  date.  Her  troops 
have  no  experience  of  the  marvellous  methods  of  modern  war.  She  has  no 
submarine  service,  she  has  no  air  service.  Her  government,  created  after 
the  model  of  Germany,  her  kaiserism,  her  Prussian  militarism,  are  fast 
becoming  obsolete.  Compared  with  the  great  powers  of  Great  Britain, 
America,  France,  and  Italy,  the  strength  of  Japan  is  meagre.  Japan  at  the 
end  of  the  European  war  is  a  third-rate  power.  Her  government  is  the 
only  military  autocracy  existing  in  the  world  to-day,  and  for  that  reason 
Japan  will  occupy  a  unique  position  at  any  peace  conference.  Japan  is 
the  only  one  of  the  Allied  nations  who  has  failed  to  take  any  adequate  part 
in  the  great  world  struggle. 

For  China,  a  republic,  to  seek  the  guidance  of  the  only  existing  auto- 
cratic military  government  in  the  world  to-day  has  at  least  the  appearance 
of  inconsistency.  Such  action  is  viewed  with  suspicion  by  all  those  in  China 
who  are  aspiring  to  a  democratic  government — a  government  by  the  people 
for  the  people. 

If  intervention  is  to  be  prevented,  there  must  be  early  restoration  of 
democratic  government,  early  reconciliation.  As  the  simplest  and  quick- 
est way  in  which  this  can  be  effected,  I  suggest  that  your  Excellency  invite 
the  President  of  the  United  States  to  act  as  mediator,  to  bring  together 
representatives  of  the  two  great  parties  of  state  in  China  that  they  may 
hear  and  weigh  each  other's  view  and  agree  to  a  compromise.  There  is  no 
loss  of  face  in  doing  this. 

During  my  recent  visit  to  the  south  I  gave  expression  to  Chinese  views 
to  all  the  leading  men  with  whom  I  had  the  opportunity  of  discussing  the 
question  of  peace  and  reconciliation  in  China.  All  without  exception 
expressed  their  belief  and  confidence  that  an  invitation  to  the  President 
of  the  United  States  to  act  as  mediator  would  be  a  wise  act  and  one  that 
promised  the  easiest  solution  of  the  grave  conflict  which  at  present  divides 
into  hostile  camps  this  fair  land  of  China. 


AMIDST  TROUBLES  PEKING  REJOICES     321 

Japan  persisted  in  her  work,  the  United  States  remained 
indifferent. 

The  people  of  China  got  tired  of  all  this.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  China  was  divided  only  on  the  surface.  Deep  down 
into  the  life  of  the  people  political  controversies  had  not 
penetrated.  They  went  on,  placid  and  industrious,  regard- 
less of  the  bickerings  of  politicians.  Chinese  revolutions 
and  declarations  of  independence  might  be  bruited  to  the 
world,  which  might  think  China  had  plunged  into  anarchy. 
As  a  people  the  Chinese  are  freer  from  governmental  interfer- 
ence than  any  nation  living.  If  the  entire  Central  Govern- 
ment should  suddenly  disappear  from  the  face  of  the  earth, 
it  would  make  little  difference  in  China.  Yet  the  long  con- 
tinuance of  political  conflicts  lets  foreign  intrigue  into  the 
national  quarrels,  and  so  reacts  dangerously. 

The  people  as  a  whole  wished  the  nation  to  be  a  unit.  But 
the  professional  militarists  had  to  be  paid  off.  After  the 
President  had  issued  his  peace  mandate,  he  asked  that  I  see 
him.  "If  decisive  action  for  peace  is  taken,'*  he  asked, 
"may  we  depend  on  the  United  States  to  back  us  in  getting 
funds  to  pay  off  these  large  bodies  of  troops  ?  If  not,  will  she 
not  lead  in  a  reorganization  loan  joined  by  several  powers  ? " 

I  asked  the  American  Government  for  the  funds  desired. 
If  they  came  conditionally  upon  the  reunion  of  China,  the 
responsible  military  governors  and  civilian  leaders  north  and 
south  would  have  the  means  to  be  rid  of  the  predatory  and 
parasitic  bands.  Japan  then  roused  herself.  She  ap- 
proached the  governments  of  the  United  States,  France, 
Great  Britain,  and  Italy  on  October  23rd,  asking  that  they 
work  toward  a  peace  settlement  with  the  leaders  both 
north  and  south.  The  American  Government  approved, 
adding  that  China  needed  money,  but  that  no  funds 
would  be  afforded  her  until  a  reunited  government  was 
seated. 

Meanwhile,  the  temper  of  the  Chinese  people  was  sounded 


322      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

in  a  gratifying  way.  John  Mott  asked  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  in 
China  to  raise  $100,000  for  the  War  Works  Drive.  I  sat  at 
dinner  one  evening  with  Liang  Shih-yi  and  Chow  Tsu-chi, 
and  said:  "A  drive  is  going  on  in  the  United  States  to  aid  all 
the  war  works  undertaken  for  the  benefit  of  the  soldiers  at 
the  front.  Do  you  suppose  that  some  of  our  friends  in 
China  would  wish  to  contribute?"  They  both  replied: 
"Yes,  we  are  sure  they  would." 

Two  days  elapsed.  Chow  Tsu-chi  called,  told  me  they  had 
formed  a  National  War  Works  Committee,  and  that  local 
committees  were  being  formed  in  every  provincial  capital. 
They  raised,  not  $100,000,  but  more  than  $1,000,000! 

It  was  the  more  remarkable  because  this  way  of  contribut- 
ing to  a  public  purpose  had  never  been  tried  in  China.  Only 
the  Shun  Tien  Shih  Pao  of  Peking,  Japanese-controlled, 
threw  cold  water  on  the  movement,  saying  that  to  be  sending 
money  to  Europe  while  so  many  provinces  in  China  them- 
selves needed  aid  was  peculiar. 

The  representatives  of  the  Associated  Powers  met  on  Oc- 
tober 1 8th.  They  felt  that  participation  in  the  war  had  not 
united  China;  a  cHque  had  perverted  it  to  factional  uses. 
Each  representative,  it  was  agreed,  should  present  instances 
in  which  the  Central  Government  or  local  officials  had  ob- 
structed action  or  been  remiss.  At  the  next  meeting,  on  the 
28th,  I  had  prepared  a  memorandum  of  instances;  this  was 
made  the  basis  of  a  statement.  A  conference  was  to  be  held 
with  the  President  of  China,  to  be  quite  friendly,  but  to  make 
manifest  the  grave  shortcomings  due  to  political  vices.  Thus, 
it  was  thought,  the  responsible  and  conscientious  elements 
in  the  Government  would  be  fortified  against  the  clique  that 
had  invaded  it.  The  Foreign  Minister,  however,  asked  that 
the  conference  be  deferred,  in  order  that  the  Government 
might  strive  to  bring  its  action  more  completely  into  accord 
with  its  real  desire.  There  was  no  threat  in  our  suggestion. 
But  publicists  often  overlooked  its  true  object,  and  treated 


AMIDST  TROUBLES  PEKING  REJOICES     323 

it  as  if  it  had  been  a  condemnation  of  China  rather  than  of  the 
controlHng  dique  in  the  Government. 

Joy  and  cheerfulness  greeted  the  news  of  the  Armistice. 
The  American  Legation  Band  was  the  first  to  celebrate, 
with  a  detachment  of  marines  it  paraded  the  legation  com- 
pounds; only  the  Japanese  Legation  sentinel  failed  to  salute 
it;  he  had  failed  to  gather  its  purport.  At  Sir  John  Jordan's 
personal  invitation  I  joined  the  British  Legation's  impromptu 
festivities  that  night,  with  some  members  of  my  staff. 
Responding  to  Sir  John's  remarks  of  welcome,  I  spoke  of  the 
trinity  of  democratic  peoples,  the  British,  French,  and  Amer- 
icans, as  destined  to  lead  the  world  to  a  fuller  understanding 
of  free  institutions  and  popular  rights. 

In  the  continuous  round  of  festivities  and  celebrations  the 
foreign  and  Chinese  communities  joined  whole-heartedly, 
with  dinners,  receptions,  special  meetings  of  societies,  and 
finally  a  great  national  celebration  on  the  28th  of  November. 
We  gave  a  reception  on  the  20th  to  the  ministers  of  the  Asso- 
ciated Powers.  As  each  minister  arrived,  the  national  air  of 
his  country  was  played  by  the  Marine  Band.  When  the  Rus- 
sian minister  came  in,  the  band,  without  special  instructions, 
played  the  old  Russian  Imperial  hymn.  Prince  KoudachefF 
was  moved,  for  this  anthem  was  now  outlawed  in  his  country; 
he  came  to  me  in  tears.  Next  day  he  showed  me  a  song  with 
music  which  he  had  suggested  for  adoption  by  the  Siberian 
Government  as  the  Russian  national  hymn.  But  at  the 
solemn  service  held  on  the  Sunday  following,  when  the  na- 
tional airs  of  the  different  countries  were  played,  when  the 
turn  came  for  the  Russian  hymn  a  pause  was  noted.  Those 
conducting  the  service  had  ruled  out  the  old  Imperial  hymn. 
As  there  was  apparently  no  music  available  as  a  substitute, 
poor  Russia  had  to  go  unsaluted. 

From  early  in  the  morning  of  the  national  celebration, 
Chinese  troops  marched  toward  the  Imperial  City,  where 
they  Hned  the  spacious  interior  courts.     The  legation  guards 


324      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

followed.  Multitudes  of  Europeans  and  Chinese  flocked  to 
the  palace,  where  the  diplomats  were  gathered,  all  but  my- 
self resplendent  in  gorgeous  uniforms.  The  neutral  ministers, 
too,  were  in  attendance.  The  European  adviser  had  found  a 
precedent  among  peace  celebrations  in  Europe,  such  as  that 
after  the  Danish  War  and  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  in  accor- 
dance with  which  the  neutral  ministers  might  attend,  though 
peace  was  not  fully  concluded.  Also,  it  was  argued  that  the 
Chinese  were  celebrating  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  and  the 
participation  of  friendly  representatives  might  be  invited 

Whispered  controversy  was  heard  among  the  ministers. 
The  representative  of  France,  seeing  senior  neutral  represen- 
tatives ahead  of  him,  said  this  occasion  was  different,  and 
demanded  that  the  rank  of  precedence  be  changed.  Time 
was  too  short  for  so  thorny  a  problem.  We  agreed  to  say 
nothing  at  all,  but  to  walk  in  a  group  forming  itself  spon- 
taneously. 

We  gathered  in  the  pavilion  of  the  Ta  Ho-men,  the  gate 
which  leads  into  the  court  immediately  before  the  main 
Coronation  Hall  of  the  Imperial  City.  Here,  in  the  very 
inner  sanctuary  of  the  thousand-year-old  imperialism  of 
China,  the  victory  of  freedom  was  celebrated.  The  square 
was  massed  with  troops,  Chinese  and  foreign.  On  the  ascend- 
ing terraces  stood  thousands  of  guests,  the  military  and 
ofl&cials  in  uniform;  over  the  balustrades  waved  forests  of 
flagsof  the  Associated  Nations,  as  well  as  long  floating  banners 
with  Chinese  inscriptions  in  gold. 

After  the  President  had  ascended  the  steps  to  the  music 
of  bands  of  the  nations,  bowed  to  all  the  flags,  and  made  his 
address,  aeroplanes  appeared,  dropping  innumerable  Chinese 
flags  and  messages  of  felicitation  printed  in  gold  on  red;  then 
they  continued  to  circle  above  the  Imperial  City.  While 
the  military  were  marching  to  the  gate,  rockets  were  sent 
skyward;  exploding,  they  released  paper  figures  of  animals, 
as  well  as  soldiers  and  weapons  of  war,  which  floated  a  long 


AMIDST  TROUBLES  PEKING  REJOICES     325 

time  In  the  air.  When  the  President  left  the  Tung  Hua 
Palace,  where  he  had  received  thousands  of  guests,  the  aero- 
planes preceded  him  on  his  ride  to  his  own  residence. 

We  celebrated  Thanksgiving  that  afternoon  in  American 
fashion  with  a  religious  service,  the  American  colony  and 
many  British  and  other  Allied  residents  attending,  as  well  as 
the  ministers  of  the  Associated  Powers  with  their  staffs. 
Premier  Chien  Neng-hsun  dined  the  diplomatic  corps  and 
welcomed  President  Wilson's  proposal  for  a  league  of  na- 
tions. President  Hsu  invited  us  on  November  30th,  and  then 
the  French  minister,  who  still  was  troubled  with  the  question 
of  the  non-belligerents,  objected  to  the  neutral  ministers 
being  there  at  all.  If  they  went,  he  said,  he  would  not  go. 
The  British  minister  and  I  devised,  as  we  thought,  a  way 
out.  Would  the  neutral  ministers  view  the  Allied  ministers 
as  guests  of  honour  on  this  occasion .?  The  secretary  to  the 
Foreign  Minister  was  chosen  to  ask  them.  Unfortunately, 
the  neutrals  took  it  as  a  demand  rather  than  an  inquiry. 
Then  the  fat  was  in  the  fire — the  neutral  ministers  would 
not  attend  the  dinner.  This  was  the  one  discordant  note 
in  our  celebrations. 

In  order  to  enable  the  Central  Government  to  get  along  at 
all,  the  diplomatic  corps  agreed  to  the  release  of  surplus  salt 
revenues  to  the  extent  of  ^5,300,000.  President  Hsu  on  the 
1 6th  of  November  ordered  immediate  cessation  of  hostilities 
in  the  Chinese  interior.  The  northern  leaders  were  still  war- 
like, but  accepted  his  decision.  The  British,  French,  Ameri- 
can, Japanese,  and  Italian  representatives  and  myself  met  on 
the  22nd  to  uphold  President  Hsu's  attitude.  We  took  up 
the  Japanese  proposals,  decidingthat  identical  representations 
be  made  at  Peking  and  Canton.  My  colleagues  asked  me 
to  draft  an  aide  memoire  which  was  to  accompany  the  oral 
representations.  Japan  objected  to  including  in  it  the  Amer- 
ican suggestion  that  no  financial  advances  would  be  made 
now  but  that  a  reunited  China  would  get  support  from  the 


326     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

powers.  The  Japanese  banks  had  bound  themselves  to 
make  further  payments  to  China,  it  was  said.  The  aide 
memoire  deplored  disunion,  disavowed  wishing  to  intervene, 
and  hoped  that,  "while  refraining  from  taking  any  steps 
which  might  obstruct  peace,  both  parties  would  seek  without 
delay,  by  frank  confidence,  the  means  of  obtaining  reconcilia- 
tion." In  the  clause  about  obstructing  peace  I  had  in  mind 
such  acts  as  the  election  of  a  northern  militarist  as  Vice- 
President.  This,  though  in  itself  a  peaceful  act,  would  have 
raised  an  insurmountable  obstacle  to  peace. 

Five  powers  were  represented  in  an  audience  before  the 
President  on  December  2nd,  the  British  minister  speaking. 
The  northern  military  leaders  had  held  a  conference  at 
Tientsin.  If,  as  reported,  they  wished  to  demand  that  Tuan 
be  reinstalled  as  Premier,  and  that  Tsao  Kun,  Military  Gov- 
ernor of  Chihli,  be  elected  Vice-President,  it  would  have  em- 
bittered the  south.  The  public  therefore  welcomed  the 
representations  of  the  powers.  The  American  reference  to 
loans  was  omitted;  nevertheless,  the  situation  produced  made 
it  no  longer  possible  for  any  one  country  to  lend  money  to 
either  faction  without  putting  itself  in  an  equivocal  position. 

The  Japanese  felt  moved  on  the  3rd  of  December  to  publish 
a  statement  about  Chinese  finance.  Japan  could  not  dis- 
courage financial  and  economic  enterprises  of  its  nationals 
in  China,  the  statement  read,  "so  long  as  these  enterprises 
are  the  natural  and  legitimate  outgrowth  of  special  relations 
between  the  two  neighbouring  and  friendly  nations.  At  the 
same  time  they  fully  realize  that  under  the  existing  condi- 
tions of  domestic  strife  in  China  loans  are  liable  to  create 
misunderstandings  and  to  interfere  with  peace  in  China. 
Accordingly,  the  Japanese  Government  has  decided  to  with- 
hold such  financial  assistance  to  China  as  is  likely  in  their 
opinion  to  add  to  the  complications  of  her  internal  situation.'* 

This  declaration  left  great  latitude  in  the  making  of  loans, 
yet  it  did,  in  fact,  acknowledge  the  appropriateness  of  the 


AMIDST  TROUBLES  PEKING  REJOICES     327 

American  position.  I  asked  Baron  Hayashi  about  it.  What 
exceptions  would  be  made .?  The  Baron  was  not  very  definite 
but  said  bona  fide  industrial  loans  were  meant.  "Most  de- 
cidedly," he  added  in  reply  to  my  continued  questioning, 
"I  favour  the  strictest  scrutiny  of  each  loan,  and  mutual 
information  among  the  governments  about  such  transac- 
tions." He  gave  me  plainly  to  understand  that  he  did  not 
approve,  and  had  opposed,  certain  deals  attempted  by  his 
countrymen  in  the  semi-official  group.  I  gathered  his 
thorough  disapproval  of  direct  interference  by  the  military 
in  international  affairs;  but  the  military  were  in  power  in 
Japan,  and  its  diplomats  were  helpless. 

In  accordance  with  its  main  suggestion,  the  American 
Government  followed  with  a  memorandum  about  financing 
China,  sent  to  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Japan.  It  had 
already  proposed  a  new  consortium,  including  virtually  all 
parties  interested  in  each  national  group.  The  Currency 
Reform  Loan  should  come  first,  with  the  shares  of  the  British 
and  French  groups  carried  by  the  Americans  and  Japanese 
so  long  as  the  former  could  not  furnish  funds.  Industrial 
as  well  as  administrative  loans  should  be  included,  and  thus 
removed  from  the  sphere  of  destructive  competition. 

The  danger  that  industrial  loans  might  be  converted  to 
political  ends  was  patent.  Yet  in  my  recommendations  I 
felt  it  difficult  to  avoid  evils  of  monopoly,  unless  independent 
enterprises  involving  loans  should  be  admitted. 

The  British  and  French  banking  representatives  plainly 
wished  to  have  America  lead  in  the  international  financial 
reorganization  of  China.  Japan,  as  its  minister  often  said, 
desired  the  United  States  to  reenter  the  Consortium — but  he 
meant  the  old  Consortium,  in  which  Japan  had  the  leader- 
ship. Japan  did  not  readily  take  to  the  idea  of  the  new  Con- 
sortium. It  declared  that  it  favoured  the  proposal  "on 
principle,"  but  found  it  necessary  to  weigh  every  detail  with 
considerable  minuteness.    This  caused  great  delay. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 
A  NEW  WORLD  WAR  COMING? 

The  old  World  War  ended  with  the  Armistice.  Was  a  new 
one  looming? 

If  one  came  it  would  break  in  China — of  that  we  were 
convinced.  Unless  it  settled  China's  problems  the  Peace 
Conference  would  fall  disastrously  short  of  safeguarding  the 
world  against  a  renewal  of  its  titanic  conflict.  In  China  the 
powers  were  rivals,  each  with  its  jealously  guarded  sphere  of 
influence.  In  the  extravagant  language  of  fancy,  Ku  Hung- 
ming  thus  pictured  to  me  the  situation:  "China's  political 
ship,  built  in  the  eclipse  and  rigged  with  curses  black,  has 
been  boarded  by  the  pirates  of  the  world.  In  their  dark 
rivalries  they  may  scuttle  it  and  all  sink  together,  but  not 
until  they  have  first  plundered  and  burned  civilization  as  we 
know  it." 

Should  any  action  be  taken  which  might  be  interpreted  as 
a  recognition  of  a  special  position  for  Japan  in  China,  whether 
in  the  form  of  a  so-called  Monroe  Doctrine  or  a  "regional 
understanding"  or  in  any  other  way,  forces  would  be  set  in 
motion  that  in  a  generation  would  be  beyond  controlling. 
In  comparison  with  this  tremendous  issue,  even  the  complex 
re-alignments  of  Central  Europe  fell  into  relative  unimpor- 
tance. The  same  fatal  result  was  sure  to  follow  any  further 
accentuation  of  spheres  of  influence. 

We  in  China  realized  this,  and  in  deadly  earnest  we  worked 
out  a  plan  of  joint  preventive  action  by  the  powers,  which 
would  unite  them  instead  of  leaving  them  in  fatal  rivalry. 
The  root  of  all  evil  is  in  the  love  of  money.  It  was  local 
financing  by  single  exploiting  powers  in  spheres  protected  by 

33« 


A  NEW  WORLD  WAR  COMING?  329 

political  influence  that  was  the  evil.  If,  instead,  the  finance 
of  theworld  could  be  made  to  back  aunited  China, there  would 
be  a  great  constructive  development,  from  which  all  would 
benefit  far  in  excess  of  selfish  profits  garnered  in  a  corner- 
We  planned  a  system  of  joint  international  finance.  That, 
despite  its  drawbacks,  would  destroy  the  localization  of  for- 
eign political  influence.  The  plan  in  its  relations  to  the 
Chinese  Government  was  worked  out  with  everyone  that 
we  could  reach  competent  to  give  advice.  There  were  the 
official  and  business  representatives  of  Great  Britain  and 
France;  the  Chinese  cabinet  ministers  and  other  officials,  and 
all  of  the  American  representatives,  including  the  commercial 
attaches  Julean  Arnold  and  P.  P.  Whitham,  and  the  Amer- 
ican advisers.  Dr.  W.  W.  Willoughby,  Dr.  W.  C.  Dennis,  and 
Mr.  J.  E.  Baker  of  the  Department  of  Railways.  Day  and 
night  the  conferences  went  on  informally;  by  day  and  night 
these  matters  were  threshed  out.  Japanese  experts,  too,  were 
consulted. 

The  time  seemed  propitious.  The  Armistice  brought  the 
hope  that  the  powers  would  cooperate.  The  separatist  po- 
litical aims  in  China  might  be  overcome,  together  with  the 
sinister  intrigue  for  dismembering  or  dominating  that  mighty 
nation  of  freemen.  Could  foreign  financial  action  and  in- 
fluence in  China  be  gathered  up  into  a  unit?  Could  it  be 
made  to  build  for  the  whole  of  China,  not  tear  it  down  in  its 
several  parts.?  At  all  events,  we  hammered  out  a  plan  to 
make  this  possible. 

Foreigners  had  gone  deeply  into  railway  loans,  making 
their  chief  investments  there.  Hence  we  made  the  plan  of 
unified  financial  support  apply,  first  of  all,  to  the  railway 
service.  The  operating  of  the  diff'erent  Chinese  lines  accord- 
ing to  the  respective  national  loans  was  a  curse;  it  was  evil 
politics,  and  it  broke  down  the  railway  service.  Foreign 
experts,  acting  as  servants  of  the  Chinese  Government, 
might  unify  the  Chinese  railroads,  though  of  this  Liang 


330     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Shih-yi,  Chow  Tsu-chi,  and  Yeh  Kung-cho — ^who  knew  most 
about  Chinese  railway  affairs — had  their  doubts.  It  would 
pile  up  the  overhead  expenses,  they  thought.  The  railways 
could  be  managed  thriftily  only  by  the  Chinese.  The  foreign 
banking  interests,  too,  might  try  to  be  depositories  for  the 
railway  funds,  as  they  were  already  for  the  customs  and  salt 
revenues.  Thus  Chinese  capital  would  pay  tribute  to  foreign 
capital.  If  still  other  revenues  were  thus  absorbed,  as  might 
be  feared,  national  economy  would  be  fettered  too  much. 

Therefore  they  proposed  a  Chinese  banking  group.  It 
would  help  in  the  financing  and  could  be  made  the  depository 
of  funds. 

These  men  sympathized,  however,  with  the  main  purpose 
of  the  suggested  arrangement  for  unification.  Foreign  ex- 
pertship  on  the  railways,  also,  was  highly  valued  by  Chinese 
railwaymen  trained  in  the  West.  True,  Mr.  Sidney  Mayers 
somewhat  frightened  them  by  his  proposals.  This  British 
industrial  representative  of  long  experience  in  China  proposed 
internationalizing  each  separate  line  by  putting  on  it  an 
international  group  of  experts.  The  Chinese  objected;  it 
would  mean  giving  all  the  important  positions  to  a  large  staff 
of  foreign  officials.  Of  this  they  had  had  enough  in  the 
Customs. 

It  was  necessary  to  dissociate  banking  from  building;  such 
a  union  would  mean  monopoly  and  fierce  attacks  upon  it  by 
all  outside  interests.  With  the  financing  separate,  the  con- 
tracting might  be  left  free  to  all  competitors,  bidding  low  and 
resting  their  bids  upon  their  repute  and  responsibility. 

So  long  as  it  remained  possible  for  different  countries  to 
acquire  special  privileges  in  distinct  spheres,  promises  of 
"integrity  and  sovereignty"  would  be  nothing  but  empty 
words.  No  matter  how  much  they  might  promise  that  they 
would  not  discriminate  against  the  trade  of  other  nations,  the 
fact  remains  that  established  position  in  itself  constitutes 
preference. 


A  NEW  WORLD  WAR  COMING?  331 

The  favoured  nations  might  more  honestly  say:  "Give  us 
our  special  position  and  we  will  give  you  all  the  equal  oppor- 
tunity you  ask." 

Foreign  influence  could  safely  be  wielded  only  as  a  trustee- 
ship for  China  and  the  world,  without  any  vested  political 
interests  or  economic  advantages  secured  through  political 
pressure.  But  Chinese  administration  was  lax.  I  urged  the 
Chinese  officials  to  set  their  house  in  order,  to  put  their  public 
accounting  on  an  efficient  plane;  even  if  necessary  to  employ 
foreign  experts  to  do  this.  They  said:  "Yes,  if  the  United 
States  will  lead,"  for  a  long  record  of  square  dealing  had  en- 
deared our  business  men  to  the  Chinese. 

But  Americans  had  been  slow  in  China.  Two  years  had 
fled,  and  the  Grand  Canal  was  not  yet  restored  as  promised. 
The  half  million  dollars  advanced  had  been  spent  on  prelimi- 
nary surveys.  Silver  had  risen;  American  gold  bought  only 
one  half  what  it  had  before.  Overhead  expense  was  high, 
and  for  the  preliminary  work  more  than  the  half-million  was 
needed.  The  Chinese  were  disappointed,  grief-stricken; 
they  began  to  be  suspicious. 

The  Japanese-controlled  papers  redoubled  their  attacks  on 
Americans.  Pretty  soon  a  Japanese  journal  at  Tsinanfu 
assaulted  the  name  and  character  of  President  Wilson.  I 
had  an  understanding  with  my  Japanese  colleague  that 
all  press  misstatement  should  be  corrected.  I  saw  him  about 
this  attack  on  the  head  of  a  friendly  nation.  He  promised 
to  look  into  it.  After  ten  days  I  wrote  inquiring  again. 
Under  the  press  laws  of  Japan,  he  responded,  a  paper  could 
indeed  be  punished  for  libellous  attack  upon  the  head  of  a 
foreign  state,  provided  that  such  head  happened  to  be  in 
Japan  at  the  time.  As  this  paper  was  notoriously  under 
the  domination  of  the  Japanese  authorities,  amenable  to  their 
very  breath  and  whisper,  I  failed  to  see  how  the  minister 
should  find  it  hard  to  bring  it  to  book.  I  merely  called  for  a 
retraction  where  the  Japanese,  if  a  Chinese-owned  paper 


332      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

so  scurrilously  had  attacked  the  Japanese  Emperor,  would 
have  asked  for  total  suppression.  The  Japanese  minister 
said  he  would  "further  consider  the  matter"  and  would  see 
what  he  could  do.  A  mild  apology  and  retraction  were  even- 
tually pubhshed. 

The  action  of  the  Japanese  in  China,  ofl&cial  and  unoflBcial, 
during  the  war,  had  aroused  the  deepest  resentment  among 
the  Chinese,  who  were  on  the  verge  of  despair.  The  Chinese 
people  were  being  whirled  in  the  vortex  of  old  and  new. 
The  old  organization  was  beginning  to  crumble;  the  new  had 
not  yet  taken  shape.  It  was  easy  to  find  spots  of  weakness 
and  corruption,  aggravation  of  which  would  bring  about  an 
actual  demoralization  of  social  and  political  life  and  the  ob- 
struction of  every  improvement;  bandits  could  be  furnished 
with  arms;  weak  persons  craving  a  stimulant  could  be 
drugged  with  morphia;  the  credit  of  native  institutions  could 
be  ruined;  and  the  most  corrupt  elements  in  the  government 
encouraged.  For  the  original  weaknesses  and  evils  the  out- 
aide  influence  was  not  responsible,  but  it  was  culpable  for 
making  them  its  instruments  for  the  achievement  of  its  aims 
of  political  dominion. 

A  vast  system  whose  object  was  the  drugging  of  China  with 
morphia,  which  utilij^ed  the  petty  Japanese  hucksters  and 
traders  throughout  the  country,  was  exposed  in  the  "opium 
blacklist"  published  by  the  British  papers  in  China.  Specific 
proof  was  adduced  in  each  case.  Often  the  blacklist  extended 
over  two  pages  of  a  paper.  Obviously  these  Japanese  drug- 
gists, photographers,  and  the  whole  outfit  of  small-fry  traders 
could  not  trafl&c  in  morphia  without  the  connivance  of  the 
Japanese  Government  and  the  support  of  semi-ofi&cial  Japa- 
nese interests.  The  Japanese  post  offices  were  used  for  its 
distribution  in  China.  Chinese  poHce  interference  with  the 
thousands  of  Japanese  purveyors  was  ruled  out  under  the 
exterritoriality  agreements.  In  Korea,  the  Japanese  opium 
grown  ofl&cially  for  "medicinal  uses"  was  produced  far  in 


A  NEW  WORLD  WAR  COMING?  333 

excess  of  medicinal  needs,  and  through  the  ports  of  Dairen 
and  Tsingtao  large  quantities  of  morphia  came  into  China. 

The  Japanese-controlled  press  at  first  answered  the  black- 
list with  charges  of  tu  quoque;  but  when  they  defamed  the 
American  missionary  hospitals,  alleging  that  they  were 
centres  for  distributing  narcotic  drugs,  nobody  among  the 
Chinese  paid  further  attention  to  them.  The  blacklists  mapn 
ped  graphically  the  thickly  sown  morphia  "joints"  around 
the  police  station  of  the  Japanese  settlement  at  Tientsin 
and  the  responsibility  was  brought  home  to  Japan.  An  offi- 
cial Japanese  announcement  was  evoked  that  no  effort  would 
be  spared  to  stop  the  "regrettable,  secret,  illicit  traffic." 

In  Shantung  Japanese  civil  administration  had  been  set  up 
along  the  railway  without  a  scintilla  of  right.  It  was  later 
withdrawn  for  new  concessions  and  privileges  wrung  from  the 
Peking  Government.  The  Japanese  were  old  masters  of  this 
trick.  Seize  something  which  you  do  not  really  want,  and 
restore  it  to  its  owner  if  he  will  give  you  something  you  do 
want.  Then  what  you  want  you  get,  but  it  is  not  "stolen," 
and  can  be  kept  with  smug  immunity.  The  arrangements 
in  Shantung  were  made  secretly,  riding  roughshod  over 
Chinese  rights,  and  intended  to  sterihze  in  advance  the  enact- 
ments of  the  Peace  Conference.  If  a  foreign  power  should 
wish  to  own  the  Pennsylvania  Railway  system,  and  should 
actually  come  into  the  United  States  and  occupy  it,  the  paral- 
lel would  be  exact  with  what  Japan  did  in  Shantung.  After 
taking  the  Shantung  Railway  and  holding  it,  the  Japanese 
stoutly  claimed  an  "economic  right"  to  it.  The  whole 
course  of  Japan  in  China  during  the  Great  War  alarmed  both 
Chinese  and  foreigners.  I  may  not  name  the  responsible 
and  fair-minded  writer  of  a  letter  from  which  I  quote: 

It  would  be  in  the  highest  degree  unfortunate  if  the  present  fortuitous 
and  temporary  possession  of  the  Leased  Territory  and  Shantung  Railway 
by  Japan  should  be  confirmed  by  the  final  Treaty  of  Peace,  for  not  only 
would  China's  sovereignty  in  Shantung  be  in  danger  of  impairment,  but 


334      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

the  trading  rights  of  Chinese,  Americans,  and  Europeans  would  undoubt- 
edly be  prejudiced. 

Another  consideration  that  has  the  greatest  weight  with  the  writer  is 
that  the  principles  for  which  the  United  States  entered  the  European  War 
and  on  behalf  of  which  the  United  States,  in  common  with  the  whole  world, 
has  paid  an  unthinkable  price  in  gold  and  blood,  make  unbearable  a  con- 
tinuance, not  to  say  accentuation,  of  the  old  system  of  foreign  intrigue  in 
China.  It  is  unbearable  that  one  result  of  the  victory  bought  in  part  with 
American  lives  should  be  the  extension  of  Japanese  power  in  China,  when 
such  extension  means  the  further  strengthening  of  the  domination  of  a 
monarchical  and  imperialistic  foreign  nation  over  China,  a  result  constitut- 
ing in  its  own  sphere  a  complete  negation  of  the  objects  for  which  the 
United  States  devoted  its  entire  resources  in  the  war  against  Germany. 

Dr.  Sun  Yat  Sen  wrote  me  at  Shanghai  on  the  19th  of 
November,  referring  both  to  internal  and  external  troubles, 
and  the  union  of  militarists,  foreign  and  Chinese: 

Through  you  alone  will  the  President  and  the  people  of  the  United 
States  see  the  true  state  of  affairs  in  China.  Your  responsibility  is  indeed 
great.  Whether  Democracy  or  Militarism  triumphs  in  China  largely 
depends  upon  Your  Excellency's  moral  support  of  our  helpless  people  at 
this  stage. 

These  words  show  the  Chinese  belief  in  the  sheer  force  of 
public  opinion,  and  their  wish  that  the  Chinese  situation  be 
known  and  understood  abroad.  This  achieved,  the  evils 
under  which  China  groans  and  travails  would  shrivel. 

We  built  up  our  solution  of  unity  for  China.  In  carefully 
weighed  dispatches  I  sent  it  to  the  American  Government, 
and  cabled  the  President  a  statement  of  China's  vital  relation 
to  future  peace.  I  was  constrained  to  condemn  Japan's 
policy,  quite  deliberately,  summing  up  the  evidence  accumu- 
lated in  the  course  of  five  years.  I  had  come  to  the  Far  East 
admiring  the  Japanese,  friendly  to  them — my  published  writ- 
ings show  this  abundantly.  I  did  not  lose  my  earnest  good- 
will toward  the  Japanese  people  but  I  could  not  shut  my 
eyes  to  Japanese  imperialist  politics  with  its  unconscionably 
ruthless   and    underhanded    actions    and   its   fundamental 


A  NEW  WORLD  WAR  COMING?  335 

lack  of  every  idea  of  fair  play.  The  continuance  of  such 
methods  could  only  bring  disaster;  their  abandonment  is  a 
condition  of  peace  and  real  welfare.  The  aims  and  methods 
of  Japan's  military  policy  in  the  Continent  of  Asia  can  bring 
good  to  no  one,  least  of  all  to  the  Japanese  people,  notwith- 
standing any  temporary  gains.  Such  ambitions  cannot  per- 
manently succeed. 

A  cure  can  come  only  when  such  evils  are  clearly  recognized. 
Lip-service  to  poHtical  hberalism  might  mislead  the  casually 
regardful  outside  world.  To  those  face  to  face  with  what 
Japanese  militarism  was  doing  to  continental  Asia  there  was 
left  no  doubt  of  its  sinister  quality.  Japan  herself  needs  to 
be  delivered  from  it,  for  it  has  used  the  Japanese  people, 
their  art  and  their  civilization,  for  its  own  evil  ends.  More 
than  that,  it  threatens  the  peace  of  the  world.  If  talk  of 
"a  better  understanding"  presupposes  the  continuance  of 
such  aims  and  motives  as  have  actuated  Japanese  political 
plot  during  the  past  few  years,  it  is  futile.  What  is  needed 
is  a  change  of  heart. 

Here  is  the  substance  of  the  memorandum  upon  which  my 
cablegram  to  the  President  was  based : 

In  1915,  coercion  was  applied  and  China  was  forced  by  threats  to  solidify 
and  extend  the  privileged  position  of  Japan  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia 
and  to  agree  prospectively  to  a  like  regime  in  Shantung  together  with  the 
beginnings  of  a  special  position  in  Fukien  Province.  After  this  there  was  a 
change  of  methods  although  the  policy  tended  to  the  same  end — domina- 
tion over  China. 

Instead  of  coercion,  Japan  applied  secret  and  corrupt  influence  through 
alliance  with  purchasable  officials  kept  in  office  by  Japanese  support.  The 
latter  insidious  policy  is  more  dangerous  because  it  gave  the  appearance 
that  rights  are  duly  acquired  through  grant  of  the  Chinese  Government; 
no  demands  or  ultimatums  are  necessary  because  corrupt  officials  strongly 
supported  by  Japanese  finance,  acting  absolutely  in  secret  channels,  suf)- 
pressing  all  public  discussion  with  the  strong  arm  of  the  police,  are  able  to 
deliver  contractual  rights  regular  in  form,  though  of  corrupt  secret  origin 
and  evil  tendency. 


336      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Japan  has  used  every  possible  means  to  demoralize  China  by  creating 
and  sustaining  trouble;  by  supporting  and  financing  the  most  objectionable 
elements,  particularly  a  group  of  corrupt  and  vicious  military  governors 
akin  to  bandits  in  their  methods;  by  employing  instigators  of  trouble;  by 
protection  given  to  bandits;  by  the  introduction  of  morphia  and  opium; 
by  the  corruption  of  officials  through  loans,  bribes,  and  threats;  by  the 
wrecking  of  native  banks  and  the  debauching  of  local  currency;  by  illegal 
export  of  the  copper  currency  of  the  people;  by  local  attempts  to  break 
down  the  salt  administration;  by  persistent  efforts  to  prevent  China  from 
going  into  the  war  and  then  seeing  to  it  that  China  was  never  in  a  position 
to  render  to  the  common  cause  such  aid  as  would  be  in  her  power  and  as 
she  would  willingly  render  if  left  to  herself:  finally,  by  utilizing  the  war 
and  the  preoccupation  of  the  Allies  for  enmeshing  China  in  the  terms  of 
a  secret  military  alliance. 

As  a  result  of  these  methods  and  manipulations,  Japan  has  gained  the 
following  advantages:  a  consolidation  of  her  special  position  in  Manchuria 
and  eastern  Mongolia,  and  the  foundation  of  the  same  in  Shantung  and 
Fukien;  control  in  the  matter  of  Chinese  finance  through  the  control  of 
the  Bank  of  Communications  and  the  Bureau  of  Public  Printing  and  the 
appointment  of  a  high  financial  adviser  together  with  the  adoption  of  the 
unsound  gold-note  scheme  happily  not  yet  put  in  force.  She  has  secured 
extensive  railway  concessions  in  Manchuria,  Shantung,  Chihli,  and  Kiang- 
su;  mining  rights  in  various  provinces;  and  special  monopolistic  rights 
through  the  Kirin  forestry  loan,  the  telephone  loan,  and  others.  Through 
the  secret  military  convention  Japan  attempts  not  only  to  control  the 
military  policy  of  China  but  incidentally  national  resources  such  as  iron 
deposits.  All  these  arrangements  are  so  secretly  made  that  in  most  cases 
not  even  the  Foreign  Office  is  in  possession  of  the  documents  relating  there- 
to. Together  with  this  goes  the  persistent  assertion  of  special  interests 
which  are  interpreted  as  giving  a  position  of  predominance. 

This  is  a  strong  indictment  and  I  feel  the  fullest  responsibility  in  making 
these  statements.  Fundamentally  friendly  to  the  Japanese  as  my  pub- 
lished expressions  show,  I  have  been  forced  through  the  experience  of  five 
years  to  the  conclusion  that  the  methods  applied  by  the  Japanese  military 
masters  can  lead  only  to  evil  and  destruction  and  also  that  they  will  not 
be  stopped  by  any  consideration  of  fairness  and  justice  but  only  by  the 
definite  knowledge  that  such  action  will  not  be  tolerated. 

As  a  steady  stream  of  information  from  every  American  official  in  China 
and  from  every  other  source  as  well  as  my  own  experience  have  made  this 
conclusion  inevitable,  I  owe  the  duty  to  state  it  to  the  American  Govern- 
ment in  no  uncertain  terms.     Nor  is  this  said  in  any  spirit  of  bitterness 


A  NEW  WORLD  WAR  COMING?  337 

against  the  Japanese  people  but  from  the  conviction  that  the  policy  pur- 
sued by  their  military  masters  can  in  the  end  bring  only  misery  and  woe  to 
them  and  the  world.  During  all  this  period  it  has  not  been  possible  for  the 
European  powers  or  the  United  States  to  do  anything  for  China.  The 
United  States,  though  assisting  all  other  Allies  financially,  could  not  con- 
tribute one  dollar  toward  maintaining  the  financial  independence  of  China 
as  undivided  attention  was  needed  to  the  requirements  of  the  west  front. 
The  Lansing-Ishii  notes,  undoubtedly  intended  to  express  a  friendly  atti- 
tude toward  any  legitimate  aspirations  of  Japan  while  safeguarding  the 
rights  of  China,  were  perverted  by  the  Japanese  into  an  acknowledgment 
of  their  privileged  position  in  China.  Now  at  last,  when  the  pressure  has 
been  released,  America  as  well  as  the  European  countries  must  face  the 
issue  which  has  been  created,  that  is,  whether  a  vast,  peaceable,  and  indus- 
trious population  whose  most  articulate  desire  is  to  be  allowed  to  develop 
their  own  life  in  the  direction  of  free  and  just  government,  shall  become 
material  to  be  moulded  by  the  secret  plottings  of  a  foreign  military  despot- 
ism into  an  instrument  of  its  power.  If  it  is  said  that  the  aims  of  Japan 
are  now  but  economic  and  in  just  response  to  the  needs  of  Japan's  expend- 
ing population,  it  must  be  remembered  that  every  advantage  is  gained  and 
maintained  by  political  and  military  pressure  and  that  it  is  exploited  by  the 
same  means  in  a  fashion,  taking  no  account  of  the  rights  of  other  foreign 
nations  or  of  the  Chinese  themselves.  Divested  of  their  political  character 
and  military  aims  the  economic  activities  of  Japan  would  arouse  no  opposi- 
tion. 

Only  the  refusal  to  accept  the  results  of  Japanese  secret  manipulation  in 
China  during  the  last  four  years,  particularly,  the  establishment  of  Japa- 
nese political  influence  and  a  special  privilege  position  in  Shantung  can  avert 
the  result  of  either  making  China  a  dependence  of  a  reckless  and  bound- 
lessly ambitious  military  caste  which  would  destroy  the  peace  of  the  entire 
world,  or  bringing  on  a  military  struggle  inevitable  from  the  establishment 
of  rival  spheres  of  interest  and  local  privilege  in  China. 

Peace  is  conditioned  on  the  abolition  for  the  present  and  future  of  all 
localized  privileges.  China  must  be  freed  from  all  foreign  political  influ- 
ence exercised  within  her  borders,  railways  controlled  by  foreign  govern- 
ments, and  preferential  arrangements  supported  by  political  power.  If 
this  is  done,  China  will  readily  master  her  own  trouble,  particularly  if  the 
military  bandits  hitherto  upheld  by  Japan  shall  no  longer  have  the  coun- 
tenance of  any  foreign  power. 

The  advantages  enumerated  above  were  gained  by  Japan  when  she  was 
professedly  acting  as  the  trustee  of  the  Associated  Powers  in  the  Far  East, 
and  they  could  not  have  been  obtained  at  all  but  for  the  sacrifices  made  by 


338      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

them  in  Europe.  They  are  therefore  not  the  exclusive  concern  of  any  one 
power.  With  respect  to  Shantung  the  German  rights  there  lapsed,  together 
with  all  Chino-German  treaties,  upon  the  declaration  of  war.  A  succession 
of  treaty  rights  from  Germany  to  Japan  is  therefore  not  possible,  and  the 
recognition  of  a  special  position  of  Japan  in  Shantung  could  only  proceed 
from  a  new  act  to  which  conceivably  some  weak  Chinese  officials  might  be 
induced  but  which  would  be  contrary  to  the  frequently  declared  aims  of 
international  policy  in  China  and  which  would  amount  to  the  definitive 
establishment  of  exclusive  spheres  of  influence  in  China  leading  in  turn  to 
the  more  vigorous  development  of  such  exclusive  spheres  by  other  nations. 
The  present  situation  of  aflFairs  offers  the  last  opportunity  by  common  con- 
sent to  avert  threatening  disaster  by  removing  the  root  of  conflict  in  China. 

Never  before  has  an  opportunity  for  leadership  toward  the  welfare  of 
humanity  presented  itself  equal  to  that  which  invites  America  in  China 
at  the  present  time.  The  Chinese  people  ask  for  no  better  fate  than  to  be 
allowed  freedom  to  follow  in  the  footsteps  of  America;  every  device  of 
intrigue  and  corruption  as  well  as  coercion  is  being  employed  to  force  them 
in  a  difi"erent  direction,  including  constant  misrepresentation  of  American 
policies  and  aims  which,  however,  has  not  as  yet  prejudiced  the  Chinese. 
Nor  is  it  necessary  for  America  to  exercise  any  political  influence.  If  it 
were  only  known  that  America  in  concert  with  the  liberal  powers  would  not 
tolerate  the  enslavement  of  China  either  by  foreign  or  native  militarists 
the  natural  propensity  of  the  Chinese  to  follow  liberal  inclinations  would 
guide  this  vast  country  toward  free  government  and  propitious  develop- 
ment of  peaceful  industrial  activities,  even  through  difficulties  unavoidable 
in  the  transition  of  so  vast  and  ancient  a  society  to  new  methods  of  action. 

But  if  China  should  be  disappointed  in  her  confidence  at  the  present  time 
the  consequences  of  such  disillusionment  on  her  moral  and  political  develop- 
ment would  be  disastrous,  and  we  instead  of  looking  across  the  Pacific 
toward  a  peaceable,  industrial  nation,  sympathetic  with  our  ideals,  would 
be  confronted  with  a  vast  materialistic  military  organization  under  ruth- 
less control. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 
JAPAN  SHOWS  HER  TEETH 

Ms..  Obata  had  succeeded  Baron  Hayashi  as  Japanese 
minister  in  December.  He  was  a  dour,  silent  man  who  had 
been  much  in  China,  as  consular  officer  and  in  the  Legation. 
He  had  sat  with  Mr,  Hioki  in  the  conferences  m  which  the 
twenty-one  demands  were  pressed  on  China.  He  was  known 
to  be  a  very  direct  representative,  in  the  diplomatic  service, 
of  the  militarist  masters  of  Japan.  His  appointment  was  to 
the  Chinese  ominous  of  a  continuance  of  aggressive  tactics. 
A  wail  of  indignation  went  up  from  the  Chinese  press,  but 
Mr.  Obata  remained.  In  my  personal  relations  with  this 
secretive  man  I  thought  I  saw  gradually  emerging  a  broader 
and  more  humane  outlook. 

The  new  Japanese  minister  called  on  the  2nd  of  February, 
1919,  at  the  Foreign  Office  and  expressed  resentment  at  the 
attitude  of  the  Chinese  delegation  at  Paris.  The  Chinese 
representatives  had  said  they  were  willing  to  publish  all  the 
secret  agreements  which  the  diplomacy  of  Nippon  had  been 
weaving  around  China.  Japan  objected.  The  sacred  trea- 
ties between  China  and  Japan  were  not  to  be  divulged  with- 
out the  consent  of  both  parties.  If  China  was  so  anxious  to 
purge  herself  of  secret  diplomacy,  let  her  publish  first  the 
agreement  of  September  24,  191 8,  which  gave  the  special 
privileges  of  Germany  in  Shantung  to  Japan.  The  displeas- 
ure of  the  Japanese  in  Paris  was  reenforced  by  Mr.  Obata  in 
Peking  by  what  the  Chinese  took  to  be  a  veiled  threat. 
''Great  Britain,"  said  he,  "is  preoccupied  with  internal  dis- 
orders.    She  cannot  assist  China.     But  Japan  is  fully  able 

339 


340     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

to  assist,  as  she  has  a  navy  of  500,000  tons,  and  an  army  of 
more  than  a  milHon  men  ready  for  action." 

The  Shantung  agreement  had  been  the  consummation  of 
the  Japanese-controlled  Minister  of  Communications.  The 
Chinese  Foreign  Office  was  not  consulted  when  the  Chinese 
minister  at  Tokyo  signed  it,  and  it  had  not  been  ratified  by 
the  Chinese  Government.  The  Chinese  people  viewed  it 
merely  as  a  draft,  and  demanded  its  cancellation  with  the 
return  to  Japan  of  the  moneys  received  under  it  by  the  poli- 
ticians. 

Mr.  Obata's  threat,  which  the  Chinese  took  to  be  an  at- 
tempt to  intimidate  the  Chinese  delegation  at  Paris,  evoked 
a  deluge  of  telegraphic  messages  urging  the  President  and 
the  Government  by  all  possible  means  to  back  their  delegates. 
These  expressions  came  from  men  of  all  parties.  Chen  Lu, 
Acting  Foreign  Minister,  tried  in  vain  to  minimize  the  effect 
of  the  interview.  Called  before  the  Chamber  of  Representa- 
tives in  secret  session,  he  said  that  the  newspaper  reports  had 
been  "somewhat  exaggerated,"  and  added:  "In  this  time 
when  the  right  and  justice  of  the  Allied  Powers  have  definitely 
destroyed  militarism  and  despotism,  we  Chinese,  although 
as  yet  a  weak  country,  may  consider  every  menace  of  foreign 
aggression  as  a  thing  of  the  past,  and  accept  it  with  a  smile." 

The  Government  at  first  cabled  the  Paris  delegation  not  to 
make  the  secret  treaties  public;  they  were  not  held  to  be  valid 
by  the  Chinese  Government,  and  publication  might  lend 
them  force.  Later,  the  Government  cabled,  leaving  it  en- 
tirely to  the  discretion  of  the  delegates.  The  diplomatic 
commission  of  the  Chin  Pu  Tang  recommended  this.  Mean- 
while, Mr.  Liang  Chi-chao  had  gone  to  France.  He  meant  to 
go  by  way  of  the  United  States,  where  I  had  prepared  for  him 
an  itinerary  and  letters  of  introduction.  Then  his  intimate 
associate,  Tang  Hua-lung,  was  assassinated  in  Vancouver. 
Liang,  fearful  of  a  similar  fate,  went  straight  to  France,  evad- 
ing the  Kuo  Min  Tang  sympathizers  in  America.     Ex- 


JAPAN  SHOWS  HER  TEETH  341 

Premier  Hsiung  Hsi-ling  told  me  that  Liang  was  to  inform 
the  Chinese  delegates  unofficially  about  the  state  of  things 
in  China. 

This  was  so  bad  that  the  American  recommendation  that 
the  powers  keep  their  money  away  from  either  party  until 
China  was  reunited  looked  more  and  more  desirable.  An 
influential  and  responsible  Chinese,  who  talked  with  me 
about  the  clique  that  ran  the  War  Participation  Bureau, 
made  this  statement:  "The  danger  to  China  is  in  the  efforts 
of  Tuan's  militarists.  Japan  is  giving  them  money  to  build 
up  an  army.  With  this  they  will  try  to  overawe  the  Presi- 
dent and  force  him  to  fall  in  with  their  aims.  The  negotia- 
tions for  peace  with  the  south  will  cease;  the  war  with  the 
south  will  go  on." 

One  of  the  most  burning  questions  both  to  private  individ- 
uals and  the  press  was  how  to  oblige  Japan  and  her  officials 
to  cease  their  support  of  the  northern  militarists  by  the  send- 
ing of  money  and  arms.  Certainly  a  fire  was  built  under 
them.  The  Japanese  minister  called  on  me  on  the  9th  of 
January  to  say  that  his  government  would  now  join  in  a 
declaration  on  financial  assistance  to  China.  He  had  to 
make  reservations  about  the  loan  of  20,cxx),cxx)  yen,  pledged 
in  connection  with  the  secret  military  agreement,  also  as 
to  the  so-called  "  industrial "  loans.  The  secret  loan  arrange- 
ment had  been  made  with  three  Japanese  banks:  the  Bank  of 
Chosen,  the  Industrial  Bank  of  Japan,  and  the  Bank  of  For- 
mosa, by  the  War  Participation  Bureau.  With  this,  the 
minister  said,  he  could  not  interfere.  Also,  his  government 
was  in  principle  favouring  a  restriction  of  the  sale  of  arms, 
as  America  recommended;  but  it  would  be  best  for  the  powers 
to  say  nothing  about  it,  as  their  joint  statement  would  be 
taken  as  an  attempt  to  restrain  Japan,  which  was  the  only 
country  able  to  furnish  arms  to  China.  Besides,  the  War 
Participation  Bureau  had  a  troublesome  private  contract  for 
arms  with  the  Tayeh  Company,  which  the  Government  felt 


342      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

it  couldn't  interfere  with.  So  there  you  are,  as  Henry  James 
would  put  it. 

I  told  the  Japanese  minister  that  we  were  not  proposing 
any  platonic  arrangement  as  Americans  were  both  able  and 
willing  to  furnish  arms  to  the  Chinese  under  legitimate  con- 
tracts, if  the  American  Government  would  permit  it.  More- 
over, as  to  the  transaction  of  those  three  Japanese  banks — 
since  the  Government  of  Japan  had  an  interest  both  in  them 
and  in  the  munitions  company  mentioned,  their  alliance  with 
the  War  Participation  Bureau  would  be  dissociated  with 
difficulty  in  the  public  mind  from  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment. 

The  War  Participation  Bureau  clique  was  actually  getting 
ready  to  equip  an  army  against  the  south  while  the  North- 
and-South  Peace  Conference  was  sitting  at  Shanghai.  Tang 
Shao-yi,  chief  peace  representative  of  the  south,  formally 
remonstrated  to  the  British  minister,  as  dean  of  the  diplo- 
matic corps,  against  such  doings  of  this  "Bureau"  and  its 
Japanese  support. 

Now,  the  Bureau  had  been  established  as  its  name  implied, 
to  facilitate  participation  of  China  in  the  Great  War.  Japan's 
financial  support  of  it  was  ostensibly  given  also  in  behalf  of 
the  other  Allies.  If  it  were  to  be  prostituted  to  the  foment- 
ing of  civil  war  the  others  as  well  could  not  escape  responsi- 
bility. A  meeting  was  held  on  the  12th  of  February  by  the 
Allied  and  Associated  ministers.  Several  strongly  urged 
that  outside  money  continually  given  for  recruiting  of  troops 
was  opposed  to  the  aim  of  restoring  settled  conditions  in 
China  and  to  the  policy  of  the  joint  declaration  of  December. 
The  Japanese  minister  was  silent.  He  said  he  must  await 
instructions. 

He  informed  me  on  February  21st  that  Japan  had  called  a 
halt  on  the  shipping  of  ammunition  and  equipment  to  the 
War  Participation  Bureau,  but  the  payment  of  the  balance 
of  the  loan  could  not  be  stopped.    Just  then,  as  it  happened. 


JAPAN  SHOWS  HER  TEETH  343 

an  American  firm  would  soon  be  ready  to  begin  delivery  of  a 
certain  amount  of  equipment  in  China,  contracted  for  in 
good  faith  during  the  previous  August.  America  had  pro- 
posed a  jomt  declaration  against  the  furnishing  of  arms, 
which  Japan  had  blocked.  As  the  declaration  had  not  been 
made,  I  could  not  then  stop  the  American  delivery  though  I 
did  so  later.  But  America  would  still  be  only  too  glad  to 
join  in  the  declaration  as  proposed. 

As  the  Japanese  were  still  paying  the  loan  funds  into  the 
War  Participation  Bureau,  another  diplomatic  "indignation 
meeting"  was  held  about  it  on  March  6th.  The  Japanese 
minister  said  his  banks  could  not  help  paying  over  those 
funds,  but  he  had  suggested  to  the  Chinese  Government  that 
it  might  be  well,  in  the  circumstances,  to  refrain  from  draw- 
ing the  money;  Japan  could  not  object  to  this.  Forthwith 
one  of  the  ministers  spoke  up:  "Then  let  us  all  make  this 
recommendation  which  Japan  has  made." 

At  this  the  Japanese  minister  was  taken  aback,  almost 
shocked.  He  had  always  argued  that  the  War  Participation 
Bureau  was  a  Chinese  internal  affair,  not  one  in  which  the 
powers  that  had  helped  form  it  should  presume  to  dip.  But 
the  suggestion  was  quickly  adopted.  As  a  result,  the  repre- 
sentatives of  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  the  United 
States,  all  solemnly  called  on  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  expressing  their  opinion  that  to  draw  the  war  partici- 
pation funds  was  not  advisable,  as  it  constituted  an  obstacle 
to  internal  peace. 

But  Japan's  advice  had  been  merely  for  the  record,  not  at 
all  to  be  acted  upon.  Soon  there  came  over  to  Sir  John 
Jordan  an  informal  memorandum  from  the  Foreign  Office, 
taking  the  Japanese  line  of  thought  that  the  War  Participa- 
tion Bureau  was  China's  internal  affair.  It  might  be  con- 
strued as  an  intimation  that  we  were  meddling.  Indeed, 
two  Chinese  of  high  position  told  me  that  the  President  and 
the  Premier  had  held  up  the  memorandum  for  several  days 


344      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

for  fear  that  it  might  give  offense,  until  the  Minister  of 
War  absolutely  insisted  upon  its  being  sent. 

Through  these  two  men  I  sent  a  quiet  intimation  to  the 
President  that  withdrawal  of  the  memorandum  would  pre- 
vent unpleasant  feelings  among  men  who  were  sincerely 
friendly  to  him  and  to  China.  The  memorandum  was  pulled 
back  without  delay;  thereupon  all  the  Chinese  officials,  ex- 
cept the  few  directly  connected  with  the  War  Participation 
Bureau,  rejoiced. 

The  five  representatives  who  signed  the  original  declara- 
tion of  December  met  again  on  the  nth  of  March,  because 
the  French  minister  had  instructions  favouring  action  upon 
the  Bureau.  The  Japanese  minister  advanced  his  argu- 
ments about  its  being  China's  business,  not  ours.  But  the 
others  took  the  view  that  as  it  was  an  Allied  war  institution 
and  Japan  had  dealt  directly  with  it,  it  was  quasi-external  in 
character.  "Is  it  not  quite  clear,"  protested  the  Japanese 
minister,  "that  the  loan  was  purely  a  commercial  affair, 
made  by  certain  banks,  and  not  controlled  by  the  Japanese 
Government?"  How,  then,  it  was  asked  in  reply,  does  it 
happen  that  in  connection  with  this  loan,  officers  of  the 
Japanese  army  had  been  assigned  to  the  War  Participation 
Bureau  as  advisers  and  instructors;  was  it  customary  to  make 
such  extraordinary  arrangements  in  connection  with  a  purely 
commercial  transaction  ? 

"I  am  not  sufficiently  informed,"  Mr.  Obata  responded 
evasively.  "I  shall  have  to  refer  to  the  reports  of  these 
transactions." 

The  position  of  Japan  in  this  matter  was  so  patently  equi- 
vocal that  it  was  amusing.  We  decided  that  we  should  make 
it  plain  that  as  this  bureau  was  created  to  further  our  common 
purposes,  we  could  not  acquiesce  in  any  political  action  or  in 
the  use  of  any  money  which  would  tend  to  prolong  internal 
strife. 

The  Japanese  minister  on  the  ist  of  March  had  notified 


JAPAN  SHOWS  HER  TEETH  345 

the  Chinese  Government  that  no  further  deliveries  of  arms 
would  be  made  to  the  War  Participation  Bureau  pending 
the  termination  of  the  North-and-South  Peace  Conference 
at  Shanghai.  We  proposed  to  follow  this  up  with  joint 
action.  Certain  representatives  were  unlnstructed,  though 
they  favoured  frowning  on  the  arms  imports.  Finally  eight 
powers  united  "effectively  to  restrain  their  subjects  and  citi- 
zens from  importing  Into  China  arms  and  munitions  of  war 
until  the  establishment  of  a  government  whose  authority  Is 
recognized  throughout  the  whole  country."  This  included 
the  delivery  of  arms  under  contracts  already  made  but  not 
executed.  I  could  then  warn  the  American  firm  not  to  exe- 
cute its  contract  for  the  time  being,  and  I  did  so. 

From  time  to  time,  since  the  early  spring  of  19 18,  Baron 
Sakatani,  Japanese  ex-MInister  of  Finance,  had  been  In 
Peking.  Mr.  Liang  Chl-chao,  when  as  Minister  of  Finance 
he  made  his  Japanese  loans,  had  held  out  the  possibility 
of  the  appointment  of  a  Japanese  financial  advisor.  The 
Baron  was  an  old  acquaintance  of  mine  and  I  held  him  In 
high  regard;  but,  In  view  of  the  fact  that  I  could  not  consider 
this  time  a  proper  one  for  settling  the  matter  of  the  financial 
advisorships,  I  had  to  distinguish  between  my  personal  feel- 
ings for  him  and  the  official  stand  which  I  might  have  to  take. 
A  Japanese  friend  wrote  me  In  connection  with  Baron 
Sakatanl's  visit  to  China:  "A  section  of  our  capitalists  have 
been  given  every  facility  to  make  money  and  to  lend  It  to 
China;  with  the  money  squeezed  from  them,  the  military 
bureaucrats  have  been  corrupting  party  men  and  sending 
them  to  China  and  elsewhere,  to  exploit  the  warring  na- 
tions while  they  are  busy  with  the  war.  The  civilian 
officials  and  militarists  cannot  think  anything  except  in 
terms  of  German  fear  or  admiration.  If  such  Japanese 
are  employed  by  the  Peking  government, '  it  will  forever 
alienate  Chinese  sympathies  from  anything  we  may  pro- 
pose." 


346      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Baron  Sakatani  from  the  first  had  nursed  the  ambition  of 
being  made  currency  adviser  to  the  Chinese  Government; 
by  January,  1919,  it  appeared  that  his  wish  was  to  be 
fulfilled.  The  Japanese  minister  announced  that  the  other 
nations  had  agreed  to  the  Baron's  appointment.  I  had  not 
agreed  to  it.  I  had  heard  nothing  whatever  about  it  and  had 
consistently  and  energetically  opposed  any  action  of  this 
sort.  I  considered  that  it  would  permanently  determine  the 
course  to  be  taken  with  regard  to  currency  loans,  and  would 
preclude  the  possibility  of  any  consultation  with  the  United 
States.  I  requested  the  Minister  of  Finance  to  defer  the 
appointment  until  I  could  consult  my  government.  The 
next  development  came  on  the  20th  when  the  Japanese 
minister  handed  me  a  memorandum  which  referred  to  the 
personal  goodwill  I  had  expressed  to  Baron  Hayashi  and 
which  went  on  to  state  that  the  proposed  appointment 
of  Baron  Sakatani  had  been  sanctioned  by  Mr.  Lansing  in 
Washington. 

I  cabled  to  Washington,  receiving  therefrom  on  the  30th 
instructions  saying  that  the  appointment  of  a  currency 
adviser  should  be  settled  only  after  full  consultation  by  all 
concerned,  and  that  Mr.  Lansing  had  not  committed  himself 
to  any  other  understanding.  I  sent  a  note  to  the  Minister 
of  Finance,  stating  that  as  one  of  the  parties  to  the  Currency 
Loan  Agreement,  the  United  States  wished  that  action  be 
postponed  until  further  consideration  could  be  given.  I 
was  immediately  assured  that  the  position  taken  would  be 
considered  as  final.  As  a  personal  friend  I  regretted  that 
Baron  Sakatani  could  not  be  retained,  but  in  so  important  a 
matter  it  was  impossible  to  stand  aside  while  action  was 
rushed  through  which  would  be  prejudicial  to  the  long- 
established  interests  of  the  powers  who  were,  at  the  time,  pre- 
occupied with  after-war  problems. 


CHAPTER  XXX 
BANDITS,  INTRIGUERS,  AND  A  HOUSE  DIVIDED 

There  is  a  phase  of  Chinese  Hfe  which  I  should  touch  upon 
if  the  picture  I  am  trying  to  give  of  the  China  I  knew  is  to  be 
complete. 

Brigandage  is  an  established  institution  in  China,  where  it 
has  operated  so  long  that  people  have  become  accustomed  to 
it  and  take  it  for  granted  as  a  natural  visitation.  At  this 
time  there  was  a  vicious  circle  around  which  brigands  and 
troops  and  rich  citizens  and  villagers  were  travelling,  one  in 
pursuit  of  the  other.  The  brigands  were  recruited  from 
disbanded  soldiers — men  who  had  lost  connection  with  their 
family  and  clan.  Often  their  families  had  been  wiped  out 
by  famine,  flood,  or  disease,  or  had  been  killed  in  the  revo- 
lution. At  other  times  the  individual  may  have  lost  touch 
through  a  fault  of  his  own  causing  him  to  be  cast  out.  It  is 
very  difficult  for  an  isolated  person,  without  family  and 
clan  connections,  to  reestablish  himself.  The  easiest  way 
is  to  enlist  in  the  army.  If  that  cannot  be  done,  he  becomes 
a  brigand.  Brigands  foregather  in  provinces  where  the 
administration  is  lax  or  in  remote  regions  difficult  to  reach. 
They  lie  in  ambush  and  seize  wealthy  persons,  who  are 
carried  off  to  the  hills  and  released  only  when  ransom  is  paid. 
In  this  way,  a  considerable  tax  is  levied  on  accumulated 
wealth.  This  money  the  brigands  spend  among  the  villagers 
where  they  happen  to  be.  Meanwhile,  the  Provincial 
Governor  bethinks  himself  that  a  certain  brigade  or  division 
has  not  been  paid  for  a  long  time  and  therefore  might  cause 
trouble,  so  he  announces  what  is  called  a  "country  cleansing 
campaign."    The  situation  is  so  intolerable  that  the  general 

347 


348      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

sees  himself  forced  to  go  to  extremes,  and  to  send  his  troops 
with  orders  to  exterminate  the  brigands.  They  proceed  to 
the  infested  regions;  the  brigands,  having  meanwhile  got 
wind  of  these  movements,  depart  for  healthier  climes, 
leaving  the  troops  to  quarter  themselves  on  the  villagers,  who 
are  by  them  relieved  of  the  money  which  they  have  made  out 
of  the  brigands.  Some  brigands  may  be  unfortunate  enough 
to  be  caught;  some  will  be  shot  as  an  example,  and  others 
will  be  allowed  to  enlist.  When  the  soldiers  have  dwelt  for  a 
while  among  the  villagers,  they  report  that  the  bands  have 
now  been  fully  suppressed  and  that  the  country  is  cleaned. 
They  are  then  recalled  to  headquarters;  their  general 
reports  to  the  governor,  and  is  appropriately  rewarded. 
Meanwhile,  the  brigands  return  from  their  safer  haunts  and 
begin  again  to  catch  wealthy  people,  whom  they  relieve 
of  their  surplus  liquidable  property.  And  so  the  circle 
revolves  interminably. 

A  little  more  efficiency  in  China  would  deliver  it  of  much 
of  its  intriguing  and  all  of  its  banditry.  Returning  to 
Peking  from  a  trip  to  the  Philippines  I  found  that  Mr.  Kyle, 
an  American  engineer  on  the  Siems-Carey  railway  survey, 
and  Mr.  Purcell,  another  employe,  had  been  seized  by  bandits 
in  a  remote  part  of  Honan.  The  bandits  took  a  large  sum 
of  silver  these  men  were  carrying  to  pay  off  the  surveying 
parties  farther  up  toward  Szechuan,  then  they  decided  to 
hold  Kyle  and  Purcell  for  ransom. 

Doctor  Tenney,  the  Chinese  secretary,  was  in  Kaifengfu, 
stirring  up  the  provincial  governor  to  hurry  the  release  of  the 
men.  The  company  was  quite  ready  to  pay  the  ransom, 
and  I  could  easily  have  induced  the  Chinese  Government  to 
pay  it.  I  was  advised  that  this  would  be  the  only  certain 
way  of  rescuing  the  men,  but  I  felt  it  would  be  a  dangerous 
precedent;  as  the  bandits  would  then  go  on  taking  and  hold- 
ing foreigners  for  ransom.  Mr.  Kyle  was  neither  young  nor 
robust.     I  feared  for  the  strenuous  life  and  the  worry  he  was 


BANDITS  AND  INTRIGUERS  349 

undergoing,  but  waited  two  weeks  for  the  Central  and  the 
Provincial  Government,  which  I  made  responsible,  to  get 
them  back.  One  night,  Mr.  Purcell  escaped.  I  then 
through  Doctor  Tenney  notified  the  Governor-General  that 
he  must  surround  the  entire  region  where  the  bandits  were, 
telling  them  emphatically  that  if  anything  happened  to  Mr. 
Kyle  the  band  would  be  hunted  down  and  exterminated. 

The  threat  was  "got  across"  to  the  bandits,  and  with  it  a 
promise  that  those  instrumental  in  restoring  the  captive 
would  escape  punishment  and  in  some  way  be  rewarded. 
After  a  week's  further  suspense  Mr.  Kyle  was  delivered  to 
the  pursuing  troops  and  forthwith  returned  to  Peking.  The 
chief  of  the  band  was  rewarded  with  a  commission  in  the 
army;  his  henchmen  were  enlisted  as  soldiers.  But  those 
who  had  no  part  in  the  delivery  were  one  by  one  caught  and 
executed.  So,  in  the  end,  a  salutary  example  was  set  to 
keep  bandits  from  interfering  with  foreigners. 

Mr.  Kyle  moved  with  the  band  every  night  in  their 
mountainous  and  inaccessible  region.  Over  divides  they 
went  from  valley  to  valley.  Mr.  Kyle  kept  his  normal 
health,  but  complained  that  they  had  not  let  him  sleep.  He 
snored  so  loudly,  the  bandits  told  him,  that  they  feared  he 
would  attract  the  notice  of  the  troops;  so,  during  the  final 
ten  days,  he  had  not  had  a  solid  hour  of  sleep.  But  he  made 
up  his  mind  that  he  would  keep  his  mental  equipoise  and  his 
physical  fitness  in  order  to  live  through  the  experience. 

Two  woman  missionaries  had  been  taken  at  about  the 
same  time  by  bandits  in  Shantung  Province.  But  they  were 
released  after  a  few  days.  The  missionaries  of  the  society 
they  belonged  to  circulated  a  pamphlet  somewhat  later, 
pointing  out  the  superior  efficacy  of  prayer  over  diplomatic 
intervention.  In  response  to  prayer  these  two  teachers  had 
been  freed  within  a  week;  whereas  all  our  diplomatic  efforts 
had  not  yet  secured  the  release  of  the  American  engineer. 

Fear  of  foreign  displeasure  lost  the  Chinese  the  chance  to 


350      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

get  the  services  of  a  great  engineer.  Before  going  to  the 
Philippines  I  had  been  visited  by  Mr.  Ostrougoff,  Minister 
of  Railways  in  Kerensky's  time,  who  had  inaugurated  the 
Russian  agreement  under  which  Mr.  John  F.  Stevens  was 
given  the  task  of  helping  to  reorganize  the  Russian  railways. 
The  work  had  been  prevented  by  disturbed  conditions. 
Admiral  Kolchak,  together  with  Alexis  Staal,  had  also  called 
on  me,  with  others  who  had  faith  in  the  beginnings  of  a 
representative  political  organization  in  Siberia.  I  recall 
Kolchak's  fine,  serious  face,  and  his  manner  which  was  that 
of  a  man  under  the  strain  imposed  by  duties  that  transcend 
any  mere  personal  interest.  On  my  return,  John  F.  Stevens 
came  to  Peking  for  a  month.  He  was  discouraged  by  the 
Russian  and  Siberian  situation.  The  general  breakdown, 
the  social  revolution,  and  the  establishment  of  Soviets  had 
demolished  the  chances  for  carrying  out  his  railway  plans  in 
Russia.  No  organized  authority  had  backed  him.  In 
Peking  he  studied  the  Chinese  railway  situation.  In  his 
quiet,  thorough-going  way,  he  looked  into  the  whole  question 
for  China;  it  was  not  long  before  he  had  great  confidence 
in  its  possibilities.  I  felt  it  would  be  a  godsend  if  a  man 
of  his  genius  for  original  planning  and  constructive  work, 
proved  in  the  great  Panama  Canal  project;  a  man,  more- 
over, who  had  intimate  experience  of  American  railway 
operation,  could  work  out  with  the  Chinese  a  systematic 
plan  for  developing  their  railway  service.  The  Chinese 
would  have  eagerly  welcomed  this  chance,  but  they  were 
not  free.  The  engagement  of  one  foreigner  would  have 
brought  demands  to  employ  many  more. 

This  was  in  the  spring  of  191 8.  I  called  on  Mr.  Liang 
Shih-yi  to  greet  him  on  his  return  from  exile.  "The  urgent 
thing,"  he  said,  "is  to  put  a  stop  to  military  inter- 
ference with  the  civil  government.  The  question  of  a  parlia- 
ment is  not  quite  so  important,  but,  as  it  has  been  put  to  the 
fore,  it  must  be  solved  first.     My  solution  is  to  elect  a  new 


BANDITS  AND  INTRIGUERS  351 

parliament  under  the  old  law.  Then  reduce  the  army  and 
separate  military  from  civilian  affairs." 

Liang  described  to  me  the  characteristics  of  the  nine  chief 
southern  leaders.  They  were  rivals,  they  had  their  hos- 
tilities; no  three  leaders  would  agree.  Two  would  come  to 
an  understanding,  and  the  rest  would  turn  and  rend  them. 
Finally,  he  predicted  that  Hsu  Shih-chang  would  be  the 
most  likely  candidate  for  President,  Tuan  having  declined. 

In  Hunan  the  northern  and  southern  troops  were  still 
fighting  and  inflicting  suffering  on  the  people  there;  General 
Chang  Chin-yao,  in  particular,  an  opium-smoking  gambler 
and  corrupter,  the  military  governor  of  Hunan;  his  troops 
destroyed  certain  property  belonging  to  missionaries.  Ameri- 
can and  British  residents  of  Chang-sha,  the  capital,  pe- 
titioned the  British  and  American  ministers  for  protection 
to  foreign  life  and  property.  I  had  learned  that  the  governor 
put  no  bridle  on  his  troops.  With  my  British  and  Japanese 
colleagues  I  insisted  that  commanding  officers  be  held 
personally  and  individually  responsible  for  injuries  to 
foreigners.  We  pointed  out  that  Chang,  especially,  was 
under  observation.  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  de- 
livered a  warning,  and  Admiral  Knight,  whom  I  had  fully 
advised,  ordered  a  gunboat  to  Changsha. 

Meanwhile,  the  War  Participation  Bureau,  created  to  aid 
the  Associated  Powers  in  the  Great  War,  was  watched  by 
Japan.  Because  of  it  they  made  their  special  military 
convention  of  which  General  Tuan  had  spoken  to  me,  using 
the  revolution  in  Russia  and  the  rise  of  Bolshevism  as  their 
pretext.  The  Japanese  militarist  element  in  the  Govern- 
ment was  active  and  urgent,  and  General  Aoki  at  Peking 
and  General  Tanaka  at  Tokyo  were  leaving  no  stone  un- 
turned to  aid  them.  They  sought  at  first  a  general  military 
alliance.  The  Chinese  would  not  consider  anything  so 
sweeping.  Then  the  unrest  in  Siberia  was  made  the  basis 
of  more   limited    cooperation.     In    March    a    preliminary 


352      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

entente  was  formed;  China  and  Japan  would  consider  in 
common  the  measures  to  be  taken  to  cope  with  the  Russian 
situation  and  to  take  part  in  the  present  war,  and  the  means 
and  conditions  of  cooperation  would  be  arranged  by  the 
military  and  naval  authorities  of  both  countries. 

War  participation  in  general  was  thus  put  into  the  pur- 
view of  mutual  agreement  between  Japan  and  China. 
While  no  general  military  alliance  was  concluded,  neverthe- 
less the  Japanese  could  now  control  what  was  to  be  done  by 
China  in  the  war.     It  meant  that  China  would  do  nothing. 

The  terms  of  the  military  and  naval  conventions  on 
methods  of  cooperating,  concluded  the  i6th  of  May,  flexibly 
permitted  Japan  in  certain  circumstances  to  control  Chinese 
railways  and  resources.  The  whole  thing  was  managed 
secretly.  The  public  became  suspicious  of  the  results,  since 
the  chief  arrangements  were  made  not  by  the  cabinet  or  the 
Foreign  Office,  but  by  the  military  and  naval  representatives. 
Would  China  longer  freely  cooperate  with  the  other  Allies  ? 
Would  she  not  be  under  Japan's  strict  leadership.?  Was  not 
this  the  entering  wedge  for  a  complete  control  of  Chinese 
military  affairs  by  Japan  ?  Would  not  Chinese  militarism  be 
strengthened  and  made  obedient  to  Japanese  policy? 

Japan's  acts  in  Shantung  gave  these  questions  pertinence. 
There  she  was  expropriating  by  eminent  domain;  in  Tsingtau 
the  Japanese  authorities  thus  acquired  about  twelve  square 
miles  of  land,  including  the  shore  of  Kiaochow  Bay  for 
several  miles,  which  gave  control  of  every  land  approach  and 
every  possible  steamship  and  railway  terminal  in  this  port. 
Plainly,  Japan  was  carrying  out  a  policy  of  permanent 
occupation. 

While  the  Chino- Japanese  entente  was  being  negotiated, 
Japanese-controlled  papers  in  China  were  preaching  enmity 
to  the  white  race.  In  May  a  Japanese  parliamentary  party 
visited  China,  making  speeches  calculated  to  stir  racial 
feeUng.    The  burden  of  the  appeals  was  that,  after  the  war, 


BANDITS  AND  INTRIGUERS  353 

European  nations  would  try  to  fasten  their  control  more 
firmly  on  China,  hence  the  yellow  race  should  now  unite 
in  timely  opposition. 

Mr.  Nishihara,  close  associate  of  the  Japanese  Premier, 
General  Terauchi,  was  unofficially  doing  the  financial  busi- 
ness of  Japan  in  China.  The  Japanese  Legation  could  deny 
that  negotiations  were  going  on,  while  Japanese  interests 
were  actively  influencing  the  financial  measures  of  the 
Peking  Government.  A  large  loan  was  proposed,  to  be 
secured  on  the  tobacco  and  wine  revenues.  They  were  the 
security  for  the  existing  American  loan,  with  option  for 
further  advances.  I  asked  Tsao  Ju-lin,  Minister  of  Finance, 
about  this  and  his  answer  was:  "The  United  States  is  not 
giving  to  China  the  assistance  she  gives  to  her  other  as- 
sociates in  the  war.  The  American  bankers  have  not 
completed  their  contract.  It  is  necessary  for  China  to  look 
elsewhere." 

Mr.  Tsao  said  he  would  at  any  time  consider  American 
proposals  and  give  them  as  favourable  treatment  as  to  any 
other  nation.  I  asked  assurances  that  before  anything 
further  was  done  on  the  basis  of  the  tobacco  and  wine 
revenues,  the  American  bank  have  a  chance  to  consider  a 
proposal  from  the  Chinese  Government  under  its  option. 
The  minister  had  denied  that  the  revenues  were  now  in  any 
way  involved;  but  at  this  request  he  sidestepped.  I  made 
the  most  of  his  denial,  placing  it  on  record  in  a  note  to  the 
Foreign  Office.  The  French  minister  took  action  similar  to 
mine.  Tsao  was  not  only  Minister  of  Finance;  he  was 
concurrently  Minister  of  Communications.  Both  depart- 
ments, therefore,  were  under  the  thumb  of  Japan. 

I  have  rather  rapidly  sketched  the  state  of  affairs  within 
China  up  to  July  of  191 8.  I  wished  a  personal  discussion  of 
the  situation  with  the  officials  at  Washington — my  first 
since  America's  entrance  into  the  war.  I  left  Peking  for  the 
United  States  after  another  long  interview  with  General 


354      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Tuan,  who  had  become  Premier.  On  June  27th  the  Premier 
stated  to  me  his  poHcy  and  motives  with  frankness.  "If 
we  stop  military  action,"  he  said,  "that  would  be  interpreted 
as  weakness.  The  south  would  only  make  more  extrava- 
gant demands,  and  further  encroach  on  northern  territory. 
Force  that  is  adequate — that  answers  the  question.  For  this 
we  need  money.  If  home  revenues  are  not  enough,  then  we 
must  have  foreign  loans.  That  will  restore  national  unity, 
which,  in  turn,  will  make  repayment  easy.  The  army  will 
be  reformed.  The  people  will  get  protection,  and  the 
country  will  prosper." 

This  policy  was  wise,  inevitable,  he  thought.  But  it  suited 
a  class  of  inept  generals  who  systematically  made  war  at 
home,  with  only  moderate  risk  of  actual  fighting.  Their 
methods  involved  money  more  than  bayonets. 

"When  you  return  from  America,"  Tuan  said  at  parting^ 
"  everything  will  be  settled,  and  the  south  will  recognize  our 
authority." 

A  sea-borne  war  expedition,  sent  to  conquer  the  south, 
was  in  his  mind.  I  could  not  but  express  my  conviction  of 
the  impossibility  of  such  an  achievement  but  he  was  obstinate. 

I  divided  my  time  in  America  between  Washington  and 
New  York,  save  for  a  visit  to  my  mother.  In  four  weeks  I 
saw  representatives  of  most  of  the  great  interests,  public  and 
private,  involved  in  China.  I  by  no  means  stopped  with 
the  State  Department.  I  saw  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the 
Adjutant  General,  on  questions  dealing  with  the  recruiting 
of  troops  to  be  stationed  in  China;  the  Intelligence  Division 
of  the  War  Department  and  of  the  Navy,  as  well  as  the 
Committee  on  Public  Information;  the  Secretary  of  Com- 
merce, and  officials  of  the  War  Trade  Board  and  War 
Industries  Board,  about  restrictions  on  commerce  and  Ameri- 
can commercial  developments  in  China,  together  with  the 
men  of  the  Shipping  Board  about  trans-Pacific  lines.  Among 
great  private  organizations  I  conferred  with  members  of 


BANDITS  AND  INTRIGUERS  355 

the  National  City  Bank;  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Company;  the 
Guaranty  Trust  Company  of  New  York;  Kuhn,  Loeb  & 
Company;  the  General  Electric  and  American  Locomotive 
companies;  the  Standard  Oil  Company  of  New  York;  the 
International  Banking  Corporation  and  American  Inter- 
national Corporation;  the  Chase  National  Bank;  the  Siems- 
Carey  Company;  Pacific  Development  Corporation,  and 
the  Continental  &  Commercial  Bank  of  Chicago. 

The  American  policy  with  respect  to  Russia  and  Siberia 
had  not  been  determined,  and  in  interviews  with  President 
Wilson  the  Siberian  problem,  to  which  I  had  been  very  close, 
as  well  as  Chinese  finance,  were  subjects  of  particular  at- 
tention. I  showed  to  the  President  how  the  Chinese  got 
loans  for  alleged  industrial  purposes;  then,  with  the  conni- 
vance of  the  lenders,  instead  of  building  railways  and  tele- 
phone systems,  they  diverted  them  to  political  or  partisan 
ends.  Thus  Chinese  credit  and  the  authority  of  the  Govern- 
ment were  progressively  weakened.  Then  foreigners  would 
encroach,  and  in  some  fields  American  opportunity  was  in 
danger  of  being  restricted  or  lost  entirely.  I  wished  to  see 
the  United  States  backing  financially  a  sound  programme  of 
Chinese  reorganization.  That  would  accord  with  our  tra- 
ditions. But  jealousies  and  friction  were  to  be  eliminated, 
hence  I  favoured  the  forming  of  an  International  Public 
Loan  Consortium. 

This  would  support  the  credit  of  the  Chinese  Government 
and  put  Chinese  finance  on  a  sound  basis.  Such  a  consor- 
tium would  claim  priority  in  making  all  administrative  or 
political  loans;  but  monopoly  should  be  avoided  by  leaving 
contracts  for  building  and  supplies  open  to  competition,  and 
by  letting  outside  financiers  make  industrial  loans.  Of 
course,  the  Consortium  as  the  chief  backer  of  China  should 
have  full  information  about  industrial  loans,  and  each 
government  should  engage  to  scrutinize  all  loans  made  by  its 
nationals  for  industries.     All  this,  at  his  request,  went  to  the 


356     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

President  in  a  memorandum  submitted  on  the  14th  of 
August. 

With  respect  to  Siberia  and  Russia,  my  information  led  me 
to  believe  that  the  Russian  people  might  still  be  influenced 
to  remain  friendly  to  the  Allies,  so  as  to  prevent  the  growth 
of  German  control.  I  had  in  mind,  not  intervention,  but 
economic  assistance.  I  urged  a  commission  that  would  aid 
the  Russian  people  to  import  the  commodities  they  needed 
most.  The  Russian  Cooperative  societies  were  anxious  for 
just  such  assistance;  thus,  their  leaders  believed,  further 
unfavourable  developments  could  be  prevented.  I  knew  the 
Russians  to  be  universally  friendly;  any  movement  initiated 
by  America  would  be  received  with  extreme  goodwill. 

President  Wilson  seemed  to  wish  something  like  this  to  be 
carried  out.  He  even  discussed  with  me  what  men  were  most 
likely  to  succeed  in  organizing  so  huge  an  enterprise.  But  he 
feared  to  place  a  representative  of  "big  business"  in  such  a 
position;  men  would  suspect  selfish  national  motives.  I 
felt  that  he  wished  America  to  lead  in  giving  the  Russian 
people  such  aid  in  reorganizing  their  economic  Hfe  as  would 
permanently  benefit  them  and  preserve  them  for  our  common 
cause. 

After  many,  many  departments  and  boards  were  consulted, 
I  found  they  were  not  thinking  of  China.  Their  chief 
problem  was  to  train  the  American  army  and  transport  it  to 
the  western  front.  They  did  not  care  to  get  Chinese  contin- 
gents there.  This  was  the  critical  moment  of  the  war.  By 
comparison  other  interests  shrivelled.  As  for  financial  ad- 
vances to  China,  the  Government  found  that  China  entered 
the  war  after  the  law  authorizing  advances  was  passed.  A 
new  law  would  be  needed.  To  propose  it  would  bring  up  the 
whole  question  of  war  policy.  The  temper  of  the  day  was  to 
concentrate  every  effort  on  the  greatest  immediate  show  of 
strength  on  the  west  front.  I  appreciated  all  this,  but  I 
deeply  regretted  that  a  tiny  rivulet  out  of  the  vast  streams  of 


BANDITS  AND  INTRIGUERS  357 

financial  strength  directed  to  Europe  could  not  pass  to  China. 
Even  one  thousandth  part  of  the  funds  given  to  Europe, 
invested  in  building  up  China,  would  have  prevented  many 
disheartening  and  disastrous  developments.  For  every 
dollar  tenfold  in  value  would  have  been  gained  in  fortifying 
Chinese  ability  to  help  in  the  war  and  in  the  post-bellum 
recovery. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

YOUNG  MEN  IN   PEKING,  OLD  MEN   IN  PARIS 

A  CROWD  of  Students  appeared  before  the  legation  gate  on 
the  5th  of  May  clamouring  to  see  me.     I  was  absent,  that 
day,  on  a  trip  to  the  temple  above  Men  Tou-kou  and  so 
missed  seeing  them.     Their  demonstration,  as  it  turned  out 
afterward,  was   the   first    step   in   the  widespread   student 
movement  which  was    to   make   history.     Their   patriotic 
fervour  had,  on  that  morning,  been  brought  to  the  boiling 
point  by  the  first  inkling  of  the  Paris  decision  on  Shantung, 
The  first  reaction  of  the  Chinese  people  as  a  whole  to  this 
news  was  one  of  dumb  dismay.     It  was  a  stunning,  paralyz- 
ing blow.     It  seemed  that  all  the  brazen  intrigue  through 
which  Japan  had  been  seeking  to  strengthen  her  hold  on 
;  Shantung,  all  the  cunning  by  which  she  had  prepared  the 
1  basis  of  her  claim  to  permanent  possession  of  the  German 
j  rights,  had  been  endorsed  by  the  Versailles  Conference. 
The  Chinese  people,  discouraged  in  Peking,  had  centred 
their  hopes  on  Paris.     When  hints   of  a  possible  acceptance 
of  Japan's  demands  were  received  in  Peking,  the  first  im- 
pulse of  the  students  was  to  see  the  American  minister,  to 
ask  him  whether  this  news  was  true,  and  to  see  what  he  had 
to  say.     I  escaped  a  severe  ordeal. 

When  they  were  told  that  I  was  absent  there  was  at  first 
a  hum  of  voices,  then  came  the  cry:  "To  the  house  of  the 
traitor!"  They  meant  the  house  of  Tsao  Ju-lin,  where  the 
schemers  had  assembled  to  make  the  contracts  which  China 
hated.  Tsao  Ju-lin,  the  smooth  little  plotter  whom  most 
people  regarded  as  the  guiding  spirit  of  the  humiliatmg  busi- 
ness, was  the  most  despised;  but  they  associated  with  him 

358 


YOUNG  MEN  IN  PEKING  359 

Chang  Ching-hsiang,  who  had  been  Chinese  minister  at 
Tokyo  when  the  secret  treaties  were  drawn  up.  The  students 
rushed  over  to  the  house  and  broke  down  the  door  and  trooped 
inside.  They  found  both  men  there.  No  time  was  lost, 
either  on  the  part  of  the  students  or  their  prey.  The  stu- 
dents breaking  up  chairs  and  tables  and  using  pieces  of  them 
for  weapons  went  after  the  two  diplomats.  Tsao,  still  smooth 
and  slippery,  managed  to  escape  through  a  window  and  into 
a  narrow  alley  where  he  eluded  his  pursuers.  Chang,  how- 
ever, was  beaten  into  insensibility.  Lu  Tsung-yu,  the  other 
plotter  whom  the  students  would  have  "treated  rough", 
was  not  to  be  found. 

For  four  days  we  were  without  foreign  news.  The  first 
brief  telegraphic  intimation  of  the  Paris  decision  was  followed 
by  the  cutting  of  the  wires;  Japanese  agents,  the  people  sur- 
mised, did  this  to  prevent  the  universal  Chinese  protest 
from  influencing  the  decision  or  causing  its  review. 

Primarily  the  cause  of  the  student  violence  lay  in  the  prox- 
imity of  the  fourth  anniversary  of  the  Japanese  ultimatum  of 
191 5;  but  they  were  also  anxious  and  stirred  because  of  the 
reported  action  of  the  old  men  at  Paris. 

While  other  telegraphic  communication  was  cut  off  I  got 
information  of  what  was  actually  done  by  wireless.  I  found 
it  hard  to  believe  that  President  Wilson  would  be  compliant 
to  the  Japanese  demands,  in  view  of  the  complete  and  in- 
sistent information  the  American  Government  had  had  from 
me  and  all  other  American  officials  in  China  as  to  what  would 
result  from  such  action.  The  Shantung  decision  constituted 
a  wrong  of  far-reaching  effect;  no  general  benefits  bestowed 
by  a  league  of  nations  could  outweigh  it.  Indeed,  as  I  stated 
to  the  Government,  it  destroyed  all  confidence  in  a  league  of 
nations  which  had  such  an  ugly  fact  as  its  cornerstone. 

To  any  one  who  had  watched,  day  by  day,  month  by 
month,  the  unconscionable  plotting  for  these  claims,  the 
decision  was  a  lamentable  denial  of  every  principle  put  for- 


36o      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

ward  during  the  war.  President  Wilson  brushed  aside  the 
unanimous  opinion  of  the  American  experts,  it  would  seem, 
for  two  reasons:  first,  he  believed  that  if  only  the  League  were 
established,  all  difficulties  of  detail  could  easily  be  resolved ; 
and,  second,  he  had  not  given  enough  attention  to  the 
Shantung  question  to  realize  that  this  was  not  a  matter  of 
detail,  but  a  fundamental  issue. 

President  Wilson  tried  to  make  himself  and  others  believe 

that  with  the  acceptance  of  the  Treaty  and  Covenant,  the 

Shantung  question  would  be  solved  through  fulfilment  by 

.       Japan  of  its  promise  "to  restore   Shantung  Peninsula  to 

V'  China  with  full  sovereignty,'*  reserving  only  economic  rights, 
i  This  was  his  primary  misconception.  The  ownership  by  a 
foreign  government  of  a  trunk  railway  reaching  from  a  first- 
class  port  to  the  heart  of  China  could  not  be  correctly  termed 
an  economic  right.  Political  control  of  such  "economic  rights" 
was  exactly  what  American  poHcy  had  tried  to  prevent  for 
decades.  The  President  submitted,  also,  in  the  apparent 
fear  that  Japanese  delegates  might  follow  the  lead  of  the 
Italians  and  leave  the  Conference.  Colonel  House,  it  ap- 
pears, was  frightened  into  this  belief  and  communicated  it 
to  President  Wilson;  the  two  believed  the  League  was  en- 
I  dangered,  and  that  every  sacrifice  must  be  made  to  save  it. 
I  The  fear  was  quite  unfounded.  I  had  seen  indications 
enough,  of  which  I  had  told  the  Government,  that  the 
Japanese  set  enormous  store  upon  their  membership  in  the 
Conference  and  their  position  in  Paris.  As  a  military,  naval, 
and  financial  power,  Japan  could  certainly  not  be  put  in  the 
first  class,  notwithstanding  the  tactical  advantages  which 
the  war  had  brought  her.  She  would  never  forego  the  first- 
class  status  bestowed  by  the  arrangements  of  the  Peace  Con- 
ference. The  Japanese  had  not  the  remotest  idea  of  throwing 
these  advantages  to  the  wind.  The  impression  they  produced 
on  Colonel  House  simply  proved  their  capacity  for  bluffing. 

\j       Had  President  Wilson  taken  the  trouble  to  understand  the 


YOUNG  MEN  IN  PEKING  361 

situation,  he  could  without  difficulty,  by  the  use  of  friendly 
firmness,  have  secured  a  very  different  solution.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  it  is  now  well  known  that  the  Japanese  were 
ready  to  agree  to  an  arrangement  whereby  the  German 
rights  in  China  should  accrue  to  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers  jointly  with  an  early  reversion  to  China. 

Probably  nowhere  else  in  the  world  had  expectations  of 
America's  leadership  at  Paris  been  raised  so  high  as  in  China. 
The  Chinese  trusted  America,  they  trusted  the  frequent 
declarations  of  principle  uttered  by  President  Wilson,  whose 
words  had  reached  China  in  its  remotest  parts.  The  more 
intense  was  their  disappointment  and  disillusionment  due 
to  the  decisions  of  the  old  men  that  controlled  the  Peace 
Conference.  It  sickened  and  disheartened  me  to  think  how 
the  Chinese  people  would  receive  this  blow  which  meant  the 
blasting  of  their  hopes  and  the  destruction  of  their  confidence 
in  the  equity  of  nations. 

In  the  universal  despair  I  feared  a  revulsion  of  feeling 
against  America;  not  because  we  were  more  to  blame  than 
others  for  the  unjust  decision,  but  because  the  Chinese  had 
entertained  a  deeper  belief  in  our  power,  influence,  and 
loyalty  to  principle.  They  would  hardly  understand  so 
abject  and  complete  a  surrender.  Foreign  papers,  also, 
placed  the  chief  responsibility  on  the  United  States.  The 
British  in  China  felt  that  their  government  had  been  forced 
into  the  unfortunate  secret  agreements  with  Japan  when  it 
could  not  help  itself,  because  of  the  German  danger  and  the 
difficulties  Japan  might  raise  by  going  over  to  the  other  side. 
The  United  States,  whose  hands  were  free,  could  have  saved 
us  all,  they  said,  by  insisting  on  the  right  solution.  They 
had  really  hoped  for  this;  their  saying  so  now  in  their  edi- 
torials and  in  private  conversation  was  in  no  spirit  of  petty 
hostility,  but  they  had  to  give  vent  to  their  feelings.  I 
feared  the  Chinese  might  feel  that  they  had  been  betrayed  in 
the  house  of  their  friends,  but  they  met  the  blow  with  sturdy 


1/ 


362     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

spirit.  They  never  wounded  my  feelings  by  anything 
approaching  an  upbraiding  of  the  United  States  for  the 
part  that  President  Wilson  played  at  Paris.  They  expressed 
to  me  their  terrible  dejection,  but  said  merely  that  President 
Wilson  must  have  encountered  very  great  difficulties  which 
they  could  know  nothing  about. 

They  all  knew,  of  course,  that  the  case  of  China  had  been 
weakened  by  the  treaties  made  through  the  connivance  of 
Tsao  Ju-lin  and  his  associates  in  the  fall  of  191 8.  Their 
resentment  was  turned  toward  Japan,  which  had  thus  taken 
advantage  of  the  war  and  the  weakness  of  China,  and  against 
the  Chinese  politicians  who  had  become  Japan's  tools. 

The  Americans  in  China,  as  well  as  the  British  and  the 
Chinese,  were  deeply  dejected  during  these  difficult  weeks. 
From  the  moment  America  entered  the  war  there  had  been  a 
triumphant  confidence  that  all  this  sacrifice  and  suffering 
would  establish  just  principles  of  world  action,  under  which 
mankind  could  live  more  happily  and  in  greater  security. 
That  hope  was  now  all  but  crushed. 

In  commemoration  of  the  soldier  dead,  the  American 
community  gathered  on  May  30th,  Decoration  Day.  It  fell 
to  me  to  make  the  address,  in  which  I  spoke  of  those  recently 
stationed  in  Peking  who  had  died  during  the  war.  Especially, 
I  spoke  of  the  fruitful  career  of  Major  Willard  Straight.  It 
was  remarkable  how  many  officers  of  the  Marine  Guard 
recently  in  Peking  had  gone  through  the  brunt  of  the  war 
and  had  been  distinguished  in  their  service.  I  spoke  of 
General  Neville,  General  Bowley,  Commander  Hutchins, 
Colonel  Newell,  and  Colonel  Holcombe,  all  of  whom  had 
been  in  the  thick  of  it,  and  rejoiced  in  their  record  and  the 
fact  that  though  they  passed  through  the  valley  of  death 
they  had  been  spared.  My  eyes  often  rested  on  the  sad  face 
of  Mrs.  Deering,  transfigured  with  the  mother's  pride  in  that 
heroic  son  whose  war  letters,  published  by  her,  are  one  of 
the  intimately  human  memorials  of  the  great  struggle. 


YOUNG  MEN  IN  PEKING  363 

I  was  impressed  with  how  inadequately  this  wonderful 
country  of  China  and  the  promise  of  its  people  were  under- 
stood in  America.  I  knew  the  difficulties  and  dangers  to  be 
overcome  there,  and  I  felt  that  Americans  well-disposed 
toward  China  would  take  a  hand  in  its  development.  But 
the  "folks  back  home,"  especially  the  interests  that  con-  \:J 
trolled  the  economic  life  of  America,  remained  blind  and  deaf,  7 
lavishing  their  money  in  Europe. 

I  had  spent  my  energies  freely,  withholding  assistance  from 
none  who  deserved  it,  although  I  could  easily  have  limited 
my  official  action  within  narrower  and  more  convenient 
bounds.  In  developments  that  would  mean  a  slow  lift  of 
this  fine  old  civilization  to  a  modern  plane  real  Ameri- 
can interests  had  come  in.  Foundations  had  been  laid  in  the 
Canal  Contract,  the  China  Medical  Board,  the  railway  con- 
cessions, the  creation  of  a  Chino-American  hank,  and  many 
other  enterprises.  America  stood  no  longer  with  empty 
hands;  she  could  not  be  confronted  with  the  gibe  so  often 
used  before:  "It  is  easy  for  you  to  suggest  generous  action, 
for  you  have  nothing  to  contribute." 

With  these  as  beginnings,  I  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that 
more,  possibly,  could  be  done  by  way  of  arousing  American 
interests  in  Far  Eastern  affairs  by  going  to  the  United  States 
than  by  staying  in  China.  I  feared,  also,  that  if  I  remained 
away  from  America  too  long,  it  would  be  difficult  readily  to 
get  in  touch  again  with  affairs  there. 

For  such  reasons,  I  came  to  the  decision  that  I  should  send 
my  resignation  to  the  President.  I  did  not  wish  to  run  away 
from  a  difficult  and  disagreeable  situation.  Indeed,  until 
the  first  effects  of  the  Paris  decision  had  been  overcome,  I 
would  not  leave.  Beyond  that  time,  I  had  no  desire  to  re- 
main. Like  the  Chinese,  I  at  that  time  still  believed  that 
President  Wilson  had  probably  met  tremendous  difficulties 
of  which  I  had  no  knowledge.  At  any  rate,  it  was  far  from 
my  purpose  to  embarrass  him  or  the  Government  through 


364     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

my  action.  Therefore,  the  only  motive  I  gave  for  my 
resignation  was  my  desire  to  return  to  the  United  States. 
However,  in  my  letter  to  the  President  I  tried  to  express 
in  moderate  but  serious  terms  my  view  of  the  situation 
and  of  the  action  which  had  been  taken  at  Paris.  This 
letter  follows : 

June  7,  1919. 
Dear  Mr.  President: 

I  have  die  honour  to  place  in  your  hands  my  resignation  as  minister  to 
China  and  to  request  that  I  may  be  relieved  of  the  duties  of  this  post  as 
soon  as  convenient  to  yourself  and  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  My  reason 
for  this  action  is  that  I  am  weaned  after  nearly  six  years  of  continuous 
strain,  that  I  feel  that  the  interests  of  my  family  demand  my  return  to  the 
United  States,  and  that  I  should  like  to  reenter  afipairs  at  home  without 
making  my  absence  so  long  as  to  break  o£F  all  of  the  most  important  rda- 

tKMWtnpt 

I  desiie  to  thank  3rou  for  the  confidence  you  have  reposed  in  me,  and  it 
shall  be  my  greatest  desire  to  continue  in  the  future  to  cooperate  in  helping 
to  realize  those  great  purposes  of  national  and  international  policy  which 
you  have  so  dearly  and  strongly  put  before  the  American  nation  and  the 
worid. 

In  making  this  commimicadon  to  you  I  cannot  but  refer  to  recent  de- 
rdopments  with  respect  to  China.  The  general  oudook  b  indeed  most 
discouraging,  and  it  seems  impossible  to  accomplish  anything  here  at 
present  or  until  the  home  governments  are  willing  to  face  the  situation  and 
to  act.  It  is  not  difficulties  that  deter  me,  and  I  should  stay  at  my  post 
if  it  were  necessary  and  if  I  did  not  think  that  I  could  be  of  more  use  in  the 
United  States  than  in  China  at  the  present  time.  But  in  fact,  the  situaticHi 
leyiiies  that  the  Amencan  peo|4e  should  be  made  to  realize  what  is  at 
stake  here  for  us  in  order  that  they  may  give  the  necessary  backing  to  the 
Government  for  support  in  any  action  which  the  developments  here  may 
require.  Unless  the  Amencan  people  realize  this  and  the  Government  feels 
strong  oiough  to  take  adequate  action,  the  fruits  of  one  hundred  and  forty 
3rear5  of  American  work  in  China  will  inevitably  be  lost.  Our  people  will 
be  permitted  to  exist  here  only  on  the  sufferance  of  others,  and  the  great 
opportunity  whidi  has  been  held  out  to  us  by  the  Chinese  people  to  assist 
in  the  development  of  education  and  free  institutions  will  be  gone  beyond 
1  recall.  In  its  stead  there  will  come  a  sinister  situation  dominated  by  the 
\  unscrupuloiis  methods  of  the  reactionary  military  regime  centred  in 


YOUNG  MEN  IN  PEKING  365 

Tokj'o,  absolutist  in  tendency,  cynical  of  the  principles  of  free  government  / 
and  human  progress.     If  this  force,  with  all  the  methods  it  is  accustomed  / 
to  apply,  remains  unopposed  there  will  be  created  in  the  Far  East  the  great-  ' 
est  engine  of  military  oppression  and  dominance  that  the  world  has  yet 
seen.     Nor  can  we  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the  brunt  of  evil  results  will 
fall  on  the  United  States,  as  is  already  foreshadowed  by  the  bitter  hostility 
and   abnormal   vituperativeness   of  the  Japanese  press  with  regard  to 
America. 

The  United  States  and  Great  Britain  will  have  to  stand  together  in  this 
matter;  I  do  not  think  this  is  realized  as  fully  by  Britishers  at  home  as 
by  those  out  here.  If  Russia  can  become  an  independent  representative 
government  its  interests  would  parallel  ours.  The  forces  of  public  opinion 
and  strength  which  can  thus  be  mobilized  are  entirely  sufficient  to  control 
the  situation  here  and  to  keep  it  from  assuming  the  menacing  character 
which  is  threatened  at  present;  but  this  can  only  be  done  if  the  situation  ,. 

is  clearly  seen  and  if  it  is  realized  that  the  military  party  of  Japan  will  con- 
tinue  its  present  methods  and  purposes  which  have  proved  so  successful 
until  it  becomes  a  dead  wall  of  firm,  quiet  opposition.  There  will  be  a 
great  deal  of  talk  of  friendship  for  China,  of  restoration  of  Shantung,  of 
loyalty  to  the  League  of  Nations,  but  it  will  be  dangerous  to  accept  this 
and  to  stop  questioning  what  are  the  methods  actually  applied;  as  long  as 
they  exist  the  menace  is  growing  all  the  time.  We  cannot  rest  secure  on 
treaties  nor  even  on  the  League  of  Nations  without  this  checking  up  of 
the  facts.  Otherwise  these  instruments  would  only  make  the  game  a  little 
more  complicated  but  not  change  its  essential  character.  The  menace  can 
be  avoided  only  if  it  is  made  plain  to  Japan  that  her  purposes  are  unmis- 
takable and  that  the  methods  utilized  to  effect  them  will  by  no  means  be 
tolerated.  Such  purposes  are  the  stirring  up  of  trouble  and  revolution, 
encouragement  of  bandits  and  pirates,  morphia,  financial  corruption,  mis- 
leading of  the  press,  refusal  of  just  satisfaction  when  Americans  are  injured 
in  order  to  gain  prestige  for  absolute  power,  and  chief  of  all  official  duplic- 
ity, such  as  the  disavowal  of  knowledge  when  loans  are  being  made  to  the 
Chinese  Government  by  leading  Japanese  banks  and  the  subsequent  state- 
ment by  the  Japanese  minister  that  these  loans  were  private  arrangements 
by  "merchants."  \ 

If  continuous  support  could  be  given  not  only  to  the  activities  of  Ameri-  \ 
can  merchants  but  to  the  constructive  forces  in  Chinese  national  life  itself  ) 
these  purposes  and  methods  would  not  have  the  chance  to  flourish  and  / 
succeed  which  they  now  enjoy. 

During  the  war  our  action  in  the  support  of  constructive  forces  in  China 
necessarily  could  not  be  effective,  as  our  energies  were  required  elsewhere. 


"^i 


366     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

Yet  I  believe  that  a  great  opportunity  was  missed  when  China  had  broken 
oflF  relations  with  Germany.  The  very  least  recognition  of  her  sentiments, 
support  and  efforts,  on  our  part,  would  have  changed  the  entire  situation. 
But  while  millions  upon  millions  were  paid  to  the  least  important  of  the 
countries  of  Europe  not  a  cent  was  forthcoming  for  China.  This  lack  of 
\^  support  drove  Tuan  and  his  followers  into  the  arms  of  the  pro-Japanese 
agents.     Instead  of  support  we  gave  China  the  Lansing-Ishii  Note. 

Throughout  this  period  the  Japanese  game  has  still  been  in  the  stage  of 
bluff;  while  Germany  seemed  at  her  strongest  in  the  war  indeed  the  Japa- 
nese were  perhaps  making  their  veiled  threats  with  a  feeling  that  if  they 
should  ally  themselves  with  a  strong  Germany  the  two  would  be  invincible; 
but  even  at  that  time  a  portion  of  the  American  navy  detached  could  have 
checkmated  Japan.  Since  the  complete  breakdown  of  Germany  the  case 
of  Japan  has  been  carried  through  solely  on  bluff  though  perhaps  it  may 
be  that  the  Japanese  militarists  have  succeeded  in  convincing  themselves 
that  their  establishment  is  formidable.  But  it  is  plain  that  they  would  be 
absolutely  powerless  in  the  face  of  a  stoppage  of  commerce  and  a  navy 
demonstration  on  the  part  of  any  one  of  the  great  powers.  No  one  de- 
sires to  think  of  this  contingency,  but  it  is  plain  that  after  the  breakdown 
of  Germany  it  was  not  feasible  for  Japan  to  use  force  nor  could  she  have 
suffered  a  greater  damage  than  to  exclude  herself  from  the  Peace  Conference 
where  she  had  everything  to  gain  and  nothing  to  lose.  In  ten  years  there 
may  be  a  very  different  situation.  Then  also  our  people,  having  grown  wise, 
will  be  sure  to  shout:  "Why  was  not  this  stopped  while  there  was  yet  time?" 
^It  seems  to  me  necessary  that  someone  in  the  Government  ought  to  give 
j  attention  primarily  to  China  and  the  Far  Eastern  situation.  It  is  very 
j  difficult  to  get  any  attention  for  China.  I  mean  any  continuous  attention 
that  results  in  getting  something  actually  done.  Everything  else  seems 
:  to  come  first  because  Europe  seems  so  much  nearer;  and  yet  the  destinies 
j  of  Serbia,  Czecho-Slovakia,  and  Greece  are  infinitesimal  in  their  importance 
I  to  the  future  of  America  compared  with  those  of  China. 

I  During  my  service  here  I  have  constantly  suffered  from  this  lack  of  con- 
tinuous attention  at  home  to  the  Far  Eastern  situation.  It  has  reacted  on 
the  consular  service;  the  interpreter  service  which  is  absolutely  necessary  to 
make  our  consular  corps  in  China  effective  has  been  starved,  as  no  new 
appointments  have  been  made.  In  my  own  case  promises  of  assistance 
which  had  been  given  repeatedly  went  unfulfilled.  In  this  matter  I  have 
not  the  least  personal  feeling.  I  know  the  result  is  not  due  to  the  personal 
neglect  or  ill-will  of  any  man  or  group  of  men,  only  it  seems  to  me  to  indi- 
cate a  general  sentiment  of  the  unimportance  of  Far  Eastern  affairs,  which 
ought  to  be  remedied.     I  repeat  that  these  statements  are  not  made  in  a 


YOUNG  MEN  IN  PEKING  367 

spirit  of  complaint;  all  individual  members  of  the  Department  of  State 
have  shown  nothing  but  consideration  and  readiness  to  assist,  but  thtrc 
has  been  lacking  a  concentrated  interest  in  China,  which  ought  to  be  repre- 
sented in  some  one  of  the  high  officials,  designated  to  follow  up  Far  Eastern 
affairs  and  accorded  influence  commensurate  with  responsibilities  in  this 
matter. 


CHAPTER  XXXII 
A  NATION  STRIKES  AND  UNITES 

The  students  of  Peking  "started  something."     For  the 

J      first  time  in  thousands  of  years  public  opinion  was  aroused 

and  organized  in  China.     Through  the  action  of  the  students, 

with  whom  the  merchants  made  common  cause,  before  and 

after  the  Shantung  decision,  China  found  herself. 

The  Japanese  papers  insisted  steadfastly  that  these  stu- 
dent disturbances  had  been  brought  on  at  the  "instigation 
of  certain  countries. "  But  instigation  was  not  needed.  If 
foreigners  had  wished  to  make  trouble  in  this  way,  they  would 
have  been  kept  extremely  busy  trying  to  keep  pace  with  the 
Chinese  themselves.  You  do  not  have  to  instigate  a  man 
to  resist  a  pillager  who  is  trying  to  break  into  his  house. 
Those  who  started  this  tremendous  movement  toward 
nationalism — for  that  is  what  it  grew  into — were  students  in 
the  government  schools  and  in  the  private  schools  of  Peking 
and  Tientsin.  In  the  beginning  the  students  were  alone  in 
the  agitation,  but  not  for  long»  Throughout  the  agitators 
were  referred  to  as  "students,"  but  this  term  came  to  be  used  in 
a  broad  sense;  it  came  to  mean  Young  China,  including  all  of 
the  youth  of  the  land  who  had  been  educated  in  modem 
schools. 

China  is  the  home  of  the  strike  and  the  boycott;  but 
never  before  had  these  weapons  been  employed  on  such  a 
scale.  The  merchants  and  students  of  north  China  met 
during  the  second  half  of  May,  declared  a  general  boycott  of 
Japanese  goods,  and  demanded  the  dismissal  of  the  three 
men  called  traitors,  the  notorious  agents  in  the  Chino-Japa- 
nese  negotiations.    The  boycott  spread  rapidly,  a  spontane- 

368 


A  NATION  STRIKES  AND  UNITES         369 

ous  expression  of  deep  resentment.  But  the  movement 
strove  also  to  control  and  purify  the  action  of  the  Chinese 
Government.  The  instrument  for  this  was  the  strike — passive 
resistance — the  stopping  of  the  wheels  of  commerce  and 
industry  till  the  will  of  the  people  was  listened  to. 

The  popular  sense  of  equity,  which  in  China  asserts  itself 
naturally  in  strikes,  responded  everywhere.  Unless  the 
Government  dismissed  the  three  offenders,  merchants  would 
close  their  shops.  Teachers,  students,  shopkeepers,  chauf- 
feurs, dockhands,  all  classes  of  workmen  would  strike.  All 
China,  indeed,  would  go  on  strike. 

The  movement  gained  momentum  like  an  avalanche 
thundering  down  a  mountain.  Its  fury  was  first  of  all  con- 
centrated on  the  attempt  to  force  the  dismissal  of  the  three 
officials  who  were,  in  the  popular  mind,  guilty  of  trading 
away  the  national  birthright.  The  organization  of  the 
uprising  seemed  to  be  almost  spontaneous.  Active  little 
groups,  similar  to  the  Committees  of  Correspondence  in  the 
time  of  Adams  and  Franklin,  sprang  up  in  all  parts  of  China. 
The  masses  of  the  people  were  marshalled  for  action.  From 
the  ten  thousand  students  who  had  originally  struck  in 
Shanghai  the  movement  expanded  swiftly  until  it  included 
merchants  and  chambers  of  commerce  and  dozens  of  other 
bodies  in  every  walk  of  life.  Associations  of  servants  were 
formed  under  the  title  of  The  Industrial  National  Salvation 
Society.  Even  Japanese  bankers  were  put  under  the  ban  by 
the  Chinese  financiers;  finally  the  boycott  went  so  far  that  it 
blacklisted  the  foreign  goods  which  were  brought  to  Chinese 
ports  by  Japanese  steamers. 

In  Peking,  fifty  groups  of  student  speakers  were  sent  out 
to  appeal  to  the  public.  General  Tuan  Chi-jui,  who,  among 
others,  was  held  responsible  by  the  students  for  the  nation's 
troubles,  stoutly  stood  by  his  subordinates.  The  militarists 
in  general,  feeling  that  the  student  movement  was  not  favour- 
able to  them,  prevailed  on  the  Government  to  try  to  suppress 


370      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

it.  Martial  law  was  proclaimed,  and  students  trying  to 
speak  were  arrested.  The  students  were  undaunted  and 
working  en  masse.  The  Government  soon  saw  that  it  could 
imprison  them,  but  that  it  was  powerless  to  stem  the  tide  of 
feeling  they  were  creating.  Thundering  from  all  parts  of 
the  country,  it  was  recognized  that  the  students  could,  if 
they  chose,  turn  the  entire  people  against  the  Government. 
By  June  4th,  nearly  a  thousand  students  were  under  forcible 
detention  in  Peking;  those  recently  arrested  had  wisely 
provided  themselves  with  knapsacks  stocked  with  food  before 
taking  their  lecture  trips. 

Then  the  girl  students  came  forth.  They  fully  shared  the 
patriotic  feelings  of  their  brothers.  Seven  hundred  girls 
from  the  Peking  schools  assembled  and  marched  to  the 
President's  palace  to  request  the  release  of  the  young  men 
under  arrest. 

The  Government  made  a  technical  mistake.  When  the 
student  feeling  seemed  to  be  a  little  on  the  ebb,  the 
Government  took  occasion  to  issue  a  decree  trying  to  white- 
wash Tsao  Ju-lin  and  his  confederates.  That  fanned  the 
flame  which  ultimately  swept  all  over  China. 

Weakening,  the  Government  offered  the  students  release 
if  they  would  return  to  work  and  make  no  further  trouble. 
The  students  saw  their  advantage,  and  stated  that  they  had 
no  wish  to  leave  their  prisons,  if  it  meant  promising  to 
abstain  from  expressing  their  opinion  in  future;  moreover, 
they  would  not  leave  until  the  Government  had  apologized 
for  their  unjust  arrest. 

The  jailing  of  this  large  number  of  the  youth  of  China 
finally  brought  such  ill-concealed  opposition  that  the  Govern- 
ment complied  with  the  students*  ultimatum.  An  apology 
was  offered  them,  whereupon  the  students  returned  to  their 
colleges  and  their  work.  But  they  continued  their  street 
lectures,  callmg  upon  the  people  to  join  in  a  powerful  ex- 
pression of  national  opinion  through  which  their  country's 


A  NATION  STRIKES  AND  UNITES         371 

institutions  and  policies  might  be  put  on  a  sounder  basis, 
and  Japanese  aggression  powerfully  resisted. 

In  Shanghai  the  boycott  and  the  strike  of  the  shopkeepers 
were  in  full  force.  Their  shops  were  closed,  they  threatened 
to  pay  no  taxes  unless  the  "  traitors  "  were  ousted.  American 
officials  at  Shanghai  sent  me  alarming  reports.  The  British 
there,  particularly  those  of  the  official  class,  were  inclined  to 
repress  the  movement. 

The  Japanese,  who  were  feeling  the  full  force  of  the  popular 
thrust,  tried  to  brand  it  anti-foreign  and  to  reawaken  memo- 
ries of  the  Boxer  period.  Some  of  the  influential  British  in 
Shanghai,  frightened  by  the  successful  efforts  of  the  mer- 
chants and  students  among  the  industrial  workers,  began  to 
call  them  anti-foreign,  too.  I  was  told  that  the  municipal 
council  in  Shanghai  might  take  very  stringent  action  against 
the  boycott  and  strike.  The  British  minister  had  gone  to 
the  seashore,  and  I  sent  him  word  that  the  situation  was 
serious. 

It  would  have  been  the  height  of  folly  had  either  we  or  the  \ 
British  let  ourselves  be  dragged  into  the  disturbance,  which 
was  directed  solely  against  the  Japanese,  and  was  fortu- 
nately not  our  concern,  and  in  no  sense  anti-foreign.  I  sent 
specific  instructions  to  the  consulate-general  at  Shanghai 
advising  the  American  community  neither  to  encourage  nor 
oppose  this  movement,  which  was  the  affair  of  the  Chinese. 
The  Americans  saw  the  point  clearly,  and  realized  how  un- 
desirable it  would  be  to  entangle  the  municipal  council  in  the 
business.  I  told  the  Consul-General  that,  illegal  and  overt 
acts  excepted,  the  foreign  authorities  in  China  had  nothing 
to  do  with  the  strike;  being  happily  free  of  Chinese  ill-will, 
we  wished  to  remain  free.  In  order  to  avoid  all  danger  of 
more  general  trouble,  Americans  exerted  considerable  in- 
fluence with  the  Chinese  leaders  to  cause  them  to  abstain 
from  action  that  would  tend  to  involve  foreigners  generally. 
They  responded  willingly. 


372      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

By  this  time  even  the  mafoos  (horse  boys)  at  the  Shanghai 
Race  Club  were  on  strike.  A  run  on  the  Bank  of  Communi- 
cations was  started  because  Tsao  Ju-lin  was  associated  with 
it.  More  and  more  serious  grew  the  situation,  but  the 
demand  on  the  Government  remained  unchanged:  "When 
the  three  traitors  are  dismissed,  the  strike  will  be  called  off; 
otherwise,  still  more  people  will  strike." 

The  Government  finally  yielded  on  the  i  ith  of  June.  The 
insistent  demand  had  come  from  all  parts  of  China  that 
the  three  unpopular  officials  go  in  disgrace.  The  Peking 
Government  complied.  But  the  great  public  in  Shanghai 
was  not  content  until  the  British  minister  and  I  gave  con- 
firmation of  the  report  that  the  mandate  of  dismissal  had 
been  issued.     Then  the  strike  was  off. 

However,  the  boycott  against  Japanese  goods  continued 
unabated.  Yet  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  movement, 
which  at  the  begmnmg  was  distinctly  turned  against  Japan, 
was  either  essentially  anti-Japanese  or  purely  oppositional 
and  negative.  Quite  early,  its  true,  positive,  national 
Chinese  character  stood  revealed.  The  Japanese  had  stung 
the  Chinese  national  pride  to  the  quick.  It  turned  against 
them,  not  in  a  spirit  of  blind  hostility,  but  only  in  so  far  as  the 
Japanese  stood  in  the  way  of  the  national  Chinese  regener- 
ation. 

j     Out  of  this  unprecedented  popular  uprising  several  mo- 

Jmentous  facts  emerged.     First,  public  opinion  must  be  so 

I  awakened  that  it  would  be  a  continuing  force,  so  organized 

j  that  it  would  at  all  times  have  the  means  of  expressing  its 

will,  so  that  it  would  be  able  to  compel  the  Government  to 

resist  further  encroachments  on  China's  rights.     That  would 

take  time;  but  it  could  be  done,  the  strike  and  boycott 

proved  that.     For  the  first  time  in  her  history  China  had 

roused  herself  and  wrung  from  her  government  a  specific 

surrender.     That  lesson  sank  deep.     The  leaders  realized 

that  this  single  act  was  merely  a  very  small  beginning. 


A  NATION  STRIKES  AND  UNITES         373 

But   the   important  thing  was   that   it   did   constitute  a 
beginning. 

The  second  important  result  was  the  sudden  focussing  of 
attention  on  the  means  by  which  native  Chinese  industry 
might  be  built  up.  The  boycott  of  Japanese  goods  had  had 
a  positive  as  well  as  a  negative  side.  Indeed  it  had  been 
stated  positively  all  along.  The  people  were  not  told  to  re- ' 
frain  from  buying  Japanese  goods;  they  were  advised  to  avoid 
buying  goods  of  an  inferior  quality — ^which  would  be  inter- 
preted to  mean  Japanese  products,  of  course — and  they  were 
pointedly  urged  to  patronize  home  industries.  The  people 
responded  with  a  will.  They  did  buy  the  wares  produced  by 
their  own  factories.  It  gave  great  impetus  to  the  develop- 
ment of  Chinese  industry,  and  gave  both  the  manufacturers 
and  the  Government  a  clue  as  to  what  a  definite  campaign  for 
the  stimulation  of  the  home  industries  might  accomplish. 

While  we  were  talking  together  informally  at  a  meeting  of 
the  diplomatic  corps,  the  French  minister,  M.  Boppe,  re- 
marked: "We  are  in  the  presence  of  the  most  astounding  and 
important  thing  that  has  ever  happened — the  organization 
of  a  national  public  opinion  in  China  for  positive  action." 

Thus  out  of  the  evil  of  the  Paris  decision  came  an  inspiring 
national  awakening  of  the  Chinese  people,  a  welding  to- 
gether for  joint  thought  and  joint  action.  All  ranks  of  the 
population  were  affected.  When  to  avoid  foreign  complica- 
tions student  delegates  went  among  the  workers  of  a 
factory  in  Shanghai  to  persuade  them  not  to  strike,  the 
workers  asked:  "Do  you  think  we  have  no  feeling  for  our 
country,  nor  indignation  against  the  traitors  .f"* 

About  the  evil  of  the  Shantung  decision  the  foreign  com- 
munities were  unanimous,  nor  did  they  feel  that  they  ought 
to  be  silent.  They  were  on  the  ground;  they  knew  the 
inevitable  consequences  that  would  follow  the  rigid  applica- 
tion of  the  decision.  They  spoke  out.  Sir  Edward  Walker, 
chairman  of  the  Commercial  Bank  of  Canada,   gave  an 


374      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

address  on  June  6th  before  the  Anglo-American  Association 
of  Peking,  deahng  particularly  with  the  needs  of  transporta- 
tion. What  the  completion  of  two  or  three  trunk  lines 
would  mean  to  China  he  fully  realized.  After  his  address 
the  British  minister  and  I,  who  were  honorary  members,  took 
our  leave,  as  it  had  been  intimated  that  the  Association 
would  discuss  the  Shantung  matter.  The  meeting  then 
adopted  a  resolution  which  expressed  the  conviction  of  Amer- 
icans and  British  in  China  in  this  wise: 

We  express  our  solemn  conviction  that  this  decision  will  create  condi- 
tions that  must  inevitably  bring  about  extreme  discord  between  the 
Chinese  people  and  Japan,  and  raise  a  most  serious  hindrance  to  the  de- 
velopment of  the  economic  interests  of  China  and  other  countries.  A 
settlement  which  perpetuates  the  conditions  created  by  Germany's  aggres- 
sion in  Shantung  in  1898,  conditions  that  led  to  similar  action  on  the  part 
of  other  states,  that  were  contributing  causes  to  the  disorders  in  North 
China  in  1900,  and  that  made  inevitable  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  cannot 
make  for  peace  in  the  Far  East,  for  political  stability  in  China  itself,  or  for 
development  of  trade  and  commerce  equally  open  to  all. 

Further,  the  evil  consequences  of  conditions  which  are  not  only  subver- 
sive of  the  principle  of  national  self-determination,  but  also  a  denial  of  the 
policy  of  the  open  door  and  of  the  principle  of  equality  of  opportunity,  will 
be  greatly  accentuated  if  Japan,  a  near  neighbour,  be  now  substituted  for 
Germany,  whose  centre  of  political  and  economic  activities  was  on  the 
other  side  of  the  globe. 

Therefore  we,  the  members  of  the  Peking  Anglo-American  Association, 
resolve  that  representations  be  made  to  the  British  and  American  Govern- 
ments urging  that  the  states  taking  part  in  the  Peace  Conference  devise 
and  carry  through  a  just  settlement  which  will  not  endanger  the  safety  of 
China  and  the  peace  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 
TAKING    LEAVE    OF    PEKING 

The  Government  was  now  confronted  with  the  question  of 
whether  its  delegates  at  Paris  should  or  should  not  sign  the 
Treaty  and  Covenant.  The  Chinese  people  were  opposed 
to  signing,  for  with  China's  signature  would  go  specific 
recognition  of  the  transfer  of  German  rights  to  Japan.  They 
had  learned  one  great  lesson:  that  to  make  concessions  to 
foreign  powers  never  got  them  out  of  trouble,  but  only 
aggravated  it.  If  the  Peking  officials  in  1898  had  turned 
a  deaf  ear  to  the  German  demands,  despite  threats  of  naval 
demonstrations,  the  Germans  could  never  have  secured  the 
things  which  the  Chinese  actually  gave  them.  The  Chinese 
people  now  said:  "Never  again!'* 

I  was  informed  on  the  28th  of  May  that  nearly  all  the 
officials  in  Peking  were  agreed  that  the  Treaty  should  be 
signed.  Knowledge  of  their  readiness  to  capitulate  brought 
the  national  movement  of  the  Chinese  people  to  its  height 
almost  immediately,  in  opposition  to  the  reactionary  militar- 
ist control.  By  the  ist  of  July,  a  gentleman  from  the  im- 
mediate entourage  of  the  President,  who  often  came  to  see 
me  on  the  latter's  behalf,  told  me  that  the  President  had 
instructed  the  delegates  at  Paris  not  to  sign  the  Treaty. 
They  did  not  sign  it  then,  and  steadfastly  resisted  all  efforts 
to  make  them  sign  it  later. 

When  the  student  troubles  were  at  their  height,  on  the 
2nd  of  June  I  was  at  the  Legation  late  one  evening  to  answer 
some  cablegrams.  I  was  interrupted  by  an  American 
woman  teacher  who  with  five  Chinese  schoolgirls  came  to 
my  office  in  a  state  of  great  excitement.    The  girls  had  stood 

375 


376     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

with  a  crowd  for  forty-eight  hours  asking  admission  to  the 
President's  palace  to  present  their  grievance.  They  had 
endured  these  hardships  as  bravely  as  any  of  the  young  men, 
but  they  were  now  alarmed  because  two  of  the  student 
leaders  had  been  seized  and  taken  inside  the  palace.  The 
girls  feared  their  execution,  and  begged  me  to  intercede. 
As  I  could  not  quiet  their  apprehensions,  I  finally  said  I 
would  direct  that  an  inquiry  be  made  at  the  palace.  By 
telephone  I  learned  that  the  students  were  being  detained 
because  they  had  been  too  forward  in  their  demonstrations, 
but  that  nothing  untoward  would  happen  to  them. 
The  girls,  happy  and  thankful  at  this  reassurance,  went 
home. 

No  one  could  fail  to  sympathize  with  the  aims  and  ideals  of 
the  students,  who  were  striving  for  national  freedom  and 
regeneration.  I,  too,  felt  a  strong  sympathy,  though  I, 
of  course,  abstained  from  all  direct  contact  with  the 
movement,  as  it  was  a  purely  Chinese  matter.  Never- 
'^  theless,  the  Japanese  papers  reported  quite  in  detail 
how  I  had  organized  the  student  movement,  and  how 
I  had  spent  $2,000,000  in  getting  it  under  way.  As 
everybody  knew  how  spontaneous  and  irrepressible  the 
movement  of  the  students  was,  these  items  excited  only 
amusement. 

Pessimism  reigned  among  liberal-minded  people  in  early 
June.  They  feared  that  followers  of  General  Tuan  would 
insist  upon  putting  him  back  into  the  Premiership,  in  which 
case  there  would  be  no  escape  from  another  revolution  to 
oppose  him,  with  the  general  demoralization  and  waste  of 
national  resources  which  would  attend  it.  The  second 
aide  memoire  of  the  associated  representatives  was  presented 
to  the  President  by  Sir  John  Jordan  on  the  5th  of  June;  it 
conveyed  the  hope  that  China's  internal  difficulties  might 
now  come  to  an  end,  that  the  peace  conference  at  Shanghai 
might  be  resumed  and  successfully  concluded  without  delay, 


TAKING  LEAVE  OF  PEKING  377 

and  it  stated  that  meanwhile  military  measures  should  not  be 
resumed.  The  friendly  advice  encouraged  the  liberal  ele- 
ments, particularly  the  express  desire  that  there  should  be  no 
further  fighting.  It  was  felt  that  the  President's  hands  were 
strengthened  for  peace. 

Dr.  Chiang  Monlin,  Acting  Chancellor  of  Peking  Uni- 
versity in  the  absence  of  Dr.  Tsai  Yuan-pei,  went  to 
Shanghai  because  the  militarist  faction  wished  to  hold  him 
responsible  for  the  acts  of  the  students.  He  was,  indeed, 
one  of  their  chief  counsellors,  but  he  counselled  wisdom  and 
moderation.  He  told  me  that  the  leaders  were  conscious 
of  much  progress  in  organizing  public  opinion,  but  that  at 
least  ten  years  of  further  work  and  experience  would  be 
necessary  before  there  could  be  any  approach  to  a  public 
opinion  consciously  and  unceasingly  active  in  support, 
or  in  proper  restraint,  of  the  Government.  "All  we  ask," 
Doctor  Chiang  said,  "is  ten  years'  time — freedom  from 
outside  interference — ^then  the  New  China  will  be  organ- 
ized." 

I  visited  General  Tuan,  finding  him  calm  but  stubborn 
as  usual.  I  asked  him  whether,  if  the  students  should  call 
on  him,  he  would  go  out  to  speak  to  them.  *'I  would 
certainly  do  that,"  he  replied;  "I  am  in  sympathy  with  them, 
but  I  feel  that  they  are  often  misled  by  people  whose  motives 
are  not  disinterested."  I  told  him  that  I  believed  the  students 
would  gladly  follow  him  and  make  him  their  leader  if 
they  could  be  assured  that  he  would  not  be  controlled 
by  counsellors  who  had  not  the  true  welfare  of  China  at 
heart. 

This  movement  of  the  Chinese  people  impressed  me  the 
more  vividly  in  the  light  of  a  letter  from  R.  F.  Johnston  on 
July  3rd  which  led  me  to  hark  back  to  the  days  of  the  old  Em- 
pire. Mr.  Johnston  was  a  tutor  of  the  young  Emperor, 
and  he  inclosed  a  translation  of  a  Chinese  poem  which  the 
Emperor  had  written  out  for  me.     It  bore  the  Imperial  seals, 


378      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

and  was  dated:  "Eleventh  year  of  Hsuan  Tung,  sixth  month, 
fifth  day."     Here  is  the  first  verse: 

The  red  bows  unbent, 
Were  received  and  deposited. 
I  have  here  an  admirable  guest, 
'         And  with  all  my  heart  I  bestow  one  on  him. 

The  bells  and  drums  have  been  arranged  in  order, 
And  all  the  morning  will  I  feast  him. 

Shortly  after,  in  a  talk  I  had  with  Mr.  Johnston,  he  told 
me  that  the  little  Emperor  had  himself  conceived  the  idea  of 
writing  something  for  me.  Johnston  had  suggested  a  cer- 
tain poem  but  it  did  not  satisfy  his  pupil,  who  finally  made 
his  own  selection.  He  said  to  his  tutor:  "I  want  to  imagine 
that  the  American  minister  is  coming  to  the  palace  as  my 
guest.*' 

The  young  Emperor,  Mr.  Johnston  said,  was  interested  in 
everything  that  went  on  in  the  political  and  social  life  of 
the  capital,  and  read  the  papers  every  day.  I  attributed  his 
interest  in  my  doings  to  the  fact  that  the  Emperor  shared  the 
love  for  America  that  is  general  in  China;  but,  also,  I  think 
the  repeated  likelihood  of  being  taken  to  the  American 
Legation  for  refuge  and  shelter  had  impressed  itself  very 
strongly  on  his  youthful  mind,  so  that  it  seemed  to  him  a 
haven  of  escape  from  all  terror  and  danger. 

Reports  came  at  the  end  of  July  that  President  Wilson  was 
defending  the  Shantung  settlement,  by  stating  that  it  con- 
ferred on  Japan  no  political  rights  but  only  economic  privi- 
leges. Had  Mr.  Wilson  given  attention  to  the  details  of 
the  question,  as  reported  over  and  over  again  in  telegrams 
and  dispatches  from  the  Legation  and  consulates  in  China,  he 
could  not  have  harboured  such  a  misunderstanding.  In  this 
instance  the  President  based  his  action  rather  on  vague 
assurances  given  by  Japan,  the  actual  bearing  of  which  he  did 
not  know.    The  term  "economic  privileges"  can  hardly 


TAKING  LEAVE  OF  PEKING  379 

apply  to  such  matters  as  control  of  the  port  of  Tsingtao  and 
the  Shantung  Railway,  and  to  a  general  commercial  prefer- 
ence in  Shantung  Province;  yet  these  were  plainly  what 
Japan  wished  to  retain.  Her  pledge  **to  return  Shantung 
Peninsula  with  full  sovereignty"  sounded  satisfactory,  but 
it  was  never  defined  to  cover  more  than  the  150  square  miles 
of  agricultural  and  mountain  land  which  the  Germans  had 
held  as  a  leasehold,  exclusive  of  Tsingtao  port.  That  im- 
portant harbour  the  Japanese  intended  to  retain,  as  well  as 
the  terminals,  railway,  and  mines. 

The  refusal  of  the  Chinese  to  sign  the  Paris  Treaty  afforded 
an  opportunity  for  saving  Shantung  to  China.  But  if  the 
German  rights  were  to  be  confirmed  to  Japan  under  the  term 
of  "economic  privileges,"  we  should  soon  find  that  these 
economic  privileges  meant  an  end  of  independent  American 
enterprise  in  Shantung  Province.  Japan  had  used  such 
"economic  privileges"  in  Manchuria.  We  were  amply 
warned  what  to  expect  from  an  extension  of  that  policy  to 
other  parts  of  China. 

President  Wilson  stated  later  that  the  League  would  pre- 
vent Japan  from  assuming  full  sovereignty  over  Shantung. 
Here  he  again  misunderstood.  Japan  had  no  idea  of  asking 
for  sovereignty  over  Shantung;  she  had  absolutely  no  right 
to  it,  and  did  not  need  it  for  carrying  out  her  plans,  so  long 
as  she  could  retain  the  politico-economic  rights  awarded  at 
Paris, 

I  reiterated  these  statements  in  my  telegrams  to  Wash- 
ington. I  explained  again  that  ownership  by  a  foreign  gov- 
ernment of  port  facilities  and  of  a  railway  leading  into  the 
interior  of  China,  together  with  exclusive  commercial  pref- 
erences, are  economic  rights  so  fortified  politically  that  they 
constitute  political  control — as  Manchuria  shows — ^without 
the  name.  In  fact,  they  could  be  safely  accompanied  with 
most  profuse  protestations  to  respect  Chinese  sovereignty. 

The  question  of  political  sovereignty  was  beside  the  mark. 


38o      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

It  had  been  broached,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  to  make  the 
world  beheve  that  something  was  being  returned.  "Re- 
turning Shantung  Peninsula  with  full  sovereignty"  was  a 
big  phrase  and  it  had  an  imposing  sound.  But  the  sover- 
eignty of  Shantung  was  not  involved,  it  had  never  been  either 
German  or  Japanese:  it  had  always  been  Chinese.  The  150 
square  miles  of  unimportant  land  outside  the  port  of  Tsing- 
tao  might  be  "returned  with  full  sovereignty,"  but  nobody 
cared  for  that.  To  talk  of  sovereignty  merely  obscured 
the  issue. 

Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen  was  just  then  busying  himself  with  the 
task  of  drawing  up  projects  for  the  further  economic  develop- 
ment of  China  with  international  participation,  and  I  corre- 
sponded with  him.  In  one  of  my  letters  I  considered  how 
rapid  and  sweeping  the  industrial  transformation  of  China 
should  be.     I  wrote: 

I  believe  that  we  should  at  all  times  keep  in  mind  the  fact  that  we  are 
not  dealing  with  a  new  country,  but  with  one  in  which  social  arrangements 
are  exceedingly  intricate  and  in  which  a  long-tested  system  of  agricultural 
and  industrial  organization  exists.  It  is  to  my  mind  most  important  that 
the  transition  to  new  methods  of  industry  and  labour  should  not  be  sudden 
but  that  the  old  values  should  be  gradually  transmuted.  It  is  highly  im- 
portant that  artistic  ability,  such  as  exists,  for  instance,  in  silk  and  porce- 
lain manufacture,  should  be  maintained  and  protected,  and  not  superseded 
by  cheaper  processes.  The  one  factor  in  modem  organization  which  the 
Chinese  must  learn  to  understand  better  is  the  corporation,  and  the  fidu- 
ciary relationship  which  the  officers  of  the  corporation  ought  to  occupy 
with  respect  to  the  stockholders.  If  the  Chinese  cannot  learn  to  use  the 
corporation  properly,  the  organization  of  the  national  credit  cannot  be 
effected.  Here,  too,  it  is  necessary  that  the  principle  of  personal  honesty 
which  was  fostered  under  the  old  system  should  not  be  lost,  but  transferred 
to  the  new  methods  of  doing  business.  So,  at  every  point  where  we  are 
planning  for  a  better  and  more  efficient  organization,  it  seems  necessary  to 
hold  on  to  the  values  created  in  the  past,  and  not  to  disturb  the  balance  of 
Chinese  society  by  too  sudden  changes. 

Among  his  suggestions  for  constructive  works,  Dr.  Sun 
Yat-sen  had  spoken  of  a  northern  port,  somewhere  on  the 


TAKING  LEAVE  OF  PEKING  381 

coast  of  Chihli  Province,  which  should  have  water  deep 
enough  to  admit  large  ocean-going  ships.  The  port  of 
Tientsin  is  not  adequate:  it  is  far  up  river,  and  lacks  satis- 
factory anchorage  where  the  river  empties  into  the  sea. 
Chinwangtao  is  a  far  better  port,  but  so  exposed  that  enor- 
mous expenditure  would  be  needed  to  improve  it;  and  its 
capacity,  even  then,  would  be  too  small.  I  asked  Mr.  Paul 
P.  Whitham,  special  commissioner  of  the  Department  of 
Commerce,  to  go  to  the  Chihli  coast  to  see  whether  about 
half  way  between  Tientsin  and  Chinwangtao  a  satisfactory 
port  site  might  be  found.  He  succeeded  in  finding  a  site 
where,  with  comparatively  moderate  expense,  a  deep-sea  port 
could  be  built.  It  was  easy  to  see  the  transformation  in 
north  China  commerce  that  this  would  bring  about.  Here 
would  be  an  outlet  for  a  rich  and  extensive  hinterland, 
including  the  Province  of  Chihli  and  all  the  region  to  the 
north  and  northwest  of  it,  particularly  inner  Mongolia  and 
western  Manchuria.  I  talked  the  matter  over  with  the 
civil  governor  and  other  provincial  leaders  of  Chihli  Prov- 
ince, also  with  the  representatives  of  Governor  Li  Hsun  of 
Nanking,  besides  certain  members  of  the  Central  Govern- 
ment. They  greatly  favoured  the  project,  and  before  many 
weeks  preliminary  surveys  were  made.  It  was  to  be  known 
as  the  Great  Northern  Port. 

I  visited  Sir  John  Jordan  on  August  14th  telling  him  of  my 
resignation,  at  which  he  expressed  regret;  but  he  admitted 
that  he  could  understand  why  I  wished  to  return  to  the 
United  States.  He,  too,  wished  to  be  relieved  of  his  duties 
as  soon  as  possible.  I  had  on  that  day  a  very  full  talk 
about  Shantung  with  Mr.  Yoshizawa,  Japanese  Charge, 
in  which  we  considered  ways  which  might  render  the 
Shantung  arrangement  more  satisfactory,  especially  if 
Tsingtao  should  be  made  into  a  genuine  international 
settlement.  But  I  emphasized  the  importance  of  the  return 
of  the  railway. 


382      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

The  negotiations  for  the  new  Consortium  had  been  going 
on  for  some  time.  The  Japanese  proposed  that  the  Con- 
sortium should  not  apply  to  Manchuria  and  eastern  Mon- 
golia. The  Japanese-controlled  press  had  attacked  the  first 
proposal  of  this  Consortium,  as  Japan  purposed  during  the 
war  to  achieve  complete  leadership  of  foreign  finance  in  China. 
If  the  United  States  would  join  the  old  Consortium,  Japan 
would  have  been  pleased,  for  there  she  led.  But  ordinarily 
the  financial  power  of  Japan  is  of  distinctly  secondary  impor- 
tance, and  the  abnormal  conditions  of  the  war  could  not  last. 
Now  Japan  approved  of  the  new  Consortium  in  principle, 
but  continued  to  procrastinate  when  a  decision  on  details 
was  required. 

My  resignation  was  accepted  in  a  cablegram  received  on 
the  1 8th  of  August,  the  President  expressing  formally  his 
regret  that  I  should  find  it  necessary  to  insist  upon  relinquish- 
\  ing  my  post.  Even  now,  when  I  knew  how  decidedly  the 
President  had  misjudged  the  Chinese  situation,  notwithstand- 
ing my  insistent  and  detailed  warnings,  I  had  no  desire  to 
advertise  differences  in  policy.  The  Japanese  press,  I  knew, 
would  consider  my  resignation  due  to  the  defeat  of  my 
"policy"  to  have  America  maintain  her  honourable  and  trusted 
position  in  China.  I  did  not  wish  to  favour  this  sort  of  inter- 
pretation by  a  controversy  with  the  administration. 

The  Chinese  understood  the  situation  quite  completely. 
When  I  told  the  President,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
the  Premier,  and  non-o£fical  Chinese  friends,  they  seemed 
discouraged  at  the  prospect  of  my  leaving  China  at  this 
juncture.  I  had  the  good  fortune  to  make  many  friendships 
in  China  with  men  whose  loyalty  and  truthfulness  could  be 
relied  upon.  Though  seemingly  distressed  at  the  idea  of  my 
going,  they  knew  I  only  hoped  it  might  enable  the  work  of 
developing  close  relations  between  the  two  countries  to  con- 
tinue more  effectively.  I  wished  to  bring  about  positive 
practical  action.    The  spirit  of  the  American  policies  and 


TAKING  LEAVE  OF  PEKING  383 

declarations  was  admirable,  but  not  enough  individual 
and  specific  American  activity  in  China  accompanied 
them. 

Mr.  Fu,  Acting  Minister  of  Education,  and  a  number  of  his 
associates  visited  me  on  the  25th  of  August^  to  consider  ar- 
rangements for  exchange  professorships  in  American  and 
Chinese  universities.  I  had  always  favoured  bringing  young 
Chinese  scholars  into  lectureships  in  American  universities, 
to  make  accessible  to  the  American  public  the  treasures  of 
Chinese  literature,  philosophy,  and  art.  President  Yuan 
Shih-kai  had  supported  this  idea,  and,  but  for  the  unfortunate 
monarchical  movement,  would  have  done  much  to  promote 
intellectual  contact  between  the  United  States  and  China. 
His  successors  shared  his  sentiments,  and  only  the  turmoil  in 
Peking's  political  life  prevented  their  working  out  plans  in 
detail. 

General  Hsu  Shu-cheng  called  on  me  from  time  to  time  and 
told  me  about  his  Mongolian  venture.  When  the  War 
Participation  Bureau  became  plainly  obsolete  its  name  was 
changed  to  "Northwest  Frontier  Defence  Bureau."  Every- 
body knew  against  whom  this  Bureau  was  to  "defend" 
China,  though  there  was  talk  about  Bolshevik  activity  in 
Mongolia,  also  of  the  designs  of  General  SemenofF  to  create 
a  Pan-MongoHan  state.  General  Hsu  unfolded  in  his  talks 
with  me  very  large  schemes  for  developing  Mongolia,  includ- 
ing a  colonial  bank,  the  building  of  highways  for  motor 
transport,  the  digging  of  artesian  wells,  and  the  establishment 
of  model  farms.  He  would,  he  said,  also  promote  the  com- 
pletion of  the  railway  from  Kalgan  to  Urga,  and  would  even 
extend  it  to  Chinese  Turkestan.  Report  had  it  that  the  Japa- 
nese had  promised  General  Hsu  an  advance  of  $50,ooo,cxx) 
for  his  enterprises.  But  he  told  me  that  he  would  carry 
them  out  with  capital  entirely  subscribed  in  China.  The 
President  and  other  Peking  leaders,  it  was  said,  apprehensive 
of  the  direction  the  overflowing  energies  of  General  Hsu 


384     AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

might  take  next,  bethought  themselves  of  the  undeveloped 
reaches  of  Mongolia.  There  would  be  the  field  ample  enough 
for  his  ebullient  nature.  All  this  time  the  Japanese  were 
carefully  watching  any  factor  that  might  become  active  in 
Mongolia,  including  General  SemenofF,  General  Chang  Tso- 
lin,  the  Viceroy  of  Manchuria,  and  General  Hsu  Shu-cheng. 
Whatever  might  happen  there,  they  undoubtedly  intended 
that  it  should  fit  in  with  their  policy  of  imposing  their  influ- 
ence upon  that  dependency. 

Mrs.  Reinsch  and  my  family  had  sailed  from  Chinwangtao 
on  the  1 2th  of  June  for  Honolulu,  where  they  were  to  spend 
the  summer.  As  my  resignation  had  already  gone  forward, 
it  was  a  farewell  to  Peking  for  Mrs.  Reinsch,  who  was  reluc- 
tant to  leave  the  city  which  she  had  enjoyed  so  much.  A 
series  of  farewell  luncheons,  dinners,  and  receptions  began 
for  me  in  August  which,  with  the  heavy  work  of  winding  up 
the  business  of  my  office,  filled  the  remaining  weeks  with 
activity  every  day  from  sunrise  until  after  midnight.  When 
President  Hsu  Shih-chang  entertained  me  for  the  last  time, 
he  said :  "The  Chinese  look  to  you  to  be  a  friend  and  guide  to 
them,  and  we  hope  your  action  and  influence  may  continue 
for  many  decades."  On  the  next  day  he  invited  me,  through 
Mr.  Chow  Tsu-chi,  to  act  as  counsellor  to  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, with  residence  in  America. 

I  left  Peking  on  the  evening  of  September  13th.  All  my 
colleagues  with  members  of  their  staff's,  the  high  Chinese 
officials,  and  a  throng  of  other  people,  had  gathered  at  the 
station  to  say  **  good-bye."  Drawn  up  on  the  platform  were 
companies  of  the  American  marines,  the  Indian  troops  of  the 
British  Legation  Guard,  and  Chinese  troops.  With  the 
Acting  Premier,  Mr.  Kung  Shin-chan,  I  inspected  them, 
accepted  their  salute,  and  made  a  few  farewell  remarks  to 
the  faithful  marines.  As  the  American  band  played  "Auld 
Lang  Syne,"  the  train  moved  out  of  the  station,  and  the 
thousands  of  faces  of  those  who  had  come  to  see  me  off 


TAKING  LEAVE  OF  PEKING  385 

became  blurred  in  the  distance,  leaving  impressed  on  my 
mind  a  composite  face,  friendly,  eager,  urging  to  endeavour. 

My  friend.  Chow  Tsu-chi,  accompanied  me  as  far  as  Tient- 
sin where  I  parted  with  him.  It  had,  all  in  all,  been  a  truly 
heart-warming  leave-taking.  I  felt  that  the  spontaneous 
expressions  of  deep  confidence  both  on  the  part  of  my  country- 
men and  of  the  Chinese  would  remain  with  me  as  the  best 
reward  for  any  exertions  and  efforts  I  had  made. 

Dr.  Charles  D.  Tenney,  American  Charge  d'Affaires  after 
my  departure,  wrote  the  following  report  to  the  Secretary  of 
State  concerning  the  farewell  hospitalities : 

I  have  the  honour  to  state  that  the  departure  from  Peking  of  the  Honour- 
able Paul  S.  Relnsch,  American  Minister  to  China,  whose  resignation  has 
been  accepted  by  the  President,  was  made  the  occasion  of  gratifying  mani- 
festations of  cordiality  toward  the  United  States  and  of  the  highest  popular 
and  ofl&cial  esteem  for  the  retiring  Minister. 

Mr.  Reinsch  was  naturally  the  guest  of  honour  at  numerous  dinners 
and  receptions  in  the  period  just  preceding  his  departure,  at  which  the 
Chinese  present  expressed  the  deepest  appreciation  of  his  diversified  activi- 
ties during  the  six  years  of  his  tenure  of  oflSce.  Published  references  to 
Mr.  Reinsch's  career  as  American  Minister,  also,  refer  to  his  many-sided 
interest  in  and  efforts  to  promote  the  joint  commercial,  industrial,  and  edu- 
cational interests  of  China  and  the  United  States,  in  addition  to  the  usual 
duty  of  fostering  international  unity  between  the  two  nations.  It  was 
made  strikingly  evident  that  the  Government  and  people  of  this  Republic 
have  come  earnestly  to  desire  and  expect  a  policy  of  vigorous  advancement 
of  these  interests  by  the  United  States  in  China.  The  feeling  of  all  was 
epitomized  by  President  Hsu  Shih-chang,  who,  at  Mr.  Reinsch's  farewell 
interview,  asserted  his  profound  belief  that  the  latter's  activities  as  Minister 
had  advanced  and  strengthened  in  a  very  real  way  all  those  economic  and 
social  relations  that  to-day  bind  the  governments  and  peoples  of  China 
and  the  United  States  in  close  friendship,  at  the  same  time  expressing  his 
hope  that  on  his  return  to  the  United  States  Mr.  Reinsch  would  abate  none 
of  his  efforts  toward  these  ends,  but  that  in  his  altered  capacity  he  would 
continue  to  work  in  the  interests  of  China. 

Mr.  Reinsch  left  Peking  on  the  evening  of  the  thirteenth  instant  and  the 
scene  at  the  railway  station  was  of  an  unusual  and  gratifying  description 
Although  it  is  not  customary  for  guards  of  honour  to  be  tendered  by  other 


386      AN  AMERICAN  DIPLOMAT  IN  CHINA 

legations  on  the  departure  of  ministers,  on  this  occasion  there  was  present 
a  detachment  from  the  British  Legation  Guard,  and  there  were  also  present 
detachments  from  the  American  Legation  Guard,  the  Peking  poHce  force 
and  the  Peking  gendarmerie,  with  military  music.  The  Acting  Premier 
came  in  person  to  the  station  to  bid  farewell  to  Mr.  Reinsch  and  there  were 
present  a  thousand  persons,  including  Chinese  officials,  foreign  diplomats, 
representatives  of  all  varieties  of  institutions  and  societies,  and  personal 
friends  of  all  nationalities. 

I  had  turned  over  arrangements  for  my  trip  through  Japan 
to  Mr.  Willing  Spencer,  the  First  Secretary,  who  had  con- 
sulted with  Mr.  Tokugawa,  of  the  Japanese  Legation.  Their 
main  difficulty  had  been  the  fact  that  Korea  was  under 
quarantine  because  of  the  cholera.  An  amusing  experience 
ensued.  In  order  to  avoid  any  risk  of  delay  I  agreed  to  be 
inoculated;  this  was  done  deferentially  by  a  little  physician 
who  came  from  the  Japanese  Legation.  At  Shimonoseki  our 
steamer  arrived  in  the  early  morning,  and  was  held  in  quaran- 
tine. The  inspecting  officers  who  boarded  said  I  should  be 
permitted  to  land  almost  immediately.  However,  they  left 
and  said  a  launch  would  be  sent  for  me  before  noon.  As 
the  evening  train  would  be  the  last  that  could  make  my  con- 
nection with  the  steamer  at  Yokohama,  I  waited  somewhat 
nervously  for  the  launch.  It  was  three  o'clock  before  the 
officers  returned,  saying  that  my  baggage  could  now  be  taken 
ashore;  soon  they  disappeared  with  the  baggage,  but  left  me 
still  on  the  boat.  I  wired  the  embassy  at  Tokyo,  telling  them 
of  my  predicament.  The  train  was  to  leave  at  half-past 
seven,  and  no  launch  had  appeared  at  six. 

Suddenly  out  of  the  evening  mist  covering  the  bay  a  little 
launch  emerged,  and  an  official  I  had  not  seen  before  boarded 
and  asked  me  to  accompany  him.  Descending  to  the  launch 
with  my  two  servants,  I  was  surprised  to  notice  that  it  did 
not  head  toward  Shimonoseki,  but  took  the  opposite  direc- 
tion. I  remonstrated,  but  the  officer,  smiling  reassuringly, 
said :  **It  will  be  all  right."    Then  the  two  inspecting  officers 


TAKING  LEAVE  OF  PEKING  387 

appeared  from  below;  smiling  and  bowing  they  told  me  we 
were  going  to  the  Isolation  Hospital! 

And  to  the  Isolation  Hospital  we  went.  There  in  the  cen- 
tral reception  room  I  was  introduced  to  the  chief,  who,  after 
a  brief  exchange  of  civilities,  announced,  "Now,  everything 
is  all  right." 

We  took  the  launch,  and  arrived  at  Shimonoseki  with  still 
a  quarter  of  an  hour  to  spare  before  the  train  departed, 
whereon  a  special  compartment  had  been  reserved  for  me. 
Everything  was  now  clear.  The  Japanese  passengers  on  the 
steamer  were  as  little  pleased  at  being  detained  there  as  I 
was.  Had  a  foreigner,  even  a  foreign  minister,  been  taken 
off  the  ship  to  Shimonoseki,  a  small  riot  might  be  looked  for. 
So  the  word  was  passed  around  that  1  was  being  taken  to 
the  Isolation  Hospital,  where  nobody  had  any  particular 
wish  to  go.  I  could  not  but  admire  the  resourcefulness  of 
these  little  officials,  and  to  feel  thankful  to  them  for  all  the 
trouble  they  took  to  solve  this  knotty  problem  without  doing 
violence  to  any  of  their  quarantine  regulations. 

I  had  only  one  day  in  Tokyo.  A  luncheon  had  been 
arranged  for  me  at  the  house  of  Baron  Okura,  where  I 
went  with  Ambassador  Morris  and  met  several  Japanese 
gentlemen,  among  them  Mr.  Hanihara,  just  made  Vice- 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  Baron  Shidehara,  the  new 
Ambassador  to  the  United  States.  We  took  lunch  on  an 
open  veranda,  overlooking  delightful  gardens,  and  after  an 
animated  conversation  I  took  my  leave  and  hurried  to  Yoko- 
hama, with  the  same  agreeable  impression  of  Japanese  hos- 
pitality that  I  had  received  six  years  before,  on  my  first 
arrival  in  the  Far  East. 


THE   END 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Abbott,  John  J.,  256,  260 

Adams,  Dr.  Henry  C,  30,  32,  35,  68, 

Administrative  Conference,  46 

Advice  from  America,  269 

Advisers,  Foreign,  47,  68 

Aglen,  Sir  Francis,  233 

Aide  memoire  of  December  2,  1918,  326 

Alston,  Mr.,  151,  233 

American  activity,  75 

American  aims  in  China,  65 

American  Chamber  of  Commerce,  2CO 

American  cooperation,  72,  73 

American  enterprise  in  China,  64,  65, 

82,  88,  91,  102,  106,  128,  2CXD,  207, 

210,  214,  226 
American    International    Corporation, 

208,  217,  219,  225 
American  Legation,  19 
American  Marines,  17,  18 
American  minister,  143,   309,  319,  358, 

378;  385 
American  Red  Cross,  14,  80,  81,  151, 

163,  218 
American  University  Club,  200 
American-French  cooperation,  223 
Ancestor  worship,  34 
Anderson,  Meyer  &  Co.,  208 
Anderson,  Roy  S.,  12,  85,  109,  213,  244, 

264 
Anfu  Gub,  317 

Anglo-American  Association,  156,  374 
Anglo-American  friendship,  155 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  135 
Anhui  Party,  188 
Anti-foreign  propaganda,  141 
Aoki,  General,  267,  351 
Ariga,  Professor,  154 
Armistice,  317 
Arms,  Importation  of,  34a 
Army,  53,  189 

Arnold,  Julean,  103,  185,  329 
Arsenals,  297 
Associated  Press,  132 
Authority,  177 
Automobiles,  108,  117 


Backhouse,  Edward,  52 

Bain,  Dr.  F.,  224 

Baker,  J.  E.,  329 

Bandits,  190,  347 

Bank  of  China,  90,  91,  97,  202 

Bank  of  Communications,  190,  299,  372 

Banking,  102 

Bashford,  Bishop,  50 

Battle  of  Peking,  284 

Beelaerts,  van  Blokland,  M.,  52 

Belin,  F.  L.,  272,  277,  283 

Bemis,  E.  W.,  223 

Bethlehem  Steel  Corporation,  67,  82, 

84,  99,  140 
Bevan,  Professor,  154 
Billings,  Dr.  Frank,  151 
"Bite  to  death,"  no 
Blood  of  enemies,  IC39 
Blythe,  Sam  L.,  245,  255 
Boardman,  Miss,  93 
Bolshevism,  351 
Botanical  Gardens,  29 
Bowley,  Major,  109,  362 
Boxer  indemnity  payments,  297 
Bredon,  Sir  Robert,  154 
Brigands,  54,  347 
British  Legation,  114 
British  minister,  325,  371 
British-American    Tobacco    Company, 

66,  67,  75,  89 
Bryan,  Secretary,  84,  140,  269,  270 
Business  representatives,  215 
Buttrick,  Dr.,  150 

Calhoun,  W.  J.,  161 

Carey,  W.  F.,  207,  208,  209,  213 

Central  Government,  54,  55,  $6,  292, 

293,  321 
Chadbourne,  Mrs.,  235 
Chang  Chien,  29,  70,  71,  80,  81 
Chang  Chin-yao,  351 
Chang  Chung-hsiang,  113,  359 
Chang  Hsun,  General,  11,  184,  262,  265, 

267,  270,  272,  274,  283 
Chang  Hu,  172 
Chang  Tso-lin,  262,  384 


391 


392 


INDEX 


Chen  Chin-tao,  Dr.,  icx>,  201,  202,  222, 

232,  247,  251,  257,  260,  264 
Chen,  Eugene,  247 
Chen  Huan-chang,  Dr.,  23 
Chen  Lu,  340 
Chen  Pan-pmg,  213 
Chiang,  Dr.  Monlin,  377 
Chien  Neng-hsun,  227,  325 
Chienmen,  17 

Chin  Pu  Tang,  96,  103,  288,  340 
Chin  Yun-peng,  General,  266,  301 
China  Medical  Board,  150,  363 
China  Press,  62 

Chinchow-Aigun  Railway,  67,  97 
Chinda,  Ambassador,  140 
Chinese  art,  29,  157,  228 
Chinese  dinners,  32,  33,  152 
Chinese  ethics,  34 
Chinese  life,  22,  49 
Chinese  handwriting,  29 
Chinese  industry,  373 
Chinese  iron  industry,  224,  293 
Chinese  language,  51 
Chinese  manners,  71 
Chinese  materia  medica,  ijl 
Chinese  musicians,  196 
Chinese  navy,  74 
Chinese  politics,  13,  42,  53 
Chinese   Social   and    Political   Science 

Association,  153,  235 
Chinese  traditions,  177 
Chinese  women,  27,  28 
Chino-American  Bank,  227,  363 
Chino-American  steamship  line,  164. 
Chino-Japanese  entente,  352 
Chinwangtao,  381 
Chou  Hsueh-hsi,  227 
Chow  Tsu-chi,  95,  96,   105,   118,   152, 

175,   176,   179,   183,   184,    190,   192, 

201,  207,  213,  322,  330,  385 
Chu  Chi-chien,  24,  27,  182,  189,  201, 

215 
Chu  Jui,  167,  261 
Chu  Ying-kuang,  167,  314 
Chuan  Liang,  225 
Chuchow  Chinchow  Railway,  221 
Chufu,  35,  37,  40,  41 
Chung  Hua  Hsm  Pao,  311 
Claims,  113,  166 
Coal  Hill,  19 

Communications,  Ministry  of,  104 
Confucian  family,  38 
Confucian  Society,  26,  ill 
Confucianism,  23,  26,  35,  iii 
Consortium,  62,  63,  69,  70,  80,  97, 

216,  239,  287,  298,  327,  355,  382 
Constitution,  199 


Continental  &  Commercial  Bank  loan, 

222,  236,  238,  256 
Coolidge,  Charles  A.,  320 
Corruption,  57,  291 
Crane,  Charles  R.,  40 
Currency  loan,  97 
Currency  loan  agreement,  319,  346 
Currency  reform  loan,  327 
Customs,  55,  68,  69 

Dane,  Sir  Richard,  68 

Davis,  Arthur  P.,  82 

Decoration  Day,  362 

Deering,  Mrs.,  362 

Democratic  party,  43,  45,  86,  96,  203 

Den  by,  Charles,  211 

Denials,  diplomatic,  132,  135 

Dennis,  Dr.  W.  C,  329 

Department  of  State,  loi,  102,  148,  171, 

176,  258,  297,  307,  313,  354 
Diplomacy  and  commerce,  65 
Diplomatic  corps  in  Peking,  1 14 
Diplomatic  tactics,  116 
Disorganization,  56 
Donald,  W.  H.,  48, 78,  244, 255, 3 12 
Dragon  flags,  275 

Economic  development,  380 

Eliot,  President,  68 

Emerson,  Miss,  185 

Emperor,  283,  377 

Empress  Dowager,  15,  18,  29,  33,  108 

Equal  opportunity,  icx) 

Extra-tcrritoriality,  114 

Famine,  50,  162 

Fan  Yuen-lin,  151 

Farewell,  384 

Feng  Kuo-chang,  General,  54,  172,  183, 

184,  236,  237,  255,  258,  262,  292,  314 
Feng  Yu-hsiang,  262 
Ferguson,  Dr.  John  C,  244,  268,  283 
Festivities,  323 
Fifteenth  United  States  Infantry,  14, 

282 
Finance,  89,   105,  214,  296,  317,  326, 

345.  355 
Finch,  John  W.,  224 
Fleisher,  B.  W.,  159 
Flexner,  Dr.  Simon,  150,  151 
Forbidden  City,  18,  19 
Foreign  Office  ball,  27 
Frazar,  E.  W.,  163 
Frazar  &  Company,  67 
French  interests,  222 
French  minister,  302,  325,  344,  353 
Fu  Liang-tso,  294 


INDEX 


393 


Fukien,  84,  99,  100,  133,  139,  140 
Funeral  of  Yuan  Shih-kai,  194 


Galley,  Robert,  118 

Gary,  Judge  Elbert  H.,  230 

Gattreli,  Dr.,  52 

Gest,  G.  M.,  90,  loi,  105 

Gilbert,  Mrs.,  12 

Gold-note  scheme,  318 

Goodnow,  Dr.  F.  J.,  30,  31,  32,"47,  68, 

IS4.  172 
Grand  Canal,  81,  170,  207,  213,  217,  331 
Grant,  Ulysses  S.,  Jr.,  185 
Great  northern  port,  381 
Group  V  demands,  134,  135,  138,  139, 

iii2,  143,  14s,  ii7 
Guthrie,  Ambassador,  234 

Han  Yeh  Ping  Co.,  87,  224 
Hanihara,  Mr.,  387 
Hankow-Canton  line,  97,  294,  297 
Harrison,  Governor-General,  164 
Hayashi,    Baron,   233,   237,   250,   307, 

327,  339.  346 
Herrera  de  Huerta,  M.,  233 
Haxthausen,  Von,  Baron,  88 
Hicks  claim,  166 
Hilfsaktion,  163 
Hintze,  Admiral  von,  167 
Hioki,  Mr.  Eki,  126,  129,  136,  137,  142, 

189,  233 
Ho,  J.  C,  295 

Holcombe,  Lieut.-Colonel,  362 
Holy  Duke,  37,  38,  4°.  41.  59 
Honorary  LL.D.,  157 
Hornbcck,  Dr.  Stanley  K.,  12,  61 
House,  Colonel,  360 
Hsiung  Hsi-ling,  86,  98,  103,  223,  341 
Hsu  Shih-chang,  47,  103,  154,  172,  192, 

266,  273,  279,  281,  317,  319,  325,  344, 

3SI.  38s 
Hsu  Shih-ymg,  201 
Hsu  Shu-cheng,  General,  202,  243,  301, 

302,  383 
Hsu  Sing-loh,  227 

Hsu  Un-yuen,  202,  227,  231,  257,  260 
Hukuang  Railways,  67,  97,  169,  210, 

211,  294,  297 
Hunan,  351 
Hutchins,  Lieut.-Commander,  183,  184, 

362 
Hwai  River  conservancy,  13,  60,  71,  74, 

80,  98,  162,  207 

Immortality,  34 

Imperial  City,  24,  164,  323 

Imperial  Family,  154,  280 


Imperial  movement  of  Yuan  Shih-kai, 

171-.179 
Impenal  Palace,  18,  281,  283 
Imperial  restoration,  1917,  272. 
Industrial  Bank,  72,  227,  263 
Industrial  Bank  of  Japan,  299,  341 
Industrial  loans,  341 
International  Banking  Corporation,  47, 

74,  102,  208 
International  railway  syndicate,  loi 
Iron  deposits,  224 

Japan  Mail,  141 

Japanese  activity,  73 

Japanese  cooperation,  217 

Japanese  diplomats,  83 

Japanese  hegemony,  191 

Japanese  in  Manchuria,  113 

Japanese  in  Shantung,  124,  126 

Japanese  loan,  232 

Japanese  methods,  335 

Japanese  minister,  287,  310,  331,  339, 

344.  346 
fapanese  morphia,  332 
Japanese  opposition  to  Yuan,  178 
Japanese  papers,  269,  331,  352,  365,  382 
Japanese  post  offices,  332 
Jeme  Tien-yew,  Dr.,  210 
Jenks-Conant   Monetary   Commission, 

300 
Jemigan,  T.  R.,  89 
Johnston,  Archibald,  67,  99 
Johnston,  R.  F.,  377 
Jordan,  Sir  John,  51,  77.  IS5.  ^57*  3i3» 

376 
Journal  de  Pekin,  61,  88 
Judson,  President,  32 

Kalgan-Urga  route,  117,  219 

Kang  Yu-wei,  272,  279 

Kiang,  General,  no,  271 

King  Ya-mei,  Dr.,  28,  112 

Knight,  Admiral,  15 1,  351 

Knox,  Secretary,  311 

Kobayashi,  Dr.,  299 

Kolchak,  Admiral,  350 

Konovalov,  M.,  154 

Koo,  Dr.  Wellington,  5,  10,  144,  171, 

256,  268 
Korea,  332 
KoudacheiF,  Prince,  197,  220,  237,  239, 

323 
Krupenski,  M.,  77,  127 
Ku  Chung-hsiu,  204 
Kuangsi,  186,  221 
Kuangtung,  187 
Kung  Shin-chan,  384 


394 


INDEX 


Kuo  Min  Tang,  2, 9, 43,  46,  86,  200,  203,      Morton,  Joy,  257 

Murdock,  Mr.  Victor,  240 


244,  247,  263,  264,  288,  340 
Kyle,  Mr.,  348,  349 

Lama  priests,  194 

Lansing,  Secretary,  268,  346 

Lansing  Ishii  Notes,  307,  337,  366 

Lee  Higginson  loan,  187,  191,  202 

Legal  talent,  208 

Legation  guards,  77 

Legation  Quarter,  19 

Li  Ching-hsi,  264 

Li  Ho-chi,  262 

Li  Shun,  262,  314,  319,  381 

Li  Yuan-hung,  General,  44,  45,  174,  181, 

193,    198,   23s,   237,  239,   242,   258, 

265,  273,  276 
Liang  Chi-chao,  32,  33,  174,  275,  288, 

289,  292,  298,  299,  340,  345. 
Liang  Chi-chao,  resignation  of,  174 
Liang  Shih-yi,  89,  90,  95,  109,  172,  173, 

184,    188,    190,    193,   201,   209,   213, 

288,  322,  330,  350 
Liang  Tun-yen,  103,  104,  124,  169,  192, 

.273.  27s 
Library,  238 
Liggett,  General,  235 
Living  Buddha,  28 
Liu,  Civil  Governor,  14 
Loans,  287,  303,  317,  326,  34S 
Localized  privileges,  337 
London  Times,  136 
Lowry,  Dr.,  156 
Lu  Tsung-hsiang,  4,  136,  137,  141,  148, 

153,169 
Lu  Tsung-yu,  112,  299,  359 
Lusitania,  168 

Ma  Liang,  46 

MacMurray,  J.  V.  A.,  50,  241 
Mailed  fist,  117 
Manchuria,  133,  137 
Martel,  Count,  22,  233,  257 
Martin,  Dr.  W.  A.  P.,  50,  66 
Mayers,  Sidney,  52,  330 
Mazot,  M.,  154 
McClatchey,  C.  K.,  159 
Mead,  Professor  D.  W.,  82 
Medical  missions,  28 
Midzuno,  Mr.,  82 
Militarists,  318 

Missionaries,  23,  39,  66,  333,  349 
Mongolia,  76,  79,  383 
Moratorium,  190 
Morris,  Ambassador,  387 
Morrison,  Dr.  George  E.,  48,  68,  154, 
238,  244,  246,  2SS,  304>  312,  319.  320 


Music,  26 

Nan  Tung-chow,  70 

Nanking,  11,  293 

Nanking  Road,  11 

Naval  base,  99 

Neville,  Colonel  Wendell  C,  185,  212, 

234,  362 
New  China,  30 
New  Year,  164,  165,  183 
Newell,  Major,  183,  362 
News  from  abroad,  158 
News  service,  159 
Newspapers,  157 
Ni  Tze-chung,  General,  266 
Nishihara,  Mr.,  353 
Nobility,  181 
Norris,  Bishop,  151 
North  China  Daily  News,  88 
Note  of  May  13,  1915,  148 

Obata,  Mr.,  137,  339,  340,  344 
Oil  Development  Bureau,  86 
Okuma,  Count,  126,  311 
Open  Door  policy,  73 
Orphans  strike,  112 
Ostasiatische  Lloyd,  88 
OstrougoflF,  Mr.,  350 

Padoux,  M.,  154 

Pan  Fu,  117,  208,  217,  395 

Paris,  Chinese  delegation  at,  339 

Parliament,  2,  3,  43,  46,  58,  199,  204, 

231,  236,  263,  350 
Pastor,  Don  Luis,  51 
Paulding  &  Company,  loi 
Peace  Planning  Society,  173 
Peace  Conference,  360 
Peace  Conference  at  Shanghai,  345 
Peck,  Willys  R.,  2,  17,  50,  161 
Peitaiho,  201 
Peking,  18,  52 
Peking,  city  walls  of,  16 
Peking  Gazette,  247 
Peking  Language  School,  157 
Peking  tramways,  91 
Peking  University,  156 
Peking-Kalgan  Railway,  210 
Pelliot,  Paul,  154,  257 
People's  Convention,  186 
Pettus,  W.  B.,  52 
Political  discussions,  269 
Pott,  Dr.  Hawks,  10 
Prisoners  in  Siberia,  162 
Progressive  party,  103 


INDEX 


395 


Provisional  Constitution  of  1912,  199, 

201 
Pu  Lun,  Prince,  108,  1 18 
Putnam  Weale,  49,  78,  136 

Quo  Tai-chi,  234,  242 

Railway  contract,  142,  213,  232 
Railway  guards,  267 
Railway  unification,  329 
Randolph,  W.,  98 
Rank  in  seating,  234 
Rank  of  precedence,  324 
Real  property  value,  150 
Recognition,  question  of,  176 
"Regional  understanding,"  328 
Reinsch,  Mrs.,  40,  78,  118,  384 
Reorganization  Loan,  62 
Republicanism,  3,  25,  31,  42,  198,  290 
Resignation,  A  Chinese,  174 
Resignation,  letter  of,  364 
Resources,  76 
Revolutionists,  130 
Roads,  163 

Rockefeller  Institute  for  Medical  Re- 
search, 150 
Rockhill,  W.  W.,  20,  30,  31,  32,  161 
Rogers,  Walter,  159 
Rosthorn,  von,  m.,  52 
Russia  and  Siberia,  355,  356 
Russian  ambassador  at  Tokyo,  311 
Russo-Asiatic  Bank,  77,  83 
Russo-Japanese  entente,  72 

Salt  Revenue,  55,  68 

Sakatani,  Baron,  345,  346 

Sarajevo,  105 

Saturday  Lunch  Club,  9 

Savings  banks,  228 

Secret  agreements,  361 

Sforza,  Count,  52 

Shanghai,  9,  115,  200,  371,  373 

Shansi  Bankers'  Guild,  90 

Shantung,  14,  35,  123,  129,  180,  188, 

190,  2C9,  218,  251,  315,  333,  337,  338, 

340.  352.  359,  374,  378,  379 
Shantung  railway,  125,  190,  379 
Sheng  Hsuan-huai,  96 
Shidehara,  Baron,  387 
Shimonoseki,  386 
Shun  Tien  Shih  Pao,  191,  322 
Sibert,  Colonel,  92,  99,  207 
Siems-Carey  Company,  207,  219,  225 
Simpson,  B.  Lenox,  48,  49,  52,  103,  131, 

.132*  IS4 
Smologists,  52 
Smith,  Dr.  Arthur  H.,  50 


Smith,  Charles  Stevenson,  235,  245 

Social  life,  208 

Southern  party,  291 

Special  interests,  100,  309,  312 

Spencer,   Willing,  386 

Spheres  of  interest,  100,  219,  221,  309, 

Spiritualism,  Dr.  Wu,  258 
St.  John's  University,  10,  200 
Stael-Holstein,  Baron,  154 
Standard  Oil  Company,  62,  66,  83,  84, 

85,  89,  98,  105,  223 
Statement  of  5th  of  June,  268 
Stevens,  John  F.,  350 
Stewart,  Dr.  M.  A.,  233 
Stone,  Dr.  Mary,  28 
Straight,  Williard,  91,  94,  212,  300 
Strike  and  boycott,  372 
Strikes,  369 

Student  movement,  358,  368,  375 
Sun  Hung-yi,  203 
Sun  Pao-chi,  5,  17,  27,  169 
Sun,  T.  C,  295 

Sun  Yat-sen,  Dr.,  43,  263,  334,  380 
Surplus  salt  revenue,  325 
Sze,  Alfred,  4,  10 
Szechuan,  211 

Taft,  President,  74 

Taishan,  35,  37,  39 

Tanaka,  General,  351 

Tang  Shao-yi,  200,  201 

Tartar  City  Wall,  211 

Taxation,  55,  115 

Telephone  and  telegraph  agreement,  225 

Temple  of  Confucius,  39 

Temple  of  Heaven,  25,  277,  282,  284 

Tenney,  Dr.  Charles  D.,  66,  161,  241, 

^  309.  3^8,  385 

Terauchi,  General,  353 

Thanksgiving,  325 

Tien  Chung-yu,  Tuchun,  117,  262 

Tientsin,  14 

Tobacco  and  wine  revenue,  353 

Tobacco  and  wine  tax,  222 

Tokugawa,  Mr.,  386 

Tokutomi,  Mr.,  303 

Troops,  foreign,  79,  115 

Tsai,  Duke,  33,  279,  281 

Tsai  Ao,  180,  182 

Tsai  Chu-tung,  14 

Tsai  Ting-kan,  Admiral,  6,  108,  129,  246 

Tsai,  Dr.  Yuan-pei,  377 

Tsao  Ju-lin,  113,  137,  189,  213,  243,  267, 

288,  289,  299,  314,  318,  3S3,  358,  362, 

370 
Tsao  Kun,  262,  277,  326 


396 


INDEX 


Tsing  Hua  College,  112,  113 
Tsur,  Dr.  T.  T.,  112, 
Tuchuns,  43,  54,  261,  264,  265 
Tuan  Chi-jui,  General,  54,  174, 188,  189, 
193,  199,  202,  226,  242,  243,  250,  260, 
265,  266,  268,  275,  276,  282,  286,  288, 
293,  298,  300,  313,  317,  354,  369,  376 
Twenty-one  demands,  129,  149 
Ultimatum,  143,  145,  146,  147 

Versailles  Conference,  358 

Walker,  Sir  Edward,  373 

Wang,  Dr.  C.  C,  112 

Wang  Chung-hui,  Dr.,  10,  247 

Wang,  C.  T.,  43,  231,  247,  250,  290 

Wang  Shih-chen,  273,  314 

War  Participation  Office,  315,  318,  341, 

,  342.  343,  3Sir  383 

War  Works  Drive,  322 

Weil,  Miss,  185 

Welch,  Dr.  George  A.,  150,  151 

Western  Hills,  16 

White,  Corporation,  J.  G.,  82,  98 

White  Wolf,  54 

Whitham,  W.  P.,  329,  381 

Williams,  E.  T.,  2,  17,  50 

Willoughby,  Dr.  W.  F.,  154 

Willoughby,  Dr.  W.  W.,  233,  235,  265, 

Wilson,  President,  63,  89.  125,  239, 
268,  308,  319,  331,  356,  360,  362,  363, 
378,  379 


Winterhalter,  Admiral,  237 
Wireless  telegraph,  159 
Wu  Fu  Ssu,  89 
Women's  Medical  College,  28 
Worship  of  heaven,  23,  24,  25 
Wu  Pei-fu,  262 

Wu,  C.  C,  186,  243,  247,  251,  253,  290 
Wu  Ting-fang,  Dr.,  9,  226,  258,  268, 
270,  279 

Y.  M.  C.  A.,  62,  66,  88,  89, 118, 155, 163 

Yamaza,  Mr.,  82,  83,  87 

Yang  Shih-chi,  172 

Yangtse,  2H 

Yangtse  Valley,  133 

Yeh  Kung-cho,  104,  172,  330 

Yen  Fu,  Dr.,  46,  235 

Yen,  Mr.  Hawkling  L.,  185 

Yen  Hsi-shan,  261 

Yen,  Dr.  W.  W.,  10 

Yi  Shih  Pao,  157 

Ying  Chang,  General,  2,  4,  1 10 

Yin  Chang-heng,  General,  110,  ill 

Yokohama  Specie  Bank,  299 

Yoshizawa,  Mr.,  381 

Young  China,  368 

Yuan,  Madame,  165 

Yuan  Ko-ting,  195,  196 

Yuan  Shih-kai,  i,  3,  5,  8,  23,  25,  31,  43, 
47,  58,  72,  79,  95,  108,  125,  129,  134, 
138,  145,  146,  171,  172,  174,  177,  180, 
184,  185,  192,  193,  383 

Yunnan,  180,  182,  183,  184 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


A     000  642  687     8 


if  ■ 


Date  Due 

■■  1  ■     . 

1 

t^Uv    i^' 

, 

nei^ 

NOV  it  1 

964 

■-  / ' 

DEC  1  i  II 

364 

iut-ti 

FEB     4  ; 

966 

FEB     . 

►   1965 

JiJM  1 

L  1965 

MAY  1  1 

1  1965  6 

-hb 

3  19gS 

jm    7  1 

9SS1 

JO^      '     -V 

1966 

MAY     6  1968  g^'^ «"'"- ^^"^°- "^' 

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